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ABSTRACT: 
TESTING THE CAPACITIES OF MIDDLE-POWER RELATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND :U:RAN 
Suleyman Elik, December 2008 
The aim of this study is to provide a fresh analysis of middle-power states' 
capabilities within the international political arena, utilising an integrated 
experimental model to conduct a unit-level of analysis of Turko-Iranian relations with 
a focus on economic, diplomatic, political and military issues. 
The principal argument of this study is that the middle-power state is the key actor in 
the region; socially constructed within a distinctive political context; resisting super 
power hegemonic intervention, and having bargaining power with regard to more 
powerful entities. The socially constructed identities of Turkey and Iran are 
highlighted as key influences in foreign relations, leading to a complex dynamic 
between these 'reluctant neighbours.' The limits of their power are clarified as 
consisting of employing agent groups to manipulate internal threats and apply 
counter-terrorist/revolutionary politics, but falling short of sufficient to control 
transnational nationalism. Using this ethnic political card to negate each other's 
influence invites foreign power penetration into regional politics. Kurdish nationalism 
acts as an independent regional player and challenges the Turkish and Iranian political 
identities, both secularist and religious. Turkey and Iran endavour to apply the 'niche 
diplomacy' in energy and pipeline routes competition in the Southern Caucasus. The 
study, thus, examines the competing factors of the both countries' geographic 
adjacency as a stimulus for economic integration as a partial entrenchment against 
diplomatic mistrust, and preventing systematic regional integration within the last 
three decades within the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) framework. The 
role of Iran's nuclear ambitions and Turkey's western alliances are examined as 
influences on the countries' identities. Contrary to the systemic and regional 
circumstances of secularist Turkey, the messianic identity of Iranian religious 
nationalism has resulted in a nuclear weaponisation programme that not only 
militarises the domestic politics of Iran, but also undermines the countries' mutual 
trust, with a profound adverse effect on the countries' economic relationship. 
In order to increase the efficiency and explanatory power of middle-power state, this 
study amended the middle-power state theory, and successfully tested its applicability 
to Turkish-Iranian relationship through various variables related to international 
relations, international policy aspects of domestic political events, ethnic tension and 
economic relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran. We urge 
all of our friends and allies, including Turkey, to not reward Iran 
by investing in its oil and gas sector, while Iran continues to defy 
the United Nations Security Council by continuing its nuclear 
research for a weapons capability. " 
Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
the Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship, Remarks 
at the Atlantic Council of the United States 
Washington, DC, (Fars News Agency, 13 September 
2007) 
Turkey and Iran, two neighbouring states with one of the longest borders (529-km) 
have preserved their positions of being the two crucial countries in the Middle East 
with common geopolitical locations, historical heritages, populations and rich cultures 
while at the same time maintaining a distance in fundamental political, security 
priorities and economic and trade cooperation. Similar circumstances can hardly be 
found in two other countries in the world. The tom picture between Turkey and this 
far away' country on its doorstep remains as an option for diversifying the foreign 
policy direction of both states in the twenty - first century. Turkey and Iran have the 
option of either drawing closer together or moving further a part in this century. 
However, despite the 'up and down relationship' that occurs from time to time, they 
successfully manage this fragile relationship with great state diplomacy by 
recognising each other's regime legitimacy and common state interests since the 
signing of the Qasr-i Shirin Peace Treaty in 1639. The polarity relationship between 
the leadership of Asia Minor (now modem Turkey) and Persia (Iran) goes back to 
ancient and middle age experiences; there was continuous rivalry between 
Constantinople, based in Anatolia and the Sassanian Empire of Persia with its capital. 
Both Empires struggled and fought for control of Mesopotamia, now known as Iraq. 
In the seventh century Muslim Arabs from the Hejaz destroyed the Persian Empire 
and Persian people converted to Islam. However, the coalition of Iranian and Seljuk 
Turks protected them from Arabic assimilation; the Turko - Persian alliance also 
provided Turks with a wide-ranging occupation of the Middle East, Asia and Europe 
after the toppling of the Arab dynasties. Ultimately, the Turko-Persian Islamic 
synthesis ended up with the brutal military campaign of the Mongols, and the 
Christian crusaders' invasion in the 13th century. As a result, the historical rivalry 
torch was taken up by Ottoman Empire, which Turkificed and Islamized Asia Minor 
and beyond, into the Balkans. The Sunni Ottomans and the Shia Safavids of Persia 
fought for the control of the Iraq, but the Ottomans finally overcame them to control 
Mesopotamia. Since the 20th century much of the Muslim world was under Anglo-
Saxon, or Russian military occupation or political domination. The strength of Turkey 
and Iran was the ability to sustain their sovereignty and unoccupied powers against 
the hegemonic demands, political threat and economic intimidation of the United 
States. Turkish military and political experience and Iranian sophisticated cultural 
reservation compose two of the legs of Islamic cultural identity in the Islamic 
civilisation. The legacy of this experience presents a great political sphere of influence 
in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus for both Turkey and Iran. 
In modern times, the secular leadership of Turkey and Iran follow the same goals of 
western type modernisation. The friendship agreement signed by the two countries in 
Iran on 22nd April 1926 referred to cordiality, neutrality and non-aggression. Under 
the same agreement, the parties also pledged to take joint action against Kurdish 
insurgency that threatened their new common political discourse as well as regional 
security. The failure of the Sadabat Pact during World War 11 questioned the 
sovereignty of Turkey and Iran against great power occupation. However, during the 
Cold War, Turkey's and Iran's strategic weight in the international community mostly 
relied on their geopolitical position as a buffer state against Soviet expansion. Hence, 
Turkey and Iran joined the US-led short-lived Baghdad Pact military alliance with 
Pakistan (which included Britain, with the US as an observer), the Central Treaty 
Organisation and an economic agreement, the Regional Cooperation for Development. 
Iran withdrew from both the military and economic agreements after the revolutionary 
leadership's seizure of power (Ogutcu, 2007). 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran increased the fear of pro-western, secular leadership in 
Turkey; around 4 million Iranian refugees spread across the world and a large number 
went through Turkey. It is estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 Iranians in 
Turkey posed major threats to Turkish domestic stability and its relations with Iran 
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(Gurdogan, 2003; Ogutcu, 2007). The Iranian state views dimly Turkey's western 
security orientation with Washington and political orientation towards Brussels, in 
order to protect its own interests and by its provision of refuge to opponents of the 
Iranian regime (Mujahidin-e Khalq) in Turkey and its pro-Israeli stance. The new 
religious leadership has also been concerned about Turkey's nationalist aspirations 
and influence over its large Azeri-origin population (20-25 % of the population). The 
spiritual leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, is an Azeri Turk and, by tradition, chiefs of 
Iran's armed forces tend to be Azeri Turks. On the other hand, Iran has managed to 
blockade Turkey's Turanist ambitons' moves to link with the Turkic State in Central 
Asia by closely cooperating with Russia and Armenia. Iran has great geographical 
advantages by as an energy corridor that stretches from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and 
Turkmenistan to eastern Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. However, 
with the western alliance, Turkey has been revealed as a regional "energy hub" for 
the Central Asian, Caspian, and Russian and Middle Eastern hydrocarbon 
transportation. Nevertheless, rather than choosing competition, Ankara and Tehran 
increased cooperation on energy and trade matters with the completion of the 2,577 
kilometre natural gas pipeline which stretches from Tabriz to Ankara in 2001. Iran is 
now the second largest natural gas supplier (20% of gas that constitutes almost 75% 
of Turkish - Iranian external trade) for Turkey after Gazprom. The preliminary 
agreement and a series of MoU between Iran and Turkey in July 2007, including 
Tehran's approval for Ankara to develop phases 22, 23 and 24 of Iran's South Pars 
gas field and pumping of Iranian and Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey in a plan is 
called Nabucco pipeline project, has been backed by Europe to move away from 
dependence on Russia by gaining access to Central Asia natural gas resources, which 
run across Turkey to Hungary and Austria through the eastern Balkans. It will 
eventually be able to carry 31 billion cubic metre of gas a year to big consumers in 
Europe (Ogutcu, 2007). Turkey's increasing energy cooperation with Iran and the 
mediation role for a dependency relation between Iran and Europe has been viewed by 
a Washington spokesman as "troubling." However, it is compulsory for Turkey and 
Iran to cooperate in relations with regard to common problems and interests brought 
along by their joint and geopolitical obligations. This neither is sacrifices Iran's anti-
Westernism and anti-US attitudes nor Turkey's concerns that stem from the past, 
namely the threat posed by attempts to import the Iranian revolution. 
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After the paradigm shift of 9/11, the rising power of Iran as a "pariah state" and the 
call to "wipe Israel from the map, " its expanding sphere of influence in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia and Caucasus, its attempts to incite the Shiites in the Gulf region, 
and Afghanistan, the home to two-thirds of the oil reserves in the world, the threats 
against the free passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, its revelation of a 
bridgehead for China and Russia to project power in the Middle East, proxy war 
through Hezbollah and Hamas, Washington's policy of curbing Iran by isolating its 
leadership in the international system and contingency plans for air strike, result in a 
situation in which resorting to military options is no longer viewed as a "non-option. " 
In terms of crude oil production, Iran produces 4 million barrels per day and 2.5 
million barrel per day of this amount is exported to the Asian markets via the Straits 
of Hormuz, and provides 84 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually production. 
Hence, Washington's possible 'air strikes' to paralyze Iran's nuclear energy and 
communications infrastructure have already been considered. The situation is critical 
as Ankara cannot afford to stand idly on the sidelines and await a "fait accompli'' 
from Washington or Tel Aviv. If the new Obama government decides to strike Iran it 
is highly probable that Washington will request Turkey's cooperation for use of the 
jointly operated bases and immediate closure of the borders to trade and human traffic. 
In this regard, Ankara would have to play a key role because much of Iran's trade 
with Europe goes through Turkey. The Turkish position on Iran today looks much like 
it did for Iraq's invasion in 2003; it would be defined as the Turkish "deja vu" in the 
case of Iran (Cagaptay, International Herald Tribune, and 18 July2008). 
1. The aim and objectives of the study 
This thesis identifies the construction of a strategic socio-political culture of two 
influential states in the Middle East and explores different types of leadership and the 
subversion of the variable agents in society, to determine the capacity of Turkey and 
Iran in the international politics. The focus of this thesis is on institutional 
development, structural changes, and the evolution of policies of the Cold War and 
post-Cold War period for the macro level of analyses. This study also undertakes a 
micro-level analysis of transnational factors to examine especially religious terror and 
counter terrorism in domestic politics and regional competition in the "niche space" 
pertaining to Kurdish military campaigns in Northern Iraq. Furthermore, it also 
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explores competitive or cooperative relations in Central Asia and the Caucuses. 
Conflict resolution on transnational issues, conflict management and energy variables 
provide a primitive explanation for the middle- power state capacity in Turko-Iranian 
relations. Above mentioned issues provide the context of the theoretical framework 
applied in this study, namely middle - power state theory. This study, however, aims 
at modifying the middle - power theory in analysing relations between Turkey and 
Iran, which is essential in theorizing and analysing the mentioned relationship. In 
addition, these studies takes analyze further by testing the modified version of the 
middle-power state theory within framework explain above. 
2. Significance of the study 
The literature on Turko--Iranian relations is very limited because most of the works, 
so far, have been focused on the Kurdish question and ideological competition. 
However, this study is the first comprehensive attempt at exploring Turkish-Iranian 
relations since 1979. Therefore, it aims at locating the capacity of middle - power 
states in international politics in the case of Turkey and Iran by utilizing a domestic, 
regional and systemic level of analysis, which provides an experimental integrated 
model in international politics. The significance of this study derives from its aim to 
overcome the shortcomings pertaining to the study of Turkish and Iranian foreign 
policies in the region. This research also attempts to clarify contemporary political 
historiography concerning two of the most important states in all of the Middle East 
and Central Asia as well as the Caucasus, which have a combined population of some 
140 million people. Consequently, the contribution of this study stems from the 
application of an experimental integrated model to the aim of the study by developing 
a particular framework. Thus, this research goes beyond the boundaries of political 
history and event analysis. 
4. Literature survey 
There are few studies, which have been directly related to Turko-Iranian relations. 
Even Turkish scholars did not pay any attention to these significant countries' modem 
historiography. It is remarkable that the two most important countries in the region 
should be neglected not just by non-Middle Eastern scholars including Turkish 
scholars, who are fulfilling their Turkish nationalist responsibilities as part of the 
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western political identity of 'Ottoman Westward' but also disregarded by Iranian 
scholars. A few introductory studies have been done mostly by Western scholars: the 
American anthropologist Robert L. Canfield's "Turko-Persia in Historical 
Perspective" is very valuable in order to define the Turkish and Persian national 
identity in the medieval period. On the other hand, Adel Allouchche's doctoral 
research, "The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (1500-
1555)" explains the basis of geo-political competition and clarifies the alienation from 
the Turko-Persian cultural synthesis. The significant contributions have been made by 
Turkish-academics. Bekir Kutukoglu's case study, "Osmanli-Iran Munasebetleri" 
(Ottoman -Iran relations, 1578-1590) is an example. However, Ernest S. Tucker's 
research highlights the possibility and failure of conflict resolution between two 
nations in his book titled "Nadir Shah 's Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran" 
which is a significant contribution to the pre-modern history of Turko-Iranian 
relations. The pro-nationalist approaches to Turko-Iranian relations were undertaken 
by Mehmet Saray who briefly covers modern history in his book titled "Tarihte 
Turkiye Iran relations" (Turkey Iran Relations in History). On the other hand, Ustad 
Robert Olson's contribution to pre-modern history of Turko-Iranian relation is more 
constructive, especially with regard to the geopolitical competition in Iraq. His book 
is entitled "The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743: A Study 
of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman Empire. " 
However, his other valuable research entitled "The Emergence of Kurdish 
Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion", 1880-1925" applies the event analysis 
method for modern historiography. He exemplified his theory, especially the impact 
of Kurdish nationalism on Turko-Iranian relations in his two important books: "The 
Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998" and 
"Turkey-/ran Relations, 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups, and 
Geopolitics. "His other book, named "Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and 
Russia, 1991-2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions" highlighted the geopolitics 
of Turkish-Iranian relations in the wider context, include the Central Asia and Middle 
East. On the other hand, he deeply analyses the ambitions of Kurds to establish 
independent state in Kurdistan- Iraq in his last book titled "The Goat and the Butcher: 
Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan - Iraq since the Iraqi War." The 
systematic approaches to Turko-Iranian relations are mostly focused on Kurdish 
nationalism. Olson applied the omnibalancing theory in his precious researches. 
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Additionally, there is only one relevant doctoral study, done by Rengin Gun in his 
dissertation "Uluslararasi r;atisma ve r;atisma r;ozumu temelinde Turk-Iran iliski/eri 
{Turkish-Iranian relations on the basis of international conflict and conflict resolution) 
(Gun, 2003). However, his analysis does not give any concrete solutions but describes 
the conflict between two countries. On the other hand, Turel Yilmaz's research titled 
"Turkiye'nin Orta Dogu'daki sinir komsulari ile iliskileri, 1970-1997" {Turkey's 
relations with its border neighbours in the Middle East (Yilmaz, 1997) gives more 
depth to Turko-Iranianian relations than Rengin Gun's research. Turkish sociologist 
Alev Erkilet Baser's work is a great contribution to comparative studies of three 
important countries, Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Her doctoral researches "Ortadogu 'da 
modern/esme ve Is/ami hareket/er: Turkiye, Misir, Iran" (Modernization and Islamic 
movements in the Middle East: Turkey, Egypt, Iran) explains the process and 
influence of ideology in the Middle East (Erkilet, 2005). 
There are still no scholarly monographs dealing with Turkey and Iran relations since 
1950. The only article which compares the regimes of both countries is "Republican 
Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian Reading" written by Jean-Francois 
Bayart. There is a smattering of articles and edited books, but no full length 
monographs. I note a few: Tschangiz Pahlavan, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: An 
Iranian View, 71-92 in Henry J. Barkey edition. "Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role 
in the Middle East (1996) is one of the few studies addressing the two countries; 
Gokhan Cetinsaya "Rafsanjani 'den Hatemiye: Iran Dis politikasina Bakislar in 
Turkiyenin Komsulari," edition. Mustafa Turkes and Ilhan Uzged (2002). This is one 
of the few articles that devote some attention to Turkey-Iran relations. His other 
article "Essential Friends and Natural enemies: The Historic roots of Turkish Iranian 
relations" was published in MERIA in 2003. It is unfortunate that his last work with 
Talha Kose reused this article, namely the "Iran File" published in SET A, which is a 
conservative think-thank institution in Turkey. The other prominent article "The 
Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological Influence" 
was written by Unal Gurdogan in 2003. There are some important articles which are 
focused on the conflict and cooperation in Turko Iranian relations. John Calabrese 
called his article "Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship" and drew the 
main outline ofbilateral relations in general. Similarly, a Turkish academic's, Nilufer 
Narli' in her article, "Cooperation or Competition in the Islamic World: Turkish -
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Iranian Relations from the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf War and After" makes a 
clear contribution to the general modern historiography of Turkey - Iranian relations. 
Though there are many articles on the general politics of Central Asia and Caucus, the 
impact of regional competition on Turko - Iranian relations seems limited in focus. 
Henri.J. Barkey's article "Iran and Turkey; Confrontation across an Ideological 
Divide" edited by Rubenstein in his book, "Regional Power Rivalries in the New 
Eurasia" provides the general analysis of the first stage in regional competition. Arif 
Keskin and Arzu Jelalifer, who are of Iranian Azerbaijani origin, follow Iranian 
domestic politics closely as members of the Turkish think-thank, ASAM and USAK 
Gundem. Professor Bulent Aras, who is the director Middle East studies at ISIK 
University, also focuses on the Middle East and Central Asian politics in general but 
gives some attention to Turkey - Iranian relations. Similarly, Patrick Clawson's and 
Soner Caqaptay's comparative works under the auspicious of the Washington Institute 
are valuable in the modern political historiography of Turkish and Iranian states. 
5. Research methodology 
The research methodology of this case study is essentially twofold, namely data 
collection as well as an analysis of contents and events of middle - power 
international politics. 
5.1. Sources of data 
The study can be defined as a macro-level analysis, theoretically, but gives great 
depth to the micro - level experimental model for Turko - Iranian cases. The 
collection of data and their analysis forces the author to apply multi-method, multi-
paradigm and multi-disciplinary perspectives in this study, because the relevant period 
covers very recent and ongoing events of political historiography. Most of them 
involve official records that have not yet been de-classified by either both side and 
consequently are not available for first hand inspection. However, I have reviewed 
whatever I received from the public statements of governments, their foreign 
ministries, and other interested ministers; the agreements between Turkey and Iran; 
the joint communiques announced at the end of official talks between the two states; 
the statements of officials of both side; the memoirs of statesmen; the parliamentary 
discussions in Turkey and congressional hearings in Iran; the bulletins of foreign 
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ministries - these are the primary sources used. I have reviewed twenty - nine years' 
worth of achieves of Turkish and Iranian newspapers, journals, magazines and 
parliamentary records and benefited from the Durham University library facilities, 
especially the micro copies of Turkish newspapers: Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and also the 
Tehran Times, Ittalaat and Kayhan International. The Durham university computer 
data system also provided a great source on Turko-Iranian cases, especially of the 
BBC monitoring service for the worldwide press review. The further sources were the 
external online data systems, especially the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) 
for Iran; the Anadolu Agency, think-thank institutions' foreign and domestic press 
reviews such as ASAM (Centre for Eurasian Studies), TUSAM (Turkish Centre for 
International Relations & Strategic Analysis), SETA V (Political, Economic and 
Social Research Foundation), TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies 
Foundation) were of great help. The political analysis and the reviews of RAND 
cooperation, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Brooking Institution, 
and Chatham House, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), are also useful for outside 
views on Turko - Iranian relations. At conferences, workshops, seminars and lectures 
I was able to make other less formal contacts with many of the leading scholars who 
have studied Turkish and Iranian foreign policy and these further enhanced my 
knowledge both in general and alerted me to many important lines of inquiry. 
5.2. The event analysis method in political science 
After collection of the necessary data from various sources, this study used the 
periodisation and chronological methods to classify the importance of the relevant 
time period of events on Turko - Iranian relations. This study can make a great 
contribution to modem political historiography of present and future trends, and stress 
the relative importance and effects of various interactions by using the pragmatic 
method based on analyses of language, religion and ethnography which have a 
socializing effect on new nation - state formation in Turkey and Iran (Moses and 
Knutsen, 200: 197). One tactic for periodization of the distant past in with relation to 
ethnographic qualitative data such as the creation of nations is focusing on 
immigration, deportation and exile in new settlements (Bulmer and Solomos, 2004 ). 
Ethnographic political theory relies on events such as the invention of a tool or the 
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origins of language, culture, identity and transformation of a society in general 
(Besserman, 1996). The social engineering policy of the state is very valuable or the 
social theory and psychoanalysis of nation states in constructing their national identity 
(Clarke and Jurist, 2007). Thus 'imaginary society project' of Turkish-Iranian 
leadership groups gives a very insightful description of social microcosms in Turkey-
Iranian case (Hammersley, 1993). The revaluation of these data in relation to selected 
IR theories and generalisations of past experience help to redefine a new states 
identity, which allows us to find conflict resolutions to contemporary problems 
between Turkey and Iran. Political research employs qualitative methods, which 
emphasise the study of contexts and behaviour in a natural rather than an experimental 
model. The modes of this research are classified as descriptive, narrative, expositive 
and argumentative (D'Angelo, 1984). However, narrative and the exposition methods 
are essential to analyse a philosophical idea, the causes of events, the significance of 
decisions, the motives of participants, the working of an organisation and the ideology 
of states in this study (Boje, 2001 ). The potent force of event history analysis defines 
the individuals and the organisations of data units, through a finite series of statements 
and factors influencing the event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). Event history 
analysis is prominent in the field of international relations, where it has been used to 
analyse time - series of international conflicts and diplomatic events (Garson, 2008; 
Hannan and Carroll, 1981 ). The timing and spacing of observations, therefore, 
becomes a critical variable in periods of observation, which is taken at each stage of a 
sequence of events and their measurement are different according to the what time 
units selected and whether the time axis is continuous or not. The events may occur 
only at certain discrete times and the state - level study of diffusion of a particular 
governmental innovation (Allison, 1982). However, the dependent covariates vary 
over the course of the study, which creates additional variables, which may influence 
the failured-time process being studied (Garson, 2008). On the other hand, the 
interpretation of documents and material culture helps to build theories such as 
functionalism, behaviourism and symbolic interactionism (Silverman, 2001 ). 
Combining the qualitative and quantitative methods in my research is an essential tool 
for grounded theory analysis (Bryman, 1988). Hence, I applied the multi-disciplinary 
approach to find out the interplay between data and analysis integrated with a multi-
paradigm theoretical perspective by using sequential transformative explanatory 
strategy (Creswell, 2003). This method is useful in my findings for theory building as 
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it analyses the units and variables to construct the validity and reliability propositions, 
and draws on both critical and analytic or interpretive procedures, (Channaz, 2000). 
Although there is currently no middle - power international relations theory, the 
author aims to establish one middle-power state theory for IR. Therefore, four 
theoretical chapters and six empirical chapters consist of the necessary empirical 
material assist in building this theory of middle - power politics. I will use the 
interpretative method that meets the criteria of scientific method: significance; theory-
observation compatibility (Hodder, 1998:155); general reproductive precession, rigor, 
and verification in Turko - Iranian cases (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The 
interpretative data analysis aims to explore differences and similarities and investigate 
whose provisions are the more flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible by 
enshrining that all texts and references are accurate than the other. Hence, the author 
provides bibliographic data of the articles or clauses are directly quoted. At the end of 
the analysis of each unit, an illustrative summary is made on the main findings with 
specific emphasis on the policy choices that could be available for Turko-Iranian 
cases. Consequently, this study applies three integrated models of IR T ( constructivism, 
regionalism, and omnibalancing) to clarify the theoretical and intellectual bases of 
interpretation and content analysis in this study. 
5.5. The contribution of the study 
This study applies multi-disciplinary 'integrated' foreign policy analysis methodology 
towards Turkish-Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East Central Asia and the 
Caucasus in the timeframe 1979-2008. It is the first study to conduct a micro - level 
analysis on middle- power state scholarship within this specific timeframe and scope 
in the wider regional context that has been outlined. In considering the influx of 
modernisation, this study also provides a new interpretation of patronage and political 
clientilism in the nation states of Turkey and Iran as middle - power states. The 
further key significance of this study is that is contributes to a new definition of a 
middle - power state and also identifies the boundaries of middle - power statecraft in 
international politics. 
6. The outline of the dissertation 
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The structure of the thesis is divided into three substantive sections and ultimately 
consists of eleven chapters that may be read "a la carte." Each section sets up a theme 
with the relevant chapters that offer relatively freestanding discussions of particular 
macro theoretical settings and experimental micro - analysis. 
Part One outlines through a theoretical approach in four different chapters. In Chapter 
One, I conduct a literature review of international relations theory to build integrated 
approaches to middle - power state international politics by focusing on 
constructivism, regionalism, and omnibalancing theories. In Chapter Two, firstly 
defines the theoretical framework of this study being middle-power state theory. 
However, this study attempts to modify the theoretical framework of middle-power 
state theory through its own assumptions on Turko-Iranian relations with the aim of 
contributing to international relations discipline through such an amendment. The 
dependent, independent and control variables are identified in testing the experimental 
model for this study within this chapter. This chapter should be considered as the 
backbone of this study as an important contribution. In connection with the previous 
chapter, I analyse the historiography of Turko-Persian relations to support the 
variables at the proposed integrated theoretical consideration in Chapter Three. I aim 
not only to identify the paradigm shift in Turkish Iranian relations but also explain the 
role of historical experience (social memory) in crafting Turkish and Iranian state 
bureaucratic traditions in foreign policy. The chapter also identifies Turkish and 
Iranian spheres of influence in the Central Asia and the Caucasus and also the Middle 
East orientation of Turkish and Iranian national identities. Similarly in Chapter Four, 
the study tests the variables of the established framework as will be elaborated in the 
context of the strategic culture of security of contemporary Turkey and Iran. Chapter 
Four will explain the structure of the 'patronage state' systems in the domestic 
politics of Turkey and Iran and clarify and compare the relative political clout of the 
two countries in the international arena. The chapter explains the role of external 
migrants and internal resettlement in formatting of nation states. It also explains how 
both states reconcile the exclusion of external religious and national identity 
connections in the framework of middle - power state capacity. 
Part Two presents an argument for an experimental model for transnational variables 
which are mainly described in three chapters. In Chapter Five, the religious and 
ideological confrontations will be analysed. The role of state-agent and the structure 
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of state religious institutionalism is essential for counter revolutionary politics of 
Turkey and Iran. Five micro case studies, which caused two diplomatic crises in the 
last three decades, will be explained within the framework of ideology and religion. In 
Chapter Six, I will deal with the armed agent group - state relationship and counter -
terrorism strategies of middle - power states to negate each others' influence in 
regional politics. The key micro research case of Turkish Hezbollah and unresolved 
political murders will focus on the consequences of patronage and political clientilism 
in the domestic politics of both countries. I will explain the modem historiography of 
Kurdish nationalism and its impact on Turko - Iranian relations in Chapter Seven. 
There will be a micro - level analysis of the new military insurgency campaign by the 
PKK which has become a major player in the Middle East over the last three decades. 
The chapter questions the legitimacy of the middle - power state in the concept of R2P 
and also analyses the f<iilure of mediation efforts by Ankara and Tehran in the 
Kurdish civil war between the KDP and the PUK in the 1990s. The chapter employs 
the chronological method to explain Turkish Iran competition in Northern Iraq. The 
research analyses the emergence of the PJAK and the KRG, which has emphasized 
the significance of the Higher Security Commission between Turkey and Iran. The 
author tries to present an objective picture of guerrilla warfare and the middle - power 
states involved in the conflict. 
Part Three emphasises middle - power competition and cooperation in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus and also considers economic relations between Turkey and Iran. 
The section consists of three chapters. Chapter Eight discusses the role of ethnic 
instability in the regional conflict and its impact on Turkey's, Iran's and Russia's 
politics in the region. The ethnic conflict has brought about severe consequences 
between the smaller powers and strong ethnic minorities in the Southern Caucasus. 
However, the instability in the Central Asia is focused on Islamic fundamentalism in 
the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan. The chapter evaluates the major difficulties of the 
democratisation process of region's countries post cold war. Chapter Nine explain 
middle - power states' capacity in regional competition in energy and pipeline politics. 
The policy options of Turkey, Iran, Russia and China in energy transport are 
examined in this chapter. In the second section of the chapter, the author checks the 
economic institutionalism of both Turkey and Iran in the wider contexts of the region. 
Chapter Ten the study explains Turkey - Iran economic relations in the last three 
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decades. The economic relationship between these two countries is considered in the 
regional context, especially concerning Turkey - Iran natural gas agreement and 
ongoing negotiations regarding the Pars Gas field. Lastly, Chapter Eleven clarifies the 
capacity of middle - power states by bringing the entire discussion together. It aims at 
providing the results of the testing of the modified version of the middle-power state 
theory. In doing so, this study demonstrates that the modified version of middle-
power state theory has an effective explanatory power in locating and examining the 
nature and dimensions of Turkish - Iranian international relationship, which 
constitutes the main contribution of this study. 
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PART 1: THEORY 
Kenneth N. Waltz provides a definition of the Theory of International Politics, which 
explains the general principles of behaviour that govern relations between states in an 
anarchic international system. It is not a theory of foreign policy and does not attempt 
to predict or explain specific state actions (Waltz, 1979: 17). Similarly, this Part 
focuses on the particular set of themes within international relations theory and the 
construction as well as reconstruction of Turkish and Iranian national identities. It is 
spread over four Chapters. 
Chapter One reviews the paradigm of international theories through systemic, 
domestic and integrated approaches, providing a multi-paradigm analysis of the 
middle-power state's international politics. In Chapter Two, the model portrays the 
theory of the middle-power state with its own assumptions and variables. The model 
further provides an integrated model of International Relations (henceforth, 'IR') 
theory by simplifying the main principles inherent in the constructivism, regionalism, 
and omnibalancing theories. 
In Chapter Three, the focus is transferred to a historical analysis, so as to illustrate the 
main outline of paradigm shifts within Turko - Iranian cases. To that end, historical 
experiences between the 9th and the 11th centuries will be presented as an integration 
model for the two nations. On the other hand, the influence of the Ottoman-Safavid 
conflict-paradigm during the 16th and 17th centuries, particularly in the creation of the 
Turkish and Iranian foreign policies, will also be analysed. The peace treaty of Qasr-i 
Shirin is considered as the recognition of dual legitimacy between two different 
sectarian religious divisions and different political discourses. The effort of Nadir 
Shah towards political integration and interfaith dialogue in the Najaf Assembly is the 
main instrument of conflict resolution theory in Turko - Iranian cases, to this day. 
However, it was the Pan-Islamist policy of the Ottoman Empire and the constitutional 
revolutions in Iran and Turkey that ultimately determined the new nation - state 
systems of the 20th century. 
Lastly, Chapter Four elucidates the newly-formed legitimacy and recognition of these 
two nation-states, their territoriality as well as the strategic political culture of security. 
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Turkey's orientation towards the West and Iran's nuclear ambitions are considered as 
components which form the national identities of modern Turkey and Iran. 
Furthermore, the preparation for an Islamic revolution and Turkey's militaristic, 
quasi-democratic experience respectively constitute these discourses. This part mainly 
tries to establish the basic assumption behind for the experimental model of Turko-
Iranianian international politics. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TURKO- IRANIAN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
1.1. Introduction 
Contemporary studies m international affairs emphasise that the multi-paradigm 
perspective provides the most useful explanation both for the Cold War and the 
realities manifesting themselves in the post-Cold War environment (Gilpin, 1987). 
Alexander Wendt, for instance, integrates neoliberal and critical theories as 
contributions to cultural phenomena, societal identities, interests and social 
constructions of power politics (Wendt, 1994:391-425). Within such approaches, 
systemic and domestic factors are transformed into transnational ones, which fill the 
gap between those two realms. This integrated model of International Relations 
Theory (hereafter, 'IRT') is applicable to Turko- Iranian relations, as analysed by the 
present study. 
After the collapse of their monarchical regimes, the republican state systems of both 
countries have followed the path of Kant's Pelagian project, which is based on the 
abolition of war through a governmental regime adopting a new social and political 
form (Kant, 2003). The anti-revisionist policy of both countries relied on national 
security concerns and tried to incorporate the international system. However, the 
modernisation programmes within these states did not result in the Western - style 
liberalism which they claim to have achieved. The authoritarian reformation of middle 
-power state can only create the 'opportunity space' for sub-groups identities, which 
enforces to subvert the society. It does not provide any expansion of public sphere in 
either Turkey or Iran. 
In contrast to Hans Morgenthau's pessimistic perception of human nature, the 
Pelagian interpretation can be adopted to comprehend the nature of both nations 
within this study. Leaving aside the intellectual imperialism of U.S. and English 
schools, the present study defines the middle - power state's relations through 
rationalist, reflectivist and constructivist levels of analysis: It also gives greater depth 
to the powers of idealism in both states' republican formations, based on their 
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historical similarities (Smith,2000)). Therefore, this work will define the relationship 
as 'middle-power states relations in the international politics' by giving a simple 
definition of their identities and spheres of influence within the "Northern Tiers" 
geographic area. Due to absence of academic any awareness of IRT within the 
Turkish and Iranian intellectual circles, there are insufficient published sources to 
provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for Turko-Iranianian International 
Relations. Whilst it is true that previous studies have dealt with the foreign policy 
behaviour of the Middle Eastern states by utilising realist approaches (Ehteshami, and 
Hinnebusch, 2001; Owen, 2004; Halliday, 2004), this study takes a single step 
forward, in terms of theory, by constructing a multi-paradigm perspective, which 
fleshes out the continuity of foreign policy from a historical perspective and its 
dynamic transformation in regional and international politics. Whilst the Turkish and 
Iranian national identities are presented in this study as independent variables, the 
regime theory, leadership, ideology and similar factors are treated as dependent 
variables. The application of the integrated model to these variables provides an 
explanation on consistency of Turko - Iranian relations, while systemic theories, in 
their consideration of system realities, simply cannot account for such continuity and 
change. Meanwhile, the domestic politics model is useful in examining the internal 
dynamics and issues faced by the state. 
It is noteworthy that the transnational models of foreign policy attempt to synthesise 
and integrate both systemic and domestic approaches. Therefore, an integrated 
approach can provide a more coherent explanation than a systemic one and a domestic 
model can individually guarantee, and also allow a holistic analysis to both Turkey 
and Iran international politics. 
By taking into account these approaches, ethnic nationalism, religious factors and 
ideological variables are analysed as external and internal threats, being the two main 
variables that constitute the integrated model in this unstable region (Buzan and 
Weaver, 2003). However, these competitive and cooperative forms of bilateral 
interactions underpin the peculiar 'up and down ' relationship between Turkey and 
Iran. A theoretical consideration of the means by which identity is constructed 
provides a dualistic set of characteristics - namely the ability or inability to construct 
either a congenial or antagonistic relationship between states. However, the 
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relationship of absolute interdependence as well as the status quo inherent in a buffer 
state provides bargaining power to middle-powers in relation to super powers' 
hegemony in this region. 
This study mainly focuses on the following research direction; 'What is the capacities 
of middle- power state in international politics?' 
To provide reasonable answers to the research question, this study proposes an 
integrated model to explain the continuity peaceful co-existence with regard to the 
essential variables of the Turkish and Iranian nation-states (Barkey, 1992; Ramazani, 
1975; Hale, 2000). However, within the last two decades, academics within this field 
have paid more attention to the domestic, regional and transnational factors 
concerning Turkey's and Iran's relationship (Olson, 2005). This study reviews the 
systemic and domestic foreign policy literature in general but also focuses in 
particular on the integrated model of constructivism, interdependence, regionalism 
and the "omnibalancing theory", as part of an attempt to build a model for middle-
power state politics. 
1.2. Review of literature regarding international relations theory 
The epistemological historiography of IRT rests on the human consciousness, and 
subliminal and philosophical assumptions. A theory is a social construction of worlds 
within the social consciousnesses of particular phenomena (Allott, 1990:31 ). Hence, 
the archaeology of theories presents a way of understanding in practice of social 
theory for the unit level of analysis. The theoretical analysis in this study is not merely 
the consideration of possible developments, but also an expression of human 
experience. Whilst everyone is morally responsible for his/her own actions, the State 
which is one reason why we continue to kill, maintain persecute and starve our fellow 
citizens. Hobbes' 'Mortal God' is the totalising Gestalt of a society unified by the 
enslavement of its members under the power of the legislature. Rousseau's 'General 
Will' is the superhuman, enigmatic and indefeasible will of the 'Mortal God. ' Hegel 
believes in the 'mechanism of society' rather than the 'Will of God' or another 
authority (Hegel, 1952:1 56). In what we idealize, he formulates the collective will of 
democracy as capitalist-scitechracy that we have found a way to divide all human 
activities systematically to collect their effort socially. On the on hand, the mythology 
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of capitalism is given a social absolutism by the collectivist ideas of Adam Smith and 
presents its foremost country representative, the United States of America, as the land 
of the future,(Hegel,1956). Moreover, John Locke (1988) defined America as the 
beginning of the world's democracy (capitalist-scitechracy), and liberty and equity. 
Hence, in the Turkish and Iranian intellectual environments, America is still 
considered as the backyard of Europe, similar to Napoleon's statement that "one 
hundred and seventy years later, America is still Europe recycled, and Europe is 
boring in new forms of its old ways" (as cited in Hegel, 1956:86). However, the 
misery of intellectual life within Iran and Turkey is not a contributor to the new 
alternative economic and political super structure within the world order and so they 
could not achieve liberal capitalism, as driven mainly by the Smithian perspective. 
However, the achievement of Keynesian capitalism paved the way for a new capital 
elite class, which has a strong connection with the governments in both states. 
Therefore, social nationalism or violent capitalism are absent from the construction of 
a model within the secularist and religious state establishments. Their revolutionary 
reflective behaviour and capabilities could be manageable by a super power (Wait, 
1996). Even though Turkey is an essential partner in the Western system of security, it 
is outside the Western scitechracy. Therefore, Turkey's anti-nuclear stance with 
regard to Iran in the last decade is attributable to the building of alternative 
scitechracy against the Western system by the Turkish elite. Therefore, I will not offer 
any an alternative paradigms based on Asiatic theory but rather consider IR T as 
covered within the general politicaVscholarly literature of the West. On the other hand, 
the English-school is helpful in understanding the world as a society or a community 
of states, although this theory could not provide a testable result in the operational 
measurement of the variables relevant to this study, despite Hedley Bull's rationalist 
approaches to liberal realism. Therefore, I rely on the traditional IRT of American 
scholars in general. 
Critiques of IR T still elicit inevitable disputes within the political and social sciences. 
For instance, Stanley Hoffman (1977) criticizes IRT as "an American social science" 
(p.41 ). The pessimistic approach of Martin Wight (1996) also questions why there are 
no international theories for perpetual peace. On the other hand, an analysis of the 
world when we study the world affairs can provide a peaceful solution for 
humanitarian intervention. However, such this political intelligence is used by 
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powerful states to intervene military in weak states and enforce the results in warlike 
in international community (Nicholson, 2000). Therefore, the state of the art in 
examining national governance within the liberal rhetoric has yet to provide any 
practical results (Kratochwill and Ruggie, 1986). Following the failure of the pax-
Ottoman system, which was based on a multi-national society (Naff, 1984), the basic 
principles of pax-Americana became similar to that of pax-Britannica, namely to 
internationalise the nation-state system by establishing the main machinery of 
international institutions for the purpose of ensuring perpetual peace (Cox, 1986). 
However, the experience of the two World Wars, nuclear proliferation and the global 
war on terrorism has undermined the validity of Western liberalism during the 20th 
century. The situation has not changed after the Cold War. In this regard, George 
Sorensen claims that uneven globalisation did not result in a new world order in the 
normative sense at the end of the Cold War, but rather caused changes in regional 
variations and transnational processes, (Holm and Sorensen, 1995:3) making Turkey 
and Iran a conflict zone, which in later years have been affected by the global war on 
terrorism thus making the creation of a peaceful zone within the long-term largely 
unthinkable. In fact, the security -based attitude of the Cold War is still effective for 
an understanding of systemic IRT policy. However, Turkey and Iran have to follow 
the multi - dimensional politics in order to protect their national security. Hence 
Steven David's omnibalancing theory explains the behaviour of both countries policy 
behaviour against transnational movements. Medium-sized states need to apply 
constructivist theory, which is an IR theory alternative to the liberalist and realist 
approaches, replicated within critical theory (Wait, 1998). There are three mainstream 
and alternative approaches to IRT, namely the systemic, domestic and integrated 
models, which serve the purpose of constructing theories aimed at explaining the 
behaviour of the middle-power state. 
1.3. Systemic approach to foreign policy 
Systemic approaches to foreign policy are based on rational actions by decision 
makers, with a state's main foreign policy purpose being to maximise/imperialise its 
power by seeking security whilst balancing external threats. 
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1.3.1 Structural realism 
The Neorealist School provides a simple but powerful explanation for international 
relations phenomena such as war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to co-operation 
and other international occurrences during the Cold War years (Waltz, 1988 and 
1997). It focuses on the systemic factors to explain the foreign policies of states. With 
regard to theoretical assumptions, the anarchical systemic constraints are the primary 
determinants of state foreign policies. The theory is based upon the separation of 
international, regional and domestic politics and claims that the whole structure 
determines and controls the various parts of the state. The internal dynamics of the 
state, such as the domestic political system, are not relevant to the formulation of 
foreign policy. Foreign policy, as perceived by this approach, should be based upon a 
rational set of objectives if the state is to survive in the anarchic arena. 
Structural realism uses the same assumptions, namely the applicability of realism, but 
rather than attributing to human nature the behaviours of countries within the realist 
framework, it places emphasis on the structure of the international political system 
(Waltz, 1986). This approach states that the nature ofhuman beings is too complex to 
be explained directly and cannot be uniquely and solely causally linked to the 
occurrence of wars. It further argues that human nature cannot change social and 
political institutions (Waltz, 2001 ). 
The lack of a 'world government' or an absolute controller over the entire system 
causes the international system to remain anarchic. Therefore, survival is the main 
reason for the state, whereas behaviour is governed by self-help within a state system 
(Brown, 1996; Waltz, 2001) argued that this condition would lead weaker states to 
rally together so as to balance against, rather than to join the bandwagon of their more 
powerful rivals. 
The main principles of neo-realism are that : (a) the state, is the principal actor that 
organises activities, accumulates and uses physical power; (b) as a unitary actor it 
serves the common interest of other actors, unifies them when necessary for survival 
within the anarchical environment; (c) as a rational actor its decision-making 1s 
determined by the national interest and the maximisation of its power; (d) it 1s 
preoccupied with national security, which in turn is concerned with national interest, 
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as national security takes precedence over all aspects of domestic policy( Kauppi, 
1999;Waltz,1986). 
To fully understand and to provide a context for IRT within this study, the following 
sections discuss the relevant theories of neo-realism, the balance of power and the 
balance of threats. 
1.3.1.1 Balance of power 
Waltz defines the balance of power as the "distribution of power in the international 
anarchical political system " (Waltz, 1986:98). It is, thus, identified as an effective 
instrument balancing the distribution of power, deterring war, and checking the 
hegemonic ambitions of emerging states. Great powers play the leading roles in 
influencing the balance of power in the international system as well as in sub-systems. 
In exploring the balance of power, Morgenthau identified two modes: a pattern of 
direct opposition in internal politics and a pattern of competition in external politics 
(Morgenthau, 1978; Miller and Kagan (1997). Bull (1991) contributed to this premise 
by summarising the functions ofthe balance of power as follows: (a) the existence of 
a balance of power serves to prevent the system from being transformed, by conquest, 
into a universal empire; (b) the existence of local balances of power serve to protect 
the independence of the state from absorption or domination by a locally preponderant 
power; (c) it is a theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of 
states; (d) coexistence is achieved through maintaining a balance of power and limited 
co-operation, becoming possible in interactions where the realist state stands to gain 
more than the other states. 
Sorensen and Holm (1993) pointed out the changing nature of realism and how this 
was a rational choice of IR T after the post-Cold War to develop the main stream of 
realist school. The concept of international systems changed, which resulted in the 
consideration of concepts such as power, sovereignty, and statehood. The capabilities 
relating to power were revealed as multi-faceted, diffused elements while the 
sovereignty of the state is undermined by international organisations or hegemonic 
powers. Keohane and Nye (1997) attempted to discover the means of bringing about 
peaceful change (p.23-37), and Gilpin (1984) addressed the problem of change in an 
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environment of declining hegemony. Robert Cox (1996) argued that history is a 
process of human nature's transformation along with changes in the structure of 
human interactions. Similarly, the paradigm of realism is infiltrated by the pluralist 
and globalist propositions, while realism restricts itself to Cold War realities, such as 
the international system, wars and the logic of anarchy. On the other hand, pluralist 
and globalist perspectives provide international, societal or hierarchical (world 
government) explanations (Burchill, 2001). The pluralist understanding of anarchy is 
slightly different from Waltz's logic of anarchy, which is described as a process 
resulting in continuity but not change. However, the pluralists' anarchy represents the 
process of continuity and change, which enables the consideration of the behaviour of 
systematic change that was seen as revolutionary by the realist school (Keohene and 
Nye, 1997). 
1.3.1.2 Balance of threat theory 
The continuity of realism in practice (Linkater, 1995) and its progressive power in 
international paradigms is critically integrated with Third World politics by Kenneth 
Walt (1997). His Balance of Threat theory considers power separated from the threat 
His emphasis is on states' orientation towards alliances, determined by the threat as 
they perceive it. Although very weak states are more likely to join any the 
bandwagon against of a rising threat in order to protect their own security, states 
generally compensate for the rise of a perceived threat by uniting. In the case of weak 
states, the definition implies that joining the bandwagon against a rising threat is 
preferable to balancing power by allying. Therefore, threat assessments are critical for 
those attempting to understand the balancing and bandwagon behaviour of a state 
(Waltz, 1999). 
The Balance of Power theory, which has previously dominated realist analyses and 
which claims that states band together to balance out the influence of a greater power, 
assumes offensive intentions by a rising power. Walt (1997) argues that this is not 
born out by empirical evidence, and that the Balance of Threat theory - according to 
which states will not create a balance against those who are rising in power if they do 
not display offensive intentions - is a better account of the evidence. Walt identifies 
four criteria for the behaviour of states. Such states evaluate the threat posed by 
another nation by assessing: (a) its aggregate strength (size, population, and economic 
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capabilities); (b) its geographical proximity; (c) its offensive capabilities; and (d) its 
offensive intentions. Wait (1991) argues that the more other states view a rising state 
as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and so 
balance against it (p.35). 
Balancing behaviour is more common than bandwagon behaviour (Jebb, 2004). The 
occurrence ofbalancing behaviour depends on a combination of four variables: (a) the 
tendency of stronger states to conduct balancing alongside weaker states. However, 
stronger states may 'bandwagon' if they are threatened by a great power; (b) the 
greater probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance when such 
support is certain. However, the tendency for free - voiding or buck - passing 
increases; (c) the more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the 
is tendency for others to balance against it. In war time the closer one side is to 
victory, the greater the tendency for others to bandwagon with it ( Walt,1987); (d) 
balancing occurs more often than bandwagon tendencies if a country does not want 
others to balance against it, leading to benevolent and test-raining types of foreign 
policy. In addition, if any country sees bandwagon behaviour as the predominant form 
of alignment, the country will have an aggressive, competitive foreign policy (Walt, 
1999). 
This theory inspired Steven David to propose the omnibalancing theory for the 
understanding of Third World states' foreign policy formation. His critics mainly 
focus on the weakness of this balance of threat theory, that it is not able to assess the 
strength of external threats, as it usually depends on internal conditions. He claims 
that Wait does not understand Third World alignment and ignores other considerations 
that these states incorporate when assessing the threat, as well as the fact that these 
nations must consider internal threats and these threats then become part of the 
equation in calculating alignments (David, 1991). Eric Labs (1992) criticises Wait on 
the same point and argues that weak states will choose sovereignty over security as 
they make their alignment choices, with weaker states choosing to fight for their 
territorial or sovereignty rights before they surrender some of them in exchange for 
physical wellbeing. Hence, his claims on security issues are not the only concern for 
nation-states, because there are other reasons for alignment behaviour. In fact, 
balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, whilst bandwagoning is driven by the 
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opportunity for gain (Schweller, 1994). Neo - realist approaches accept that all states 
have the same goals and have the same strategies to achieve these goals (Labs, 1992). 
1.3.1.3 The critics of neo- realism 
Though the issues of institutionalism and states' absolute gains are a shared priority 
amongst neo-realists and neo-liberals, the ontology of both paradigms is based on 
essentially the same view of the world and an identical perception of knowledge 
( epistemology)(Powell, 1994 ). In general, the key trend of realism aims to explain the 
nature of the world, which has to correspond to reality, but does not have the goal of 
predicting trends in world politics. The integrated approaches of neo-realist and neo-
liberalist scholars such as David Baldwin (1993) illustrates the six main areas of 
contention between neo - realists and neo - liberals suggesting that two approaches 
contribute to a better understanding of the relevant factors, promoting international 
cooperation. Robert Keohane (1989) claims that despite having different assumption 
about human nature, the amalgamation of the two paradigms is basically similar over 
the nature of war and the character of international society. On the other hand, the 
reflectivist critiques by Cynthia Enloe (1990) attributed great weight to the role of 
masculinity and femininity by looking at the place of women in international politics. 
She argues that the private sphere influences the public sphere which, in her opinion, 
challenges the core approaches in rationalism. However, due to a failure to present 
testable theories, the reflectivist approach is considered intellectually weak and 
illegitimate in the realm of IRT. The neo - liberal approach of Inis L Claude that of 
collective security versus balance of power, emphasise the effective management of 
power amongst the independent and interdependent states of the world (as cited in 
Russell, 2005). On the one hand, the democratic peace theory of Russet (2005) claims 
that liberal democracies avoid going to war with another and accuses the neo-
conservative administration of undermining democratic peace theory in his theoretical 
framework. In Robert Gilpin's (2002) hegemonic stability theory, maintenance of a 
liberal world economy requires strong political leadership by the dominant economic 
power, this is expected to have obligations including the creation and maintenance of 
a liberal trade regime, the establishment of an international monetary system, and 
playing the role of 'lender of last resort' to prevent financial crises. In a realist or 
state-centric intellectual framework, the political analysis thus fashioned is a realist 
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version of the hegemonic stability theory. On the other hand, Keohane's explanation 
(1989) of cooperation and regimes together with Joseph Nye's complex 
interdependence theory brought new directions to neo-liberal development theory. 
Political realism is seen as a philosophical disposition and a set of assumptions, but 
not a scientific theory as such, even though it does give a testable hypothesis and 
systematic theories relating to the world (Gilpin, 1986). According to Richard Ashley 
(1984 ), the major difference between classical realism and neo-realism is 
methodological, using closed-loop tautology as if the classical realists were members 
of the realist group and were intuitive, whilst the neo - realists were more scientific in 
character. In response to his critics, Gilpin (2000) claimed that if the realists and neo -
realists observed the practice of states, they could be credited as being the first true 
political scientists. His argument supports Waltz's theory that laws must be 
established by observing things that happen repeatedly. 
In contrast, Ashley (1984) and Wendt (1999) highlight the weakness ofneo- realism 
in noting that its proponents fail to explain the meaning and importance of sovereignty, 
which is socially constructed and changes over time. In fact, neo - realism emphasises 
continuity, but does not deny the occurrence of change. The change in the 
international system has occurred because of the configuration of military power, not 
due to change in its organising principle. Hence, anarchy may give way to hierarchy. 
The units within an anarchical environment must rely on self-help; national politics 
(hierarchic, vertical, centralised, heterogeneous, directed and contrived; the realm of 
authority, administration and the law; and international politics (the realm of power, 
of struggle and of accommodation as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralised, 
homogenous, undirected and mutually adaptive). Systemic approaches analyse these 
three realms in light of the mechanisms of international structures and the interactive 
units of national and international politics. The most successful units of the system are 
the leaders and others will emulate them. 
Instead of focusing on how units interact, a structure must focus on how units are 
arranged or positioned. Hence, the unit level of analysis and the reductionist methods 
of neo - realism give some insight into explaining the general attitude of middle-
power states' behaviour, including their efforts to increase internal capacity and 
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external efforts for alliances as part of the international community. However, the 
absence of socially constructed theoretical approaches restrains the systemic 
theoretical explanation in Turko- Iranian cases. 
1.3.2.0 The Theory of globalism 
The concept of globalism was encountered after the inception of modernism, it shares 
some features with realism and pluralism, but perceives the world capitalist system a 
differently (Clark, 1997). Whilst pluralism, as a perspective, perceives the global 
economy in terms of dependence, globalist perspectives contend that structure of the 
world capitalism perpetuates an equitable relationship between North and the South 
(Viotti and Kauppi, 1999:341 ). Cultural transnational factors and political economy 
are the main components of the globalist approach (Leiber, 2002), but centre and 
periphery relations are replaced with a central periphery model in this theory. The 
globalist security perspective is divided between into the centre and periphery 
(Little,1995) and analyses international relations based on four main assumptions: (a) 
the international system defines the level of analysis; (b) the behaviour of individual 
actors is explained by a system that provides constraints and opportunities; (c) some 
individuals, states and societies benefit from this system, but it is used up by others; 
and (d) historical analysis is important in understanding the international 
system(Viotti and Kauppi, 1999). 
Contrary to realists' and pluralists' view of the state as an independent variable, 
globalists consider states as dependent variables. A global-centric analysis focuses on 
how some states, classes, or elites use mechanisms of domination to benefit from the 
capitalist system. On the other hand, globalists share certain commonalities with 
realists and liberalists school (Russet and Starr, 2003). Like realists, globalists 
consider the state to be a very significant actor in international affairs, but they 
emphasise the conflicting interests of social classes. Hence, the state is not a unitary 
actor, but capitalist class may cooperate with multinational corporations to maintain 
the political and economic environments. Contrary to the behavioural approaches of 
liberalism, realism and globalism, capitalists emphasise the system level of analysis, 
while globalists separate certain features of system-level components from realist 
approach. Whilst the globalists focus on the capitalist mode of production, realists 
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concentrate on the distribution of aggregate power. They also emphasise intimate 
connections between the international system and domestic politics. Although the 
globalists are also concerned with the welfare of less developed countries, they are not 
as optimistic about the possibility of peaceful change. Change, peaceful or 
revolutionary, is problematic in the globalists' view (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999). 
1.3.2.1 Dependency theory 
The dependency school originated in the Latin - American countries and within the 
UN bodies throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Dependency theorists such as Dos Santos, 
Cardoso and Furtado argued that development is not autonomous and depends on the 
cycles of the world's advanced economies. 
The definition of dependency is provided by Theotonio dos Santos: 
"By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the 
former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, 
and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some 
countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other 
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, 
which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development" 
(Des Santos, 1970:231). The theory focuses on the influence of international 
structures, which divide all countries into two categories-the core and periphery 
(Gourevitch, 1978 and 1993). 
According to this theory, world economic structures and levels of development are the 
main determinants of foreign policy options. Structure places constraints on the 
foreign policy alternatives of regional countries, but also provides opportunities for 
the core countries. Decision - makers of regional powers, therefore, have little choice 
in foreign policy - making. The foreign policy of the less developed periphery nations 
is dictated by the developed core system, according to this theory. Frank (2004) 
stressed how the periphery or third world was actively underdeveloped by activities, 
which promoted the growth in wealth of the core Western countries and of elites on 
the periphery. The periphery produced materials which were exported to the core 
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states. They were then processed or converted into manufactured goods, and re-
exported to periphery with the added value simplified the transformation of 
underdevelopment in Latin America by presenting a radical solution by cutting off 
contact with western capitalism and the Cuban revolutionary movement (Cardoso, 
2001). However, Warren (1980) challenged the dependency and world system 
theories by looking at the key element of Marx's thinking, namely the contention that 
around capitalism could produce rapid and progressive social change. Therefore, the 
next section will explain the world-system theory in the context of dependency theory 
and globalism. 
1.3.2.2 The world- system theory 
The origin of the world-system theory goes back to Marxist views, which contributed 
to the development of world politics (Nye, 1991). According to this the process of 
historical change is a reflection of society's economic development. Marx and Engels 
in their joint text, The Communist Manifesto, defined the history of all hitherto 
existing societies as the history of class struggle (Hobden and Jones, 2001 :204). 
Therefore, in capitalist society, the conflict that is posited is one between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The economic modes of production determine the 
broader social and political relations in Lenin's imperialism, namely "the highest 
stage of capitalism" (Lenin, 1976). Lenin's analysis concerns the structural division 
between the core and the periphery, which was further developed by the Latin -
American dependency school by focusing on the periphery, as discussed above 
(Prebish, 1964). 
In addition, Immanuel Wallenstein (2006) outlined the key features of world-system 
theory by stating that organization of the global economy is divided into the core, the 
periphery and the semi - periphery. In this model, the periphery serves the interests of 
the core and the external behaviours of periphery states themselves are also dictated 
by the core states. The inequitable level of exchange ensures that the core remains the 
dominant partner in the relationship. Wallenstein (2006) also identified a transitional 
belt between the two poles, known as the semi-periphery, which accommodates the 
newly industrialised countries. The semi - periphery states are dependent on the core, 
as they are created by the core. Nevertheless, semi-periphery states may develop their 
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economies at the expense of the periphery, but they can do so only with permission of 
the core. However, this process is strictly limited, and ensures that the states of the 
periphery remain dependent upon the states of the core. The process of global 
capitalism in this realist perspective highlights the influence of imperialism, as it 
perpetuates dependency and oppression (Huntington, 1996; Rashid, 1997). Economic 
factors are critical in explaining the evolution and functioning of this capitalist system 
and the reorganisation of sub -system within the overall international system (Kauppi, 
and Viotti 1999). 
Marxian Antonia Gramsci's key concept, namely 'hegemony', is defined by Robert 
Cox (1983). He claims that free trade is a hindrance to the peripheral states' interests 
and welfare benefits while it is very much in the interest of the hegemonic power. On 
the other hand, critical theory has touched on questions concerning international 
society and security, developed by the Marxist Frankfurt School led by Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas. Habermas 
(1991) argued that the emancipatory potential lies in the realm of communication and 
radical democracy, within which his theory was later revised by Andrew Linkater in 
favour of moral boundaries' expansion within the political community. Therefore, he 
concluded that the European Union is an example of the post-Westphalian institution 
of government. 
1.3.2.3 Multiculturalism of globalisation 
After the Cold War, the liberal ideas (liberal democracy and market capitalism), 
which embrace a certain degree of multiculturalism became the new universal project. 
Intellectuals such as neo-liberalist Fukuyama, in his Hegelian prediction, presented 
liberalism as the final form of human government (Fukuyma, 1992). He also claimed 
that Islam had been defeated by liberal democracy, because Islamic cultural and 
political conquest is over. In response to end of history theory, Davutoglu (1994) 
claimed that this 'endism ' paradigm is a fallacy that fails to explain the historical 
process of civilisation. His assumption regarding Islamic civilisation warrants great 
credibility as an alternative ontological and epistemological dynamic for continuity 
and change in history. Davutoglu (1994) claimed that the Islamic paradigm is not only 
"the one true, final and universal religion but also the foundation of states 'morality in 
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the international system. ''The world is seen as consisting of two poles within Islamic 
systemic theory. The abode of Islam (dar a/- Islam) and the house of war (dar a 1-
harb) between two worlds, in which there could be no lasting peace and a state of 
permanent war, would prevail (Ramazani, 1975). This anti-Western rhetoric used 
terms like 'arrogant ' and 'satanic ' referring to the balance of power (Ehteshami, 
1996: 184). Further negative approaches to Islamic political culture are provided by 
Huntington who claims that the clash of civilisation is a historic development. 
The advance of global culture and capitalism is met with fundamentalist resistance, in 
the form of a domestic insurgency. Huntington highlighted the tension between 
Western and Islamic culture as a clash of civilisations, serving as the main cause of 
international conflict. His concept of "clash of the civilisation" remains the subject of 
many discussions that have become more relevant in the aftermath of the traumatic 
events on September 11th. He defines civilization through its cultural identity 
(Huntington, 2002:23) and nation states, which remain the most powerful actors in 
world affairs. He rejects the two core principles of modernisation and development 
tradition -- that all good things go together, and that distributing power is more 
important than accumulating power. Those assumptions resulted in the 'clash of 
civilisations' paradigm as a means of explaining international conflicts. However, the 
general critique comes from Edward Said, who interpreted this theory as the "clash of 
ignorance" (Said, 2002). Moreover, Buzan and Weaver (2003) claim that there is no 
cultural clash between the great civilisations, but rather a clash is experienced 
between regional states. Though the political Islamic movement has suspicions about 
global culture and capitalism, the secularist and political Islamic model have been 
enforcing globalisation in different ways, because Muslim societies do change in the 
21st century. 
1.3.2.4 The critics of globalism 
Neo-liberal and neo-realist responses to globalism assume that the forces of globalism 
challenge the sovereignty of the state. However, the state still has a monopoly over 
the legal use of coercive power regardless of globalism. The inception of modem and 
post-modem relations also increases the concern about the security of nation states, 
because state alignment in terms of polarity is now more complicated with regard to 
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continuity and changes in the foreign policy than in the past. Even though 
globalisation impacts a domestic politics through transnational social movements, 
which may be a challenge for national leaders, Waltz rejects the notion that the state 
can not be pushed aside by global actors (Waltz, 1979). In fact, the current rules and 
institutions promote a global economy under the control of the United States. The 
controversy between globalist and neo-liberalist schools mainly focuses on free 
markets. Free market neo-liberals believe that globalisation is a positive force and the 
state should not fight globalisation or attempt to control it with unwanted political 
interventions (Smith and Baylis, 2001: 196). Globalisation theory is connected with 
dependency, world order, modernisation and development theory. In the next section, 
this research discusses dependency and world- system theory and the general critiques 
of multiculturalism, so as to explain the behaviour of states based on the global 
economic structures. As such human interactions are dependant on one another, the 
concept of international society increases the dependency relations of the nation state 
(Dunne, 2001). 
1.4.0 Domestic approach to foreign policy 
In the aftermath of globalist challenges to the sovereignty of nation states, most neo -
liberalist scholars have focused on domestic policy models, largely focusing on the 
decision-making process, bureaucratic politics, internal power struggles and 
ideological legitimisation (Wait, 1998:42). Governing elites pertain to state structures 
(Snyder, 1991) the ideology of the regime (David, 1991 ), opposition movements, 
regime change, and internal stability (Walt, 1987). The following Sections discuss the 
domestic structure model developed by Katzenstein, unified theory by Snyder, 
democratic peace theory proposed by neo - liberals, the bureaucratic politics model 
and organisational processes' model of Allison, and domestic opposition, regime 
change and foreign policy change in Hagan's model, all of which provide the main 
theoretical premises within this section. 
1.4.1 Katzenstein's domestic structural model 
Katzenstein wrote three articles on domestic structure models, to explain the foreign 
policies of industrialised countries (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan), which basically rely on a coalition between political and economic 
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institutions (Katzenstein, 1977). He claims that the interaction between their state and 
private sectors is more co - operative than that between undeveloped countries 
(Katzenstein, 2007). However, the process of industrialisation dominates state 
bureaucracy and, later these state elites occupy the apparatus of governmental. This 
cooperative transmission provides them with a direct involvement in the foreign 
economic policy implementation of the state. Stephen Wait's and Mearsheimer's 
recent work emphasises the influence of the 'Israeli Lobby' in the foreign policy of 
the United States in this context (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006) 
However, Katzenstein's domestic structure model undermines the role of international 
systemic factors for the big industrialised states and the role of domestic factors for 
small-industrialised states. His theory basically can be classified as a sub-lens theory 
of the systemic approach. Thus, his argument is not applicable to middle - power 
state's foreign policy of continuity and change. However, the connection between the 
private and state sector is not cooperative in the middle-power state. Rather the state 
creates its own capital classes, which then dominate the foreign economic policies of 
these countries. Meanwhile, the latest studies by Katzenstein have contributed to 
constructivism by mainly clarifying the concept of strategic culture in security and 
the concept of identity construction in society. A later section will consider a 
compromise ofhis argument with that ofWendt's constructivist theory. 
1.4.2: The Unified model of Jack Snyder 
Government generate the 'myth of empire' and overextend themselves abroad. Hitler's 
unitary act is classified as an elite persuasive expansionist policy. However, Stalin's 
moderate overexpansion policy is a product of the political and propagandistic 
activities of an oligarchic group who hijacked the state and converted national policy 
to its own interest. He points out the propagandist activities of the imperialist group, 
such as big corporations, the ruling class, and the military and indicates how thye 
benefit from imperialism and expansionist policies in general. Snyder ( 1991) 
identified three basic regimes types: the democratic, where interests are integrated and 
methods of criticism institutionalised; the cartelised, where parochial interest may 
hijack government policy; and the unitary -- involving either a dictator or an oligarchy. 
Expansion is in unitary and moderate within democratic states, but overexpansion 
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occurs m cartelised states, which have many concentrated groups. He focuses on 
societal groups rather than state leadership groups, which are more important in the 
non-Western world (Snyder, 1991). His book, the "Myths of Empire" examines the 
likelihood that democracies will engage in imperial overexpansion and be restricted 
with authorial politics. This research has benefited from his theory when comparing 
revolutionary and leadership-driven societies. 
1.4.3 Democratic peace theory 
Owen and Snyder have focused on democratic countries to produce a liberal domestic 
political model, which evaluates liberal countries as being more peaceful than non-
democratic countries, since the foreign policy of democratic countries is not so much 
subject to revisionists or threats from other states (Owen, 1994). Democratic countries 
prefer to solve conflicts with mutual negotiations due to the pressure of public opinion 
(Owen, 1994). Jack Snyder's recent studies emphasise civil society and strong state 
institutions that can enforce the rule of law, which are important theoretical 
components (Snyder, 2000). The democratic peace thesis holds that war has become 
unthinkable between liberal states. However, the theory does not explain non-
democratic and authoritarian countries' foreign policy behaviour and cannot explain 
the long-term friendly relations between liberal democratic and authoritarian states. 
1.4.4 Bureaucratic politics and organisational models by Allison 
Graham Allison points out the bureaucratic politics and organisational process models 
explain decision-making processes and the foreign policy of states. This model has 
signified the individual actors as the main players in decision-making policy. The 
Organisational model provides the leaders with opportunities or places constrains on 
them. The theory does not explain how foreign policy continues and changes, because 
bureaucracy and established state institutions generally resist major restructuring. In 
comparison to developed countries, underdeveloped countries' policy-making 
bureaucracy is vulnerable to the leadership's subordination to foreign policy 
institutions. Turkish (Ozkececi-Taner, 2005) and Iranian foreign policy bureaucracy 
can be classified as well-organised state institutions, equal to those in Western 
countries. However, this study can use the foreign policy continuity process proposed 
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by the author, including his bureaucratic and organisation process models (Allison, 
2002). 
1.5.0 Integrated Approaches to Foreign IPolicy 
The integrated model provides a significant tool of analysis both for domestic and for 
transnational phenomena of international theory. Such integrated sub-systemic lens 
theories are discussed in this section in an effort to explain foreign policy continuity 
and change in the Turko-Iranian case. 
Rosenau's integrated model focuses on external sources of states' foreign policies. 
Individuals' roles, the government, non-governmental organisations and systemic 
variables are seen as the main determinants of foreign policy buildings. Systemic 
factors bring threats from abroad as an ideological challenge. The other four factors 
are considered as internal elements of foreign policy. Therefore, undeveloped 
countries formulate their policies with in their internal structure. Rosenau's theory is 
more suitable to adapting political elements to a states foreign policy. In his theory, 
foreign policy change is a constant phenomenon, experienced by nation-states in their 
daily activities. He concentrates on governments' adapting to internal and external 
demands. However, his theory does not have sufficient robustness to serve as a 
suitable model for foreign policy continuity and change (Rosenau, 1981 ). 
Holsti's foreign policy restructuring model develops an integrated model for foreign 
policy change. He concentrates on patterns of external relations, to reach foreign 
policy restructuring, which is usually a response to military, cultural and economic 
threats, whether domestic or external. He utilises four sets of independent variables: 
external and domestic factors; vulnerability and domestic factions; historical-cultural 
factors; and the policy-making process (Holsti, 1982). This type of foreign policy 
reorientation and restructuring is based upon the level of external involvement. 
Foreign policies of a nation-state become subject to reorientation when external 
penetration occurs (Holsti, 1982:4). However, restructuring happens when a state 
changes from one type of foreign policy pattern to another, such as from dependence 
to diversification and he underestimates governing elite groups and transnational 
factors as foreign policy determinants. 
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Hermann, on the other hand, proposes four different independent variables to explain 
foreign policy changes, but his variables are related to sources of policy - making: 
leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external shocks. He 
claims that foreign policy changes are concentrated on minor changes in state policies, 
but he overestimates the role of the decision-making process (Hermann, 1990:3-21). 
Stephen Krasner (as cited in Risse-Kappen, 1995) interprets the neo- realist approach 
as being supportive of transnational factors which influence the power calculations 
between states. He argues that transnational institutions have the greater impact on 
state preferences and policies, and the more they command power (material), such as 
resources, the more they are institutionalised (pp.3-33). 
Ideological and nationalist movements, in fact, influence the foreign policy behaviour 
of the state, which is used to build an integrated model of foreign policy in this study. 
With the end of the Cold War, transnational ideologies have emerged in the form of 
Islamic fundamentalism, which is considered a significant opposition movement to 
the Western-dominated new world order of liberal democratic regimes after 9/11 
(Huntington,1996). For the Turko-Iranian examination, three level correlations were 
applied to understand the rise of the trans-national ethnicity--discussed in the 
following Sections. 
1.5.1 Omnibalancing theory by Steven David 
Omnibalancing, as a theory, presents a multi-dimensional theoretical model which 
gives more suitable explanations for the behaviour of regional middle-power states. It 
establishes a bridge between the international perspective and the domestic level of 
analysis for middle-power states' behaviour (David, 1991) as it operates from a realist 
perspective in the international realm, and integrates pluralist and globalist maxims in 
the domestic field. In accordance with the macro lens theory of the realist school, 
power is considered to be the most important factor in the international system. It is 
therefore argued that the balance of power theory is the most effective mechanism 
with which to organise state relations. However, balance of power theory provides an 
inadequate explanation for the behaviour of Third World states, (Quilliam, 1999) 
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because it is confined to relations and dismisses the relevance of the international 
dynamics of states. 
The main principles of omnibalancing in general terms can be summarised as follow: 
(a) Middle- power states are not unitary; unlike the realist school, in which the state is 
divided and subject to intense competition among a variety of social, ethnic, 
confessional and sectoral groups; 
(b) The environment of the domestic arena is perceived as anarchic rather than 
hierarchical as it is viewed from a realist angle. These states cannot organise regional 
alternative security blocs or economic alliances against the great powers or an 
established balance of power; 
(c) The middle-power regime is not unitary, thus the scheme cannot produce a 
universal regime to be followed by the other regional states. Middle-power regimes 
are perceived as international and regional threats to the international system. This is 
down to the fact that the middle-power states are able to defend themselves from the 
great powers and they become a barrier to expansion of the great powers. Therefore, 
the state is open to threats from external and internal powers. To impede this, states 
have to create a multi-dimensional balance between interest groups so as to provide 
domestic stability and to produce suitable foreign policy. For the purposes of Steven 
David's theory of omnibalancing, the balance of power can be used to examine 
domestic politics and is an analytical tool for explaining state or regime behaviour; 
(d) The leadership of the middle-sized power state is a component of the unit level of 
analysis, as there is a lack of social stability and institutional framework to support 
civil society and non-governmental organisations. Therefore, the regime is a 
phenomenon subject to dispute between the society and state. For David decision -
making processes revolve around the interests of the leader and his closest elite and 
family. Decisions taken by the regime are supported by the security services and the 
regime barons so as to ensure the regimes' survival. The leader of the middle-power 
state provides the balance among the domestic interest groups and forms the 
peripheral alliances between regional powers. For David, state interests in a middle -
power are subordinated to the requisites of regime survival; 
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(e) Regime survival is the foremost objective of Third World leaders and can be 
achieved through balancing the interests of domestic groups and forming alliances 
accordingly. Their (leaders') assets are of state interest, which is necessary to the 
requisites of regime survival; 
(f) Foreign policy is rational in the middle-power state. According to the (neo) realist 
school, systemic factors partially determine the making of the foreign policies of the 
state, but for David domestic politics play a significant role in making foreign policy. 
Despite the importance David attaches to the role played by domestic politics and the 
structural forces of the international system in forming foreign policy, omnibalancing 
recognise that foreign policy is based upon rational decision - making processes. 
David does, however, give greater importance to the role of internal threats than to 
that of external threats as motivators of foreign policy; 
(g) Internal threats (as defined by national identity, such as Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey and Iran) are more important than external threats. For the middle-power state, 
internal threats are considered to be mortal threats to the regime and state hierarchy, 
as such threats damage national security and weaken the status of the state in the 
international system. The state usually uses military solutions against internal threats, 
which in turn brings about criticism from international institutions. Middle-power 
states use this kind of internal threat to weaken rival partners in order to play a greater 
role in the region. 
In applying this theoretical framework to the subject-matter of this study, Turkey and 
Iran can be considered to be middle-power states in the international system 
(Ehteshami, and Hinnebusch 1997). According to these principles, Turkey's and 
Iran's geopolitical competition and co-operation can be explained by using this theory, 
but the theory does not have sufficient ability to explain their foreign policy continuity 
and change. To build an integrated three - level model, the question of whether 
regional security systems can be definable through various perspectives must be 
resolved. 
39 
1.5.2 Regionalism or regional integration 
Josep Nye defined an international region as a limited number of states linked by a 
geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence; and 
(international) regionalism as the formation of interstate associations or groupings on 
the basis of regions (N ye, 1968) Others, such as Haas (1970) have stressed the need to 
distinguish notions of regional cooperation, regional systems and organisation and 
regional integration. For this framework, the breakdown of the Soviet subsystem 
created space for regional powers in Central Asia and the Caucasus such as Turkey 
and Iran, so that new regionalism could develop. However, the Kremlin has 
reconstructed a sphere of influence in the 'Near Abroad' composed of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, driven by regional political factors. Generally, 
there are three main components of regionalism :( a) interdependence; (b) cooperation 
between states; and (c) regional integration. 
An analysis of the Turko - Iranian interaction in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
requires a form of regionalism which differs from European integration, because they 
have only achieved economic co-operation in the form of trade investments and other 
economic connections. However, they lack the degree of economic institutionalisation 
and political participation required in multilateral trade negotiation (Baylis and Smith, 
2001). According to Karl Deutsch (1978:240), there are four conditions for this kind 
of integration; (a) mutual relationship between the units; (b) compatibility of values 
and presence joint rewards; (c) mutual responsiveness; and (d) some degree of 
generalised common identity or loyalty. These conditions, therefore, could not have 
been accommodated by idealist of Turanism of Turks and the political Islamism of 
Iran, because they could not create the security communities (zones of peace) among 
the Central Asian and the Caucasus states. However, Russia has partially created the 
political and economic unit with regard to their political behaviour, because it is still 
the only hegemonic power ensuring regional stability. Security and economic and 
cultural connections are restricted to the establishment of an interdependence 
relationship between Russian and Turkic states (Kubicek, 1997). 
An intermediate regional power, such as Turkey, is closely linked to the core states. 
However, Iran established its interdependence relationship with mostly peripheral 
regions, in contrast to its politically turbulent and economically stagnant society. 
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Therefore, it now has insufficient economic and political capacity to integrate with the 
new region. So far only one of the three core regions, namely Europe, aspires to build 
such organisations. The other two, namely North America and East Asia, are both 
economically strong, but so far they lack a regional political order. After Russia, 
European countries are, therefore, the main trading partners of Central Asian and 
Caucasian states. Moreover, Chinese political and economic influence is increasing 
with trade, investment and political integration under the auspicious of the Shanghai 
Co-operation Organisation, because the core regions are those regions which are 
politically capable, no matter whether such capability is expressed in the form of a 
political organisation. It can be posited that social and politico - cultural changes need 
long - term democratisation processes and economic openness, so as to access 
macroeconomic regions. However, the security concern of the medium-sized state 
forces its leadership group into a natural alliance with the super powers in order to 
protect itself. Hence, the regional security complex theory emphasises the sub-
national micro-security analysis in order to understand the emergence of a new 
regional system as well as competition in the sub-national regional environment. This 
will be elaborated in the next section. 
1.5.2.1 Regional security complex theory by Buzan and Weaver 
The concept of regional security complex theory (RSCT) was developed by Buzan 
and Weaver, (2003:378) and applied in the case of South Asia, the Middle East and 
the post-Cold War integration of Europe. Buzan and Weaver have attempted to fill the 
gap between regional and system levels of analysis. RSCT can be defined as a cluster 
of nation states within which ''security interdependence is relatively more intense 
inside than across its boundaries" (Buzan and Weaver, 2003:29).This theory focuses 
on the state as the main unit in the political, military, economic, societal and 
environmental sectors. It uses neo - realist approaches to explain the interplay 
between the formation of regional security complexes and the anarchic character of 
the international system within the geographical proximity. However, regionalism 
mostly uses a more constructivist model to explain society and state security than 
other models based on the kind of roles - enemy, rival and friend which dominate the 
system, for the security of the state is more important than societal security, if state 
security is under threat. RSCT is capable of incorporating neo - realist understandings 
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of the global level into its own multi - level scheme by giving priority to the lower 
level of analysis (Buzan and Weawer, 2003). The theory endeavours to show that the 
international system, and its sub - system, the unit and its sub - unit, as well as 
individuals can explain the pattern of national security for the level of analysis. Both 
contributors on the theory have specified four different levels of analysis (Buzan and 
Weawer, 2003: Prawindarti, 2005): 
(a) the domestic level, observation of which can reveal vulnerabilities. The specific 
vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has; 
(b) state-to-state relations as the pattern of amity and enmity; 
(c) the regional interaction within the neighbouring region; 
(d) the role of global powers in the region as they interplay between the global and 
regional security structures. 
The main types of security complexes for the understanding of the regional security 
structure are standard and centred on security complexes: 
(a) The standard Security Complex is defined as the polarity of regional power and 
varies from polar to multi-polar. There is no global level power or uni - polar regional 
power in the region. Therefore, the region is open external interference and global 
power penetration. However, conflict formation between sub - systems and sub - units 
is defined by the patterns of rivalries, balances, alliances or concerts, and friendship. 
(b) The centred Regional Security Complex which includes super - powers and great 
powers, regional powers and institutional integration. A uni - polar climate centred on 
a super- power, and a great power climate centred on a great power. However, there 
is no regional uni - polar power in the regional complex, the regional system is multi -
polar but they open to override by super power intervention (Buzan and Weawer, 
2003:40-89). Between standard security complex and centred security complex theory 
are geographically determined zones of weak interaction occupied by insulators, who 
are not capable of bringing the different complexes together into one coherent 
strategic arena. 
It should be stated that RSCT can organise empirical variables and predict new 
directions in the following forms: 
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(a) RSCT is defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-
global and geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence; 
(b) The particular character of a local RSCT will often be affected by historical 
factors such as long - standing enmities between the Greeks and the Turks, the Arabs 
and the Persians or the common cultural embrace of areas of civilisation as in the 
instance of Arabs, Europeans, South Asians, North- East Asians and Latin Americans; 
(c) The formation of an RSC derives from the interplay between the anarchic structure 
and its balance of power' results, and on the other, the consequences of local 
geographical proximities; 
(d) Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction amongst 
neighbours than among states located further apart. Thus adjacency provides a 
potential proximity for security interaction in the military, political, societal and 
environmental sectors. Anarchy, the distance effect and geographical diversity yield a 
pattern of regionally based clusters. Smaller states will be usually locked into a 
regional security bloc with their neighbours. This can explain state situations such as 
internal threats to a weak state with regard to US very statehood and political ideology; 
inadvertent and unit-based threats to vulnerable nation states; unintentional threats 
against states on ideological grounds; structural systemic threats to weak states on 
political ideological grounds; and threats to international society, order and law. If 
both sides of a local conflict are dependent on the same power, it usually results in 
balance and preserves the conflicting parties by ushering them into a peace process. 
The patterns of amity and enmity can be understood by beginning analysis at a 
regional level and extending it through inclusion of the global actors. The regional 
level is a crucial one for security analysis. 
On the other hand, RSCT cannot form an overlay and unstructured regional security 
due to the following cause: 
(a) Overlay can occur when interaction capacity in the region is low, but higher in the 
wider system. The overlay's external power moves directly into a regional complex 
by suppressing indigenous security dynamics, and great power interests dominate or 
penetrate the region, virtually resulting in the long - term stationing of great power 
armed forces in the region and in the alignment of the local states according to the 
patterns of great power rivalry. An overlaid security region could transform into any 
of the other forms (Prawindarti, 2005); 
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(b) An integrated actor can disintegrate; 
(c) Unstructured security regions exist where local low level capabilities amplify the 
effect of geographical insulators and high capability reduces them. The model of 
unstructured security regions is one in which the units are too weak as powers to 
generate security interdependence on a regional level. No regional RSC exists because 
the units do not become each other's main security concern. 
It can thus be concluded that RSCT reveals security as a relational phenomenon, a 
pattern of amity and enmity as well as of state-to-state relations intertwined with the 
character of the relationships. The dynamic of security elements generates the 
structure of a regional security complex by observing the states within it. The concept 
of a security community cannot be specified in the role of the global power in which 
the US is penetrating the region as the main overlay of the regions security system 
into Middle East. The RSCT also stresses the notion of security and peace 
interchangeably, and leaves an open space for the redefinition of the concept of 
security in a region. However, it overlaps with the concept of the security community. 
The theory perceives a strong linkage between the concept of security and the concept 
of a region. The noticeable correlation between security complex theory and the 
constructivist approach is very valuable in understanding continuity and changes in 
foreign policy. The concept of security community thus tends to see peace (and 
security) as an output of community social construction, while RSCT tends to see 
security itself as a social construction (Buzan and Weawer, 2003). 
1.5.2.2 The critics of RSCT 
Structural realists do not accept RSCT as a valuable theory for the foreign policy -
making of a state, as its approach to anarchy and conflict is more simplistic than that 
dictated by systemic approaches. The theory's approach to Huntington's cultural clash 
theory and conflict between rivals is founded on a regionalist basis rather than a 
systemic one. The theory classifies the international system in a regional context as a 
'one -plus -four' system since the end of the Cold War and devotes attention to issue 
of immigration (which are often evaluated as external and internal threats since the 
end of the Cold War) and to other issues stemming from it. This is because ethnical 
and ideological identities are internal threats which can become external threats and 
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cause the region to become vulnerable to external penetration. In fact, the theory is 
very vulnerable to the use of force against global societal fragmentation in terms of 
security concerns in Europe and the US after the inception of global terror, namely 
foreign immigrants entering western countries. They are considered components of 
diversity in the liberal societies now representing an internal security threat to the 
Western societies. RSCT cannot explain foreign policy continuity and change but can 
provide a geographical security portrayal of states' relationships. 
The issue thus becomes the selection of elements that can be employed in 
understanding the foreign policy continuity and change, mentioned above, within the 
parameters of this study. The progressive historical approach component relates to 
state and national identities, alliance formation against external threats, ethnic 
conflicts playing the role of an internal threat as well as a regional challenge and co-
operation which potentially provide useful perspectives in determining the continuity 
and change in foreign policy. 
1.5.3 The social theory of international politics ( constructivism) 
Alexander Wendt (1999) builds on the shared character of the liberalist wing of the 
rationalist tradition and contemporary constructivist wing of reflectivist, as a third 
alternative approach. However, Adler (1997:322) does not accept constructivism as an 
alternative theory but views it as the true middle ground between nationalism and 
relativism (Checke,1998:327) accepts that constructivism builds a bridge between 
rational choice theorists and post-modem scholars.However,Ruggie (1998:35-36) 
distinguishes three variants of social constructivism as 'neoclassical, based on 
intersubjective meanings; post-modernist, based on epistemological breaks with 
modernism; and naturalistic, based on the philosophical doctrine of scientific realism. 
This study focuses on Wendt because his theory present as an alternative ontology, a 
re-description of the world politics (Unif, 1998:58).In opposition to the realist 
understanding of anarchy, which is the permissive regarding causes of war, the 
anarchy myth of Wendt (1999) is neither necessarily confrontational nor cooperative. 
He claims that there is no pattern to international anarchy but "the anarchy is what 
states make of it. " If a state behaves aggressively towards another, the nature of 
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international anarchy is confrontational. If a state behaves cooperatively towards 
another, the nature of international anarchy becomes cooperative. Though states 
determine the nature of international anarchy, they depend on their identities and 
interests, which are prone to change. Constructivism argues that neither identities, 
interests nor institutions in international politics are stable.They have no pre-
determined nature, but rather are formed through interactions with other identities and 
with collective social institutions. Therefore, anarchy and self-help only become 
meaningful once social interactions have taken place. 
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the 
following core claims: (a) a state is the principal unit of analysis for international 
political theory; (b) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective rather 
than material.Wendt argues that intersubjective categorisation rather than the material 
aspects of structures influence behaviour, because intersubjective structures are 
constituted by collective meanings; and (c) state identities and interests are to a 
significant degree constructed by these social structures, rather than imbued 
exogenously into the system by human nature and domestic politics. According to 
Wendt (1994 ), there are two fundamental principles of social theory. Peoples' actions 
depend on meanings and meanings arise out of interaction (Zehfuss, 2002:36). Social 
constructivists assume that the fundamental structures of international politics are 
socially constructed. 
Wendt focuses on identity to explain the change and continuity in foreign policy. 
Identity is considered as a property of international actors that generates motivational 
and theoretical dispositions (Wendt, 2007:24) Wendt defined identities as relatively 
stable, role - specific expectations about the self, created through collective 
meanings(Wendt,2007:24). Identities provide the basis for interests, and they, in turn, 
yield a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests (Wendt, 2007:161). 
Wendt discusses the egoistic nature of identity and how to develop interactions 
between actors in a security concern (Wendt, 2007:36). The process of interaction is 
not only the changing behaviour of people but also the changing of identities. The 
common identity feelings make up the national identity that aggregates the 
relationships between the self and others. Identifications can come close in the 
opinion of some to patriotism. Wendt claims that identities may be hard to change but 
46 
they are not carved in stone. This demanding process transforms the 'self that 
changes behaviour (Wendt, 2007:21). Constructivists argue that actors in world 
politics are dynamic and that the identities and interests of states (and other actors) 
change across contexts and over time because the state identity is pre-determined 
(Alice, 2003). However, social constructivists can be pessimistic about changing 
international relations and achieving international security because the behaviour of 
actors in anarchy is unpredictable prior to social interaction. States are influenced by 
other ideas such as the rule of law and the importance of institutional co-operation and 
restraint (Wendt, 1994). 
Wendt's and Katzenstein's eo-work on the culture of national security identifies 
norms and identities. They claim that norms have constitutive effects that specify 
identity and its particular behaviour (Katzenstein, 1996). Additionally, states' 
domestic and international environments are arenas in which actors contest norms and, 
through political and social processes, construct and reconstruct identities. The norms 
and mutual practice of recognition of sovereignty and self-determination regulate state 
behaviours and reconstruct their identities (Kratochwil, 1989). 
This study utilises the essential principles of constructivism versus realist 
understanding to expand the argument, because it deals with identities not only as a 
process that includes the identities of both policy - makers and societal units, but also 
the internalisation of identity processes by which they are influenced by a cultural 
mentality and patterns of social life. It is the externalisation of these specific choices 
through constructivism that has a direct impact on the formulation of national interests 
and foreign policy, as constructivism points out distinctive categories of political 
groups and the strengthening of group identities. This multifaceted construction 
process highlights perceptions and helps to explain the chronic sense of insecurity 
versus realist understandings. The culture of national security is valuable for the 
definition of the Turkish and Iranian culture of political security which is 
reconstructed in both as part of the governmental establishment. Social theory 
presumes that the identities, norms and interests are components of dynamic change in 
society. People create society, which produces the norms that then make up the agent. 
The continuity of this circle reconstructs the political identity for society's general 
interest (Unof, 1998). 
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1.5.3.1 Critics of constructivism 
Constructivism fails to deliver on its promise of evolving beyond reification because 
in order to escape the concrete logic of anarchy, it ratifies the state. Constructivism 
fails to restore a focus on the process and practice in international politics (Weber, 
200l).Additionally, the poststructuralist critics of constructivism (Keohane,l998) 
emphasise Gidden' s notion of the "duality structure" that both constrains action and 
acts as the medium through which actors act and, in doing so, potentially transform 
the structure ( as cited in Isiksal,2004).However, from a methodological perspective, 
constructivism is incompatible with realism's focus on the association between 
realism and both materialism and rationalism, whilst the realist paradigm is 
incompatible with constructivism's focus on aspects other than methodology (Barkin, 
2003). 
1.6. Conclusion: overall discussion for the multi-paradigm perspective in theory 
building 
The multi-paradigm perspective examines the means of bridging across blurred 
paradigm boundaries and their correspondence with each other to unify the main 
variables in analysing world politics (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). To build an integrated 
model, the overall discussion should identify the main variables of systemic, domestic 
and regional politics as they affect foreign policy continuity and change. 
As mentioned above, systemic assumptions explain foreign policy-making as being 
rational, by using a reductionalist method. But they do not explain middle - power 
country behaviour in regional and domestic politics, since they ignore the diversity 
within the state, regional structure and domestic realities, as well as concepts such as 
its leadership and ideology. In this case, the difference between regime survival and 
state survival is a critical one. Neither the balance of power theory nor the balance of 
threat theory can explain the co-operative and competitive behaviours of Turkey and 
Iran. This study uses the assumptions of neo - realist and neo - liberal theories and 
their sublime theories for the behaviour of the middle - power state. 
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The present study has also benefited from the interdependency theories of neo-
liberalist challenges to structural realism. Keohane states that "since international 
institutions, rules and pattern of cooperation can effect calculations of interest, and 
can also be affected incrementally by contemporary political action, therefore they 
provide a natural focus for scholarly attention as well as security concerns" 
(Keohene and Nye, 187).Their assumption reflects continuity and change and also 
delineates the limitations of cooperation within Turko-Iranianian economic relations. 
The economic criticism of globalism is that individual cases are examined in terms of 
dependency and capitalist world-systems, whilst giving little attention to the 
cooperation of international systems in the process of capital accumulation and its 
related dynamics. Critics of globalism look favourably on the concept of semi-
periphery because it is poorly defined and not subject to checks and balances. On the 
other hand, as medium-sized states, Turkey and Iran are not able to challenge western 
democracy (capitalism - scietarchy) and have no option in that they cut off economic 
and political relations. Consequently, these theories cannot explain the variations 
found amongst core (developed) states and peripheral states (less developed countries). 
They also cannot account for foreign policy continuity and change in most countries, 
such as Turkey and Iran. 
On the other hand, major studies on the characteristics of states, governmental 
organisations and individual leaders have not provided a general theory to explain the 
behaviour of middle - power states, but they do identify other factors of internal 
dynamics in contrast to realist and liberalist assumptions (Wait, 1998:34). In addition, 
domestic politics models give insufficient weight to the systemic variables in 
explaining foreign policy continuity and change. Therefore, it is the author's belief 
that the integrated model is more helpful than domestic and systemic approaches in 
clarifying the behaviour of middle-power states. Therefore, following chapter aims at 
discussing middle-power state theory with the objection of contextualizing as a 
theoretical framework for this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO MIDDLE POWER S'f ATES 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
2.1. Introduction 
An integrated approach into Turkish-Iranian relations will present a new model for 
Middle Eastern middle power states relations. This holistic approach employs 
systemic, regional and domestic international theories influencing continuity and 
change and explaining the long tradition of Turkish-Iranian bureaucratic politics 
which have been conducted so far. The logic of this foreign policy brings together 
domestic inputs, cultural, ethnic, and state identity within regional and systemic based 
approaches. The study attaches these dimensions to integrated theories by adding the 
transnational factors such as ethnic identity and state identity (regime) to explain the 
evolution of processess of continuity and change. Three main areas are utilised in 
order to signify the applicability of the theory, namely identity policy, regional, 
systemic alignment and economic policies. In this model a more comprehensive and 
more explanatory framework than that seen in previous studies will be used, to be 
discussed further in subsequent sections. This chapter utilizes different key concepts 
from various disciplines for the contextualization of the proposed model of the theory. 
The chapter also uses multivariate assumptions which allow for conclusions to be 
made about how two or more variables are related; positive and direct relationship 
between two variables produces one variable and causes the other to rise. The 
relationship between two variables also implies that the cases are not distributed 
randomly, but rather indicates the presence of an identifiable pattern. 
This chapter will first overview Turko-Iran diplomacy to demonstrate their placement 
in world politics, modify the definition of middle power state, explain the nature of 
Turko-Iran relations and identify variables to offer an alternative integrated approach 
to middle power state's relations in international politics. 
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2.2. The foundation of Turko-Iran diplomacy 
As middle power states, Turkey and Iran have a long tradition of independent conduct 
at the top level of bureaucratic politics and have presented a more measured response 
to balance of power conduct of global politics. The political forces of both states aim 
to reach the "ultimo ratio" in foreign policy implementation (Waltz, 1979). In 
comparison with great power, middle power employs a multi-dimensional art of 
diplomacy in communication with regional and balance of powers to avoid war or 
maintain survival in the international society. However, the hierarchy of states 
contains ambiguous issues as to how states can be presented as a great/super power, 
middle power and small power in international relations. Clausewitz's criteria are 
chosen to classify the state's power capacity in this study; these are statistical 
measurement, their perceived power and their statecraft (Clausewitz, 2004). This 
comparative country-based research will deal with the capacity of contemporary 
middle power states. They perform niche diplomacy, which involves concentrating 
resources in specific areas and may act as catalysts in launching diplomatic missions, 
facilitators in setting agendas and building coalitions of support, and institutions in 
international relations. Therefore, looking at the diplomatic history of world politics is 
essential to explain the hierarchy of state and measurement of middle power, great 
power and small capacity in international politics. 
2.2.1. Turkey and Persian's placement in the multi-polar system and notion of 
nation state 
The diplomatic history of world politics began with empires which have been typical 
modes of government for the longest period of history. The empires aspire to be 
international systems themselves (Kissinger, 1994). Therefore, they have no need for 
a balance of power. However, the rivalry or competition between imperial powers 
presented the same power struggle to dominate others by use of zero sum game. For 
instance, the Ottoman state took the rivalry torch of Byzantine and acted as Kaiser 
against the Persian Empire in the Eastern Hemisphere. Two great powers policy 
behaviour could be explained in realist perspective. However, in spite of the western 
engagement, the Ottoman state remained geographically marginal, culturally alien and 
historically hostile to Europe. Therefore, the political power of Ottoman states started 
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to decline in the 16th century. However, the Thirty Year's War in Europe (1618-1648) 
allowed the Ottoman state to restore its power in the Eastern hemisphere; Ottoman 
Sultan Murat IV recaptured Baghdad (1638) from Iran and signed the Turko-Persian 
detente (Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin) in 1639. This agreement was seen as Turko-Iran 
detente after the long lasting war by the 'recognition of dual legitimacy' of each 
others' religious and political discourse. On the one hand, the civil war in Europe did 
not only decentralize the Holy Roman Empire's power, but also created the nation 
state system in Europe. Cardinal Richelieu who is the first architect of the modem 
state system introduced the French nation state project. In the 17th century, the French 
and Spanish Empire was the major balance of power in Europe while the Ottoman 
state maintained its great power status quo. However, the discovery of new trade 
routes and the rising of Sea Powers in Europe had overridden the Ottoman control 
over trade routes in the Mediterranean belt and Eurasia. Hence, the defeat of the 
Ottomans by Russia in the north and by the Austria-Hungarian Empire in Vienna 
(1683) was further hastening the decline of empire. Changing of the balance of power 
increased the pan-European sentiment in Richelieu's system which contemplated a 
United Germany might dominate Europe and overwhelms France's interest. However, 
Great Britain was revealed as a balance of power and dominated European diplomacy 
in the 18th century. On the other hand after the victory of the Napoleonic War, Great 
Britain, Russia and Metternich's system reconstructed the European Concert at the 
Vienna settlement in 1815. The system offered a power based multi-polarity system. 
The pessimistic approaches to power first became a subject of diplomatic discussion 
in international politics, because the Russian advancement westwards further 
challenged the status quo of both Poland and Ottoman Turkey which was no longer a 
mortal threat for Europe. Ottoman states rather became known to the cabinets of 
Europe as the "Eastern Question. " However, as a buffer state, Turkey and Poland 
blockaded the Russian advancement into Europe. On the other hand, the question of 
intervention into middle power states such as Turkey and Iran dominated the 
European diplomatic environment. The Great powers, Britain, Russia and France 
agreed that if there were any intervention in those countries, it should be a collective 
one but not a sole intervention being a competitive intervention. Therefore, the 
collective interference of Britain, France and Russia in Turkey's internal affairs 
resulted in Greek independency in 1827. On the other hand, the Russia-Iran and 
Turko-Iran treaties resulted in territorial loss for Iran mostly in Armenia and 
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Transcaucasia. The most important of these were the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and 
Turkmanchay (1828) with Russia, the Erzurum treaties of 1823 and 1847 with the 
Ottoman Empire and the Paris treaty with Britain. However Britain was alarmed by 
Russian expansion into the region and therefore the "great game" between Russia 
and Britain in Afghanistan (1838, 1881, and 1919) became an intensive rivalry in 
Persia and Tibet to control Indian, Eurasian and Middle East natural sources. At the 
end of the 19th century, modernity also challenged the Turkic and Muslim peoples 
when Caucasus and Eurasian steppes fell completely under the Russian and Chinese 
occupation. However, two revolutionary leaders Napoleon Ill and Bismarck were not 
happy to see the Mettemich system underline its order in the wake of the Crimean 
War in 1851 (Kissinger, 1994). After The Crimean War (1854), Holy alliance 
(French-Britain-Ottoman) forced Russia to return Bessarabia, Kars and the eastern 
shore of Black Sea. Russia also lost its claims to the guardianship of Slavic nations 
and the Orthodox East, regarded the Ottoman Empire in Europe as a Christian "terra 
irredenta, " but France replaced as the sovereign authority in the Holy land of the 
Middle East. The Crimean War and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had 
accentuated the interest of Britain and France in the Near East and were followed by 
Britain's rule of Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt which was officially part of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1882. This was done to protect commerce, especially in the Persian Gulf 
and Levant connection with the Indian trade route for Britain's imperial policy, 
because Britain and Tsarist Russia extracted many economic, commercial contracts 
that transformed Iran into a semi-colonized country. On the other hand, as a 
consequence of the Crimean War, Turkey was admitted for the first time to the 
community of nations, however, this was a passive and not an active membership 
(Weight, 200:290), because the practice excluded the Sultan or his representatives 
from international conferences, even from those that were arranged specially to deal 
with the "Eastern Question, ". This continued until after 1856 and shows that the 
Ottoman Empire was not really accepted as a great power. Therefore, the place of the 
Ottoman Empire in the European system was a little below that of the great powers 
but well above that of the small states, this position does not seem to have led anyone 
to describe the Empire as a middle power. On the other hand, the balance of power 
changed after France was defeated in the Prussia-French War of 1870-1871. It is 
essential that the term of middle power states was first formally recognized among the 
states of Germany, because the German confederation of middle power states 
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survived the defeat of Napoleon and its three most important were Bavaria, 
Wiirttemberg and Hanover which employed a particular type of foreign policy in 
defeating Napoleon (Holbraad, 28). Although the Post-Napoleonic international order 
(Treaty of Paris in 1871) created German and Italian unity, the Ottoman state became 
known as the "Sick Man of Europe. " After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Ottoman 
states further lost Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro which achieved 
independence. However, Britain's historic policy in the "Eastern Question" was to 
preserve Turkey's independence as a bulwark against Russia. Turkey has still played 
an effective role in the Eurasian buffer zone. Afghanistan, an outpost of the Indian 
Empire, became a British protectorate as a result of the Second Afghan War (1878-
80). Therefore, Britain preferred to keep relations with the Ottoman Caliphate to 
secure its hegemony in Pacific and Indian continent. However, the congress of Berlin 
further provided an opportunity for Tsarist Russia to interfere with the internal affairs 
of Turkey in 1878. The treaty of Berlin listed the sovereign states of Europe as six 
great powers, German Empire, Great Britain, Italy, Austro-Hungary and Russia 
(Weight, 2002:37), but the military weakness of the Ottoman and Persian Empires and 
their inefficient administration and long record of economic decline had long since 
taken them out of the rank of great power, therefore they remained silent in world 
politics (Weight, 2002: 303). As a great power, Britain and France's further 
interference into Ottoman and Iranian hemisphere materialized in the Nile Valley and 
Persian Gulf while Russia had been trying to occupy the entrance of the Black Sea 
Straits. On the other hand, Ottoman-German cooperation began to develop an interest 
and influence in Turkey. Germany established a direct link between Berlin and 
Constantinople in 1883. However, the great power's penetration into Ottoman 
periphery forced a removal of Ottoman presence from all ofThessaly in 1898. On the 
verge of Great War, the Young Turk government policy caused total destruction of 
Ottoman balance of power after the losing of Africa and Balkans while Persia was 
positioned into sphere of influence by Britain and Russia at the same time. Before the 
First World War, both countries position in international society was ambiguous, 
because the six great powers were agreed among themselves, they treated it not as a 
great power but as a state upon which their will was to be enforced. But when Turkey 
was able to negotiate an agreement with the six great powers and participate in its 
execution, it might be ranked as seventh great power because, Ottoman and Persian 
states were not evaluated as an intermediate power but rather accepted as oscillating 
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between one extreme and the other. In European Concert, Italia was like the Ottoman 
and Qajar Empire, it could be regarded as an intermediate-class power (Holbraad, 
1984:36).During the Great War, the Turko-German alliance successfully resisted 
against entente powers in Dardanelles and Gallipoli in 1915. However, British 
humiliation at Kut-al-Amara in Mesopotamian and the Palestine Front resulted in total 
British control over energy sources in 1919. After the Arab revolt and the replacement 
of British and French sphere of influence in Middle East, the region remains one of 
the cockpits of international politics as the strategic land-bridge between Europe, Asia, 
and Africa, and oils resources for the industrialized countries. 
The victory of entente powers changed the new international order and it was 
established by the principles of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. It dismantled the 
imperial system, and offered nation state system as major players in international 
society. The multi-polar nation state system included five great powers namely, 
France, UK, US Italy, Japan were allowed five delegate each in the League of Nations. 
However, this system lasts as long as no conflict of interests has arisen to make a 
decisive schism between the great powers. However, the role of intermediate powers 
are below the rank of Great Powers such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Iran Central 
Russia, Poland, Greater Serbia , etc. (Holbraad, 1984:48). On the other hand, the First 
World War transformed US into the holder of the balance in the international order. 
The idealism of Woodrow Wilson offered that the international system should be 
based on balance of power but recognize ethnic self-determination. Security should 
also rely on military alliance but it should be collective security. Wilson's idealism 
implemented by Entente powers who forced Turkey to accept the Armistice of 
Moudros (1918) and Treaty of Sevres (1920) but their imperialist policy was faced 
with national resistance known as the Turkish War of Independence that provided 
Mustafa Kemal to easily establish the Republic of Turkey with European discourse of 
nation state while Reza Shah failed to do so. The new state legitimacy was recognized 
by the international society by signing of Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, but the 
rejection of Wilsonian Armenia and Kurdistan proposal did not allow for the 
development Turkey-American relations until the ''peaceful transition of power" from 
Britain to the United States (Carr,2001). On the other hand, the rise of Lenin's Russia 
as an alternative discourse of capitalism made Turkey and Poland buffer zones for 
European security at the same time Iran has played a frontline zone for security of 
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Persian Gulf and Asia pacific. The situation in Eurasia was also critical when the 
Uzbek revolt began in 1916 but the failure of the Turkistan and Basmachi resistance 
movements in 1922, 1924 and 1926 wiped out Turkic people from the history of 
world politics. Consequently, Soviet Russia occupied the Turkic lands by following 
divide and rule politics. 
2.2.2. The peaceful transition of balance of power and atomic revolution 
The new leadership in Turkey and Iran had hijacked the states and entrenched the new 
oligarchy in the state bureaucracy and society by use of the authoritarian reformation 
without providing any facilities for modernisation. Therefore, the concept of nation 
state is different from traditional middle power nation states, because the Western 
context of nation states based on the social contract, which is rooted in western 
political philosophical tradition (Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Alex Tocqueville, John Rawls) and Smithian and Keynesian approaches to 
capitalism, which encompass this system. However, both Turkey and Iran's new elite 
designed the new states with their new definition of strategic culture, which restricts 
the hegemonic ambition but they failed to create common political culture in society. 
Therefore, both countries spent their wealth and power to stabilize internal security. 
Both Turkey and Iran have no political contribution to the new designed international 
system. However, realist and moralist international theory asserted that the morality 
plays a significant role in behaviour of the states (Carr, 2005). Thus his theory 
supports the establishment the League of Nations. However, the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
concluded outside of League of Nations, was embodied with American values and 
Wilson's idealism. However, both of them failed to bring peace to the international 
society after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia in 1935, and the German invasion of Poland in 1939. According to the 
Kellogg-Briand World Order, Turkey and Iran can be classified as neither middle 
powers nor small powers but have a wider scale geopolitical capability in the 
alignments of the great powers. Turkey and Iran could not achieve security on their 
own even though they signed the Sadabat Pact in 1937, because both states were 
militarily weak and politically authoritarian, but internationally maintained their 
geopolitical importance as intermediate state powers. Hence, during the Second 
World War, Turkey and Iran played essential roles as buffer states against German 
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and Russian aggression. The Great powers had vital interests in preventing the others 
from controlling the buffer zones as neutral or independent to establish their own 
control. The geopolitics and energy sources of Iran led to reconsideration of Iran's 
position when the global conflict revealed. Therefore, Britain and Russia occupied 
Iran. British Middle East Command stretched from Malta to Iran, Syria to Ethiopia 
and kept Germany outside of both the African continent and the Middle East. 
Therefore, during the Second World War, Turkey's active neutral position also put 
Germany away from the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea security belt. However, 
Turkey and Iran were happy with Germany's attempt to gain mastery of the small 
vassal-state in Caucasus against Russian hegemony over two decades, because Turkey 
and Iran hoped that the German military campaign on the Russian front would have 
given freedom to Turkic and Muslim peoples in Russia. Russia always showed its 
ambitions on South Azerbaijan and the entrance of the Strait in Turkey. However, 
after the failure of the German operation of Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, Stalin's 
brutal campaign destroyed the Turkic and Muslim elements in the Caucasus. On the 
other hand, as a result of nuclear revolution, the United States had given up its 
isolationist policy and then launched its "Open Door" policy. The peaceful transition 
of power from UK to US has protected the North Atlantic lifelines and gave assurance 
to Britain's survival against German and Soviet penetration into Western Europe. The 
meeting of the big three (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) in Tehran in 1943 designed 
the strategy against Japan and Germany's threat and made clear America's balance of 
power status. The dropping of the first nuclear and plutonium bomb on Japan in 1945 
changed the balance of power in international politics. The atomic monopoly 
overstretched American influence from Asiatic and greater buffer belt and from 
Mediterranean to the Pacific Ocean whereas those were controlled by Britain in 19th 
century. The agreement between King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and President Franklin 
Roosevelt in 1945 was another stage in transition of power from Britain to the United 
States in the Middle East. During the transition period, the Great Powers were unable 
to save the European buffer state, Poland, from becoming a satellite of Soviet Russia 
at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Stalin also established its sphere of influence and 
satellite in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1948. The rise of the Soviet threat in Europe, 
Asia and Middle East challenged America's offshore balance status quo in the late 
1940s. However, Harry Truman's pressure on Stalin to withdraw Soviet troops from 
Iran strengthened American offshore balancing strategy. Soviet demands on Turkey to 
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control the Black Sea Straits have never been satisfied and caused another crisis in 
1946, which led to the Truman doctrine, which in effect decleared that the United 
States had a vital interest in Turkish independence which cannot be lost without a 
general war. The symbolic American navy vessel named Missouri, was sent to 
Istanbul to secure the Mediterranean security belt in April 1946. The decision had 
been made to ensure that the independence of Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy is 
essential to protect Euro Atlantic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean when 
Pentagon Talk was held in 194 7. The British support Israeli state was established in 
Palestine that hastened Britain's withdrawal from region but created another proxy for 
Washington's containment policy in 1948. 
The transition of balance of power from multi-polar to bipolar enshrined the 
principles of democracy and has promoted pan-Europeanism by every means since 
1947 in resistance to Russia. Stalin's Russia killed millions of people in Eurasia and 
Eastern Europe. Arendt's 'The Origin of Totalitarianism' portrays the Soviet Union as 
a mutation of the same species as Nazi Germany. Stalin's imperialist expansion 
directly threatened buffer states Turkey and Iran. While the situation forced Turkey to 
establish a systemic relationship with the US and Europe, the US entrenched special 
relations with the Shah of Iran in the 1950s. American commitment to contain Soviet 
expansion led NATO to establish a unified military command for their forces in 
Western Europe and the North Atlantic. As an offshore balancer, American 
commitment to Japan was also essential as deterrence within the South Asian Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO). The pact brought together Great Britain, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan as an anti-communist alliance to 
blockade China and the Soviet Union. Kennan's containment theory has dominated 
American diplomacy since the Cold War but it has never implied the complete 
elimination of Soviet power. Containment, instead, sought a modification of 
behaviour through a combination of determinants and rewards. Soviet Union was not 
considered a military threat. Rather, it was valued as a hegemonic balancer in bipolar 
international system. Therefore, Soviet ideological propaganda forced the US and 
Europe to impede communist influence in domestic politics. Kennan supported the 
CIA activities around the globe and contra- guerrilla warfare, which overlapped with 
Eisenhower's chorally on the Monroe doctrine in Latin America. The first act of the 
CIA successfully overthrew the pro-Soviet Musaddegh's government and restored the 
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Muhammad Reza Shah's power in Iran. On the other hand, the economic containment 
policy of Washington was aimed at blocking the economic warfare of the Soviet 
Union in Europe. The relations were bad and warlike. They were to some extent 
restrained and had not reached the point of hot war. The containment was another way 
of restoring a balance of power in the international society. On the other hand, the 
patron-client relationship between Ankara and Washington and the special 
relationship between Tehran and Washington made their sovereignty variable to the 
West. American support for Turkey's democratisation process and Shah's reformation 
program was not dependent on their commitment to liberal democracy but their 
geopolitical significance as a western ally gave reasonable respect to their 
independence. Both Turkey and Iran have effective role in Middle East and Northern 
Flank. However, both of them could not have supported the Secretary of State Dulles' 
project of Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) which was considered to be a 
Middle East version of NATO with the purpose of containing of the Soviet Union 
along its southern border. However, both of them became part of the collective 
security concept ofNorthern and Southern Tier of nations to be composed of Turkey, 
Iraq, Syria and Pakistan with Iran, known as the Baghdad Pact. Even though Britain 
together with France had tried to regard itself as the pre-eminent power with Baghdad 
Pact was established in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Britain and Iran as a junior 
partner of US against Soviet threat. However, the overthrowing of King Faruk of 
Egypt and King Faisal oflraq put an end to Turkey's and Great Britain's influence in 
the region. Whereas, the transition of power changed the leadership group in Middle 
East such nationalisation program of Musaddagh and Michel Aflaq's pro-Arab 
nationalism theory inspired Nasser and the Baath party removed the British-France 
influence including the Turkish in the Middle East. During the Suez Canal crisis, 
Soviet and American coercion on Britain and France demonstrates that the two super 
powers acted as a balance of power and did not allow a great power illusion in Egypt, 
Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria after the 
Suez War alarmed both Turkey and the United States. Turkey wanted to use its Euro-
Atlantic vision to penetrate Middle East politics. Turkey supporting US intervention 
into Lebanon by allowing the use of Incirlik bases in 1958 strengthened Turkey's 
position in the Mediterranean and deliberately served as a military bulwark against 
Soviet expansion during the Cold War era. Furthermore, Turkey's pro-western policy 
as well as its ties with Israel, were criticised by Arab states after signing of secret 
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Periphery Pact which included Iran and Ethiopia in 1958. The restoration of the pro 
western-northern tier alliance of Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan with the US 
observer in CENTO further alienated Turkey and Iran from the Middle East in 1959. 
The pact was structurally weak and has no centralized military command, however it 
was only helpful in obtaining arms from the US After the end of British rule in 
Cyprus, the long standing arc of crisis began between Turkey and Greece with the 
civil war in 1957. However, Turkey maintained its influence by signing the Treaty of 
Guarantee in 1960. 
2.2.3. Responding to containment policy: patron-client relationship 
The Eisenhower government employed the nuclear theory of Henri Kissinger. 
Kissinger suggested that nuclear war could be kept limited and might, under certain 
circumstances produce less devastation than a conventional war (Kissinger, 1957). 
According to US nuclear umbrella policy, Turkey has harboured US tactical nuclear 
weapons in its territory, which persistent adherence to this imprudent deterrence 
policy in the Middle East and Mediterranean and Black Sea since the Cold War. 
Eisenhower government moved intermediate-range nuclear missiles to bases in 
England, Italy, Turkey as a quick -fix to plug with possible missile gap. Thus, the 
presence of nuclear forces in Europe provided the Pentagon the second strike 
capability against Soviet tactical weapons. Turkey's and Iran's significance in the 
Northern Flank was also to reduce Soviet first strike capability and to divert at least 
450,000 troops in the Caucasus and resist its attack as buffer states in 1960s while U.S. 
positioned 24,000 troops in Turkey. The second strike capability to nuclear triad 
(bombers, missile and submarines) for surety were also in placed in the Mediterranean, 
Pacific and Persian Gulf to give the ability to cause massive destruction to anyone 
attacking the alliance nations. Hence, Turkey rightly opposed the proposal to 
establish a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Balkans. The proposal was first 
put forward by the Soviet Union on 25 June 1959, when the deployment of U.S. 
medium range nuclear missiles, namely Jupiter missiles to Turkey was on the horizon 
in 1961. However, the American containment policy first was checked with Fidel 
Castro takeover of Cuba in 1959 and then when allowed the deployment of Soviet SS-
4 and SS-5 missile in October 1962. The Cuban missile crisis first questioned the 
dangers of nuclear warhead for the purpose of military deterrence. Therefore, the 
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architect of the Vietnam War, Robert McNamara asserted that the 25,000 nuclear 
warhead in Europe served no military purpose whatsoever (Morris, 2004). He rightly 
developed the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which held that in a world 
in which both the US and Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons to wipe 
each other off the map, both sides' fears of nuclear retaliation would prevent either 
from ever using the weapons for aggressive purposes. Although critics decried 
McNamara's nuclear "balance of terror" policy as mad (MAD), he believed that it 
would help maintain a stable nuclear world. As non-nuclear countries, such as Turkey 
and Cuba, the hosting of strategic missile put them under first strike option which is a 
more terrible threat than others. During the crisis, the bargaining of small and medium 
sized states' national security, so called Turkey-Cuba trade affected middle power 
state's foreign policy behaviour and also questioned the offshore balancing role of 
super powers. The talk ofjirst detente reconciled the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) 
and the Non-proliferation Treaty (1969) which proved that nuclear warheads do not 
anymore a military deterrence whatsoever. On the other hand, the change in security 
perception helped to diversify middle power states policy behaviour in international 
society. For instance, Turkey followed the partial engagement policy with U.S. after 
receiving Johnson's blunt letter that rejected Turkey's demand for military 
intervention into Cyprus. Turkey's role declined in the Western cabinet while Iran 
successfully employed the multi-dimensional policy towards Soviet Russia as well as 
Europe and the US. The Shah of Iran became the main customer of Soviet and 
American arms and also major a partner of Eurodif via Sofidif (Franco-Iran 
consortium which owned 25% ofEurodif) in 1970s. Turkey's attempt to rehabilitate 
its relations with Soviet Russia, so called Russo-Turkish detente did not survive long 
as Iran's cooperation with the Kremlin in the 1970s. However, Turkey's new strategic 
design in Pan-European sentiment made structural change in Turkish foreign policy 
behaviour. In fact, after the Second World War, there was no balance of power in 
Europe, because Germany and Italy became middle power states of today and client 
of United States, these neutralized, disarmed and unified states might create a power 
vacuum tempting to Soviet and US intervention. For instance the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 checked the structure of the bipolar system. In addition, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict caused the super power confrontation in Middle East in 1973. 
Therefore, the recovery of France's sovereignty was essential to America's role as an 
offshore balancer in Europe and the Middle East. However, the joining of Britain and 
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France into a nuclear club provided an opportunity to restore their great power status 
in international society. After the solution of the German Question between Soviet 
Russia and United States, Franco-German reconciliation further supported Pan-
European idealism. 
Turkey rejected American demand to use Incirlik bases for in the Arab-Israeli war of 
1967 and 1973. Therefore, the partial engagement of the Turko-American alliance 
relationship was further reduced when Turkey occupied the Cyprus in 1974. Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus impeded the Soviet interference into Mediterranean Sea at this 
critical time. The US had no commitment to liberalize such as nuclear host countries 
as Turkey, Italy and Japan and act as a proxy alliance to Iran's domestic politics but 
rather make sure that the leadership kept their alliance relationship with US. Therefore, 
American interference into the domestic politics of middle power states was 
experienced when military took over the civil government three times in Turkey, and 
Iran. As Niebuhr (1986) points out, sometimes it is necessary to do evil in order to 
accomplish the good. Therefore, the contra guerrilla department of NATO supported 
the right-wing parties in the nuclear hosting countries to make sure the strategic 
weapons security, especially in Turkey and Italy and Japan, which those countries has 
been considered as 'first strike' capability by US and 'first-use' by Soviet. The 
ostpolitik of the West German government was opening up the relationship between 
Soviet satellite and Europe. Therefore, the detente relations with communist blocs can 
be seen as yet another attempt to containment and was effectively a less cost approach 
as implemented by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. The Shah used revisionalist policy 
against Turkey and Gulf countries by using Kurdish and Shia religious card in the 
1970s. However, the rise of Shah's Iran as a regional power questioned the proxy 
alliance relationship between Iran and Washington - Tel Aviv. Therefore, the rise of 
right-wing religious ideology and populism in Iran was dominant, and that served to 
prevent Soviet ideological expansion as a 'negative balancer' in the Middle East. 
Therefore, the Pentagon did not put forward any attempt for fully fledged military 
intervention to Iran. America only had made alliance with such radical Islamist 
guerrilla against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Hence; the new 
structural change in the region helped the restoration of Turkey's client status quo in 
the Northern Flank which has made Turkey the only ally in Northern Tier. 
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Turkey's mam concern was not only an inability of the new regime of Iran to 
conclude another Soviet intervention into Iran but also that it would increase the 
Kurdish separatist movement in the region. However, the new regime restored its 
central power and oppressed the left-wing parties and Kurdish separatist in Iran and 
also stalled the nuclear program. Therefore, Turkey removed its troops back from the 
Iranian border and normalized its relations with the new regime. The United States 
spent a billion dollars implementing the counter revolutionary politics against the 
Third World type revolution in Iran. Thus, Iran-Iraq war not only blockaded the 
revisionist policy of the new regime but also caused the suspension of the nuclear 
program of Iran. As Tarita Patsi claims, Tehran-Israel-Washington "treacherous 
alliance" has served Iran's 'negative balancer' status in the region. In addition to this, 
it has increased the 'forward defence strategy ' of the Pentagon in the Middle East by 
stationing the strike forces of CENTCOM into the Persian Gulf in 1983 and the Joint 
Task Forces to be located roughly in the centre of the Indian Ocean against the extent 
of probable threat. A forward strategic line also consists of a group of military bases 
and facilities and strategic cooperation with Arab states. However, after the third 
military coup, Turkey successfully contained the religious and ideological threat of 
Iran by using religious agents until the late 1990s. The common security engagement 
was articulated after the signing of military agreement with Washington, while 
Reagan's Star War project known Strategic Defence Initiative, based on the ambition 
to construct a space based anti- missile system to defend the US from the Soviets in 
1983, launched what was the starting point of the Second Cold War process. During 
the Cold War, Soviet power was exaggerated by the necessity ofhegemonic balancer 
but it was revealed that is a great illusion (Allin, 1995), because, the Soviet Union is 
long way from centrality of its key Third World clients such as Syria, India, and Iraq. 
The Kremlin lacked influence in other important Third World states such as Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Therefore, Palma commission offered 
security needs be based on mutual commitment to joint survival, and the 
acknowledgement of others legitimacy and security concerns, because in the nuclear 
age and unilateral security is no longer violate as a deterrence in international politics 
(Bakis, 2001).Since the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Ankara's security concern 
has increased in the Balkans and Eurasia. However, Saddam's fatal blunder to invade 
Kuwait invited 'collective intervention ' into Iraq in 1991. Whilst Iran followed the 
neutral policy against coalition forces, Turkey was directly involved in the War 
63 
against Saddam's oppressive regime. Turkey's policy in the Middle East can be 
described as power politics, including Post-Cold War strategic partnership with Israel 
and the United States. However, Iran aimed at ideological expansion in the Shia 
crescent in the Persian Gulf. Both countries insulator position between the Middle 
East, and post-Soviet Eurasia always made the region to vulnerable super power 
penetration, because there is no great power in this security complex. The Turkey-
American relationship was one of the regional allies with the regard to regional 
insecurity but marked by conflict of interest in the issue level politics such Kurdish 
and Armenian problem not long term grand strategy. America's core alliance and 
forward defence forces served Turkey's interest in the Bosnian and Kosovian conflict 
and NATO's Partnership for Peace program in Eurasia. The gradual extension of 
NATO to all democratic states wanted to strengthen Turkey's ties with West while 
Iran was faced with containment policy since the post-cold war. The Nuclear program 
of Iran has been perceived by Washington to break the reliability of its security 
umbrella in the Middle East. As a middle power state, to seek strategic self-
sufficiency (including nuclear weapons) would not allow super power containment 
any more. Both Russia and Iran see NATO as direct threat against them. Thus Russia 
would rather engage with China at Shanghai cooperation Organisation. Hence, the 
strategy of selective engagement is considered as another way of forward strategy in a 
post9/11 international system. Turkey has followed Gareth Evan's cooperative 
security theory based upon multilateral collaboration while it is excluded from new 
European security system. Both Turkey and Iran supported the United States in the 
"War on Terror." However, the metaphor of "axis of evil" put an end to Tehran-
Washington rapprochement. Even though the evil regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq 
were overthrown, both Turkey and Iran were not happy to see American military 
intervention in the region. However, the Russian-Georgian war checked post-cold and 
post 9/11 politics and the American influence in the Eurasia. The region is still 
vulnerable to Russian military intervention due to unresolved ethnic and political 
issues in Caucasus with having of military bases in Georgia, Armenia, and Gabala 
Radar station in Azerbaijan. Therefore, Turkey and Iran's fear on Russian threat still 
played effective role in their foreign policy behaviour. As an offshore balancer US 
cannot prevent the rise of new great powers either within (EU, Germany, and Japan) 
or outside (China, a resurgent Russia) its sphere of influence. Therefore, Iran's 
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negative balancer position is essential for the offshore strategy of America such 
commitment of Turkey to client status quo in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
As it has been mentioned in Chapter One, the systemic approaches to middle power 
politics can only explain middle power and super power's alliance and client 
relationship. The containment theory of Kennan and Kissinger's theory of domino 
effect supports the role of offshore balancing strategy of United States in Middle East 
and Eurasia. Turkey and Iran have survival as non-imperialized countries in the region 
by using self-reliance and alliance strategies. Both Iran and Turkey benefited from the 
simplicity of the bipolar system as it reduces the proliferation of uncertainty and 
miscalculation making war less likely. However, post-cold war and post- 9/11 politics, 
the client status of Turkey and the negative balancer status of Iran in regional politics 
still impede the Russian expansion. On the other hand, domestic theories to 
international politics are considered as sub-lens theories of systemic approaches 
which are mostly aimed at explaining super power domestic politics. Therefore, both 
systemic and domestic theoretical assumptions cannot explain such states as Turkey 
and Iran bilateral relations. However, the integrated model provides holistic 
approaches to middle power states politics in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
2.3. Modifying the concept of middle power states 
The various interpretations of definitive middle powers characteristics have neither 
been formally nor explicitly evaluated within the concept of the international power 
structure. Therefore, the definition of middle power state requires a new model or 
modification, which is necessary in the conceptualisation of this case study. 
Three types of middle power states are considered in classifying the states. Though 
each one of them characterizes their own systemic, regional and domestic sentiment, 
they have some commonalities which distinguish them from great power to small 
power state behaviour. Jonathan Ping (2005) applied perceived power, and statecraft 
measurement to classify the hierarchy of states in his work. For Turko-Iranian cases, 
the perceived power and statecraft is more constructive than statistical measurement, 
because there is always evolution in political discourse but continuity of the national 
identity ofTurkishness and Iranianhood. According to this ranking category, there are 
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three basic classifications of middle powers; oriental middle powers in Asia-Pacific 
and the Middle East, Anglo-Saxon middle powers (Canada, Australia) and Latin 
middle powers. 
Oriental middle powers are more occasionally considered as buffer states, while 
Anglo- Saxon middle powers have played insulator roles in international relations, 
because they are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic but regionally 
influential. However, the focus in this research is on Middle East middle powers 
which have some commonalities with other middle powers, while they have some 
distinct in foreign policy behaviour and orders in Middle East and Eurasian security 
complexes. There is no equity among these middle powers in the Middle East. For 
instance, Turkey, Iran and Egypt compose a regional triangle ranked first while Syria, 
and Saudi Arabia are considered within the 'second order.' On the other hand, Israel 
can be classified neither as second nor first order. It could be distinguished between 
'upper secondary powers ' which were almost able to play the role of dominant 
powers having nuclear deterrence and alliance relationship with the West and lower 
second ones which had less in common with those powers. Due to the Palestinian 
issue as an internal threat, Israel spent its power for domestic politics that weaken Tel-
A viv to act as a middle power states in the regional politics. Rather than integrating 
the region, Israel has established its own security system in the Levant. As mentioned 
above the periphery pact in 1958 did not provide an institutional security engagement 
with those states. Similarly, Turkey-Israel security cooperation has only provided 
Turkey to return to region and improve the economic and security engagement 
between the proxy power of Israel and the client Turkey , so called 'eo-opt alliance' 
relationship, because the security alliance between the two countries has not been 
socially constructed. Rather, it had been enforced by Turkey's dependency on military 
to the core. For instance, Turkey has to buy the data system of strategic weapons from 
Israel. However, post-9/11 has proved that for Turkey and Israel political interest is 
conflict in the issue of Palestine and the Kurdish question. Both of them have accused 
the owner in interfering with each others internal affairs. Therefore, Iran has never 
perceived Turkish-Israel security cooperation as a national security threat against Iran. 
Similarly, the Iran-Syria alliance has not been considered as a threat by Turkey. Both 
alliances characterize that middle powers prefer to make alliance relationship with 
less powerful states. However, they can not manage to entrench institutionalized 
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security alliance relationship. It is essential for the balance of power to impede 
alliance relationship between equal middle power states in the Middle East and 
Eurasia. 
In order to provide a better theoretical framework to analyse the Turko-Iranian 
relationship, this study proposes the use of middle power states framework, the 
parameters of which are discussed below. However, as mentioned, the conventional 
definition of middle power state as developed in the literature may not necessarily be 
efficient enough to explain the Turko-Iranian relationship; and therefore certain 
modifications have to be introduced to the available framework with the objective of 
producing a more efficient theoretical framework. All these characteristics including 
the proposed or new characteristics are described as follows: 
(a) Middle power is a key actor in the region: Middle powers seek to maximize 
autonomy by balancing regional impact of great power. Geographical proximity to 
offshore balancer enables the middle power states to conduct more independent global 
foreign policy than that of more distant middle powers attracted to the United States. 
Middle power states economically and technologically depend on core and the best 
can minimize the constraints of dependency on their autonomy by diversifying their 
links. They also have sufficient force and authority to maintain themselves without 
help from others. During the Cold War, the strategic engagement between Turkey-
Iran and US architect of CENTO in the Middle East. Both countries military 
technology dependency to core lessens their policy behaviour. However, Turkey and 
Iran launched multi-directional policy in economy and military technology. The 
preeminent priority of both countries is now to develop self-reliance assertive and 
pragmatic policy to demise their dependency. Whilst Turkey's strategic engagement 
in forward defence strategy plays a multi-dimensional role in international politics, 
Iran's military technological contract with Russia and Asian market improved her 
self-reliance. However, the nuclear proliferation of Iran will create a new resonance in 
the region. Therefore, United States maintained the constant instability in proximity 
region to negate middle power such as state Iran and Turkey. However, middle 
powers have a special interest in maintaining the balance of power in the region. 
Turkey is very pleased to see the North Atlantic vision in Kosovo and the Partnership 
for Peace program of NATO in the Caucasus. On the other hand, neither Turkey nor 
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Iran is happy to support to American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather 
than using force as preponderance strategy, they have no concern on super power 
offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
(b) Middle powers organise the regional polarity system in their sphere of influence/ 
history: Middle power polarity system has some characteristic rivalry such bipolar 
hostility between two super powers. The ideological and religious rivalry would form 
an alternative political discourse, which encourages the establishment a regional 
alliance. Their alliance relationship could not provide any security pact, but rather a 
political economic alliance such as Turkey-Israel and Iran-Syria security alliance 
mentioned above. They have taken some regional roles that may be open to middle 
powers under conditions of dualistic limited conflict might well be possible for 
several such powers also in situations of triangular restrained rivalry. The role of 
middle powers in this type of triangle has been considered only in regard to the 
relationship between the two super or great power rivals. As client middle powers, 
they were recommended as defenders of the balance of power and providers of peace 
and order. Therefore, they may engage in joint activities with alliance super powers 
despite non affirmative to offshore initiative in many fields of common interest. For 
instance, Turkey's strategic engagement worked in the Second Gulf War in 1991 and 
the Russia-Georgian War in August 2008. On the other hand, non-aligned middle 
powers, less affected by the polarising forces of the dualistic system, have a wider 
range of possible roles as a negative balancer in the regional system. For instance, 
Iran's partial cooperation in removal of the Taliban and Saddam regime demonstrates 
the clear shared interest between super power and middle powers. 
(c) Middle powers are able to play a role as regional balancer: The alliance or 
special relationship between middle powers and balance of power encourages the 
regional polarity to maintain anarchy in the international system. The anarchy 
enforces the maximisation of power for sovereignty and survival in the international 
society. The negative balancing strategy of Iran and forward forces strategy ofTurkey 
serve offshore balancer strategy in the Middle East. The causality here enforces the 
self reliance capacity strategy. However, the other can restore the alliance relationship 
by gaining relative importance in the region. According to these assumptions, Turkey 
68 
and Iran fulfilled their middle power commitment to international system after the 
revolution. 
d) Middle powers have the ability to resist super power intervention or make bargains 
with the balance of power: The structure of duality system had impeded the super 
power military intervention. However, the unipolar system questioned the bargaining 
capability of the second order middle power state in the Middle East and Eurasia after 
the US led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq because there was no strategic balance of 
power after the collapse of the Soviet Union even though security system remain 
undisputable in the international system. Super power intervention into weak state 
threatens middle power security but provides a bargaining power to regional middle 
power states. For instance, Iran has bargaining capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan. On 
the other hand, Turkey used her bargaining power in regard to US sanctions against 
Iran and the Turkish parliament's rejection of the March memorandum in 2003 which 
demonstrated that as a middle power state, Turkey can say 'No'to super power, US 
when their interest comes across a conflict in the regional politics. I will explain these 
cases in the Chapter Seven. Similarly, Iran have kept using of Hezbollah as a forward 
defence strategy in the Lebanon and also kept its nuclear program to reach certain 
deterrence patterns in the regional system. 
(e) Middle power is not able to entrench a coalition: As part of the modification of 
the concept of middle power initiated by this study, this 'proposed' characteristic 
states that in the absence of institutional engagement between oriental middle powers 
distinguishes them from Anglo-Saxon middle power states and discourages the 
regional alliance relationship; they only make political alliance relationships with less 
threatening one. For instance, the Iran-Syria and the Turkey-Israel alliance are a good 
example for this assumption in this research. However, middle power states have no 
capacity to entrench an alternative economic, military and political system against the 
balance of power system. Thus, the offshore balancing strategy of super power does 
work in that region where there is no regional balancer. On the one hand, the structure 
of patrimonial and rentier Turkey and Iran neither allow the emergence of liberal 
society nor the coalition-building in the regional system. For instance, even though 
Turkey and Iran have established regional organisations such as the Baghdad Pact, 
CENTO, RCD, ECO and D-8, they are not able to entrench a super economic and 
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security or political structure against super power containment. Similarly, Latin 
American middle power states demonstrate the same characteristics in their regional 
alliance and their interdependence relationship with their other counterpart. Super 
power can contain middle powers' hegemonic regional ambitions. Hence, the military 
coup d 'etat and 'exit guarantee' securitize the domestic politics of Oriental and Latin 
middle power states. Whilst these middle powers have no capacity in contributing of 
international peace, Anglo-Saxon middle powers serve as 'mediators' or 'go-
betweens ' and through international conflict management and resolution activities 
such initiatives of middle power in nuclear non-proliferation (Neack, 2000). 
(f) Balance of power is able to contain middle power revolution in the region: Being 
the second 'new' characteristic of the modified concept of middle power state, this 
containment oriented characteristic suggests that "revolution leads to war, but the war 
in turn affects the revolution, which was recognized" Walt (1996:6). Thus, the 
warfare of Iran-Iraq was to be met by the counter revolutionary tactics of the United 
States which has successfully impeded revolutionary tactics of new regime in the 
region. The failure of this policy of Iranian regime transforms the characteristics of 
revolution from universal to religious nationalism. Therefore, Iran is now identified as 
a hegemonic threat by GCC countries. In addition to this, nuclear ambition of Iran is 
considered to be a fatal threat by the balance of power, because if such middle powers 
have any WMD capability, balance of power cannot contain Iran any more, which 
change the balance of power in the region. Sagan (et al, 2007) strongly argues that 
nuclear proliferation of such countries is not acceptable, because the complexity of 
bureaucratic organisation, which often acts in incoherent ways, have their own 
imperfect bounded conception of rationality. Contrary to Sagan, Waltz (2003) argued 
that deterrence also work its-conflict subduing effects in other conflict, such as the 
Indo-Pakistan conflict. However, Iranian nuclear proliferation might challenge the 
regional balancer and create a new resonance in international society. However, 
Turkey does not perceive nuclear attempts of Iran as an eternal threat because Ankara 
consider that nuclear Iran would provide Turkey with an opportunity to comply with 
its own nuclear program. On the one hand, if both countries have nuclear capability, 
the balance of power can still enforce the nuclear regime in the stability of the 
regional system. However, this type of containment of super power would avoid the 
use of force against middle- power. In this regards, Waltz's theory of proliferation 
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will be applicable if rational politics will be begun by the Obama government in this 
case. 
2.4. The nature of Turko-Iran relations 
The features of Turko-Iran relations have been experienced as friendship, rivalry, 
detente which represent the peaceful co-existence by competition and co-operation. 
The paradigm of friendship, rivalry and detente reflect the main characteristics of 
Turko-Iran relations. However, the Turko-Iran detente has seen middle power 
containment policy between each other since the 17th century without going to any 
fully fledged war even though the oscillatory relations experienced in their sphere of 
history in Eurasia and Mesopotamia. The ethnic instability is the flashpoint to set 
strategic engagement between two countries when great power penetrates regional 
politics. 
In order to explain the behaviour of Turkish and Iran foreign policy, this section will 
introduce certain intellectual norms and efficient definition of the middle-power to 
explore the nature of the Turko-Iran relationship as developed over the years and can 
be explained through the following parameters: 
(a) The cordial relationship: The friendship paradigm inherited from the Turko-
Persian Islamic syntheses created a new dynamic culture from the Danube to the 
Indian continent, which I will deal with in the Chapter Three. This hybrid culture still 
plays effective role in bilateral relations when the hegemonic power penetrates the 
geographical proximity of Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis. Due to the long lasting 
disintegration from Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis, they could not reconstruct a new 
coalition building program against Russia's or Britain's hegemony in the region. 
However, there was some attempt to restore Turko-Iran friendship relations such as 
Nadir Shah's Najaf Assembly, Pan-Islamism, the Tagrib movement and the D-8 
project of the Turkish premier Erbakan which was aimed at accommodating new 
entrancement to check the regional balance. On the other hand, during the Cold War, 
this geographical proximity of Northern Flank provided Turkey and Iran a strategic 
security depth within Euro Atlantic community. However, since the post-Cold War 
era, the great game could have been expected by the great powers between two middle 
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powers, but no such conflict occurred except economic and quasi-political 
competition. I will endeavour to cover these issues in the Chapter Eight and Nine. 
(b) Rivalry relationship: There were two developments enforced the Ottoman and 
Safavid military conflict. Firstly, the Mongol invasion put an end to the reign of 
Oghuz Turks in Eurasia, Iran and Turkey. Secondly, Shia externalism established a 
new imaginary society in Persia which caused political and religious alienation of 
both nations from each other. However, the sovereignty of Iran is always essential for 
Turkish policy strategy, because the occupying of Iran would bring the great burden 
in internal politics. Therefore, the presence of Iran as 'negative balance' provides 
Ottoman Turk the opportunities to legitimize their hegemony in the Middle East. I 
will deal with these cases in the Chapter Three. Even though some of the today's 
politicians give reference this rivalry torch, the paradigm of enmity relations has not 
been conducted by the Turkish and Iranian diplomatic environment since the detente 
agreement in 1639. In fact, the rivalry is generally less intense in relations and may 
take less demanding form of tacit co-operation. Therefore, rather than following the 
zero sum game, Turkey Iran has followed the zero plus game for peaceful co-
existence by respecting each other's regime and sovereignty. However, the rivalry 
between the middle powers is now tempered with a measure of cooperation. However, 
the nuclear ambition of Iran would cause a systematic alteration in the regional system. 
There may be rivalry or a starting point for the armed conflict through various levels 
of tension, ranging from restrained rivalry and cold war to crisis and war. I will 
explain the rivalry relationship in the related sections of Chapter Three and Chapter 
Four. 
(c) Detente relationship: The Turko-Iran detente seemed to be moving towards a 
relationship of peaceful co-existence by employing the holistic approaches to conflict 
and cooperation. Since the Qasri Shirin Treaty, the Turko-Iran relationship can be 
classified within a detente framework which offers a middle power containment 
policy practice. Two politically divergence far away countries on each other doorstep 
can negate each others influence while they manage economic and reach security co-
operation at the same time. 
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(c.a.) Competitive detente relationship: The hostility between two countries rooted 
from their sphere of history led their archaic hegemonic ambition in controlling of the 
Caucasus and Northern Iraq. There are three kind of competition between Turkey and 
Iran; geopolitical, ideological, and client or negative balance strategy, which those 
policy implementation provide the second order competitive detente relationship in 
regional system. During the 1980s, the ideological competition between secularism 
and the Islamic revolution occupied Turkish -Iranian diplomatic relations. The 
ideological competition is based on Shia national identity in the GCC countries and 
regime differences between secularist regime and political Islam movement. These 
ideological differences created two time's diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran 
in 1989 and 1997. However, both capitals learn how to manage those differences of so 
called conflict management in bilateral relations in the last three decades. The 
ideological differences bring other dimensions, which provide the legitimacy to the 
leadership groups to impose their regime discourse in domestic politics. Therefore, 
until the brink of war, both countries are happy to show alternative regime as an evil 
regime against each other. On the other hand, secularism is a revolution within 
Sunnite religion. Similarly, Islamic governance (Valayat-e Faqih theory) is 
considered as a revolution within Shia religion. However, there is no proxy alliance in 
Turkey for Shia religion to interfere with Turkey's internal affairs, because Alevite in 
Turkey is one of the agents of state-establishment even though their religious identity 
politically has not been recognized by state. I will explain these issues in Chapter Five. 
On the one hand, Turkey has no strategic policy to return back to the Persian Gulf 
after the First World War. However, the military intervention of Turkey and Iran into 
Northern Iraq created tension between two regional powers. During Iran-Iraq war, 
Tehran used Kurdish guerrilla groups against Saddam regime and Turkey's growing 
influence in the region. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet empire, both 
Turkey and Iran tried to export their ideology to Central Asia and the Caucasus but 
the competitive strategy of both countries has not only failed but resulted in the 
building of a regional polarity; while Iran became political allied with Russia-
Armenia, Turkey tried to use the Euro-Atlantic vision in the region and strengthened 
ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, Russian military bases and the Russia-
Georgian War in August 2008 checked Iran's political alliance and Turkey's 
economic dependency with the Kremlin. Another dimension of Turkish Iran 
competition was seen in the 'second order' to be a reliable alliance with super power 
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United States; whilst the Shah of Iran achieved the proxy alliance of the Carter 
government, Turkey was faced with international isolation in the 1970s. Therefore, 
Turkey is benefited from the regime change in Iran to restore its alliance relationship 
with the North Atlantic Organisation. However, the Tehran government suffer a lot 
from 'negative balancer' status even if enmity regime was overthrown in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
There are two basic concepts checking the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey and 
Iran; the threat perception and regional alliance. (a) "Internal threat is more essential 
than the external one" as Steven David said. Thus Turkey sees radical Islamism and 
Kurdish nationalism as a national security threat while Iran considers that MKO and 
the secularist movement is a fatal threat for the regime survival. Turkey and Iran use 
the forces to penetrate the buffer zone when the power vacuum revealed in the region. 
The nature of their coercion is limited by hot pursuit right which does not allow full-
party occupation to the buffer zone, because if any middle power or small power 
invades the buffer zone in the security complexes, they may cause regional or general 
war. Therefore, the balance of power does allow such power intervention into lesser 
power territory. For instance, Turkey and Iran made military intervention into 
Northern Iraq. However, they have been forced to remove their troops from 
Kurdistan-Iraq. The use of force also cannot solve transnational problems, therefore, 
the weakness of middle powers invites third party solutions or interventions such 
situation which occurred in the Ottoman-Egypt conflict, Crimean War and ongoing 
intervention and Afghanistan and in Iraq. The other characteristic of middle power 
produces negating strategy to demise her counterpart sphere of influence. For instance, 
Turkey and Iran has applied this policy strategy in Northern Iraq and Central Asia and 
Caucasus. I will deal with this 'negating strategy' in the Chapter Seven and Chapter 
Eight. On the other hand, Turkey benefited from the forward player strategy to 
increase her sphere of history in the Central Asia and the Caucasus and the Balkans. 
For instance, the independence of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina was the product 
of a forward strategy of patron-client alliance. 
However, both countries achieved to contain either secularist or Islamic revolutionary 
activities by using para-military or non-military groups as state agents. In contrary to 
traditional middle power states, Turkey and Iran have used the agents to maintain 
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anarchy in domestic politics, and created counter revolutionary or counter terrorism 
strategies, because the state is not agent of society. Rather, society becomes the agent 
of state in both societies. However, they avoided going into direct conflict with each 
other, because if they went to war; they may cause total war that may change the 
balance of power in international system. I will explain the middle power containment 
strategy in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
On the other hand, (b) the middle power regional alliance does not provide anything 
in forming of a bloc. Similarly, Turkey and Iran's alliance relationship only created a 
counter balance strategy against the other regional powers. However, they have no 
capability to establish a security bloc to deter super power penetration into region 
because super power longs for maintaining of its containment in those regions by 
resisting their regional challenges (Holbraad, 1984:64). 
(c.b.) Cooperative detente relationship: Cooperation between two neighbours is 
modified by an interdependence relationship in economy, transport, energy, security 
sectors and their technological dependency considerable component of detente 
relationship. The regular meeting of such organisations; ECO, Iran -Turkey Higher 
Security Cooperation and Border Security Commission, Tripartite Security 
Cooperation provide some systematic settlement between Iran and Turkey so that 
they arrange and rehabilitate possible misunderstandings in bilateral relations. 
Turkey's positive attitude on Iran against the United States' economic and political 
isolation politics prove that the Turkey- Iran relationship has special meanings as well 
as a fragile character, because the sovereignty ofbuffer states can play significant role 
in resist in hegemonic penetration. Therefore, Turkey rejects the possible air strike to 
Iranian nuclear facility, because the situation will break down the regional stability 
and possibly destroy Turkey's strategic detente management as well as agreements 
with Iran. Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement,the Nabucco pipeline project, and the 
ongoing Pars Gas Field deal increased the dependency relationship between two 
capitals. Therefore, Turkey supports Iran in her affiliated international organisation 
and never applied the economic sanction of the UN and the United States. I will 
explain these cases in Chapter Nine and Chapter Ten. 
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2.5. Identifying Variables 
There are three variables which are applicable to theory building for the purposes of 
this case study: independent, dependent and control variables. Monroe (2000) argues 
that "Independent variables are those presumed in the theory underlying the 
hypothesis to be the cause and dependent variables are the effects or consequences" 
(p.20), but "control variables are additional variables that might affect the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables" (p.21 ). All variables in the 
assumptions below would be measured in a quantitative or qualitative form for the 
same unit of analysis. 
2.5.1 Domestic and national level variables for modelling the 'furko-Iranian 
relations 
The most important domestic factor that influences the foreign policy behaviour of 
states is the leadership group and state identities defined by them. The state identity is 
given here as independent variables, in return, leadership groups are considered as 
dependent variables for the unit level of analysis in Turko-Iran cases. Consequently, 
the following hypotheses are constructed as part of theory modelling in this section: 
Variable I a: Society, leadership and regime change 
Assumption I a: Unless the leadership groups satisfY societies 'security, political and 
economic needs, or causes of conflict within the societies ' realm, the logic of 
collective action could reconstruct a new political discourse 
The society, which has always been the main machinery of domestic politics is 
considered here as an independent variable. However, leadership plays dependent 
variables role in this assumption. The security, economic, and political sectors are 
presented as conditions for the regime change which create a new political discourse. 
The structure of Turkish Iranian society is differentiated from each other in respect of 
identity construction and the entrancement of a new strategic culture. Iran established 
the imaginary society project that mixed Shia religion and Iranian nationalism. Iran 
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has not received much external population; therefore, the leadership could not impose 
any traumatic alteration in the society. However, 80% of Turkey's population rely on 
the external immigration from Caucasus and Balkans who established a secular 
regime and aimed to create a secular society under the auspices of a Turkish national 
state. Therefore, the Turkish imaginary society project put religion as a hidden 
identity but disregarded the ethnic diversity under Kemalist leadership. As a security 
provider, Kemalist leadership realigned with Kurdish and Alevite seculars who 
became the reliable agents of a Turkish nation state since the republican period. 
Therefore, Turkey has not been faced with such an Islamic revolution as in Iran by 
keeping religion as a hidden identity and using agents in the society. On the other 
hand, as an independent social body, Shia religious institutions changed the regime of 
the Shah. In the absence of internal security, economic weakness can bring the 
communicative action to change the regime. Messianic identity of leadership 
established an Islamic State at aiming to create a general Islamic society. However, 
leadership groups seem to be hijackers of the states in Iran and Turkey. Therefore, the 
absence of liberal society and social movement remains their regime security 
guarantee. 
The following hypotheses will try to theorize the interlink between threat and policy 
behaviour of states as part of theory modelling in this section: 
Variable I b: internal and external threat and the leadership group 
Assumption n b: If the elite leadership group perceives an internal and external 
threat against state-establishment, they may realign with the regional and super 
powers to ensure national or collective security. 
The leadership groups see themselves as state. Therefore, the leadership group is able 
to reconstruct the strategic political culture as well as the nation state identity. The 
modernisation program from above would be challenged by ethnic, religious, and 
ideological movements. Therefore, the threat perception is considered here as an 
independent variable. However, the leadership groups act as a dependent variable. 
The outcome of this interaction would be regional and domestic alliance in this 
assumption. For instance, Turkey and Iran established an alignment relation with US 
against Soviet threat. On the other hand, Iran has made a regional alliance with Syria 
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against American containment policy in the region. Turkey Iran Higher Security 
Commission serve co-operation and intelligence sharing against the Kurdish 
insurgency movement, because both Ankara and Tehran perceive Kurdish nationalism 
as an internal threat as well as an external one. Consequently, the following 
proposition is necessary for construction of the theory. 
Variable I c: State identity and patterns 
Assumption I c: If state identity and its interests manifested themselves as 
competitive or co-operative patterns in an enmity and amity relationship, then the 
patterns determine the character of relationship between insulator states and regional 
middle-power states. 
The main determinant factor between two neighbouring states relations characterizes 
an autarkic interaction. As an independent variable, the patterns identify features of 
relations. State identity and interest serve as condition variables in this assumption. 
However, the regime differences sometimes create a competitive relationship, as 
opposed to a rationalist policy approach. The Islamic regime of Iran and the secular 
regime of Turkey reflect 'two sides of the same coin ' but still have potential 
competitive and cooperative features of a relationship. The amity or enmity 
relationship depends on the individual leadership in that discourse. For example the 
leadership of the Ozal government emphasised the economic ties rather than political 
ones. However, the leadership of the military governments by Ecevit and Yilmaz 
highlighted the political and regime interaction versus the leadership of Khomeini and 
Rafsanjani, which was confrontational and resulted in the mutual undermining of state 
identities. Hence, the fourth hypothesis, which explains the importance of regime 
security for the leadership group, is appropriate for the construction of this theory. 
Variable Id: regime threat and leadership 
Assumption I d: Regime security is more important than the state security as the 
regime survival is equated to state survival, bringing about the regional authoritarian 
state. If the regime identity plays an effective role in foreign policy making of the 
states, the state-to-state relations are more confrontational than co-operative within 
the regional system. 
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The threat is considered as independent variable; because the leadership groups 
actions rely on the challenge of threat in this assumption. The interaction between two 
variables would conclude duality relations in such cooperation or competition. The 
Islamic regime of Iran and the secularist regime of Turkey are considered to be 
alternative political models for the Muslim state in general. Therefore, the 
revolutionary export policies of the Iranian government have been perceived as a 
national security threat by Turkey, and Islamic tendencies in domestic politics are also 
manipulated through resident Islamic communities by the secular leadership of 
Turkey. For instance, the headscarf issue is the main reason behind cutting diplomatic 
relationship twice in the last three decades. Therefore, the security issue preserves its 
relative status quo as a source of conflict in Turko-Iranian relations. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis emphasises the importance of theory-setting. 
2.5.2 Transnationallevel variables 
There are many significant transnational factors influencing the foreign policy 
behaviour of a state, among which ideological and ethnic movements cause a new 
direction of foreign policy continuity and change in the systemic context as discussed 
in the following sections. 
Variable II a: Transnational ideology and the leadership group 
Assumption 11 a: lftransnational ideology challenges the governing groups or social 
stability of the regional system or international system, regional states and governing 
elite groups reorganise its foreign policy and make alliances with the less threatening 
ideologies or external environments, especially in religious, social, and political 
concepts, all of which may have a deterministic impact on foreign policy making, as 
ideological movements organise the new societal identities and influence directly or 
indirectly the foreign policy behaviour of the state. 
Transnational movement is taken as an independent variable which determines the 
behaviour of the leadership groups. The consequences of threat perception would be 
an alliance with internal agents to contain counter ideological movement. Whilst 
ideological movements rehabilitate the behaviour of the state and create a new 
dynamic unit for state bureaucracy and society, economy and political behaviour of 
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the state, they also produce the opposite frictions in middle-power countries, so as to 
challenge the regime or governing elite group's static position. The regimes and 
societies within such states are very vulnerable to transnational ideological 
movements, which lead these countries to forge alliances with the external 
environment, employing an Omnibalancing policy model in their internal and external 
affairs. The state attempts to create balance and thus co-operate with less threatening 
regimes against the primary threat. Political and ideological revolution (political Islam) 
in a state (Iran) causes the reorientation of the foreign policy of other states {Turkey) 
in that regard. Consequently, the hypotheses on revolution are constructed as part of 
theory modelling in this section: 
Variable 11 b: Third World revolution and super power 
Assumption 11 b: If middle-power states' have a revolutionary movement such as the 
Islamic revolution in Iran and communist revolution in Third World, they may 
challenge the interest of the super power interest in the region. However, the global 
power is able to contain the revolutionary expansion of these states in the regional 
politics by use of counter-revolutionary policy strategy. 
The revolution is considered as an independent variable which receives a counter 
effect from offshore balancer super power. The political outcome will be containment 
policy or using of second order military coercion against the middle power revisionist 
policy. For Iran, experience indicates that the middle-power states' revolutions are 
able to expand their influence to the whole region. However, if an ideology is 
perceived as a threat to global power's interest in the region, the global powers create 
a barrier against its overexpansion into the region. For instance, the Turkish secularist 
revolution has not been considered a threat for Western civilisation, but the Islamic 
revolution of Iran is perceived as a threat for global powers and their allied interests in 
the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Hence, the regional state and super 
powers were able to manipulate the overexpansion of the middle-power state 
revolution and also to counter the interference to the Middle East by the other super 
power. With regard to Turkish domestic politics, the super power (United States) 
countered the left-wing revolutionary challenge posed by the Turkish youth 
movement in 1980. Hence, the institutional integration of client and patron 
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relationship allows the super power to directly or indirectly interfere in domestic 
politics of a country without undermining the sovereignty of the leadership group and 
the state identity. Consequently, the following assumptions focus on sub-group 
regional actors as part of theory modelling in this section: 
Variable 11 c: Sub-group ethnic nationalism and internal leadership groups 
Assumption 11 c: When sub-group ethnic nationalism causes intensive social 
movements against the common strategic political interests, the leadership of the state 
use military coercion against these militarised groups and seeks collaboration with 
the other regional countries encountering similar challenges. 
Kurdish military guerrillas have behaved as a regional player. Hence, they are 
considered as an independent variable in this assumption. However, leadership 
group's behaviour depends on their campaign for the counter action. As a result of it, 
the outcome would be either military intervention or regional co-operation in the 
region. A topic worthy of examination is the transnational ethnic nationalism of the 
Kurdish people in the Middle East, which illustrates middle-state power behaviour 
against internal and external threats. Steven David claims this is an internal threat as 
the Islamic movement and Kurdish nationalism inside Turkey are manageable. On the 
other hand, the transnational movement of Kurdish nationalism is a tool of 
interference with the regional affairs of the Turkish government. Hence, Turkey was 
able to exploit a power vacuum to conduct military incursions into Northern Iraq. 
Therefore, the anarchical character of sub-group nationalism creates amity and enmity 
patterns of relationships between regional and global power. Security cooperation 
between Turkey and Iran is a reliable hypothesis in seeking cooperative relationship 
against the common regional threat, especially with regards to Kurdish issues in the 
Middle East, despite having different regimes and a bipolar regional setting. 
Variable 11 d: Transnational sub-group nationalist threat and leadership groups 
Assumption 11 d: If the transnational ethnic movement is a secondary threat for 
other regional states, these states will use such ethnic nationalism against their 
counterpart states. The host states will make alliances with other regional or global 
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states in order to balance against the threat coming from transnational ethnic 
nationalism and supervised states. 
The Kurdish nationalist threat is considered as an independent variable in this 
assumption while leadership's political activities are seen as a dependent variable. 
The consequences of this conflict would form the regional alliance. The militarisation 
of Kurdish nationalism became both an internal and external threat, which politicised 
the transnational phenomena especially in 1990s, for Turkey. Iran and its alliance with 
Syria have used Kurdish and Islamist groups as political cards against Turkey's active 
politics in the Middle East and Central Asia to decrease its influence since the 1980s. 
Whilst Turkey strengthened its relationship with Israel, Iran has focused on Russia 
and also domestic military technology, especially with by restarting the nuclear 
programme. This regional environment against transnational Kurdish movement is 
vulnerable to external interference in a variety of different ways. Thus, regional 
middle-power states struggling with the militarisation of ethnic movements force 
them to make alliances with regional and international powers. 
As I mentioned in the first section, the foreign policy behaviour of states is influenced 
by many systemic factors such as international structure, alliance patterns, regional 
context, geopolitical and geo strategic positions of states as well as international 
regimes. This study argues that systemic factors are equally effective in determining 
foreign policy of the middle-power and insulator countries' relations. The relationship 
between global powers and middle-power states is seen as periphery and core in the 
context of relations in the global view, which mostly involved patron-client or 
overlaid relationship. Both regional middle-powers and global powers are unable to 
directly control peripheral regions and neither great powers nor middle powers are 
able to dominate the regions. However, if they are dominant, they will likely become 
a global power. Therefore, hostile great powers can be deterred from attacking the 
middle-powers. Alliance relations between regional middle powers are the main 
obstacle to global dominance, in that regional middle powers are able to escape from 
diplomatic isolation and defend their sovereignty (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). 
Consequently, the following hypotheses, relating to systemic levels, are also 
constructed as part of theory modelling within this Chapter. 
82 
2.5.3. Systemic level variables 
According to systemic change in the international system, state leadership can create a 
new dynamic of society and a new bureaucratic class that brings a new direction to 
state foreign policy that could turn former friendly states into enemies in relation to 
the state identity. Most change in the middle power state internal politics is reshuffled 
or shaped by the super power containment and coercion. Therefore, systemic setting 
has relative influence in the domestic politics of middle power states. 
Variable IV a: patron-client relations, and containment 
Assumption IV a: Middle-power and global power relationships characterise the 
deferrable and cooperative features in systemic realms; while middle power states are 
able to bargain with the global power as to its own interest and defend her from 
global power isolation, a global power has the capability to operate or override the 
region and establish an opposite-pole system by directing a regional middle power 
satellite state. 
The systemic behaviour of patron and client is considered as an independent variable; 
however, the containment and bargaining power capability of states bring about an 
alternative alliance in the region. For instance, despite counter revolutionary activities, 
dual containment, and the metaphor "axis of evil" politics of United States, Iran 
sustains its regional status quo and applies alternative politics by entering the Asian 
markets to avoid Western isolation. However, the politics of Washington became the 
primary national security threat after the occupation to Afghanistan and Iraq as far as 
the Iranian leadership group is concerned. However, Iran's negative balancer role and 
Turkey's client status could not resist the super power intervention into their backyard. 
Therefore, both negative balancer and client are not happy to see the preponderance 
policy of the neo-conservative US government. On the one hand, Patron-client 
relations enforced to eo-opt the Turkey-Israel security agreement. 
As a result, the following assumption explains the interest conflict between super 
power and middle power state relationship. 
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Variable IV b: interest conflict and alliance relationship 
Assumption IV b: If the interest becomes confrontational between a patron and a 
client state, the systemic setting in the international system determines their alliance 
relationship 's continuity and change, which may be confrontational or cooperative. 
Unlike alliance relationships, if the interests of the super power and the enemy state 
converge; the regional alliance would be more vulnerable for turning into a 
cooperative or alliance relationship as long as the ideological differences are not a 
threat for super power interests in the region. 
The interest conflict plays independent orientation between super power and client 
states. The situation can check the reliability of their alliance relationship. Therefore, 
the outcome of this confrontation will determine the patterns of relations. For instance, 
American and Turkish interests were contradictory, especially American support for 
the state establishment process in "Kurdistan-Iraq " after the failure of the March 
memorandum in Turkish parliament to open the northern 'front door' for the U.S 
army. However, Washington and Tehran have agreed to cooperation against the 
Taliban regime until Bush's announcement of the "axis of evil" which included Iran. 
The cooperation in Iraq with regard to Shia groups is still ongoing between the two 
opposite alliances, but this partial cooperative relationship would not able to change 
the negative balancer role of Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia. On one hand, 
the systemic alliance relationship between Turkey and United States is also more 
competitive than cooperative, including by countering the PKK in the region after the 
new Washington process in early 2008. 
On the other hand, super powers never allow the emergence of middle power states as 
regional powers in the regional system. Foreign policy behaviour of great powers and 
middle-powers is rationally based on the anarchical system (Ehteshami and 
Hinnebusch, 1997). However, the overriding of regions is very vulnerable to the 
transformation of new security complexes which have capability to deter regional 
hegemonic competition in areas of regional middle-powers. Competitive and co-
operative relations are mostly seen in mini sub-complexes and in sub-units in the 
region because this complex is very vulnerable to foreign penetration. An insulator 
middle power state, which is not able to bring the different complexes together into 
one coherent strategic arena, plays a passive balancing role in the instable and 
overridden regions. It is more dependent on core global power policies, unless its 
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interest is confrontational. Therefore, the patron-client relationship between insulator 
and the global power provides foreign influence in the region with the contractual 
activities and also an alliance against the regional competitors (Buzan and Waever, 
2003:40-89). The following hypothesis explains the regional competition and regional 
integration. 
2.5.4 Regional level variables 
Variable V a: Power vacuum and competition, 
Assumption V b: Historical rivalry torch between middle power states becomes 
apparent if the power vacuum manifests itself in the adjacent vulnerable region or the 
major power withdraws from the region. The competition will able to create a 
medium sized bipolarity system in the region. 
The power vacuum is presented as a conditional variable which creates a competitive 
relationship. The competitive character of relationship is considered as an independent 
variable even if the competition depends on the balance of power in the region. The 
competition between middle power states can only negate each other's influence in 
the region. The logic of this regional rivalry torch and anarchical order in the region is 
seen as competitive due to the super-power interest competition in the region. The 
main determining variants in the regional systemic contexts are historical standings, 
overlay and transformation. The relationships between the periphery and semi-
periphery or regional systems and subsystems or unit/subunits are the main systemic 
regional explanations used to understand regional anarchy. Buzan and Waever (2003) 
believe that the regional system is anarchic as the anarchy is by its nature a structural 
systemic anarchy. Thus, the regional states' foreign policy behaviour is explained by 
the realist understanding of such great power politics in the region. The tools of this 
anarchical system are non-governmental sub-state entities or internal threats and low 
interaction capacities of the regional states, which are key technological devices and 
social infrastructure. Competitive and co-operative relations are experienced in the 
realist game within historical standings, because internal threats are vulnerable to 
becoming external threats through the actions of regional and global powers. The 
regional states receive threats from neighbouring countries, if regional subsystem 
where a particular state is located is unstable and has many conflicting issues. The 
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regional context may, therefore, enforce states to pursue a defensive or offensive 
deterrence policy. 
Turkey and Iran have got a middle-power state capacity to influence the regiOn 
(Ehteshami and Hinnebush, 1997). Consequently, the following assumptions explain 
the economic dependency and political integration for purposes of constructing this 
theory. 
Variable V b: dependency and competition 
Assumption V b: If economic variables (energy, communications and economic 
incorporation in this research) are more important than political integration, then the 
competition characterises the economic struggle for institutionalism. However, 
middle-power states do not have the capacity required to create institutional 
incorporation models for the regional economic and political integration, as is the 
case with, for example, the European Union. 
The dependency relationship between medium-ranked states is evaluated as 
independent variables. However, the competition depends on the patterns of economic 
variables. The relationship would be characterized as cooperative but institutional. 
Theoretically, middle-power states would be able to compete with their equivalent 
counterparts to penetrate regions by using their cultural and economic proximity. 
However, geo-economic and geopolitical regional autarky requires cooperative and 
competitive rational politics. Hence two regional middle-powers are able to manage 
co-operative or competitive relationships with weaker states. However, they are not 
capable of establishing an institutional integration or coalition-building to dominate 
the region. In fact, the regional middle-power states are depended on the core, 
economically and technologically. However, the physical regional dependency 
enforces the cooperative relationship between middle-powers. In reality, regional 
dependency is more important than the global dependency relationship, because geo-
economics and geo- cultural linkage enforce compulsory relationships between them. 
There are three vital dynamic elements in developing the dependency relationship 
between Turkey and Iran. These variables encourage the middle-power state to forge 
an economic alliance but economic institutionalism could not provide any systematic 
management in the regional system. For instance, the Economic Cooperation 
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Organisation and the Organisation for Islamic Countries are not capable of 
institutionalising Turko-Iranian partnership within the Northern Tier geography. 
Consequently, the following section provides an experimental explanation for the 
testing of the integrated model. 
2.6. Parameters of the integrated model for the unit leven analysis in Turkish-
Iranian cases 
The multi-paradigm perspective tries to restructure a model for Turko-Iran cases 
during the Cold War and in the period that followed. The model consists of domestic 
and national, transnational (ethnic nationalism, ideology), systemic and regional 
variables, used to explain regional middle-power states' relationships within the 
parameters of this case study since 1979. Theories relevant to national identity 
provide an explanation for the domestic, bureaucratic and the leadership's role played 
in foreign policy formation within Turkey and Iran. For transnational cases, political 
Islam and secularism, Islamic terrorism, and Kurdish nationalism will be examined. 
Additionally, the regional co-operative detente or competitive detente relationship in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus attract the focus of this study with regard to issues of 
energy security and also examine the economic integration of the regional state with 
new partners as well as between themselves. 
2.6.1 The experimental model for the deconstruction of Turkish and Iranian 
grand strategy 
The concepts of Turkish and Iranian identity are more stable than state identity, which 
is changeable if the systemic situation creates any alternative models such as imperial 
or nation states. However, the new identity definition of peoples transforms society by 
preserving certain characteristics of the former manifestations. Hence, continuity is a 
factor within the definition of individual identity in Wendt' s writings, but the change 
would be experienced in the regime, ideology, and nationalism as dependent variables, 
as even though Turks and Iranians reside in different locations and were controlled by 
different dynasties, Turkish and Iranian people maintained their status quo as separate 
national identities in the primitive basin of civilisation. Turkish cultural identity 
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integrated with three other cultural identities, which are the Russian, Persian, and 
Greek culture of identities. I describe the experience of both nations as the Turko-
Persian cultural synthesis in the 9th and 1Oth centuries, within Chapter Three. The 
countries' leaderships use authoritarian social engineering processes to reconstruct 
nation state identity. While Turks reject their historical reservation and experience 
which they now define as a 'torn identity', Iranian people preserves the cultural 
connection with their past. However, the revolutionary religious leadership try to 
engineer the society as a religious one, unlike the Turkish secularist implementation. 
In fact, both leadership groups would oppose transnational movements which are 
contrary to their nature. After the revolution, the different religious formations such as 
Shia and Sunni, presented an alternative sectarian religious identity. While Iran's 
religious identity play a more important role, Turkey's Sunni religious identity still 
has a passive role so called 'hidden identity' of secular state-establishment. However, 
the nationalist and secularist identities ofTurkey are still seen as an alternative regime 
for the regional countries. On the other hand, the involvement of the Islamic Iranian 
regime in the nuclear programme is considered to be a part of the strategic culture in 
the security sector which has resulted in militarisation of the internal politics of Iran. 
However, the religious state identity of Iran strengthened the position of Turkish 
secular leadership and secular identity of Turks as a Western security ally. Hence, the 
westernisation politics of the Turkish state are considered a part of national identity of 
Turkish people. I will apply this model to my case studies in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four. 
2.6.2 The experimental model for completive detente relationship in discourse of 
religious-ideological and Kurdish transnational movement 
The Islamic ideology of Iran emerged as threat for Western interests and secular 
regimes of the Middle East in 1979. As a consequence of the Islamic revolution, the 
United States and Israel lost one of the most important alliances in the region. 
However, Turkey benefited from the new positioning of Iran in the international 
community, as this caused the strengthening of its ties with the Western security and 
economic systems, particularly in the military coup d'etat in Turkey in 1980s. The 
domestic restructuring of Iranian and Turkish foreign policies contributes to 
international confrontation with regard to veil disputes and Turkish Hezbollah, which 
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twice caused diplomatic crises, because the ideological differences are perceived an 
alternative threat for the regime of both countries. The Kurdish nationalist movement 
and military insurgency campaigns of PKK and PJAK are classified as transnational 
factors in the study of Turkish and Iranian relations. The tripartite security 
cooperation among Syria, Iran and Turkey challenges Kurdish nationalism after the 
super-power involvement in Iraq. American-led invasion of Iraq and the super power 
involvement creates a mortal threat for the regional states, making the area more 
vulnerable to foreign influence, especially in Iraq and the Kurdish areas. The conflict 
between the patron and client and between negative balancer and offshore super 
power is still a useful point of analysis in identifying the power of transnational 
movements. This competitive detente relationship will be dealt with in the Chapter 
Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. 
2.6.3 Testing model for cooperative and competitive detente relationship in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus 
Regional systems are considered to be a microcosm of the international system and 
the changes in the international community, as a bipolar system and unipolar order, 
were equally significant for the regional systems. The regional opposite alliance 
system is not as active as the rivalry of great powers, but it has importance from the 
regional perspective. Iran's alliance relationship and close ties with Russia and Asian 
complexes are perceived as a threat and a source of anxiety for Turkish foreign policy 
makers. On the other hand, Turkey's alliance with Israel and NATO are considered a 
national security threat to Iran. However, the American intervention inot Turko-Iran 
buffer zone has broken the negative balancer role of Iran and forward strategy of 
Turkey. Therefore, Turkey-Iran security will dramatically increased in Northern Iraq 
since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Turkey's insulator role in the region provides the facilities for Iran to promote its 
nuclear ambitions to penetrate the region, while its systemic Western-oriented 
regional policies provide a threat for Iran's regional ambitions. Nevertheless, both 
countries are always aware and careful not to escalate into open conflict with one 
another. Even if this regional low-intensity opposite alliance system looks like a Cold 
War conflict between both countries, this anarchical regional order creates a 
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hierarchical balancing act in the region, as well. This can, in turn, be explained with 
realist-perspective assumptions. In considering geopolitics, Turkey and Iran are not a 
regional threat to one another, locally, as both states' boundaries are determined 
through geographic realities and cultural borders of the society shaped over the 
centuries (Balbay, 2006). However, this is does not prevent an influence competition 
over Iraq and the Caucasus during the historical process (Davutoglu, 2004). The 
balancing relationship between Turkey and Iran has successfully operated the 
peaceful co-existence, discussed in the following sections. 
Buzan and Weaver (2003) defines the Middle East region as a pattern of security 
interdependence that covers a region stretching from Morocco to Iran, including all of 
Arab states plus Israel and Iran but excluding Cyprus, Sudan and the African Horn. 
Afghanistan is an insulator between Middle East and South Asia and Turkey between 
it and Europe. Davutoglu points out that those external triangular strategies of Turkey, 
Iran and Egypt determine the politics of regional setting for the grand strategies of 
these middle power states as a historical continuity and change (Davutoglu, 2004). 
The political sketch between external triangles operates the internal dimension but the 
influence of great powers and middle-powers should accumulate the power politics in 
the region, but such sub-systems of Iraq, Saudi, Syrian and mini subsystem of 
Lebanon, Jordon, Palestine, Northern Iraq and Israel's its own subsystem generally 
have been characterised as competitive with each other in the Middle Eastern security 
system. On the other hand, Mutual regional threats and regional competition operate 
in both countries' regional relations. The competition between these regional players 
is experienced in the shadow of the great powers. However, Turkey and Iran have 
never gone ahead to the point of regional co-operation against their mutual threats due 
to the existence of the dominant factors of different state identities and interests in the 
region. They prefer to co-operate in some areas of consensus where threats are 
concerned, rather than creating a regional security complication for their respective 
national securities. As I mentioned above, Turkey's and Iran's regional threats have 
always been Russia and the domestic ethnic paramilitary groups. Therefore, the Soviet 
threat during the Cold War pushed both countries towards an alliance with the 
Western security system. However, after the Cold War, the situation changed within 
the international system, and so Turkey and Iran diversified their foreign policies. The 
realms of historical rivalry then appeared and their competitive or cooperative detente 
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relationship began in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Northern Iraqi region. The 
influence of Turkey and Iran in Central Asia operates through competition, but the 
rivalry over the Caucasus complexes is more intensive than those in Central Asia. 
Turkey's nationalist ambition over the Caucasus mini sub-complexes is a threat for 
national security of Iran and Russia--since Turkey pursues parallel policies with the 
superpower against Russia and Iran in the region. On the other hand Iran prefers to 
have a co-operative relationship with Russia over the Caucasus mini complexes. 
However, Iranian geographical advantages and Turkey's cultural benefit create a 
balance between the two regional players. The failure of the regional policies of 
Turkish and Iranian parties over Central Asia facilitate the regional establishment of 
an independent security complex, but the Caucasus complex is always vulnerable for 
foreign military intervention such Russia-Georgian War in August 2008. The 
competition in the region is rather a struggle of economic influence than is one of 
political influence. 
2.6.4 Experimental model for cooperative detente relationship in the discourses 
of complex- interdependency 
The regional middle-power states are dependent on the core economically and 
technologically, but they are more dependent on their neighbours in aspects of 
regional necessities, such as economic, especially energy and transportation, cultural 
and security issues. This peripheral dependency necessitates creating a balance or 
shaping the co-operative detente relationship between the two neighbours. The most 
important sector of the Turkey-Iran relationship will be checked on economic and 
security interdependency. However, the Iran-Iraq war, which brought economic 
opportunities to improve Turkey's Middle Eastern relations, the country has followed 
pragmatist and 'active neutrality' foreign policies against Iran and Iraq during 
wartime. Turkey is also the only Western alliance country that did not recognize the 
American economic sanctions (the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act) against Iran. For 
instance, in opposition to this economic embargo, Turkey made a natural gas deal 
with Iran in 1997. However, the institutional relationship (ECO, D-8 and OIC) 
between Turkey and Iran is not constructive in bringing about regional integration, or 
coalition building in economic and security sector. As we mentioned above, middle 
power states have no capacity for such a model against balance of power in the region. 
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Rather than dealing with the operational measurement of variables which had outlined 
in methodology section of introduction. The following section will try to establish its 
own integrated approach to the cases of Turkey Iran relations as part of articulation 
theory modelling in international relations. 
2.7. Conclusion: Contribution of the Integrated Approach to the Discipline 
Rather than focusing on specific theories or single model, much of sub-lens systemic 
integrated approaches draw upon insights from the field of international relations to 
develop generalisation for explaining domestic, regional and global politics of middle 
power states. The theories of omnibalancing, RSCT and constructivism are reviewed 
integrated approaches to Turkish and Iranian cases. 
The theory of omnibalancing asserted that realism must be broadened to examine the 
internal threat in addition to focusing on external threats and capabilities. Seeking is 
valuable in examining the middle-power states' multi-directional international politics. 
However, contrary to the main principle of the omnibalancing theory, this study posits 
that the middle-power state is a unitary actor for the principle unit of analysis. The 
concept of Turkish and Iranian states is socially constructed with the legacy of the 
independence war in Turkey and the Islamic revolution in Iran. Hence, the secular 
leadership of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and Messianic leadership in Iran are also 
unitary actors. Hence, this oligarchic leadership of the middle power state is different 
from the leadership of institutionally constructed western states. If the leaderships' 
interest and national interests come into conflict, they may choose their interests in the 
framework of security, because they became states. On the other hand, Turkey and 
Iran have an extensive interest in economic cooperation. However, due to security and 
economic engagements with different blocs; they do not have enough policy capacity 
to establish a regional economic system in the area. Having different religious and 
ideological backgrounds, the leadership of middle-powers use this ideological 
differentiation to legitimise their legacy. So, they are content with regional and 
domestic anarchy even if this transnational movement damages the national and 
public interests. On the other hand, the policy outcomes of states and regimes as 
unitary actors are vulnerable to internal and external penetration. The external type is 
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seen here as global functionalism, which indirectly influences the society of the 
middle-power state. The state regime and leadership can control these external and 
internal dependent threats, especially by using its agent communities. As stated by 
Steven David, an internal threat is manageable, such as Kurdish nationalism, political 
Islamic movement and internal terrorism. However, there is a gap between his theory 
and rational politics and the weakness of his explanation pertains to constitute a 
manageable internal threat. This study argues that the domestic movement (internal 
threat) can become a transnational one if it challenges the state regime and leadership 
by using military options. Secondly, if the state regime or leadership lost their 
hegemony with the alliance agents (Alevites in Turkey) and less threatening agents 
(Islamic groups), the society would establish another political discourse or new 
leadership such as the Islamic revolution in Iran. Therefore, middle-power states 
should provide a power vacuum between systemic and domestic demands to impede 
their mutual enforcement, so as to maintain the legacy in society, but always remain 
open to the use of force against the overexpansion of transnational movements, which 
invite the external intervention of regional and global powers. The agent communities 
who are not fully part of the state-establishment must find an 'opportunity space' in 
the centre or share the wealth of the state. However, this agent expansion in the state 
is limited only by economic liberalism but not by political factors in the long run. 
Therefore, while having an alternative regime theory, political parties have never been 
institutionalised in Turkey and Iran. For instance, the deviation of Menderes, Ozal, 
Erbakan and Erdogan or Khatemi's leadership could not provide any 'policy 
outcomes ' as unitary actors in the secular state-establishment or messianic leadership, 
because they are considered as part of the leadership group's perestroika, negating 
and agent construction strategy for the continuity of the regime. The inside and 
outside interactions between the core and the periphery have the same measurements 
of independent and dependent variables. The outcome would be seen as an integration 
process on both sides but the hegemony of the state could not refrain from use of 
force to penetrate the state-establishment in Turko-Iranian relations. 
However, society is not set in stone; the dynamics of change could subvert the logic of 
collective action in society. The subversion in the 'opportunity space' presents similar 
issues of super power leadership and middle-power leadership interactions despite the 
discrepancies of using power against the threats differentiated by the regimes. While 
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super-power states use soft power and their institutional bodies, which provide a wide 
range of public space against the leadership, the middle-power behaviour against the 
internal threat demonstrate the hard-power intervention with regard to the periphery. 
Due to absence of the wide range "public space", the practical intervention of the 
middle-power state could appear as a military "coup d'etat", as experienced in 
Turkey three times during half a century. However, the intervention of the 
institutionally constructed liberal state leadership could be vanishing in the public 
sphere as such Western countries prevail in society. Due to a lack of opportunity 
space to crystallise the public demand and state authority, internal threats can be 
considered as being more dangerous than external ones in the middle power states 
theory. For example, the Turkish state used coercion against Kurdish insurgency and 
employed religious agents (Islamic groups) against Turkish Hezbollah in the 1990s, 
because the Turkish state and its leadership do not have enough political power to 
satisfy the ethnic and religious demands coming from the periphery. 
On the other hand, there is subversion in liberal society, especially against the foreign 
identities, namely immigrants from the Islamic world. As a consequence of liberalism 
and globalism, liberalist society does not want to share its wealth with foreign entities 
that increase nationalism and create a barrier against global integration in the nation 
state system. As a result of liberalist society subversion, the global war on terror and 
the focus on internal threats, attention is also given to external connections to rogue 
identities in the Western societies. Therefore, foreign immigrants are contemplated as 
a homeland security issue and are the biggest threat for Western democracies in this 
regard (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). 
The omnibalancing theory provides an explanation for alignment and realignment of 
Third World states' policies when they choose a side. David presumes that state can 
choose the less threatening partner, especially on the issue of transnational Kurdish 
nationalism. Iran used Kurdish nationalism against the rising influence of Turkey after 
the Cold War. However, after the emergence ofPJAK as a national security threat for 
Iran, Tehran terminated close relationship with the militant Kurdish nationalist 
movement. In that discourse, the Regional Security theory of Buzan explains the holy 
tripartite security meeting of Turkey-Syria-Iran. On the other hand, if the 
transnational movement became the common enemy, the adjacency could generate the 
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security interaction between the regional states and result in military cooperation for 
national security in countering transnational movements. 
The secular regimes of the Turkish and Islamic regimes of Iran cannot extensively 
expand into the region because they do not have enough systematic capacity to 
produce an alternative economic and political discourse for the international 
community. Their revolutionary movement is manageable by a super power by using 
of containment strategy. For instance, the Islamic revolution of Iran has been 
successfully manipulated by the United States' counter-revolutionary politics. On one 
hand, middle-power states benefit from this opposite regional setting. For instance, 
Turkey strengthened its ties with Western security and economic systems after the 
Islamic revolution. 
In the framework of the middle-power definition, states can organise the regional 
polarity system in their sphere of influence but middle-power states would be 
incapable of creating a regional integration or coalition buildings. The institutional 
integration of middle-power states after the Cold War could not produce any 
systematic formations. For example, domestic change in Russia concluded with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Empire; most scholars state that Turkey and Iran would have 
occupied the vacuum in the region due to having some degree of generalised common 
identity or loyalty with Central Asian states and countries of the Caucasus. However, 
the security and economic interdependence of these states produced a new regional 
system. The middle-power interactions in the region have only experienced economic 
competition, especially in the field of energy. To integrate my middle power theory, 
the nature of Turkey- Iran relations had been determined as cordial, detente 
relationship mentioned above since the 1979. 
Consequently, this chapter examines these areas to explain foreign policy continuity 
and change -- the systemic and regional changes after the domestic changes occurred 
in the Soviet Union; the systemic and the regional systems are seen as an independent 
variable for Newly Independent States and Turkey/Iran. Hence, the competitive and 
cooperative relations have been restricted by the balance of power's delimitation in 
Turko-Iranian relations. On the other hand, the geographic adjacency and its related 
economic autarky are the main motives of regional state cooperation. The domestic 
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policy change and regime change resulted in the growth of the transnational 
movement, especially with regard to the formation of religion, ideology, nuclear 
proliferation and internal terrorism in regional politics. Despite playing a part in the 
systemic, regional, and domestic changes in the society of states, Turkishness and 
Iranianhood remain the main dependent variables in identifying middle-power states' 
international politics. Hence, the following two Chapters attempt to contextualise the 
construction and reconstruction of Turkish and Iranian strategic cultures of security, 
state, religion and society. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF TURKO-PERSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURAL IDENTIY 
3.1. Introduction 
Despite social structural differences, the two nations achieved a common 
epistemological cultural synthesis in which the material conditions, interests, and 
ideas constitute part of a framework. The mutual social and political systems allowed 
them to avert Arabic cultural assimilation by maintaining their language and social 
identities in the Middle Ages. However, the gap between ancient Persians and Turks 
has, in modem times, crystallised the cultural identity of Turko - Persia, creating a 
profound Islamic civilisation and fashioning the "Gaza" spirit of Islam in the 9th and 
1Oth centuries are modem times makes it easier to understand the common elements of 
the two countries. Even though the cordial give-and-take relationship had mutual 
influence, the status quo of the nations did not preclude national awareness, but rather 
created a mutual national culture. On the other hand, the segregation of Turko-Persian 
national identity in the 16th century reinforced the ethnic national consciousness of 
both nations. However, despite of their similarities of their cultural identities, there 
was also conflict (Tucker, 2006:114).Central Asia and the Caucasus played central 
roles in the development of a Turko - Persian strategic culture. However, Kurdish and 
Shia extemalism penetrated this Turko - Persian cultural synthesis as foreign elements; 
extemalism had become a sordid political card used to weaken each others' strategic 
national interests in the region, and magnifying the peripheral ethnic nationalist issues 
during the privious two centuries. The states' security concerns became a main 
instrument in the ir formation as the nation states. 
The author argues that historical and sociological institutionalism as well as symbolic 
interactionalism constitutes elements of structural idealism in Turko - Iranian relations 
that can be now designated as an undefined common political identity. The author 
also aims to draw the main lines of this interaction and to discover the paradigm shifts 
in the Turko - Iranian relationship, which are influencing the foreign policy makers' 
mindset in modem times. The author outlines the historical those paradigm shifts from 
the present day back to the past by using the periodisation method of social history 
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theory. He also uses the key concept of Robert Confield's "Turko - Persian 
synthesis" which facilitates the contextualisation of the concept of 'Turko - Persian 
strategic cultural synthesis' (Katzenstein, 1996), and applies the Alexander Wendt 
social theory of international relations within this chapter. 
3.2.0 The conceptual framework for a Turkish national identity 
Turkish people were faced with three fundamental national identity crises throughout 
their history: Chinese assimilation, conversion to Islam and Westernisation. This 
section presents an overview of the important Turkish national identity fragmentations, 
which include language, homeland, culture, religion, and history from the foundation 
ofthe ancient Turkish Empire to the present day (Smith, 1990:14-103). Conversion to 
Islam and the evolution of a Turkish Islamic paradigm are investigated in the third 
section which provides an explanation for the crisis in Westernisation policies. 
All languages change. Otherwise the users will belong to a state characterized by 
inertia status qua. Hence, change rather than perpetual continuity characterises 
Turkish language formation. Turks rejected the adoption of the symbolic Chinese 
languages in the early stage of their history to instead preserve the phonetic 'Orkhon 
inscriptions' until they converted to Islam. The 'sun language theory' and 'the 
Turkish history thesis ' claim that the Etruscan alphabet originally imitated an ancient 
Turkish language, which provides a cultural explanation for the ancient Turkish 
homeland of Anatolia but also supports the idea of Turkish nation being the part of the 
Western community (Mirsan, 1966, 1970, 1985, and 1998).This idealistic nationalism 
philosophy also proliferates pan - Turkish ideas of the unity of Turkish nations 
stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Wall of China, after the collapse of the Soviet 
empire. This romantic nationalism in Turkey could not keep pace with the realm of 
Turkish language formation during the historical process. Due to divisions into Turkic 
language, Turkic states cannot communicate with each other. In 1990s, the Turkish 
International Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) organised a grouping of 
countries to create new common alphabets to develop economic, cultural and political 
connections with each other (Oran, 2005). This project aims to fulfil the theory of 
Ism ail Gasprinski ( 1841-1941) who published a newspaper in the Crimea called 
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Tercuman, which had as its motto "dilde, fikirde, iste birlik" (unity in language, 
thought and action). 
Table 3.1: Turko or Turko Tatar language divisions 
JAGATAI TA TAR WESTERN TURKISH 
Uighur Kyrgyz Derbent 
Koman Bashkir Azerbaijani 
Jagatai Nogai Crimean 
Uzbek Kuman Anatolian 
Turkoman Karachai Rumelian(Constantinople) 
Kazan Kara-Kalpak 
Meshcherak 
Siberian 
Sources: Czaplicka, and Collins, 1999 
According to this classification, modern Turkey has accommodated Rumelian 
language groups but excluded the imports (Ottoman language) from Arabic and 
Persian languages. Rather, they used the Anatolian people's language to create an 
imaginary homogeneous society by transferring former paradigms to the Turkish 
nation (Lewis, 2001 ). With the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, as part of the 
Westernisation process, the connection between the Ottoman heritage and the new 
nation was completely cut off. Ataturk aimed at creating a homogeneous society 
based on Turkish ethnicity by changing it from a heterogeneous society based on the 
millet system of the Ottomans (Perry, 1985).As a new imagined language project, 
Today's Turkish language is very close to Azerbaijani and Crimean languages, but the 
Jagatai Turkic language family has different cultural and political connotations in the 
Asian steppes. In this respect, Kazakh and Uzbek identities compete and shape the 
future of political and cultural formation in the Central Asia. The chart below shows 
the languages and population divisions during the first census after the establishment 
of the nation state. The only ethnic majority language was Kurdish, but Turkish 
speakers constituted more than 98 percent of the population. This language was thus 
chosen as a strategic national cultural frame of the modern Turkish state. 
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Table 3.2: Turkey's language and population distribution in the census of 1927 
Race Turkey in Europe Turkey in Asia Total 
Turks 774,800 10,961,200 11,736,000 
Kurds 1,700 1,182,300 I, 184,000 
Arabs 134,000 134,000 
Circassians 1000 95,900 96,000 
Albanians 5,000 15,000 20,000 
Tartars 400 10,600 I 1,000 
Pomaks 1,000 9,000 10,000 
Greeks 77,000 77,000 
Annenians 50,000 27,000 77,000 
Bulgars 2,000 1,000 3,000 
Jews 45,000 37,000 82,000 
Unclassified 18,000 114,000 132,000 
Foreign subjects 65,000 21,000 86,000 
Total 1,040,000 12,608,000 13,648,000 
Sources: Pallis, 193 8 
On the other hand, the Ottoman strategic language approach attempted to create a 
special imperial political language but not a scientific or cultural one. Since this 
language was produced from the mature grammar and vocabulary words from J agatai, 
Farsi, Arabic and Anatolian languages, it became the symbol of the Turkish Islamic 
paradigms during the imperial period. But its duality in written and spoken forms 
caused it to be removed from publications so as to allow communications with the 
periphery in Anatolia. Nor was it also not embraced by other parts of the empire, and 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's language reforms adopted a new version, as part of 
Turkey's cultural and political transformation into a Western oriented state. 
The territorial legacy of modem Turkish lands was determined by the last Ottoman 
parliament in 1920 as a "National Pact" (Misak-i Milli) (Shaw, 1976; Hurewitz, 
1956). In the historical context, current Turkish territory was made the nation's 
homeland following with the "Battle of Manzikert" in 1071 (Sumer, 1971) and then 
defended as a motherland during the Independence War in 1923. It finally gained 
international legitimacy with the "Lausanne Conference" in 1924 (Tahau, 1963). 
However, the cities of Batum, Mosul and Kirkuk are still outside this "National 
Pact." 
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3.3.0 The conceptual framework for an Iranian national identity 
The Iranian national identity was formed from the transcendent and immutable 
principles which have been experienced throughout Iranian history. To understand 
these principles, it is necessary to consider the phases of the self-determination crisis: 
Islamisation, and modernisation, other related frictions. Westernisation had 
established links with ancient Iran but revolutionary movements go back to the 
constitutional revolution in 1908. Thus, the elements for a national identity such as a 
shared homeland, and a common culture (religion, language, and tradition) are 
reconciled within this framework (Smith, 1990). 
In the Naqsh-e Rostem script, Darius was fully conscious of his racial affiliation and 
declared his Aryan lineage. The Pahlavi dynasty was proud of this dual reference to 
Aryan (Poliakov, and Howard, 1996) and imperial heritage. His monarchical 
legitimacy notion reached its peak during the commemoration of the 25th century 
anniversary in 1971 of the foundation of the Persian Empire by the Cyrus the Great in 
Persepolis (Ramazani, 1972). During the transition from the imperial community to a 
nation state, Reza Shah and Ataturk launched a new society built on the foundations 
of previous empires. Persia became Iran, many town and street names were changed 
to pre-Islamic elements and symbols, such as the Academy of Gondishapur, which 
became the symbol of cultural awareness for Iranian people in the 20th century (Dols, 
1987). Even though the concepts of Iran and Pahlavi are narrower than those ofPersia 
and Farsi, they still play a very significant role in inspiring the romantic 
nationalisation amongst the Iranian people. 
After the industrial revolution in Europe in the 18th century, Iranian and Turkish 
national identities were faced with the same cultural and political crises. In response 
to western imperialism, the tobacco revolt movement and successive constitutional 
revolutions improved the collective national awareness of the Iranian people. The 
reform programmes of the Shah continued the constitutional revolution by 
establishing a constitutional monarchy (Lambton, 1987; Vaziri, 1993). Western 
educated intellectuals such as Taqizadeh, Kazimzadeh Iranshahr, Ali Akbar Siyasi, 
Ali Dashti, Mustafa Adl, Amir A 'lam, and Mohammed Said produced modernisation 
programmes for the Shah's monarchy (Bayat, 1991). The role of clerics and 
intellectuals in the constitutional revolution is very important to the Islamic 
revolution's legacy. Contrary to Algar (1969)'s assertion, Mongol Bayat (1991: 1 0) 
argues that despite the clerics' visible participation in the constitutional revolution, the 
clerics and state were not mutually exclusive but rather dependent upon each other as 
clerics were important agents of constitutional change in society. However, Ali Reza 
Afshari (1993) pointed out the conflict between secularists and traditionalists in his 
historiography of Iranian modernisation. Both Ahmed Kasravi (1940) and Nazim al-
Islam Kirmani emphasised the nationalist and liberal motives of the constitutional 
struggle. However, Mahdi Malikzadah (1949) and Firiydun Adamiyat (1976) consider 
the revolution as a solely liberal advance. The constitutional revolution is still a major 
factor in determining the reformation policies of clerics after the Islamic revolution. 
The establishment of Dar ul - Funun in 1851 (Michael, 2003) and the reforms of the 
court system were aimed at promoting modern Iranian nationalism. Secularisation and 
nationalism were considered a part of the modernisation programmes which 
especially targeted the tribal system of such Iranian ethnic peoples as Bakhtiaris, 
Khamseh, Lurs, and Qashqai, who become urbanised over decades through religious 
institutional power in society (Katouzian, 1997). This policy peaked when the Shah 
began to operate the White Revolution (land reform) programme in the 1960s 
(Abrahamian, 1982). However, this state centralisation programme created two 
important crises during the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty: the Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabat and the Azerbaijan People's Government as Soviet-backed client states in 
the 1940s which also resulted in the Islamic revolution in 1979. 
The historical territorial legacy of Iran extended from the sacred crescent of the Ox us 
Rivers,the Amu-Derya and the Syri - Derya in the north in Transoxina, and the sacred 
crescent of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers in Mesopotamia (Frye, 2000). The 
emergence of the Shia crescent in the twenty - first century is part of the same 
continuity of territorial nationalism in Iran. The Sassanid dynasty had controlled 
today's Middle East security complexes as a Middle Age super- power state and even 
challenged the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, Iran's role in the Persian Gulf and the 
Caspian Sea did not only affect the domestic situation but also became a part of its 
historical legacy claims (Ramazani, 1972). According to Arnold Toynbee, Shah 
Ism ail nearly restored the ancient frontiers of the Sassanid Empire in the 15th century 
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(Barthold, Minorsky, et al. 1968:4 7 5-9), but at the end of 19th century, the loss of 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, much of Georgia, and Afghanistan, as a result of Russian and 
British military action, helped shape Iranian nationalism (Clawson and Rubin, et al. 
2005:143) 
Additionally, the 'Nevrooz' is the symbol of the continuity oflran's national identity 
which ensures the collective solidarity of the Iranian nation. The resurrection of an 
Archimedean identity and the myth of Shahinshah in Nevrooz (Vaziri, 1993:87) 
become integrated with Shia political theory and still affect the self-determination of 
revolutionary Iran (Ramazani, 1972). The annexation of Babylonia in 529 B.C. by 
Cyrus coincided with the celebration of Jewish salvation in 144l(Sykes, 2004). This 
friendship formed part of the political agenda aimed at improving the Iran-Israel 
relationship during the Pahlavi period. It is also the symbolic root of the Turko-
Persian cultural synthesis, spreading from the Caucasus to Asia. 
Changes in the Persian language are evolutionary rather than revolutionary-- the 
language of A vesta was written in ancient Persian which was very close to Sanskrit. 
In the Middle Ages, Pahlavi languages were used as the official language of the 
Sassanid Empire. After the conversion to Islam, the Pahlavi alphabet was replaced 
with the new Farsi - Arabic inscription (Pope, 1999). Persian national culture was not 
only playing a very important role in the state bureaucracy of Arab and Turkish 
empires but also in systematising Islamic science and restoring Jewish theological 
literature during the Middle Age (Neusner, 1975). The process of Iranian adaptation 
of Islam took about two centuries was and completely different from Egyptians and 
Barbers interpretations of Islam but it was closer to the Turkish. The national heroes 
and social characters of Freidan, Rostam, Kowrosh, Darios, Barbod, and 
Anousherevan are related to the Islamic Iranian characters such as Selman Farisi and 
Caliph Ali and Hussein. The poets, such as Feduki, Ferdowsi, Sadi, Hafiz, and 
Mawlawi Rumi are the main figures of the Persian national identity, as part of the 
religious and romantic nationalism in Iran (Ashraf, 1993). As a consequence of this 
cultural dominance of Iran, Farsi was accepted as a lingua franca in Afghanistan, 
India, Central Asia and the intellectual environment for Islamic countries (Frye, and 
Nelson, 1977:236). Even if the original Pahlavi language was lost, Reza Shah 
encouraged the Pahlavi tradition and state-sponsored language reforms to eliminate 
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Arabic-type words from the language of Persians. His language reform of Shah was 
not a discontinuity of Iranian national identity such as Ataturk's reforms which 
replaced the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, but a continuation of ancient 
Iranian national culture in modern times (Perry, 1985). Therefore, the subjectivity of 
the Iranian national identity and collective solidarity is more constructive than the 
Turkish one. However, the Persian language's current status is the result of the 
obligation to learn the language by all citizens and the banning of peripheral 
languages in the press and public education. It has increased ethnic nationalism in Iran. 
The language barrier between the Farsi-speaking Shia of Iran and the Arabic -
speaking Shia of Iraq may have emphasized a separate linguistic national identity or 
consciousness (V aziri, 1993: 169-172). 
The pre-Islamic Iranian religions of Mithraism, Manichaeism, and Zurvanism were 
embraced by Zoroastrian which was accepted as the official religion of the Sassanid 
Empire. However despite discontinuity between the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods, 
Nasr claims that there are many cultural attitudes from the past can still be observed. 
Islam possesses a great capability for absorption and synthesis which has permitted it 
to incorporate Alexandrian and Hindu wisdom as well as many elements from pre-
Islamic Persia (Nasr, 1996). Massignon and Mason (1989) argued that the spirituality 
of Islam has been illuminated prism through which Iran has contemplated the universe 
and its ancient myths. Additionally, Henry Corbin (1998) focused on the Imam in 
Twelver Shia political thought, who is very much like the philosopher-king in the 
platonic tradition and the imamate is in turn very similar to the ideal kingship among 
the ancient Aryans on the Persian plateau. 
The movement of Persians from Sunnite to Shia combines the elements of intuition, 
intelligence, and light with Zoroastrianism. Shiism provides a unique cultural identity 
and stimulates a consciousness of collective solidarity as a unifying authority among 
the ethnically diverse regions of Iran (Vaziri, 1993; Peters and De Vries 1976:1-25). 
However, the Shia world is separated from the Sunnite territorially and Shiism is thus 
the mechanism of Iranian nationalism (Lampton, 1987:280). Ali Seriati identifies two 
equally important modes of Iranian national identity-- Iranian nationhood and Shiism 
(Shariati, 1979). The Islamic Iranian identity represents an attempt at bridging sacred 
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and secular traditions and modernity and it has been adopted increasingly by the 
leadership and lower echelons of the Iranian regime. 
Reza Shah's long - term nationalism and society - building programmes, unlike 
Musaddiq' s struggle for the nationalisation of oil in 1951 , attracted more scholarly 
attention than his coercive reforms. Richard Cottom stresses the liberal nationalist 
friction in Iran (Cottam, 1979). On the other hand, racial nationalism and Anderson's 
imagined society concept was adapted by Mostafa Veziri (1993). This was the 
secularist approach to ethnicity (Kedourie, 1993). In opposing this racial approach, 
Jalal Al-i Ahmed previously argued that our ancient society and tradition could not 
withstand the onslaught of Western technology in which European civilisation was 
adopted (Veziri, 1993). However, religious nationalism has changed the idea of 
religious and ethnic liberal nationalism in Iran, although they continue to comprise 
Iran's identity. Iran is one of main pillars of Islamic civilisation, achieved through 
national strategic culture under religious unity (Shia). However, the ethnic sector is 
still vulnerable to foreign interference in the Sunni part of the modem Iran. 
Map 3.1: Ethno- religious make-up of Iran 
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July 2008) 
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According to a 2000 report, the ethnic composition of Iran was: Persian 51%, Azeri 
24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 
2%, other 1%. The linguistic distribution of Iran's population is: Persian and Persian 
dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, 
Arab 1 %, Turkish 1 %, other 2%. However, the percentage of religious followers was: 
Shi'a Muslim 89%, Sunni Muslim 10%, and Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and 
Baha'i 1%. (www.islamic-world.net). The sphere of Shia influence provides political 
power to Iran, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Kuwait. 
Table 3.3: The religious sphere of influence of Iran 
Countl)· Perceutage of Total Population Population of 
Sbi'ites Shi'ites 
Iran %90 68,7 million 61,8 million 
P.~.$.tAA %20 165,5 million 33,2 million 
Ir.~q %65 26,8 million 17.4 million 
l.n.d.i.a %1 1.095,4 billion 11 million 
A~.eJb.~jj~An %15 8 million 6 million 
Afglumi.ll.~ll %19 31,1 million 5,9 million 
s-.~4.i .. h.~b.i.a %10 27 million 2.7 million 
l&.bM.QJ.l %45 3,9 million 1,7 million 
Ku.w . U~ %30 2.4 million 730 thousand 
B.ahr..Un. %75 700 thousand 520 thousand 
.SYXA~ %1 18,9 million 190 thousand 
UAE %6 2,6 million 160 thousand 
_.QatM. %16 890 thousand 140 thousand 
Tlw gm 'ite Populalion around the World 
Sourcfl: Baztab News, http://www.baztab.comlnf!wsl52316.php 
Despite the multi-ethnic diversification of Iran, Table 3; 3 shows that the majority of 
Iran is Shia, which creates a pattern for the construction of the national identity. 
Therefore, Azeri secular nationalism cannot become a threat to Iranian national 
security because such a small fragment of the population. The centres of the Shia 
universe are still Najaf and Lebanon, where Iranian political influence is strong. Iran 
also plays a very important role in the Persian Gulf with this religious identity 
connection; Iran is considered a regional threat to the Gulf countries. If Iran were to 
set aside its religious identity definition, its identity could be classified within the 
Asiatic culture but its orientation is now towards the Middle East as far as religion is 
concerned. 
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The modem Turkish state cannot achieve a strategic national culture on Kurdish 
issues and authoritarian secularism, as these factors pose a threat to the territorial 
unity of the (Turkish) state. On the other hand, the concept of an Iranian strategic 
national culture presents a different picture in the region. Although Iran has achieved 
a strategic religious and linguistic culture, its ethnicity is very vulnerable to foreign 
interference. 
3.4.0 Conceptual framework for Turko - Persian strategic cultural synthesis 
There are similarities between Turkish and Iranian national identity definitions; they 
can be defined as a Turko-Persian strategic cultural synthesis, which is an ecumenical 
mix of Arab, Persian and Turkic elements blended together during the ninth and tenth 
centuries. To clarify this concept, both types of identities must be considered: after 
the Westphalian type of state emerged in the Middle East, there was no subjective 
identity which was defined as 'Turko-Persian identity' exceptional from Iranian -
Azeri. However, the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis is still the main cultural 
commonality between Turkish, Central Asian, Caucasusian and Asian and Balkan 
Muslim peoples. This synthesis created during an integration process which covered 
the period from Islamisation to the Sunnite Shia sectarian division. Alienation from 
this integration began with the Mongol invasions and peaked during the Ottoman-
Safavid period.It has also been repeated during the modernisation process; the Pahlavi 
and Revolutionary Republican Islamic states. 
3.4.1 The Integration process of the Turko - Persian strategic cultural synthesis 
Turko - Iranian relations experienced both friendly and hostile military relationships 
during early periods their history, in the region of Transxonia. The first confrontation 
between Parthia (250 BC-226 AD) and the Hun Empire did not harm their national 
identities (Ogel, 1981 ). The second serious confrontation between Turks and Iranians 
occurred in the same region between the Sassanid (226 -654 AC) and the Goktiirk 
(552-745 AC); Turkish nomadic troops were defeated in first Turkish-Hephthalite 
War in 538 and the second the Turkish-Hephthalite War in 619 by the Persian forces. 
After the war the Sassanid and the Gokturk became allies and jointly fought the White 
Huns (420-552) provided amicable relations and kinship between the two nations. 
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However, an alliance between the Gokturk and the Byzantine Empire led to Turkish -
Iranian hostilities (Kafesoglu, 1984:94; Oztuna, 1983). These pre-Islamic relations 
were mentioned in Ferdowsi's Shahnama. He considered that the Turanians (Turks) or 
Turanizamin were the enemy of the Iranian nation (Firdawsi and D. Davis, 2006; 
Firdawsi, 1967: 126-8). After annexation by the Byzantine emperor of the Gokturk 
and Byzantine alliances, Heraclitus sent sorties into Iranian territory from 622 to 628 
to carry out raids and maintain pressure on the border. Thus; Iranian land became very 
vulnerable to an invasion by Arabs (Sykes, 2004). The battle of Qadisiyyah and the 
Nihavend war between the Islamic and Sassanid empires resulted in the demolition of 
the Sassanid Empire in 651. After the war, however, the transition process of Iranian 
national identity to an Islamic identity took place 'two centuries silence,' during 
which most were converted to Islam when the Abbasids (750-1258) took over (Lewis, 
1976}. The Arab-Turkish alliance in the Talas War in 751 was the main historical 
turning point with regard to Asian and Middle Eastern states. It ended the Chinese 
expansion in Central Asia (Yilmaz, 1970). After four Caliphate administrations, the 
Umayyads initially launched a policy of ethnic identity for Arabs. This required 
formal association with an Arab tribe and adaption of client status by the Mevali. The 
Iranian Mevali class was employed in the state bureaucracy and held intellectual 
positions, but was accepted as second class citizens in Arab nationalist states. The 
founder of the Hanafiya School, Ebu Hanifa, and Imam Ja'far, founder of the Twelver 
Jurisprudence schools, were persecuted and tortured by these rulers (Harald, 1999). 
The Turkish Mevali class also held military positions in the Abbasid period. Initially, 
the Abbasids strongly supported of the Turko - Iranian coalition to keep out the 
Umayyad State (Yildiz, 1976). 
The myth of Ebu Muslim Khurasani became a key part of the transformation of the 
Turko- Persian cultural synthesis and Islamisation (Vambery, 1873:1-19}. Before the 
Turkish dynasties in Persia, the emergence of Iranian Muslim dynasties, such as the 
Saffarids, Samanids, Ziyarids, the Buyids, Kakuyids, Buvandids of Tabarestan and 
the Gilan had a great effect on the conversion of the Persian and Turkish nations. The 
capital of the Samanids, Bukhara, was the centre of the Turko-Iranian Islamic 
synthesis. But Raduki who gave credit to Aryan myth of Iranian nationalism had 
served as a poet in Samanids state (Frye, 1965). 
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The Turkish Islamic identity was generated by the Oghuz tribe who chose Islam and 
separated from the other Turkish tribes. Thus, the notion ofTurkishness is the product 
of a Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis. Other identities such as A vars, Khazars, 
Magyar, and Bulgars were not accommodated within the Turkish national identity 
after the dominance of the Oghuz Turks. Halil Inalcik (2000) believes that Ottoman 
state (tradition) has two roots: Central Asia and Persia. Ottoman states took from this 
tradition the idea that the state subsisted through the maintenance of "tore" or "yasa" 
(codes of law). Fuad Koprulu (1992) further argued that the legitimacy of the Turkish 
dynasties depended on mystical "Gaza "and "Gazi Warrior Sultan" paradigms which 
had been transferred from the Oghuz Turks to the Karahanid, Ghaznevi (962-1187). 
This warrior role provided distinctive advantages for developing a Turko - Persian 
coalition till the 15th century. Even though the Seljuk Turks put an end to the 
intermezzo period of Iranian dynasties (Frye, 1967), this Turko - Iranian coalition had 
successfully persisted despite an Arab cultural assimilation. This Turkish warrior and 
Persian cultural experience created a new dynamic spirit for an Islamic expansionism 
spreading from Asia to the Balkans (Bertold, 1962 ). The question of the Turko -
Persian coalition can be defined as a strategic Turko - Persian national identity or a 
strategic Turko - Persian cultural identity. This, however, is subject to serious debate 
(Canfield, 1991: 1-34) because the responses to this question provide an explanation 
for understanding the nation - building of Central Asian states and transnational 
Kurdish problems in the region. The cities of Samarqand, Bukhara, Isfahan were seats 
of the Turko - Persian culture during the Samanids, Ghaznevi and Seljuk - Turk 
administrations. The legacy of Ghaznavi persisted in Afghanistan, Persia, Transoxania, 
and the northern part of the Indian continent, in which a Turko-Persian synthesis of 
Islam and Persian cultural identity was promoted (Robinson, 1991 :1 04-131 ). Persian 
court traditions were implemented by the Abbasids, Samanids, the Ghaznavi, Seljuks 
and the Seljuk Rum. Farsi became the court language in Turkic dynasties and the 
literary language of the Turko-Persian synthesis of Islam (Mazzaoui, 1991 :78-1 03). 
The manuscript of the Firdawsi (Shahnama), Kashari Mahmut's Divan-i Lugat ut-
Turk (Turkish Language Dictionary) and Yusuf Has Hajib's, Katadgu Bilig's 
(Wisdom of Royal Glory) helped to establish Turley and Iran as states each 
possessing a national. Identity influenced by its own mythology and culture (lnalcik, 
1991:1-19). 
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After the victory of the Seljuk Turks in the battle of Dandanakan, their legitimacy was 
accepted in the Middle East security complexes including the Sassanid territorial 
legacy. Seljuk Turks systematised the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis by develop an 
Islamic Turko - Persian approach to life by establishing Nizamiya Madrasas in the 
cities of Baghdad Nishabur, Belh, Herat and Isfahan in 1065. This school was 
considered an alternative scholarly institution to the Shia Fatime state's Ezher School 
in Egypt (Atay, 1983). Sunni schools of thought were systematised by the el-Gazzali 
and Shafite jurisprudence, which was promoted in the territory of the Seljuk Empire. 
The Turko - Persian coalition's legitimacy peaked during the rule of Malikshah and 
his Persian advisor Nizamulmulk, whose manuscript, Siyasatnameh, provided a 
distinctive explanation of Turko-Persian political experiences (Darke, 1978). The 
Seljuki Rum in Anatolia (1 081-1307) and the Atabegs were the distributors of the 
Turko - Persian synthesis of Islam and the main defenders of Islam against Christian 
crusaders prior to the Ottoman conquest of the region (Hillenbrand, 1999).The se 
Turko - Persian experiences in religion and science provided a more distinctive 
explanation for the Turko-Persian synthesis. There are three paradigms which formed 
after lbn Sina (A vicenna). 
Table 3.4: The formation of the Turkish and Iranian theosophical tradition 
lbn Sina (Avicenna) 
Ghazzali 
Fahreddin er-Razi 
Ottoman religious roots 
Sources: Karliga, 2005 
Ghazzali 
Nasireddin et-Tusi 
Iranian religious roots 
Suhreverdi-
Sehrezuri 
Iranian religious roots 
lbn Sina-Ghazzali-er-Razi theological tradition and lbn Arabi's theo - mystical 
paradigms comprised the Ottoman cultural thought and identity. On the other hand, 
lbn Sina - Ghazzali - Nasireddin et-Tusi and the lbn Sina - Suhreverdi-Sehrezuri 
paradigms were transferred to the cultural identity of Persia (Karliga, 2005). Prior to 
the collapse of the Soviet empire, Khomeini sent a letter to Gorbachev, in which he 
advised him to read the Fusus ul-Hikem, which was written by lbn Arabi who 
belonged to the third sector of the Islamic paradigm. The text shows that the tradition 
of lbn Sina was still effective in the formation of a revolutionary Islamic state. Most 
of the Islamic scientists and philosophers as such Farabi, Ulug Beg, Biruni, Taftazani 
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and Cami belonged to this Turko - Iranian synthesis but the confusion about their 
national linege is related to political alienation from the Turko-Persian synthesis. 
Their identities are not only Turkish or Persian but also a synthesis of both nations' 
'strategic cultural identity' (Sayili, 1939). 
Even though the Ottoman and Safavids were distict from each other, this cultural 
synthesis continued in literature but not at a political level. For example, Shah Ismail 
wrote his poetry using the penname Khati in the Turkish language, while (Minorsky, 
1942). Yavuz Selim wrote his using words borrowed from Persian (Belig, 1891). The 
role of Mevlana is still the main paradigm of Turko - Persian synthesis of Islam. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of Turko - Persian cultural identity is still a significant 
cultural factor in the Balkans and Asia, even though political subdivision began with 
the nation - building process that caused an identity crisis in Islamic civilisation. Most 
scholars believe that the philosophy and Islamic science were terminated after el-
Ghazzali's Tehafut'ul Felasife (Ghazali, 1958).However, this idea cannot explain an 
ineffectiveness of Averroes' Tehafu't Tehafut' in the Islamic World (Averroes and 
Van den Bergh, 1954). The crisis in Islamic civilisation has to be reconsidered as a 
political phenomena rather than a cultural one, because the alienation from Turko. -
Persian coalition eradicated the collective consciousness of Islamic civilisation in the 
Ottoman and Persian environments. It is very unfortunate that the experience of 
Andalusia could not transfer to the cultural geography of the Turko - Persian synthesis 
to create a new dynamics of Islamic civilisation. The Ottoman version of the 
renaissance during the disintegration period was not successful in maintaining the 
superiority of the Ottoman legacy in the Europe. The disintegration of the Persian 
national identity after the Shia extemalism was a major loss for the Persian nation 
because neither the Kurds nor Central Asian peoples embraced the shiatinazation of 
Iran nor did Indian and Balkan Muslims accept the new nation building of Iran. 
Therefore, the Ottoman and Turkish states effectively maintained their political status 
quo by conducting the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis within their territories. For 
instance, though Turkish flag's symbols (star and crescent) were taken from the 
Christian tradition of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks distributed the flag 
throughout the Islamic world as a sign of political power. 
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3.4.2.0 Alienation from the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis 
In the aftermath of the Mongol invasions of the Islamic World, most of the Turko-
Persian cultural heritage was destroyed and, following the fall of Baghdad in 1258, 
Delhi became a significant cultural centre for Muslims in the East (Canfield, 1991 :53-
77). The status quo of the Oghuz Turks was seriously damaged in the Islamic world 
up until the rise to power of the Ottoman Empire. In order to understand the 
continuity of the Ottoman legacy in modern Turkey's formation, this study looks at 
the scholarly discussion of Ottoman history by its doyen. Imber argues that the 14th 
century was basically "a black hole" for any scholar who attempts to reconstruct the 
history of this period. But Herbert Gibbons claimed that the Ottomans were a new 
race which ensured the continuity of Byzantine administrative practices under an 
Islamic guise (Lowry, 2004). It could not have emerged from purely Turko - Muslim 
roots, hence its Byzantine - Christian origins, but achieved a superior racial mixture, 
blending wild Asiatic blood with European stock. His argument basically presumes 
that the Ottomans were not equipped culturally to create a state. However, both Fuat 
Koprulu and Franz Babinger rejected his argument by arguing that Ottomans 
institutional roots derived from Seljuk and llhanid precedents (Lowry, 2004). 
Friedrich Giese pays attention to the mediation role played by the Akhi federation of 
craftsmen and merchants in the towns of Anatolia in transferring the administrative 
system of Anatolian Muslims states to the emerging Ottoman entity (Lowry, 2004). 
Paul Wittek expands his argument and focuses his attentions on the heterodox Sufi 
groups, Baktashi lodge played significant role to conversion of Balkanian people 
convert to Islam (Lowry, 2004). The coalition of Bithynian peoples and Akhi 
federations in the town of Anatolia provided the underpinnings of early Ottoman 
administrative practices as well as a bridge to bring them together. Lowry (2004) 
rejected the argument that the early Ottomans were not a tribe or people linked 
genealogically, but were rather groups of Anatolian Muslims bound by a common 
desire to fight the Christian infidels, which constructed the gazi ethos. Inalcik (2000) 
advances his argument by claiming that this common background tied together the 
Byzantine frontiers troops with Muslim gazi and that this led to assimilation. The 
Holy War and colonisation were the dynamic elements in the Ottoman conquests, and 
administrative forms adopted in the newly conquered territories derived from earlier 
Seljuk {Turko-Islamic) models. Inalcik rejects that aspect of Gibbon's work which 
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argues for the non-Turkish nature of the Ottoman's institutional base. On the other 
hand his thesis reconciles Koprulu's theory on the tribal origins of the empire with 
Wittek's Gazi thesis. The other Turkish Ottoman writer, Cemal Kafadar ( 1995) 
claims that gazi is only one element, but Ottoman frontier culture expresses the 
liquidity and fluidity of Islam and Christianity alike and emphasises the inclusionary 
nature of these two dominant cultures. However, without taking into account the 
historical approach, Dimitri Kitsikis argues that the Ottoman Empire was in reality a 
Turkish-Greek Empire (Lowry, 2004).When Ottoman Empire collapse, Lloyd George 
considered Grece to be the heir to the Ottoman Empire rather than the Turks after the 
end of Great War. 
However, the Tamerlane Empire (1336-1405) wanted to maintain the synthesis of a 
pro - Sunni- Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis, and challenged the Ottoman state at 
the Battle of Angora in 1402. After "forty years stagnation" (Fetret Devri) and 
following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman state was completely alienated 
from the Persian administrative system it created its own court system based on the 
Turkish language and the multinational millet system, which was integrated with 
Byzantine and Turko - Persian experiences (Kopruluzade, 1931 ). This decision 
shocked the highly Persianised Mughal Muslims in India and Central Asia, because 
they had copied the Persian court tradition and languages. Formation of the Janissary 
army and abolition of the tribal system, the transition of the Ottoman state from a 
tribal to a multicultural imperial millet system undermined the power of the Turkoman 
tribe in state administration such as the Candarli family (Kemal, 1972). This identity 
transformation was challenged by Aq Qoyunlu (white sheep), Uzun Hasan, in the 
Battle of Otlukbeli (Karateke, 2005:99-110) and Shah Ismail in the Battle of 
Chaldiran. The question is why Shah Ismail and his followers were perceived as arch 
enemies by the Ottoman states. The heterodox character of Akhi and its succeeding 
branch, Baktashi, played a very effective role in security of the state and the 
continuity of states systematic assimilation of the Anatolian people into Turkishness. 
However, the Alevi sect, which is proximate to the Baktashi tradition, mixed with the 
Shamanic and Mazdek religions and emerged as a rogue sub-religious identity that 
cooperated with the Shah Ismail missionary movements in Anatolia. However, after 
the victory of the Ottoman state, and following the Shiatining of Iran, Alevi 
population left the alliance. After that the group was seen as a national security rogue 
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threat by the Ottoman state. The victory of the Ottoman state also provided a profound 
dual legitimacy of Ottoman sultan who became a Kaiser to the Europeans and Caliph 
for the Muslims (Kafadar, 1995). The dual legitimacy of the Ottoman state was very 
ambiguous in the context of Byzantine heir and Islamic Caliphate. But the Ottomans 
had weaknesses in both political and religious legitimacy. The argument of Lutfi 
Pasha clarifies the legitimacy of the Caliphate in the Ottoman state system. He claims 
that the legacy of Caliphate does not belong to any ethnical background such as the 
Kureyshi paradigm (Gibb, 1962). The concept has to do with the basis of power, so 
that the Ottoman state received this legitimacy by enforcing its power from the 
Memluk state at the battle of Mercidabik in 1517 and became the main shelter for 
Muslims (Gibb, 1962). This realist approach to the legacy of the Caliphate was used 
by Mustafa Kemal in abolishing it in 1924. He transferred its legitimacy to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (Kili, 2001). This long- standing authority of the 
Ottoman state provided real religious legitimacy for the Turks but the Ottoman state 
had not used this religious power until the Kucuk Kaynarca treaty with Russia on 
10/21 July 1774 (Hurewitz,1956) and Abdul Hamid's Pan - Islamist defensive 
policies (Karateke,2005:28). He believes that Pan-Islamist policies against 
nationalism could create an alternative collective solidarity among Muslims but his 
policy did not prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman millet system. The legacy of the 
Byzantine Empire remained at a symbolic level in Ottoman state diplomacy until this 
romantic legacy was challenged by the Russian Tsar and the Austrian - Hamburg 
Empire, was used to justify Napoleon conquest (Karateke, 2005:20). In fact, Oghuz 
legitimacy is still maintaining its status quo throughout the Turkish state tradition, 
even after Islamisation (Kopruluzade, 1931 ). 
On the other hand, Persian alienation from the Turko - Persian synthesis was an act of 
serious withdraws from the Islamic world, because it introduced Shiism into Persia 
and distinguished Persian society from the Ottomans millet system and the Turko -
Persian synthesis of Islam. Turkoman tribes and the Azeris played a very significant 
role in the creation of the Safavid dynasty and nationalisation of Persia during the 
Safavid and Qajar periods. They partially gained power after the Islamic revolution, 
but the transition of Persian could not create a multi-cultural system but rather a 
centralised notion of Shiatinazed Persian civilisation. This transition became more 
durable than the Ottoman millet system after the emergence of the nation state system, 
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because the multi cultural millet identity and decentralised system of the Ottoman state 
were dissolved dramatically in Arab land and the Balkans. On the other hand, Iran 
maintained a collective solidarity stronger than that in Turkey. There is a different 
interpretation of the origins of Ottoman- Safavid conflicts (Karateke, 2005: 152-169); 
Adel Alouche pointed out that Ottoman - Safavid conflicts should be considered 
within the framework of the entire geopolitical pattern of Middle East and 
Transsoxania at the end of 15th century and the beginning of the 16th rather than 
within the simplistic framework of Shi 'ism versus Sunnism. In other words, the 
Ottoman - Safavid confrontation should be viewed in the light of two antagonists' 
relations (Allouche, 1980; Kutukoglu, 1993). The Safavid synthesis integrated with 
Arab Twelver Shia in Iraq, on the other hand, this Shia extemalism from Najaf and 
Jebeli Amal centralised the administration of Persia (Stewart, 1996:81-103). The 
transformation from Shafi to Ja'feriye Jurisprudence made Iran a motherland of the 
Shia Muslim but this development abandoned the influence of Qizillbash in Persian 
politics and a Persian engagement of Anatolia (Turner, 1989). The battle of Chaldiran 
in 1514 between Selim and Shah Ismail and subsequent wars in 1723-1747, 1776-
1779/80, 1812-1823 distinguished the religious and political structures of the rival 
states (Savory, 1987). The Fatwa ofKemal Pashazade concerning Qizilbash made this 
conflict a part of the status quo of the Gaza against the Safavid state, which proves 
that this war was not a religious war but a closanisation to penetrate the regions 
(Tekirdag, 2003). Both sides recognised one another's legitimacy with the Amasya 
Treaty in 1555 but dual power legitimacy in the Islamic world was reconciled by both 
parties signing the Qasri Shirin treaty) on 17th May 1639, which is still the main 
reference for supporters of Turko - Iranian friendship (Kutukoglu, 1993).The 
proposal of Nadir Shah caused a significant struggle to merge the Turko - Persian 
synthesis in the 18th century. During the Najaf conference, Shah proposed that 
Twelver shi'ism be considered a fifth school of Sunnism. His Ja'fari mazhab concept 
has been portrayed as a device to transform Iran into a Sunni country. In subsequent 
letters to the Mongols, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks, it was stated that he should 
recognise the Oghuz ancestry as a basis for closer political and cultural ties. His 
further offer to join the Ottoman state was unfortunately not evaluated properly by the 
Ottoman ruler due to internal problems between states (Tucker, 2006). The last 
attempt for unifying the Turko - Persian synthesis came from the Cemaledin Afghani 
in 19th century, when he proposed that Islamic unity against Western imperialism was 
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the basis for a nation state system, such as the British Commonwealth, but his 
philosophy clashed with the pan - Islamist policies of Abdul Hamit (Keddie, 1983). 
The Jon Turk proposal, Turanism initiated a new dimension during WWI but failure 
ended the Turko - Persian synthesis and also the millet system (Hanioglu, 1995). The 
last victory of the Ottoman millet system in the Dardanelles could not produce an 
alternative unity for dynamics but rather created new nation states which favoured 
new state centralisation and new imaginative society policies. 
In short, though the Mongol invasion resulted in the dissolution of the Turko-Persian 
cultural synthesis, it drew the Turkish movement towards the West and resulted in the 
construction of two strategic national cultures - the Ottoman Empire in the West and 
the Shiatinazation of Iran in the East. After that time, the position of the two states 
becomes competitive, with alternatives national strategic cultures in politics and 
society in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. However, the competition of 
the two friends intensively continued during the Safavid period while a lower more 
low intensity of competition was maintained during the Qajar period. This regional 
competition was frozen until the collapse of the USSR. In the next section, the study 
briefly analyses Turkey's and Iran's establishment of this peripheral identity 
relationship. 
3.5.0 Withdrawal of Turkey and Iran from the Caucasus and Central Asia 
There are three main central powers and cultural identities in the region: Russians, 
Turks and Persians. Peripheral identities include Georgians, Armenians, Chechens, 
Azeris, Circassians, Abkhazians in the Caucasus and Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tatars, 
Kazakhs, Kyrgyzi, and Tajiks in Central Asia and have maintained their status quo 
under the influence of their central identities. In addition, Afghan identity played an 
important role in the Great Game between Russia - Britain conflicts during the 19th 
and 20th centuries, however, the Uzbeks always considered themselves a central 
power in the region with reliance on Mongol and Timur state traditions. During the 
Ottoman-Safavid conflict, the Uzbeks were in an alliance with the Ottoman Empire 
(Burton, 1991). However, the Babur governments were in alliance with the Safavids 
against the Uzbeks in Asia. 
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Throughout medieval times, peripheral identities were dominant in region as middle -
power kingdoms, but after the separation of the Turko - Persian synthesis, peripheral 
identities had to confront the emerging power of Russian, and Persian shiatinezed 
Persia. Only the Azeri Turks took up the new a religious identity. The other nations 
who were islamised with the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis remained under the 
Ottoman sphere of influence. Frye (1965) pointed out the present peoples of central 
Asia, whether Iranian or Turkic speaking, have one culture, one religion, one set of 
social values and traditions with only language separating them. Due to this separation, 
the nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia gradually grew more isolated from both 
the new Persian and Turkish identities. 
The Treaty of Zuhab (Peace of Qasr-e Shirin) in 1639 divided the region into the two 
front lines of Safavid Iran and the Ottoman; the accord granted Y erevan in the 
southern Caucasus to Iran and all of Mesopotamia to the Ottomans, but the legacy of 
Ottomans ended in the region with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. Similarly 
Iranian political power in the region ended with the Treaties of Gulistan in 1813, 
Turkomanchia in 1828 and Akhal in 1881. But the most harmful event for Iranian 
nationalism was when Northern Azerbaijan became a part of Tsarist Russia and the 
Soviet Union. Between the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia annexed the Crimea 
(Macfie, 1996) and following the entente powers' Ggreat Game in the region showed 
that the Persian - Ottoman dichotomy put an end to the political power of Turko -
Persian cultural synthesis. Cemaleddin Afghani's proposal signified that nation states 
have to be formulated by central identities but his attempts were underestimated by 
the Turkish and Iranian foreign policy - makers (Keddie, 1972). Subsequently, the 
Russian identity became the main threat to Turkish and Iranian national security. 
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Map 3.2: Russian annex of Turkish and Iranian buffer security zones 
Sources: Cossa, 1999: 11 
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After the loss of the peripheral security zones, Anglo-Russian occupation in 1907 and 
1941 made clear the importance of this synthesis. Therefore, both countries diplomacy 
were always aware that the Russian sphere of influence could create a main threat to 
their national security. In fact, both countries became a peripheral security zone 
against Russian expansion. 
Christian Georgia and Armenia maintained their national identities under Turkish and 
Iranian rule, and the Ghulam army brought Armenia and Georgia to the attention of 
the Iranian administration (Herzig and Kurkchiyan, 2005; Herzig, 1996). While 
Georgia played a neutral role in the region, Armenia became an ally of Russian and 
Persian after the establishment of a Tsarist Armenian state. This historical legacy was 
very important after the emergence of regional independent states in 1991 . 
The main transition period from a Turko-Persian identity to a Russian identity was 
experienced under the Soviet Union. Soviet Russia launched a state - building process 
in the region and states were separated from each other, allowing Russian cultural and 
political penetration into the regions at a rapid rate (Allworth, 1973). Therefore, the 
Turkish kinship model and the Iranian revolutionary strategy failed in the region after 
the collapse of the Soviet Empire but the relative importance of the Turko - Persian 
cultural synthesis had an influence on the sub-conscience of new nation states' 
political and cultural lives. Russian languages were replaced with Persian languages 
in diplomatic missions as "linguafranca " for the region. 
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During WWI, the failure of the Committee of Union and Progress Party (CUP) 
government' s Pan-Turanist policies and Enver Pasha's personal struggle in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia had resulted in complete isolation for the peripheral 
identities. Enver Pasha aimed to establish an Azerbaijani state in the Caucasus but 
following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, Sultan Galiyev's Turanist attempts 
assisted the expansion of Soviet imperial hegemony in the region (Kakinc, 2003). 
With the Ankara-Moscow coalition against Enver Pasha in the Caucasus and the 
entente powers' invasion of Anatolia, Turkey reaffirmed the political legacy of Soviet 
Russia in the region, but the treaty of Kars was signed between the Ankara 
government and Soviet Russia in 1921 . While this treaty provided the Ankara 
government with international legitimacy, Turkish - speaking people had lost their 
whole cultural and political contact with each other until the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire. The legitimacy of the Kars treaty was renewed by Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 
Turkey in their first stage of the independence process. On the other hand, the Anglo-
Russian entente ignored the neutrality of Iran and occupied Iranian territory in 1907. 
Map 3.3: The Anglo- Russian Convention of 1907 and Soviet Occupation in Azerbaijan and the 
Socialist Republic of Gilan 
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Due to the Russian invasion, Ottoman and Iranian bureaucrats set up an interim 
Movakkat government between 1916 and 191 7 to defeat the Russian and English 
forces in Kermanshah (Cetinsaya, 2006). Indeed, during the war, the Ottoman army 
thrice invaded the city of Tabriz and reached Hamadan. After end of the war, Iran 
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sought territory from Turkey in the Paris Agreement and the Sevres Treaty but Soviet 
Russia filled the vacuum in Iran and supported the establishment of the Persian 
Socialist Soviet Republic, which lasted from June of 1920 till September of 1921.Due 
to the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty (Hurewitz, 1956). Peaceful relations continued 
until 1933. Following the Anglo-Soviet invasion, 1941-1946, Azeri and Kurdish 
nationalism in modem Iran were increased. The People's Republic of Azerbaijan and 
the Kurdish Mahabat government established as puppet states of the Soviet Union in 
1945. Because of centralisation policies, awareness of peripheral identities became an 
internal threat to Turkey and Iran after the 1990s. There are two main reservations for 
Turkey and Iran concerning the region's security and cultural sphere of influence. 
Iran's influence is mainly in the Dari - speaking countries of Afghanistan, and 
Tajikistan. However, Turkey's cultural sphere of influence covers most of Central 
Asia, Azerbaijan and also parts of Russia. 
3.5.1 Middle Eastern orientation of Turkish strategic national culture and the 
Kurdish nationalist challenge 
In this section, the roots of Kurdish nationalism is dealt with to establish the basis for 
Chapter Seven and to explain the Middle Eastern orientation of Iran in Chapter Five, 
under the title of Shia. The origins of Kurdish people are uncertain but they have 
maintained their national identity for the last two thousand years whilst they had been 
faced with two significant identity transformations: Islamisation and modernisation. 
They converted to Islam from Zoroastrian in the 7th century before the Turks and 
Persians and served as a military regiment in the Islamic imperial army. Their 
Islamization integrated with the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis so that they protected 
their national identity and languages. The warrior role of Saladin Ayyubi against 
Christian crusaders provided significant prestige in the Islamic world and contributed 
to the Kurdish national identity during the period of the Turko - Persian Islamic 
cultural synthesis. One of the aims of Kurdish nationalism is to manufacture the 
Kurdish history with its own legends such Saladin Ayyubi. 
The Kurdish language belongs to the western sub-group of Iranian languages, which 
in turn belong to the Indo-Iranian branch (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992). Unlike Turks 
and Persians, they could not systematise a written or spoken language in literature for 
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nation - building. They speak different dialectic groups, gradually shading into one 
another, such as Kurmanji or northern Kurdish, spoken in Turkey and the 
northernmost part of the Iraqi and Persian Kurdistan, and Sorani, spoken in southern 
Kurdistan. Both Sorani and Kurmanji have a written literary tradition, to some extent. 
Sub-dialects include Kermanshah, Leki, and Gurani, spoken in Iran and a Zaza accent 
spoken in Tunceli, and Bingol in Anatolia (Kreyenbroek and Sperl, 1992 ). Sharaf 
Khan's Sarafname (a history of Kurdish ruling families) in 1597 and Ahmad Khani' s 
(1650-1706) epic poem "Mem- u Zin" distinguishes Kurds from Persians, Turks, and 
Arabs. Though Gellner's agro-literate society concepts are certainly relevant to the 
Kurdish case in the 19th and 20th centuries, Anderson and Gellner's explanation also 
supports the concept of a nation, which is a product of relatively recent technological 
and economic developments (Gellner, 1995). Therefore, the facilities of globalisation 
provide space to pan - Kurdish nationalist in their propaganda activities and create 
common national awareness by satellite, radio, internet etc. 
After the Persian Shiatinized national identity transition, (Bruinessen, 1992) Kurds 
became part of the Ottoman millet system, but they differentiated themselves by 
adhering to the Shafi'i madhhab. While some unorthodox Alevi Kurds cooperated 
with the Safavid state, Kurdish-Safavid conflict increased in the battles of Dimdim in 
1609 and 1610 and created a serious defence barrier against Shia transformation in 
Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia. However, Kasri Sirin's Treaty in 1639 severed 
the Kurdish territorial legacy even though the Kurds maintained their tribalism system, 
which provided them with exceptional autonomous status in tax payments and 
administration during the Ottoman period (McDowall, 2004). This alliance 
relationship between Turks and Kurdish groups continued until the Treaty of Berlin in 
1878 (Hurewirtz, 1956: 189). The treaty ventured into Turko - Kurdish relations and 
entailed superior status for Christian minorities such as the Suriani (Syrian Orthodox) 
in cities of Mardin and Jazirah, Assyrians (Nestorians and Chaldean) in city of 
Hakkari, the Bahdinan across the Urmiya and Armenians from the city of Van 
northwards (Hurewirtz,1956: 190). The first serious rebellion against the new modus 
vivendi was started by Sheikh Ubeydullah in Eastern Anatolia and Iran in 1880; he 
was captured by Ottoman and sent to Hijaz as an exile (Karpat, 2002). However, the 
terror activities of the Armenian Committee in the Kurdish region created serious 
tension between the two countries. The Ottoman state dealt with the expansion of 
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Pan-Islamist policies in mostly Arab societies,but also in Iran. In opposing the 
Sultan's policies, the Qajar dynasty used the Armenian political card against Ottoman 
influence (Cetinsaya, 2006). Abdulhamit organised Kurdish tribes by setting up the 60 
Hamidiye Regiment in 1876, which was effectively used until 1918 by the Ottoman 
state to suppress Armenian revolts in eastern Anatolia and in WWI in the Caucasus 
and Palestinian front lines (McDowall, 2004). The Simqu revolt by the Kurds against 
state centralisation between 1918 and 1922 was suppressed by Cossack brigade leader, 
Reza Shah (McDowall, 2004).After Sheikh Said's rebellion in 1925 (Olson,1992), 
Turkey lost negotiating power against the British Mandate in Iraq and Mosul and 
Kirkuk was given to the British Mandate in the Ankara agreement, as mentioned 
above ( Olson, 1976).A claim for Kurdish statehood was made in the Sevres Treaty but 
ended in the Lausanne conference on 24th July 1923 (McDowall, 2004). As a result of 
centralisation policies, Kurdish identity faced suppression and isolation in Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Whilst Iranian and Iraqi Kurds' national identities were 
recognised by the governments, Turkey has denied the identity of a Kurdish nation in 
Turkey until the 1990s. State centralisation policies against a series of Kurdish 
uprisings such as the Sheikh Abdurrahman rebellion in 1927, the Ararat rebellion 
following the establishment of an Ararat Republic by Ihsan Nuri Pasha in 1927 and 
1930, and also the Dersim (Tunceli) Rebellion in 1937 provided intensive 
international support for the legitimacy of a Kurdish national identity against 
centralised state policies (Olson, 1995). The alienation of Kurds from the Turks, 
Persians and Arabs is mainly related to the territorial legacy of Kurdish land on which 
Kurds have existed for a significant time, in a semi-autonomous status. But as 
mentioned above, the land and their regional status quo were fragmented by the 
Treaty of Zuhab. Further division occurred between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia. 
There is a significant Kurdish population in the region. The figures for Ghasemlou 
show 10,409,000 in total in 1965. But the population has not increase much in Iraq 
due to deportation and war between the Kurds and the Iraqi authority. However 
Burinnessen and McDowal reported a Kurdish population of 19, 8000,000 in 1984 
and 22,600,000 in 1992. Nevertheless, the real figures for Kurdish people are still 
unclear, due to non-recognition of the Kurdish national entity. 
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Table 3.5: Kurdish population 
Author 
Turkey 
Iraq 
Iran 
Syria 
Other 
Total 
Short & Bruinnessen 
Ghassemlou( 1965) McDermott (1977) (1978) 
4,900,000 5,600,000 7,500,000 
3,300,000 3,400,000 2,500,000 
1,550,000 2,025,000 3,500,000 
400,000 500,000 
259,000 165,000 100,000 
10,409,000 11,630,000 14,100,000 
Sources: (Stansfield.2005:75) 
McDowall( 1992 
More(1984) ) 
10,000,000 10,800,000 
3,000,000 4,100,000 
6,000,000 5,500,000 
800,000 1,000,000 
1,200,000 
19,800,000 22,600,000 
In brief, the peripheral identity relationship in the region of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia provides a security zone both for Turkey and Iran after the dissolution of Soviet 
Empire, but there are no longer a legacy of Turkishness and systematic immigration 
flows from the region. On the other hand; Kurdish internal immigration has replaced 
Turkish-oriented migration to the big cities and this assimilation process cannot be 
successful in creating a common national identity. Therefore, the project of a strategic 
Turkish cultural identity was under fire, but it certainly has capacity to develop into a 
common strategic identity in a Turkish and Kurdish coalition. From the point of view 
of Iran's cultural lineage with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, revolutionary politics 
encouraged expansion of the Iranian cultural sphere of influence for Asiatic 
orientation politics. However, Turkey tried to return to the western backyard of the 
Eurasian steps rather than Middle Eastern strategic cultural reservations. 
3.5.2 Middle Eastern orientation of Iranian national identity: Shia externalism 
The paradigm of the Kerbela tragedy and the myth of Hussein had a strong influence 
in forming the Persian Shiite identity and the revolutionary regime of Iran (Michael, 
1980: 13). Due to refusing to grant legitimacy to the temporary rulers of Sunni states, 
their social rights deteriorated under persecution by Sunni rulers, torture, and isolation. 
Therefore, the substantial Shia population sustained its hatred and opposition against 
the central authority, becoming a marginalised anarchical ethnic group, which 
gravitates from the majority of society and led to the practice of systematic taqiyye 
(dissimulation), through which they could refuse to disclose their true opinions to 
avoid personal danger (Akhavi, 1980). 
123 
Until Shah Ismail, Iran was the centre of the Sunni Islamic universe in the Middle 
Ages, and the question of how he succeeded the apostasy of Iran and created 
Anderson's imaginary society in Persia can be answered by Parsons' concept of 
Weberian personal charisma, which can be developed in one of two directions: a 
traditionalised or a rationalised structure (Parsons, 1967). Despite an ignorance of 
Twelver Shiite law, Shah Ismail accommodated the body ofTwelver Shi-ite norms by 
externalism and became the architc of the religious Persian identity. This identity was 
transferable and acted as a state religion to legitimise his political legacy, which was 
something neither Fatimids nor Buyids could have encouraged in the past. Therefore, 
the conversion of the Persians must be seen as a wholly 'political act' rather than as a 
desire to promote religion per se. 
The externalism of orthodox Shia clerics from southern Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon/ 
Jabal-i Amal in order to fuse Shia jurisprudence, theology, and philosophy intensified 
the situation in Mesopotamian. The founder of Twelver Shia, Sheikh Ali al Karaki 
(d.1535) was invited to indoctrinate people with Ja'feri thought in Safavid Iran 
(Turner, 1989). Safavid Iran deemed its legacy to be descended from the seventh 
Imam Musa al Kazim which implied that Safavid's dynasty ruled on behalf of the 
Hidden Imam. The importance of Shia externalism for this study is related to the 
territorial issue of Iraq and the Qizilbash's role in Iran and transition of Alevi identity 
in Anatolia, because, after the Shia externalism in Iran, the polarisation between 
Persian nobles and the Qizilbash created an internal conflict. As a consequence of this 
duality, Shah Abbas the Great (1588-1629) centralised the state organisation. Alevi 
(Olsson and Ozdalga, et al 1998) and the exalted Turkoman lost their power in 
government until Nadir Shah took power. 
Shah Ism ail ordered all preachers to lead the Friday prayers in the name of the Twelve 
Imams and encourage 'sabb', the cursing ofthe first three Rightly Guided Caliphs for 
usurping the rightful place of Imam Ali to increase the political adversary and division. 
Twelver Shi 'ism was used for the aim of creating a new state rituals and traditions in 
Persia. The battle between the Sunnite Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire 
was also seen as an exploitation of religion to enhance rationalised authority. The 
religious polemic of fatwa (verdict) allowed shedding of the blood of a male and the 
taking of each others' women and children captive to legitimise the political conflict 
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in Islamic politics. Ultimately, the agreement in 155511590 provided two important 
consensuses: Iranians would stop the cursing of the first three caliphs, and Ottomans 
would guarantee the protection of all pilgrims to Mecca and Medina (Ragip, 2003). 
3.5.2.1 Attempts of religious conflict resolution: Najaf Assembly 
After the Afghan occupation and following Nadir Shah's (1736-1747) seizure of 
power in Iran and his termination of Imamate lineage with the Ja'fari proposal and 
ecumenical efforts, Shia clerics were exiled from Isfahan to Iraqi holy cities and India 
in 1722 ( Nakash,2003:238-62). His concept of the exalted Turkmen tribe and the 
Ja'feri proposal urged Persia to integrate with the Ottoman state (Lockhart, 1958; 
Ricks, 2001). Therefore, he wanted his legacy to be part of the Ottoman vassal state. 
Nadir's coronation on the Mughan step in March 1736 and his success in 
incorporating tradition into the Council of Najaf introduced a royal legitimacy in 
Persia and Eurasia for unity of Muslim Umma, and succeeded the invention of 
tradition in the council of Najaf modified Shiism in such a way as to make it 
acceptable to Sunnis (Tucker, 2006). However, his attempts were regarded with 
Shiism to be suspicious and eschewed the vassal status request by Bab-i Ali. The 
Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam also issued a formal fetwa against the Ja'feri madhhab in 
April 1742, stating that Nadir's whole Ja'feri concept was a cloak to hide belief which 
was actually Shia and therefore heretical (Muhimme Defteri, 148 :226). Rather than 
seek religious reconciliation, the Ottomans preferred to recognise the independent 
"status quo" of Iran and the "de facto" leadership of Nadir Shah signed the Kurdan 
Treaty in 1746. The agreement granted formal Ottoman recognition to Shia Iranians 
as fellow Muslims and made Iran part of Dar al-Islam without compromising the 
custodian of the Two Holy Places. Peter Avery (et al, 1991 observed that Nadir's 
political and military activities contributed to the final separate identity of Iran as a 
modem nation state. Even though Nadir's novel version of Islamic ecumenism was 
not implemented, the role of religion was reduced in diplomatic discourse, which 
accentuated the division of the Shia school as Akhbari and Usuli during the reign of 
Qajar dynasty. 
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The political role of the Shia clerics diversified in the government of Qajar (1795-
1925). Shia schools have different interpretation in politics. The Akhbaris in Iraq 
rejected the doctrine of ijtihad, to state that certain judgments could be derived from 
them alone. They became literalistic, interested more in transmitting religious 
knowledge than in encouraging interpretive reasoning (ijtihad). The Usulis, however, 
contended that, in the absence of the imam, clerics could exercise the doctrine of 
Ijtihad. Clerics derive their authority from the Hidden Imam and are entitled to 
interpret the Sharia. The triumph of the Usuli School transformed their political 
strength in revolutionary ideology in Iran in twentieth century (Newman, 1986). This 
internal issue of Shia and ethnic nationalism is still unresolved between Iraq and Iraq. 
The disavowing of the Ottoman past impacts on a broad range of security and 
religious issues in Iraq. The Ottoman state divided Iraq into three provinces--Baghdad, 
Basra and Mosul, which were under the governance of the central government in 
Istanbul. The shrine cities of Iraq were called Atabat (Karbala, Najaf, Kazimayn and 
Samarra) and held semi-autonomous status until the British occupation. The Ottoman 
state encouraged the larger tribal confederations towards a settlement strategy which 
was the bedrock of the Mamluk administrative system. In contrast to Persian and 
Azeri mujtehids, Iraqi mujtehid lacked a close network interwoven with mosques, 
places of worship and financial connections; people were more closely linked with 
their resident local sayyids rather than the mujtahids in Najaf (Faleh, 2003:64). Iraq's 
distance from the centre of power in Istanbul reinforced the claim of the Shah as the 
protector of Shia interests in this frontier zone (Berkes, Cumhuriyet 14 February 
1979). 
3.5.2.2 The failure of Pan-Islamism for the new axis 
Shia-Sunni strife was faced with an external threat in the late 19th and at the beginning 
of the 20th century. Consequently, the Pan-Islamist policy of Sultan Abdul Hamit 
(1876-1909) marked the unity of ummah against Western imperialism (Cetinsaya, 
2003; Ozdalga, 2005).The proposals of Cevdet Pasha and Iraqi Question Committee 
set a precedent for the Ja'feri proposal to use the mujtahid's influence over the people 
in Iran and Iraq to create a Shia opposition movement. Anger against European 
penetration of Iranian and Ottoman territories greatly intensified the issuing of 
religious fatwa by Iraqi Shia clerics, who called an Ottoman-Iranian rapprochement. 
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The Pan-Islamist reformer Sayyid Jamal al-Oin al-Afghani (1837-97), who was the 
architect of alliance between the clerics and radical secular elements, convinced the 
Marjai Taqlid, Sayyid Mirza al-Shirazi in Najaf to issue the fatwa against the 
autocratic Nasir al-Oin Shah Qajar (1848-96), which prohibited the consumption of 
tobacco by Muslims (Keddie, 1981; Marcinkowski, 2004). During his exile in 
Istanbul, Al-Afghani cooperated with two Iranian secular dissidents, Mirza Aga Khan 
Kirmani (a writer and publisher of the journal Akhtar) and Sheikh Ahmad Ruhi. On 
the other hand, Shah rebuilt the Afghani dissident movement promoted the Ottoman 
covert activities in Iraq, and began to use the Armenian political card to interact with 
the Ottoman policies in the region (Ak9am, 2004). As a result, the Ottomans had to 
terminate the revisionist religious policies in the region. The imperial game around the 
time of the war was exacerbated by the assassination of the Shah in May 1896 and the 
foreign occupation of Ottoman and Iranian territories. After the toppling of the Qajar 
dynasty, Reza Shah recruited enlightened modernists to impose nationalist and 
secularist social- engineering policies. However, the Shah's ambition for a republican 
state was faced with severe criticism because of Mustafa Kemal's abolition of the 
Caliphate, which was supported by the Shia clerics. Therefore a type of alternative 
regime theory between two nations emerged in the region. 
3.6.0 Conclusion: the paradigm shifts in Turkish-Iranian national strategic 
culture in the framework of social theory 
In this chapter, the author has tried to review the evolutionary processes of Turkish 
and Iranian strategic cultural identity formation, the rise and fall of imperial dynasties, 
the experience of unification and disengagement from the Turko-Iranianian strategic 
cultural synthesis and, lastly, the formation of separate national strategic political 
cultures. Historical experience can only be valuable if it determines the foreign policy 
maker's mindset. In this framework, the Turko - Persian cultural synthesis can be 
classified as an undefined common cultural identity in Turkish and Iranian idealist for 
the unity of both nations. 
The policies of the Erbakan government and his mindset may be rooted in reference to 
this experience, which supports a possible axis against Christendom, as in the Middle 
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Ages. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran appear to be enemies when reference is 
made to the conflict between Selim the Grim and Shah Ismail. This policy 
interpretation is a key to understanding the crisis period between the two neighbours 
in 1989 and 1997. However, there is a moderate paradigm which provides a space for 
the equal co-operation between two national states. Iran and Turkey have been 
reliable friends since the Qasri Shirin Treaty that recognised the legitimate recognition 
of territory and regime theories of one another. The fourth point is that Turkey and 
Iran are the two entities in the Middle East, whose behaviour is based on paradigms 
from the period of the Shah and Ataturk. On the other hand, the concept of satellite 
and sovereign states' paradigm is a key to the Iranian policy- makers' agenda. Turkey 
is considered a satellite state of America and Israel, which are the main enemies of 
Iran. However, Iran is open for cooperation with the super power if it can establish 
pragmatic management. While Turkey has a great advantage in security and political 
concern, Iran lost its strategic importance after the revolution in 1979. If regime 
change in Iran takes place, it would likely return this client paradigm. In comparing 
the reconstruction of the state, Iranian national strategic identity embraces most of the 
society's facts and experiences. A problem does exist in the public sphere used by 
state. The religious right and ethnic entity definitions of the state are still in conflict 
with the people. After the deduction of this paradigm in theory, the social structures of 
both states are reducible to each country's individual foreign policy leadership. They 
are analysed in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE RECONTSRUCTION OF TURKISH AND IRANIAN 
STATE IDENTITY, .FAITH, SOCIETY AND A 
STRATEGIC CULTURE OF SECURITY 
4.1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the emergence of the Westphalia nation-state system, the identity 
definition of a state created new enthusiasm, including the formation of a new 
imaginary society project by Turks and Iranians during the 20th century. This project 
and its parts were opposed to non-state actors like individuals, transnational social 
movements or multinational corporations. Both modern Turkey and Iran recognised 
the territorial and identity legitimacy of each other and managed to produce a new 
national state identity, faith and society. However, the modernisation project was 
filtered down from above by the Shah and Ataturk is still questionable due to the 
authoritarian practices of both countries. Whilst Turkey became a partner of the 
Western security system and her dependency on arm technology to NATO, Iran was 
viewed as "lone a planet" a pariah state, by the United States. International pressure 
forced the messianic leadership to develop a nuclear capability for Iran to be a 
deterrent against Western initiatives. This study argues that the virtual state 
conception in Turkish understanding depends on Shamanistic beliefs of the state 
system, which were embedded with the Islamic factor under the leadership of the 
Oghuz tribe. That legacy was transferred to the nation state system by the mixture of 
immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus, and by the local population who 
created a new state identity under the political discourse of Turkishness. On the other 
hand, the legacy of the Iranian nation-state identity moved away from a secular 
national identity to a religious national state in the form of a republican system. It is 
unfortunate that the norm and value system of both nation state systems failed to 
create a model of a state system acceptable for the international community but 
instead became part of the superior Westphalia state system. Therefore, the key 
concept of Peter Katzenstein' s and Jack Snyder' s "strategic culture" in middle-power 
state's security as a pattern of identity definition will be applicable to analysing 
Turkey's and Iran's strategic national security cultures (Katzenstein, 1996), (Snyder, 
1977). This chapter analyses bilateral relations and the authoritarian implemented by 
129 
both countries by dealing with the cultural and political practices during the 20th 
century. It also contributes to the literature on nationalism by comparing the 
evolutionary Turkish and Iranian national identities. 
4.2.0 Secularist and religious centralisation: the legitimising of nation state 
leadership and order 
The nature of a man's identity formed the nature of strategic state formation in Turkey 
and Iran. Ataturk's character was formed by the political consequences of Mete Kan 
(209-179 B.C), the Ughuz tribe or Chengiz Khan and their imagination for Asiatic 
unity. This is considered an alternative model to a secular Muslim state, through 
strictly following a policy of Westernisation (Mango, 2002). The conservative 
approaches to Turkish nationalism theories contrast Turkish nationalism with 
Alparslan's victory in the Manzigert Valley. They include references to Kilic Arslan, 
Osman Beg, and Fatih Sultan Mehmet's legacy in God's state, in the road map of 
Westernisation politics (Top((u, 1978; Ozer et al: 14). Rather than adopting the only 
reference to the constitutional movements of Westernisation, this movement 
condensed Ataturkism and Kemalism within Turkish - Islamic synthesis after the 
1960s. In opposing the conservative approach on Turkish nationalism, Suna Kili and 
Turhan F evzioglu present Ataturkism as the model of modernisation of Turkishness 
(Fevzioglu, 1982; Kili, 1995). 
On one hand, Reza Shah's political references originated from Cyrus the Great and 
Muhammad Reza's nationalist honour, driven by the myth ofPersepolis and inspired 
driven by the light of Zarathustra, which invoked the national awareness of a nation 
state system by rejecting the Persian cultural infuence, which was the main motivation 
for the Turkish dynasties in Iran. However, the myth of Mustafa Kemal in general 
reflects Celebi Mehmet's stagnation policy for reconstructing the new nation state. 
The anti-revisionist policies of Mustafa Kemal aimed to protect the "Kizil Elma" 
doctrine (Anatolia is considered Kizil Elma) and Constantinople as symbolic elements 
of this metaphor (Tansel, 1952).The issue is the distinction between the revolutionary 
reservations of the new Turkish strategic national culture in modem Turkey and 
constitutional monarchy or a religious republican state's national and cultural 
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attributes. In this section, the study deals with secularist legitimacy. The main focus is 
on the origins of a strategic culture of security and reconstruction of state identity. 
4.2.1 'fhe roots of political and cultural material reservations of 'furkishness: 
Revolutions, immigration and secularism 
The political of Mustafa Kemal begin with an Ottoman modernisation program. 
Ottoman westernisation was launched with the "New Army" (Nizam-i Cedid) at the 
opening of the Imperial School of Naval Engineering (Muhendishane-i Bahri-i 
Humayun) in 1773. The experiment proved to be successful by the early nineteenth 
century. The "New Army" had 22,700 soldiers and 1,600 officers at this stage (Hale, 
1994). This process of modernisation was completed in 1826 by Sultan Mahmud 11, 
who abolished the Janissary order and took over the Baktashi dervish orders' property 
on the grounds that they subscribed to a heterodox belief system. The new state order 
transformed a solidly secular-minded and western-trained officer of the royal army. 
At the same time, it created a Nakshibendiyye Sunni Sufi power class in society and 
then placed this new religious class in the state apparatus. In order to form the state 
bureaucracy, the School of Administrative Sciences (Mekteb-i Mulkiye) was founded 
to train non-military western-type administrative bureaucrats and diplomats in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1859. These groups became the driving force of pro-
Western public opinion in Turkey, pulling the rest ofthe country along with it (Ortayli, 
1983). 
Population reservation about the new Turkish state came from a member of regions. 
The first serious immigration wave departed from the Crimea in the aftermath of the 
Crimean War (1853-56). The exodus of Russian Muslims increased after the new 
Ottoman army and new political cadre lost the war against Russia in 1877-1878. The 
situation created a big hole in state confidence and also reshuffied the Ottoman state 
population. Russian Muslims in 1897 numbered nearly 20 million while Ottoman 
Muslims numbered only 14.1 million (Meyer, 2007), Karpat, 1985). Most sources 
place the total number of Muslims leaving Russia for the Ottoman Empire in the latter 
half of the 19th century and early 20th century at well over one million. A body 
designed to enhance supervision of immigration by moving refugees from cities to the 
provinces was created by the Ottoman Empire and called the Refugee Commission 
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(Muhacirin Komisyonu). Despite the Tsarist government's attempts to prevent 
Muslims emigrating, they left the Crimea in their tens of thousands towards the 
Ottoman Empire in 1874, 1890 and 1902 (Meyer, 2007). Ziya Gokalp criticised 
tanzimat (preordination) for having failed to develop cultural bases of the nation in 
this context. Instead of unifying the nation it had widened the gap between the rulers 
and the common people (Heyd, 1950). 
As mentioned earlier, the Berlin treaty provided Russia with the opportunity to 
interfere with the Ottoman state's internal affairs. Russia became the main ally of the 
Armenian population which caused the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion and later 
Armenians joined the opposition movement of Young Turks. The policy of the three 
men (Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pasha) was aimed at creating a one- nation project and 
was advanced by Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary cadre during the withdrawal from 
the imperial territories. One man died in the Asian steps for his Turanist ideology, and 
two men were assassinated by the Armenian Diasporas. The discussion of the 
Armenian issue here is limited to highlighting its role in damaging the construction of 
a Turkish identity and being a political card against Turkey's policy orientation of 
Western liberalism. 
The question, therefore, comes down to the relative importance of these conceptions 
in determining today's Turkish identity. The founder of Turkish modernism, Sultan 
Abdul Hamit himself, claims that "the great Ottoman state was founded on faith, after 
Y avuz Selim absorbed the caliphate. But since the original state was established by 
Turks, in reality this Turkish state asserted its Turkishness ( devlet i Turkidir; Turki in 
the sense of Turkish not Turkic). Since the exalted Osman established this sublime 
state it has stood on four principles: the ruler is Ottoman, the administration is Turkish, 
the faith is Islam, and the capital is Istanbul. The weakening or dismissal of any of 
these principles will affect the foundation of the state" (Karpat, 2001 :336).The other 
clear response came from a pro-Turkish writer, Justin McCarthy, in his book Death 
and Exile (McCarthy, 1995). He claims that after the external immigration from 
Caucasus and the Balkans, the demographic structure of Turkish society was 
reshuffied. The new dynamic demographic transfusion facilitated the initiation of an 
imaginary society engineering process by Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary team (Kili, 
2001). Secondly, the nation state's immigration priorities are considered by Soner 
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Caqaptay in his fascinating work (Cagaptay, 2006). Modern Turkey's population 
composition characterises the multi-nationality of the country and the exclusion of 
Kurds and Arabs and the inclusion of Balkan, and Caucasus Muslims; these 
immigrants became the main element of the new states elite cadre. 
Table 4.1: Priority in immigration 
Sources: Cagaptay (2005) 
1. Turks 
2. Turkic Groups 
(Tatars, Karapapaks) 
3. Stateless Balkan Muslims 
(Pomaks, Bosnians, etc) 
4. Caucasus Muslims 
5. Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, 
Jews, Christians 
u 
Allowed 
with 
inspection! 
Not 
Allowed 
However, the zones of Turkishness in the first stage of the country's formation 
present a very ambiguous picture of the new state's apparatus since Ataturk's strategic 
national identity project was based on a combination of ethnicity and language (it 
included Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims who can speak Turkish) and territory 
(residents of Anatolian included non Muslims who can speak Turkish) (Hinnebusch, 
2003:18). Mustafa Kemal adopted ethnic nationalism which was considered a foreign 
concept in the past but his project is taken up by the Young Turk movement who were 
looking for a linguistic based nationalism (Turkification) which was compatible with 
a multi-national state. This was aimed at stopping the decline of the empire and led to 
the Revolution of 1909 that enforced the acceptance of the constitutional and 
parliamentary system on the Sultan (Hinnebusch, 2003). However, both parties' 
projects and their implementation resulted in the collapse of the empire, and new state 
faced Kurdish nationalist and Islamist challenges. Religious Kurds ask whether 
Turkishness represents an ethnic category or part of historical (Islamic) paradigms. 
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The secular Kurdish intellectuals Abdullah Cevdet and Mehmet Ziya Gokalp (1968) 
integrated the Durkheimian collective social solidarity theory and Jacobin French 
secularism methods to create the 'One Nation' under the aegis of Turkishness. 
Abdullah Cevdet political theory became the main policy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
by abolishing the spiritual institutions of the Ottoman dynasty and the caliphate in 
1924 and the religious institutions of Seyhulislam (Sheikh of Islam). The adaption of 
the Swiss Code was opposed by Abdul Hamit's sublime Turkish definition mentioned 
above. A second man in the new Turkish Republic, the National Chief (Milli Set), 
Ismet Inonu, who originally came from a Kurdish family background (city of Bitlis), 
did not accept the proposal of Saint-Picot or the Wilson principle at the Lausanne 
conference. He said that there were no ethnic minorities recognised in Turkey, only 
religious minorities. He had successfully imputed that "Kurdish interest is in equal 
consideration with Turks, and there is no question about it (Aksin, 1991:195; Heper, 
1998; Hurewitz, 1956; Hale, 2002). The common interest consensus between secular 
Turks and Kurds ultimately achieved the establishment of a new nation state under a 
Turkish strategic national political culture. On the one hand, the religious leader, 
Sheik Said, in providing legitimacy to the uprising, claimed that there was no 
legitimacy between Turks and Kurds after the abolition of the caliphate, which had 
provided the implicit social contract between them (Mumcu, 1991). The discussion 
about this revolt is whether it had a religious or an ethnic basis. Prominent Kurdish 
experts such as Bruniessmen (1992; Olson, 2000; McDowell 1997) evaluate the 
Kurdish revolt as an expression of ethnic nationalism, but in fact, Said's religious 
argument very effectively stimulated the Kurdish people, because most of them are 
more religious and remain tribal. After several Turkish military campaigns against the 
PKK and the Turkish Hezbollah, the societal structure of the region was completely 
changed. The Turkish authorities are very aware that they have to sever the religious 
connections amongst the Kurdish nationalist and religious people. 
The religious identity of modern Turkey was redesigned but the religious movement 
has challenged state reformation politics during the republican period. Even though 
the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (Unification of Education Law) forced the closing of 
the Ottoman education institutions in 1924, the transition period continued until 1934 
and most of the Kurdish madrasa schools (seminary schools) survived until the PKK 
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and Turkish Hezbollah terror emerged in the 1980s. The Kurdish population received 
both Arabic and Kurdish language education and Shafite madhab jurisprudence 
education from these civil educational institutions. The students were also recruited as 
imams in the region, because the Turkish government could not provide a Shafi or 
Ca'feri education in the state religious schools (Zinar, 1998). As a result of terrorism 
and the Turkish military campaign, the Kurdish people have been deprived of that part 
of their national identity in which they separated from the Ja'feri school of Iran and 
Hanafi school of Turks. In this context, Gramci's claim explains the Kurdish national 
uprising:"Nationalism arises in threatened and underdeveloped peripheral societies 
whose intelligentsia invite the people into history and modernize their vernacular 
culture" (Form an, 1998: 145). Though, the cultural project of nationalism was an 
important agent of social change (Gellner, 1983 :39-58), Turkish nationalism diverged 
from the Turkish Islamist paradigm and lost its legacy of authority after the Lausanne 
conference. The Turkish scholars, Yilmaz and Aydin described the new Turkish 
state's religious 'modus vivendi' as "Lausanne Islam"(Yilmaz, 2005). 
On one hand, the secularisation of Turkey and its Islamic synthesis do represent but 
rather continuity of the Ottoman state's secularist formation, because Ottoman state 
reconciled itself with clericalism and theocracy after Kanuni's law in the imperial 
council. The religious catechism points out the religious doctrine in theology is that of 
Maturidi, and in jurisprudence that of Hanafi. However, the Ottoman state's religious 
doctrine was that of Esari in akaid (essence of belief) and Hanafi in practice. On the 
other hand, the new state aimed to create a "Gesellschaft Society", as opposed to the 
Ottoman state's policy based on a "Gemeinschaft society" (Ataman, 20005). The 
argument by the Anthony Smith (1989:341) corroborates the fact that Kurdish 
nationalism arises out of the pervasive moral crisis of dual legitimisation where divine 
authority is challenged by secular state power. In fact, the Turkish state fabricated its 
national distinctiveness in terms of imagination and institution but it was a failure in 
building a modern nation as an artefact of an imagined political community 
(Anderson, 1991 :37-46). However, Ataturk was very successful in the creation of a 
"Gesellschaft Society" in terms of a Turkish Islamic synthesis (Richmond, 1984:289-
300). The other question of Turkey's Islamic synthesis arose during the republican 
period. The Turkish nationalist paradigm was faced with Turkish Islamist paradigm 
challenge in the periphery of society when the government forced the recital of the 
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Adhan (call for prayers) in Turkish in mosques, instead of Arabic from 1932 to 1950. 
The liberal policies of the Democrat Party paved the way for religious freedoms in 
society. 
In summary, the state centralisation politics of Turkey and Iran do not allow non-
governmental organisations an effective role in society. The cultural reservation of 
Turkishness and an Iranian national identity also exclude other ethnic minorities from 
creating a common political discourse under the leadership of Turkishness and Iranian 
civilisations. And countries have maintained their status quo as motherlands when 
immigration and ethnic cleansing occur in the peripheral zones of Turkish and Iranian 
society. 
4.2.2 Turkey Iran relations during the republican period: legitimising the 
territorial boundaries in the neighbourhood 
The modernisation initiatives in Turkey and Iran left behind the old religious and 
political disputes. The legacy ofthe Tehran Protocol in 1911 and Istanbul Protocol in 
1913 was enforced by Kurdish rebellion in the 1920s so that both states had to 
reconsider making a new agreement with regard to the borders. The two countries 
notes exchanged in 1924, signed the Friendship and Border Security Agreement in 
1926, and an additional protocol in 1928 renewed this protocol. However, Turkey 
used the hot pursuit right to allow military pursuits of Kurdish rebels into Iranian 
territory which almost led the two countries into war in 1930 (Poulantzas, 2002). 
During the crisis, Reza Shah used the Kurdish political card to weaken Turkish 
influence prior to the border agreement. Both sides called back their diplomatic 
personnel from each other's capitals. Ultimately, they signed a border agreement in 
1932 that provided Turkey with possession of Mount Ararat but left the Kotur (near 
Van) to Iran. Following the Security of Border Agreement on the 14th March 1932, a 
Friendship, Security, Neutrality and Economic Co-operation Treaty was signed by 
both parties on 5th November 1932 (Soysal, 1989). Though Turkey and Iran left 
behind the legacy of former dynasties, they renewed the paradigm of the Qasri Shirin 
treaty, which is an example of longstanding relations between the two countries. 
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4.2.3 The failure of the Sadabat axis 
State-centralisation policies overwhelmingly improved relations and resulted in 
further diplomatic achievements in the 1930s. The relationship peaked when Reza 
Shah visited Turkey on 19th June 1934. He was welcomed with the Ozsay (Original 
Lineage, or alternately Pure Race) opera that music was composed by Adnan Saygun 
and as the book by a liberto, Miinir Hayri Egeli. The composition was based on the 
Persian epic Shahname that portrays the founders of Iran and Turan, the names of 
regions that historically represent Persian and Turkic cultures. Reenacting this story in 
the opera provided a direct comparison between the first rulers of Iran and with Turan 
resembling Reza Shah and Ataturk, solidifying the alliance (Woodard, 2007). The 
performance took place in Ankara at the Halkevi (people's house) to emphasize the 
forward-looking reforms of the secular, democratic nation and to help in 
strengthening the alliance relationship that bore fruit in the form of the Sadabad Pact, 
which was signed in Tehran in July 1937 (Soysal, 1989; Hurewitz, 1956). After the 
negotiations regarding the boundary conflict between Iraq and Iran, the pact was 
established in the Middle East for the sake of middle - power balance against multi-
polar threats (Cubin, 1977). Its members included Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey; 
it was established all the terminal boundaries between Turkey and Iran except for 
those in Central Asia, the Caucasus and India. At the same time, the Shah promoted 
authoritarian secularist measures in Iran, similar to Mustafa Kemal's reformation. 
Nevertheless, the occupation of Iran by Allied Forces also demonstrated that the 
agreements were not effective in a crisis, as the entry of allied troops into Iran in 1941 
had severe consequences for its political stability. Turkey played the role of 'active 
neutrality' during the course of the war, signing the tripartite treaty with the French 
and British on 19th October 1939 (Deringil, 1989; Weisband, 1973; Ataov, 1965), and 
a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany on 18th June 1941 (Soysal, 
1989). Due to the ineffectiveness of the Sadabad Pact in WWII, the two governments 
continuously worked to ease tensions through negotiations. Tehran was suspicious, 
believing that it could not depend on Turkey in those critical times. In fact Soviet 
Union was the main determining factor in bilateral relations in which both parties 
were concerned about the other's possible security ties with the Soviet sphere of 
influence. As a result of the failure of the Sadabat Pact, one can see that a Third 
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World alliance could not create an axis against great powers. During the WWII period, 
Turkey and Iran felt sympathy for the Nazis against Russia, which would allow them 
to expand their nationalist ambitions. Iran desired to regain Northern Azerbaijan. 
However, Turkey hoped that the Nazi government would provide freedom for Turkic 
states in the peripheral zone of Turkey. Neither hope materialized because Iran was 
occupied by the allied forces in 1941.But Turkey remained an active neutral during 
the war and protected itself from any engagement of war. After the end of WWII, 
Ankara did not show any sympathy for the Soviet-supported Azerbaijan Democratic 
Government in Iranian Azerbaijan (Karatay, 2003), (Keskin, 2005), or the Kurdish 
Republic in Mahabad (Olson, 1998:20-27). Turkey, therefore, did not object to 
Tehran's centralised military solution for the Azeri Turks and Kurds in Iran. The 
Shah's achievements against the separatist movements and his provisions for national 
stability gave him more credibility in Iranian society in this stage. Needless to say, 
WWII damaged Turkish-Iranian relations. The competition between the two 
neighbours was reformed in the form of a client and satellite state in the new world 
order. 
4.2.4. 0 Soviet ethnic cleansing of Turkic periphery zones 
The politics of the Bolsheviks' Korenzatsiia (nativatisation) integrated Turkic groups 
into the Soviet system in the 1920s. However, the political settlement by the Soviet 
leadership (Stalin) was a demographic disaster for the Kalmyks, Karachay, Chechen-
Ingush, Balkars, Crimeans, Germans, Finns and Korean during the war. It is 
noteworthy that the Soviet ethnic cleansing involved groups which had religious and 
ethnic connections with modern Turkey. This study does not consider the deportation 
of the Kalmyks, Koreans, Germans, Greeks and Finns. As will be explained, the 
nations of the Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils, Chechens and Ingush 
Crimean Tatars, Balkars, and Karachays were faced with massive deportations and 
ethnic cleansing during World War 11. In fact, the Kremlin aimed to destroy both 
Turkey's and Iran's frontline security zones in the Caucasus, through which those 
nations had supported the Nazi German occupation to Russia during the war time. 
Otto Pohl claims that the politics of Stalin's regime were in contravention of the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide treaty which was signed on 1948 by 
the General Assembly of the United Nation (Pohl, 1999:3). According to the UN act, 
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the resettlement question of Meskheti Turk is still an immutable issue in Turkey's 
periphery security zone in the the Northern Caucasus. 
4.2.4.1 Death, exile and special settlement contingent of Meskhetian Turks, 
Kurds, and Khemshils 
The Meskhetian Turks are descendents of Georgians who converted to Islam and 
adopted the Turkish language during the 17th and 18th centuries. They share the same 
language, religion, and customs as the Anatolian Turks (Bugai, 1995: 165-6). They 
were deported from the Turkish-Georgian border regions which were strategic areas 
for the USSR, as a routine security measure, to special settlements in Kazakhstan and 
Central Asia by the Soviet leadership between 1945 and 1953. Stalin moved 
Meskhetian Turks from Georgia to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 
1944 .. However, it is estimated that 46,000 Meskhetian Turks fled from Uzbekistan 
after the ethnic clashes, which made it impossible for them to live in safety in 1989 
and some ofthose living in Uzbekistan moved to Azerbaijan and found refuge in 1992. 
Their real homeland is Georgia, and they still want to return back home 50 years after 
Stalin deported them in Central Asia (Khazanov,1992), (Daniloff, 1997). On the other 
hand, Kurds first arrived to Transcaucasia as early as the 1oth century and established 
permanent populations in the border districts of Georgia in the 19th century. The 
Khemshils are ethnic Armenians who converted from Christianity to Islam. The 
majority of them used to live on the Turkish-Georgian border but now about 20,000 
ofthem live on the Turkish side ofthe Georgian border (Ascherson, 1995). 
Table 4.2: Deportation and special settlement ofMeskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils 
Nations Date Numbers in Exile Percentage Death 
Turks and Kurds and Khemshils 01 October 1945 88,800 4.00% 6,902 
Turks and Kurds and Khemshils 0 1 October 1946 84,402 3.40% 4,343 
Turks and Kurds and Khemshils 01 April1949 81,026 3.50% 2,259 
Turks and Kurds and Khemshils 01 January 1950 86,164 3.30% 2,389 
Meskhetian Turks 01 January 1953 46,790 1.70% 4,655 
Kurds 01 January 1953 8,843 0.30% 1,500 
Total 396,025 16.20% 22,048 
Sources: Zemskov, 1990: Table 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992:Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4 
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Due to the deportations, many of the special settlers from Georgia suffered from 
malnutrition, exposure and disease. Between the beginning of 1945 and the end of 
1950, it is recorded that 22.048 people died and 16% of population was deported 
including Turks, Kurds and Khemshils (Bugai, 1992). 
4.2.4.2 Deportation, exile and special settlement of Crimean Tatars 
The Crimean Tatars lived in the Crimean peninsula from the Middle Ages until May 
1944. They are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School and speak a Kipchak - Turkic 
language. They constituted only 25% ofthe population ofthe Crimean ASSR in 1923, 
but their population decreased to 19.36% to 218,179 while the Russian population 
was counted as 49.6 % with 558,481 in 1938 (Pohl,1999:109-118). Turkey's 
connection with Crimean Tatars was based on the alliance of the Ottoman and 
Crimean Tatars against Russia and also a religious-language connections and the 
existence of a Crimean immigrant population in modern Turkey (Pohl, 1999: 1 09-118). 
Like the other nations, they benefited from the politics of Soviet Korenzatsiia in 
1920s. However, they were faced with massive ethnic cleansing during World War II. 
The German army occupied Sevastopol in July 1942 and executed 91,678 people, 
including most ofthe peninsulas' Jews and Gypsies from October 1941 to April1942. 
Due to Crimean Tatars fighting alongside the German Army against Soviet army units, 
Stalin's regime accused them of being Nazi collaborators after the Red Army 
recaptured the Crimean peninsula from the Germans and arrested 5,381 anti-Soviet 
elements in Crimea in May 1944 (Pohl, 1999). 
Table: 4.3.Deportation and Special Settlement of Crimean Tatars 
Nations Date Numbers in Exile Percentage 
Cri means OI October I945 I95,200 8.70% 
0 I October I946 I93,959 7.80% 
0 I April I949 I86,535 8.10% 
OI January I950 I93,467 7.50% 
OI January I953 I65,259 6.00% 
Total 934,420 38.10% 
Sources: Zemskov, I990; Table: 3: pp. I 55; Bugai, I992: Doc.33:25I-2 and 34: 253-4. 
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Stalin's regime started a massive deportation of Crimean Tatars to Uzbekistan which 
included nearly one million or 38% of the total population. They remained exiled in 
Uzbekistan until Stalin's death on 5th March 1953. However, a massive immigration 
flood occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s. Between 1945 
and 1953 the deportation and resettlement policies caused 42, 000 Crimean Tatar 
deaths, which was one of the most extreme examples of ethnic cleansing and 
collective punishment in modern history (Pohl, 1999:1 09-118). 
4.2.4.3 Deportation and exile and special settlement of Chechens and Ingush 
Chechens and Ingush are two related nationalities living in the area of the North 
Caucasus. There are even connection with Turks and Iranians because the languages 
belonging to the Nakh branch of the lbero-Caucasian language group. Although they 
have strong religious ties with Turks, they practise a form of Sunni Islam of Hanefi 
School greatly influenced by Sufi the Qadiriya brotherhood and a warrior legacy in 
the frontline security zone of the Turks since the late 18th century. The Sufi leadership 
guerrilla fighters resisted the Tsarist colonial subjugation from Dagestan and 
Chechnya, a resistance which still inspires the Gaza spirit of Turkishness. Andrew 
Mongo claims that 58 Turkish volunteer guerrillas joined the war against Russia 
during the first and second Chechen Wars in the 1990s (Sabah, 29 November 2003). 
The Tsarist army took Imam Shamil into custody after twenty five years' of guerrilla 
warfare in 1851. However, the Soviet leadership created a separate Chechen 
Autonomous Ob1ast and an Ingush Autonomous Oblast on 7th July 1924. They 
merged Chechnya and Ingushetia regions and formed the Chechen-Ingush 
Autonomous Oblast on 5th December 1936 (Pohl, 1999:79-86). 
Table: 4.4. Deportation and Special Settlement of Chechen and lngush 
Nations Date Numbers of Exile Percentage 
Chechen and lngush 01 October 1945 405,900 17.20% 
01 October 1946 400,478 16.30% 
01 April 1949 365,173 15.80% 
01 January 1950 372,189 14.50% 
01 January 1953 165,259 6.00% 
Total 1,708,999 69.80% 
Sources: Zemskov, 1990; Table: 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992; Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4. 
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A massive exodus of Chechen and Ingush peoples occurred when the Red Army 
expelled the German military from the Magobek and Mozdokin in December 1943, 
which the German army had occupied on 8th August 1942. Due to being branded as 
bandit nations by the Soviet leadership, between 23rd February, 29th February 387,229 
Chechens and 91, 250 Ingush were deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 180 
trains in 1944. Another massive deportation of Chechen and Ingush peoples occurred 
between 1945 and 1953 and included 1,708,999 (70 %) of the population. 
Nevertheless, between 1957 and 1961, 384,000 Chechens and 84,000 Ingush returned 
to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR from exile. 28,000 Chechens were relocated in 
Dagestan and 8,000 Ingush resettled in North Ossetia and only 34,000 the Chechen 
and 22,000 Ingush remained in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia by 1961. In spite of this 
massive return to their homeland, Chechen and Ingush peoples shaped only 42% of 
the population because Russians still formed the largest ethnic group in the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR, with 49% of the population (Pohl, 1999). 
4.2.4.4 Deportation and Exile and Special Settlement of Balkars, and Karachays 
Karachays are a Turkic people closely related to the Balkars. Their ethnologies stem 
from a mixture of Huns, Bulgars, Khazars and Kipchaks. They speak the Kipchack -
Turkic language which is a branch of the Ural - Altaic language groups. Balkars -
Turkic groups are also descendents of the Kibchack Turks who adhere to the Hanafi 
school of Sunni Islam and who settled in the Caucasus. Moscow formed a unified 
Karachay - Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast on 22nd January 1922, but split the 
Karachay Autonomous Oblast and the Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast on 25th April 
1928. According to the 1939 Soviet census, 75,736 Karachay lived in the USSR. 
However, about 70,900 of them lived in the Karachay Autonomous Oblast. They 
constituted 28% of the oblast's population. Earlier, the Soviet government had created 
the Kabardino - Balkaria Autonomous Oblast on 1 September 1921. Balkars 
composed only 11.2 % of the population in that oblast while the Russians composed 
43% of the oblast's population in 1939. Hence, most of the population was composed 
of the Cherkess and other nationalities. Prior to Germany's reaching the Northern 
Caucasus, the local Karachay dissidents started an insurgency campaign against 
Soviet Russia despite 25,000 Karachays and Cherkess fighting against the Nazis. 
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During August 1942, Germany tied to capture the oil fields of Baku, Grozny and 
Maikop but they only took Maikop (Pohl, 1999:73-8). 
Table 4.5: Balkars, and Karachays 
Nations Date Numbers of Exile 
Karachay 01 October 1945 60,100 
Balkars 01 October 1945 33,100 
Karachay 01 October 1946 60,139 
Balkars 0 1 October 1946 32,817 
Karachay 01 April1949 57,491 
Balkars 01 April 1949 31,873 
Karachay 01 January 1950 59,340 
Balkars 01 January 1950 32,645 
Karachay 01-Jan-53 63,327 
Balkars 01-Jan-53 33,214 
General Total 862,445 
Sources: Zemskov, 1990: Table 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992:Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4 
During World War 11, Germans occupied the area inhabited by the Balkars for five 
months in 1942. However, following their expulsion from the territory of the 
Karachay Autonomous Oblast and Balkars Autonomous Oblast in 1943, the Stalin 
regime accused the Karachays and Balkars ofbeing traitors or collaborators with Nazi 
Germany and carried out deportations in a military fashion on 6th November 1943. As 
a result of this policy, the NKVD (People's Commissariat oflnternal Affairs) exiled a 
total of 69,267 Karachays and allowed Georgia to annex their territory, with 2,115 
Georgian resettling there. Between March and October in 1944 the Stalin regime 
conducted the deportation of the entire Balkar nation. The NKVD deported to 112,340 
on 14 train echelons to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (Pohl, 1999). 
Thus, 58,387 Chechen, Ingush, Karachays, and Balkars perished due to the special re-
settlement policy of the Soviet regime in 1944. Between 1944 and 1948, a total of 
144,704 (25.42 %of the population) died from the harsh conditions in exile. During 
1949 and 1950 another 19,086 North Caucasian individuals were died, leading to a 
total of 163,790 (28.77%) deaths. 8,300 North Caucasians perished during the 
transportation to the special settlements. Between 6th November 1943 and 26th 
November 1948 the Karachay population declined by a total of 12,398 people, 17.9% 
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of the population. Approximately 19,000 Karachay deaths occurred from the time of 
their deportation to 1948. However, the Chechen and Ingush population decreased by 
114,259, 23.87% of them deported. During transit and deportation, 100,000 Chechens 
and 23,000 Ingush people died between 29th February 1944 and 26th November 1948. 
Joseph Stalin perfected the modem style of ethnic cleansing between 193 7 and 1949 
as the regime deported 3,266,340 people to Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia (Pohl, 
1999). These humanitarian issues in the Turkic World did attract attention in the 
international community but the tragedy assisted the Turkish Islamists and racial 
nationalism as well as revolutionary left-wing youth movements in the intelligentsia. 
Whilst Turkey did not receive many immigrants from the Caucasus exile, it had 
received from the Balkans in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, the dynamic of the 
Turkish internal identity was not only constructed from within society but by an 
external links. Turkey and Iran could not have had any influence on the creation of the 
periphery zone in the region, on the verge of dissolution of the Soviet Empire in the 
1990s, because both countries' political elites were not aware of any Soviet ethnic 
assimilation in Central Asia or the Caucasus during the 20th century (Pohl, 1999). 
4.2.5.0 Resettlement of international system and legitimising of the Turkish and 
Iranian nation state identities 
The pivotal period (1930-1945) of the transition of power encompassed the British 
Empire losing its global pre-eminence to the United States (McKercher, 1999). 
However, the end of World War 11 saw the Soviet Union's expansionist policies and 
territorial demands required Turkey to cede the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and 
allow it to establish a Soviet naval base in the Dardanelles Strait on 20TH May 1945. 
Kremlin ambitions for Iranian oil induced Ankara and Tehran to turn towards the the 
West. The discovery of nuclear fusion has also made fundamental changes to 
international history and the outset of the Cold War system pushed both countries into 
changes in their strategic national security and internal political settings. During the 
Musaddiq era (1951-1953) in Iran and the Adnan Menders governments (1950-1960) 
in Turkey, the Turkish state joined NATO after sending of its troops to Korea in 1952. 
Ankara received a great amount of economic aid from the Marshall Plan which also 
secured Turkey's democratic transition. Soviet Russia recognised Turkey's territorial 
integrity in 1953 and therefore the legitimacy of the Turkish state identity or 
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independency was guaranteed by the Western alliance. Hence, Turkey's democratised 
transition was not optional but a compulsory change that created the new face of the 
state, namely Kemalism rather than Ataturkism. 
Iranian nationalism peaked when Musaddiq took power in Iran. The concept of 
"negative equilibrium " and a liberal Iranian nationalism had been implemented by the 
nationalisation of the Iranian oil fields on 15th March 1951 (Zabih, 1982). But a CIA-
supported military coup d'etat, named Operation Ajax ousted Musaddaq, 
(Gasiorowski, and Byrne, 2004). Therefore, the legacy of Muhammad Shah was 
mainly reliant on the alliance with United States in the international community and 
defeating the Kurdish and Azerbaijani uprisings. Turkey's fear of a communist 
takeover in Iran pushed its policy openly towards Britain and the West. During this 
critical time in Iran, the relationship between the two neighbours was hostile. 
On the one hand, both countries' recognition of the Israeli state and diplomatic 
engagement with Tel Aviv were critical decisions. Turkey completely isolated itself 
from the historical legacy claims of the Ottoman Empire and assumed a peripheral 
role in the Middle East. Turkey and Israel agreed to a secret "Periphery Pact" 
designed to link Israel, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia in 1958 (Armaganoglu, 1991). The 
policies of Iran and Turkey with regard to Middle Eastern conflict were seen as pro-
Israeli and pro-western by the Arab countries. Hence, Turkey had to pay for its 
rapprochement by receiving Arab support when the United Nation was voting on 
Cyprus issues in the 1960s and petrol crisis in the 1970s. 
4.2.5.1 Turkey Iran relations during the Cold War: the failure of the Baghdad 
Pact, CENTO and RCD 
The concept of a "Northern Tier" on the southern periphery, aimed to create a 
"collective security system" against the Soviet threat for both Turkey and Iran. 
Therefore, the Baghdad Pact was established in 1954 by Britain, Iraq and Turkey but 
excluded Afghanistan, which encouraged the Soviet leadership to invade Afghanistan 
in 1979. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in November 1955 (Kemal, 2005). 
Unfortunately, this Northern Tier concept was no longer viable because of the Suez 
cnsts m 1956 and Lebanon civil war in 1956 (Ramazani, 1966). This successive 
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events alienated the Arab countries as well as Gamal Abdul Naser and his cause of 
Arab nationalism from both Turkey and Iran. The Ba'aths revolution in 1958 and the 
developments that followed in Iraqi politics culminated in Iraq leaving the pact in 
1959 (Dawisha, 2003). 
Turkey's democratisation attempts were foiled after a Turkish military coup d'etat on 
27th May 1960 that resulted in the tragic death of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and 
his two top men Fatin Rustun Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan. Due to Turkey's approach to 
the internal politics of other countries, the Shah of Iran supported coup d'etat at that 
time. The Islamist journalist Tamer Korkmaz (2007) focused on the transition of 
Turkish strategic national security and its tenure engagement with the Gladio 
organisation. He claims that the Ergenekon organisation, which has operated under 
the shelter of NATO, is the main suspect for the unresolved political murders in 
Turkey since the Cold War. Despite its authoritarian appearance, the new constitution 
of 1960 provides more freedom for ethnic groups, especially Kurds. 
The relationship with Iran continued with the establishment of an organisation for 
economic, technical and cultural cooperation, called Regional Cooperation for 
Development (RCD), in July 1964.It involves Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in the 
territory of old (Islam, 2003). In creating this new body, the three states de-played 
down the security aspect of CENTO (Ersoy, 1994). Such developments further 
substantiated Iran's and Turkey's image in the Arab world as puppets of Western 
imperialism within the Northern Tier. However, due to the Jupiter Missile crisis in 
1963, receipt of President Johnson's letter, Cypriot issues in the 1960s. Therefore, 
Turkey's European cultural engagement began with the Ankara agreement in 1962 
and such politics became a strategic state policy of Turkey. It revised its foreign 
policies in relation to Middle Eastern countries. Turkey remained neutral during the 
Arab-Israeli war in 1967 (Laqueur, 1967) and also joined the Organisation of Islamic 
countries (OIC) in 1969 because the American arm embargo against Turkey 1974-
1978 forced Turkey to diversify its foreign policy. As part of improving relations with 
the Arab World, Turkey recognised the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 
1976 and allowed the PLO to open an office in Ankara in 1979 (Criss and. Bilgin 
1997). Similar diversification appeared in the Iranian foreign policy with improved 
relations with Moscow after September 1962. With Moscow's acceptance ofTehran's 
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assurances regarding the American military presence on Iranian oil, US-Iran relations 
were not harmonious due to Kennedy's engagement in social engineering in Iran 
(Ramazani, 1975). However, relations between the US and Iran improved during the 
Johnson administration, in contrast to Turkey's previous uneven relations with the US. 
In February 1971 President Nixon's broad agreement with Iran to sell it a 
sophisticated weapons system, set the stage for Iran's current military build up. Iran 
was engaged in an unprecedented buying spree of defence equipment worth billions 
of dollars, as would befit the 'gendarme' of the Gulf. Turkey was not impressed by 
these developments because the aim of the Shah was to make Iran a regional power in 
the Middle East. Moreover, the Shah launched a new modernisation process, namely 
the White Revolution, which forcibly aimed at reducing the authority of the religious 
structure in Iran (Pahlavi, 1967). Iran started to play a role in the regional balance of 
power in the Middle East after Britain withdrew from the Gulf. The US and European 
states helped the new policy direction; Iran took the opportunity to improve relations 
with the West and in particular, the US.The Shah brought in over 100,000 foreign 
investors, professionals and technical experts to Iran. These, together with foreign 
bureaucrats, were used to bring massive changes to Iranian society including a new 
elite class. In the 1970s, Iran showed its power by seizing from the Gulf Sheikhdoms 
of Shrujah and Ras al-Khyma, three small islands (Ebu Musa, Tunb, and Lesser Tunb) 
on the eve of their joining with Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah and Umm al-
Qawayn to form the United Arab Emirates. However, Iran and Iraq's Shatt-al Arab 
waterway issues were the cause of a regional conflict between 1963 and 1967 and 
concluded in war in 1980 (Cubin, 1977). Despite their connection with Western 
security systems, both countries's engagement in the security context remained 
limited. Whilst Iran became the rising power in the region, Turkey was faced with 
internal terror and an economic crisis during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Turkey-Iran's security engagements were not generally constructive. However, this 
long-standing alliance to the Western security system provided legitimacy for the 
Turkish state's identity in the international community. 
4.2.5.2 The roots of Alevi self-identity definition and the influence of Iran in the 
periphery 
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Upon the religious uprising against state centralised policies in Iran, the Shah started 
to use Alevi's religious card and Shia nationalism in Iran and Iraq such as the imperial 
legacy claim of the Safavids in Mesopotamia, to divert the attention of Iran's clerical 
insurgency in 1960s and 1970s. He brought Alevi students from Eastern Anatolia to 
give them a Shi'a education in the city ofQum, which suggested the influence of Iran 
in the internal affair of Turkey. His manoeuvres did not work because of the various 
Alevi self identity definitions in Turkey such as Muslim, Alevi and Atheist. 
Table 4.6: Alevi self-identification 
Muslim only 
Alevi only (including Bekhtasi and Kizilbas) 
Atheist 
Sources: Dressier, 2008; Cagaptay, 2007 
12.10% 
40.80% 
15.10% 
If Alevis defined themselves himself as Muslim, they mostly belonged to the Twelver 
Shiism of Ja'feri, Iran. However, the majority of Alevi mixed with the Bakstashi and 
Qizilbas sect, whose alliance was with the secular establishment in Turkey. The 
atheist identity came from a different ethnic background, dominated by left-wing 
groups. Alevi organisations such as the Cem Foundation claimed that Alevis 
constitute 10.4% of the population, more than 20 million people (www.cemvakfi.org), 
(Washington Times, 10 January 2007). However, others place this figure even higher 
at 25 million (Milliyet, 18 October 2000; Sabah, 20 November 2003). According to 
me identity definition of the Alevi population, Iran only has the chance to play the 
religion card with a small portion of Ja'feri in the province of Agri, and Kars, but the 
other Alevis are strictly reliant on the secularist regime of Turkey. 
Many Alevi women were educated as early as in the 1930s, and were recruited as 
school teachers to spread the secular nationalism in devotion to Ataturk's legacy. The 
Alevis showed loyalty not only to Ataturk but also to his party, the CHP, which 
moved to the left in the 1960s. However, in the 1970s, the Alevis played a significant 
role in setting up socialist, communist and secularist, political parties, militias, and 
even terrorist groups. Therefore, the Alevis became targets for Islamists, and Turkish 
nationalist parties and the Alevis were targeted by these groups during the intra-
militia violence in the 1970s such as the affairs of Maras in the late 1970s. 
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Additionally, the militia and sympathizers of Islamists and nationalist parties killed 
more than 100 Alevis, wounding more than 1, 000 in other clashes in the cities of 
Corum, Sivas and Malatya in the late 1970s (Hurriyet, 9 November 2004). As 
mentioned before, the Akhi Sufi tradition, the shamanistic Turks in Anatolia, 
produced a liberal Sufi version of Islam which is close to orthodox Islam but preserve 
shamanic culture to a degree. However, dance and music in worship and wine 
drinking celebrations and mixed-gender praying became common rituals in the Alevi 
faith (Zeidan, 1999). This is a rural specific version of Turkish Islam, initially called 
Qizilbas and later named Alevism. After the closure of Bekhtasi Sufi order in 
1826,Sufis order gradually went underground and were influenced by Alevism, while 
Alevis incorporated elements ofBekhtasism. 
Map: 4.l.Turkey: Alevi population by province 
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The Alevis come from a triangular zone in central-north Anatolia, the population 
spreading from Eskisehir to Erzurum, and Kahramanmaras. But the smaller Alevi 
communities (called Cepnis, Tahtacis, Turkmens, or Yoruks) are spread on the 
mountain ranges along the Aegean and Mediterranean littorals, from Canakkale in 
north-western Turkey to Gaziantep in southern Turkey (Van Bruinessen,1999; 
Shankland, 2003 ). On the other hand, the centre of the Baktashi is still in Kosovo,--
the country which provides a strong connection with the Central Asian cultural 
synthesis. On one hand, the internal immigration from the countryside to the 
metropolitan cities created the urbo-rural groups in the 1980s and 1990s. This urban 
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population jumped from 41.81 % in 1975 to 64.9% in 2000 (TUIK, 2007). Both the 
Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party received a great deal of support 
from these various reservations but the Alevi population and the urbo-rural class in 
the cities have been challenging the Islamist parties under the guise of the Ulusalcilik 
(nationalism) and Kemalist Turkish nationalism, as an anti-Western bloc, since the 
2000s. 
4.2.5.3 The proxy of Kurdish and Azeri ethnic political cards 
Muhammad Reza Shah's ambition to be a regional actor undermined Turkey-Iran 
relations in 1970s. This process also exposed the role of the patron client -
relationship between two powers in the Middle East. Taking advantage of one another, 
the foreign policy makers of Turkey and Iran were very careful to ensure super power 
support. The image of Tehran also became that of a Western capital in the Middle 
East. The gaining leverage against Iraq, which affected Turkey's internal issues, the 
Kurdish problem between Turkey and Iran and Iraq became a major issue particularly 
after the 1970s, when the Shah and American backed an Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla 
groups (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party) for an 
autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq. The connection between Iraqi Kurds and 
Iranian Kurds was stronger than with Turkey's Kurds. Thus, both sides used this 
ethnic card against each other. The legacy of the Barzani family on Kurdish 
nationalism internalised in the 1970s and peaked in the 1990s and 2000s. Turkish 
authorities closely watched the Shah's regional power activities involving the Iraqi 
Kurds. However, tensions abated when Iraq accepted the "thalvag" division of Shatt 
al-Arab. Shah stopped his support for the uprising at the 1975 Algiers Accord with 
Iraq. In opposing the Shah, Turkey began to use the other peripheral Iranian - Azeri 
political card against his revisionist policies. The Turkish ambassador stressed that 
"while driving from the Turkish border into Tehran I had felt as if I was in my own 
country" (as cited in Boruvali, 1989:90-91).That undiplomatic statement was 
interpreted by the Shah as an obvious reference to the prevalence of Azeris in Iranian 
Azerbaijan. Tehran viewed Ankara's promotion of Turkish Azeri nationalism as a 
method of withstanding the Soviet threat. This gave rise to heated polemics and 
mutual accusations in the Turkish and Iranian press. Iran called back its ambassador 
from Ankara for a second time during the reign of the Pahlavi regime (Tschanguiz, 
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1996:72).1ranian sympathy and shelter for the Kurds provided Iran with the chance to 
use Kurdish ethnicity to weaken Saddam's regime during the war. The status quo of 
this friendship is still a determining factor for understanding the regional politics. 
The roots of the Kurdish revolutionary movement lay in left-wing and Islamic 
organisation in the 1970s which characterise similar social movements of Iranian 
revolutionaries, As a result of civil war in Turkey in 1970s, the leaders of the left-
wing organisations, Deniz Gezmis, Yusuf Arslan, and Huseyin lnan were persecuted 
after the military coup d'etat in 1970.The Marxist groups also lost numerous members 
after the military coup d'etat in 1980. On the other hand, the political Islamic 
movement took advantage of the space in the society and state apparatus created by 
the communists and nationalists in 1990s. The political Islamic movement neutralised 
the fundamentalist Islamist after Erbakan was called back from Sweden by the 
military generals in the 1960s. In fact, Erbakan played a very effective role in the 
movement of Islamists groups into the political centre of the state and impeded the 
emergence of a militarised Islam, called Akincilar at that time. Therefore political 
Islamic cadre simultaneously became the main prop of the secular state after the 
acceptance of a mistress role in state politics. However, the issue of Kurdish national 
entity became militarised after the military coup d 'etat in 1980. 
4.2.5.4 The roots of political Islam in Turkey 
The rising of a political Islam against the coercive modernisation also threatened both 
countries' relations. To control the Islamic movement in society, the Turkish state 
allowed the Islamist party a political role. They created the National Order Party in 
Turkey, but because of the party's manifesto, it was banned in the early 1970s. 
Following this, a second party was formed by the same political cadre with the name 
of the National Salvation Party. This was more successful, and became a junior 
partner in a coalition government in 1974. The party's religious discourse and 
demonstrations held in Konya were believed to contribute to the military takeover on 
12th September 1980 but they did not have the political power to become a central 
power of the state or a revolutionary movement, as in Iran. 
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The Turkish military hierarchy saw the domestic security of Turkey as being at risk 
from increasingly confident hostile elements. These included not only fundamentalists 
but communist activists as well. Therefore, in light of the Iranian revolution, Turkey's 
military quickly carried out a coup d'etat and banned all political parties. The advent 
of a military regime in Turkey also brought changes to Turkey's handling of foreign 
affairs, one example being the withdrawal of Turkish ambassadors from Israel 
(Robins, 2003). This was the forth centralisation policy of Turkey based on Kemalist 
nationalism. The legacy of Ataturk gained credit from the 1962 and 1982 constitutions 
which were integrated with '2 8 February - process ' in 1997. However, Kemalist 
oligarchy was defeated when they attempted to constitutional crisis in April 2007 and 
in August 2008. 
4.2.5.5 The roots of revolutionary political Islam in Iran 
Iran's clergy began to be politically outspoken and criticised the actions of the Shah's 
regime (Yavuz, 2007). While Najaf maintained its religious status in the Shia 
community, the city of Qum emerged as the religious centre of Iran during the Pahlavi 
dynasty. Ayatollah Khomeini's predecessor, Sheikh Abd al Karim Hairi (1859-1936), 
established the Hawza-i Ilm to teach Islamic science. Ayatollah Burujerdi (1875-1961) 
the Merja-i taqlid of his time, made the clerics financially independent by regularising 
for the collection of religiously sanctioned taxes such as Zakat, Khums etc. After this 
financial independence of the Shia clerics, the city of Qum and religious institutions 
such as mosques became an alternative political centre of the Iranian opposition 
movement(Keddie, 1983). TheForestersrebellionin 1917and 1921 (Munson, 1988), 
and demonstration of 15 Khordad 1975, the Safavi's organisation of Fedayan-i Islam 
in 1945, Keshani's Mujahidi-ni Muslim in 1950 and Ramadan and Black Friday in 
1978 indicated that the political power of Shia Islam in Iran was rising and that the 
clerical movement was a threat to the Pahlavi dynasty (Munson, 1988:196). However, 
they could not send their message to the young generation (Shariati, 1982). Shariati's 
lecture in Husayniye-i Irsad merged this gap between the secular youth people and the 
clerics. The lecture series began in 1963 and continued until the Shah closed the 
institution in 1973. Shariati's ideological tie with Iqbal's "ego" Islamic identity 
project of "reconstruction of Islamic thought" and his conceptualisation of Islamic 
terms with modem sociology accentuated eligious ideology which was replaced with 
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the collective solidarity of Durkheimian sociology theory (Shariati, 1982 ). The self -
identity of Ebu Zer el-Gifari was presented as that of a revolutionary figure for the 
Iranian youth. Both Ayatollah Motahhari's and Ali Shariati's lecture influenced the 
clerics and secular intellectuals but Shariati's criticism of the madrasah's curriculum 
and 'non-tawhidi ulema' resulted in a split of the two scholars. While Mutahhari left 
the Huseyniya-i lrshad in 1968, Khomeini preferred to remain neutral in the conflict 
(Erkilet, 2004). Shariati criticised the Safavid dynasty as having distorted Islam by 
creating dynastic to the inheritance of power and giving high status to the non-
Tawhid-i clerics which are the non-political religious leaders who believe that religion 
is to be separated from politics and that clerics should only tend to the spiritual 
matters of the mosque (Hussain, 1985). Shariati's ideology was followed by military 
and civil organisations, the action organisation, the militant Muslim movement, the 
Liberal Islamic Party in 1978, and the Independency Action and Amal organisation, 
which played key roles in establishing an Islamic state in Iran (Erkilet, 2004). There is 
no comparable religious, intellectual or religious movement in Turkey. 
The emergence of modem Turkey and Iran fulfilled the mission of creating a common 
political discourse within the nation-state establishments. The legacy of Ataturk relies 
on the victory in the Independence War which impeded the Balkanisation of Istanbul 
and the territory of Turkey. However, the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty claims is that 
it is descended from the ancient emperor, Cyrus the Great. Despite the establishment 
an alliance relationship in Sadabat, Baghdad Pact and CENTO, the absence of a 
security establishment could not provide Iran with any deterrence or a structural 
alliance. During World War II, both Turkey and Iran lost their legitimacy in the 
periphery zones in Central Asia and the Caucasus. While Iran was occupied by the 
British and Russia, Turkey itself was threatened by the Russia. The new legitimacy of 
Iranian and Turkish statehood was reformulated under the Western security system. 
Competition between the two countries resulted in them becoming reliable clients 
with a super power. Iran played its client status quo during the late 1960 and 1970s. 
The roots of both countries also underwent completely different changes, and Turkish 
society was not faced with any revolutionary euphoria. 
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4.3.0 The Construction of Turkish and Iranian strategic culture of security: 
nuclear ambition of Turkey and Iran 
The process of the establishing the Turkish and Iranian nation states has been 
explained above, but the components of Turkey's and Iran's strategic culture of 
security and its direct or indirect involvement in foreign policy are dealt with in this 
section. There are three propositions explaining the legacy of Mustafa Kemal in 
formation of a strategic culture of security in Turkey: the project (1) of the nation state 
lacked the new dynamics of an economic system and a strategic national culture of 
security, as an alternative system for the international community in the last two 
centuries; the project (2) of Turkish-Islamic synthesis demonstrated the Balkan 
influence on the formation of modern Turkey but the concept of Ziya Gokalp's hars 
(culture) is suspicious of this western outlook ( Heyd, 1950). The radical imaginary 
society theories (3) proposed by Abdullah Cevdet and Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoglu 
with regard to Westernisation were absent from the security theory of the state 
(Karaosmanoglu, 1929). 
The foreign policy of Ataturk accommodated realism, anti-revisionist policy and 
allegiance to legality in international dealings, along with a suspicion of the West. The 
policy of Ataturkism is the oft-repeated "Peace at home; Peace in the World" 
(Feyzioglu, 1982:309). During World War 11, Turkey's foreign policy - makers 
practised his active neutral policy. However, the foreign policy of Kemalism is 
different from Ataturkism, which was the reformulated legacy of Mustafa Kemal, 
namely Kemalism ideology. Kemalist theory became fully engaged with the Western 
security system and embraces the democratisation policy since the 1950s. However, 
the theory of Kemalism provides more power to the military, which conducted 
military coup d' etat three times in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Since Centennial of 
Ataturk's birthday and 'Ataturkism-Ataturk Principles-Kemalism' in 1981, the 
National Security Council took the initiative and exercised a postmodern military 
coup d'etat (28 February- Process) in 1997, constitutional crisis in 2007 and 2008 
against the democratically elected government. The influence of the military in the 
state plays a very effective role in the national security. Hence, the author considers 
that the security sectors in Turkey and Iran are valuable for constructing a strategic as 
well as a political culture of security. Rather than writing a separate chapter, this study 
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considers the nuclear ambition of Iran and the security setting of Turkey in this 
chapter due to their importance in the construction of nation state identity. 
4.3.1.0 The role of NATO in the construction of a Turkish strategic culture of 
security: the concept of a Turkish virtual state and citizenship 
Turkey's rulers are considered a shadow of the God who provides the Justice for 
welfare of society on Earth. This imperialist intuition of Turanism is replicated within 
Turkish nationalism (Ulusalcilik), a new brand of nationalism as opposed to 
'milliyet<;ilik ', which has been in circulation since the French Revolution. 'ulus ' is 
coined and filled with meanings other than 'millet' (nation), which is a historical 
category encompassing belief and tradition. Hence, 'ulusalcilik' is nationalism 
without a nation, or it is etatism with the nation that is mainly driven by the ancient 
Turkish Shamanistic religious tradition (Ergil, 2008). New laws allowed the killing 
even of a royal family's children to stop a possible threat to the unity of state authority. 
This is not an Islamic understanding of the virtual state but the continuity of the 
Shamanistic concept of virtual states during the Ottoman period. Mustafa Kemal's 
political reservation reflects the similarity to the previous imperial experience. The 
legacy of the state restores the national aspirations of Turkishness under the aegis of a 
pluralistic, democratic and organic state. One can argue that the historical legacy of 
the state is, therefore, more important than citizenship, or religion. This is clear from 
the concept of Turkish racial superiority by Ali Nihal Adsiz and statement by Turkish 
security staff endorsing the using of violence against the Islamic opposition 
movement considered the arch enemy of the secular state. For instance, Turkish 
general Dogu Silahcioglu and deputy chief of staff, Cevik Bir clarify that "we can kill 
more than three million people" if necessary when the 28 February -process in the 
stage implicated Welfare Party supporters (Silahcioglu, 2008). Former deputy state 
security court judge of Y assiada case, Baku Tug, said that if the communist revolution 
occurred on 9th March 19 71, three million people will be killed (Zaman, 3 March 
2008). However, it is not fair to generalise the military's understanding of the state as 
the concept of the state is more Aryan claptrap or a sacred unit with untouchable 
principles such as secularism and statetism. Since 1952, Turkey's engagement with 
the Western security system supports this security concern of the state elite. Therefore, 
the study tries to explain NATO's material engagement with Turkey's strategic 
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culture of state security. Turkey's benefits from the Western security system include 
its air defence system and some key military technologies, especially from the United 
States. However, this strategic dependency has been faced with two crises-the 
Western arm embargo between 1974 and 1978 and the "bag affairs" in 2004, which 
undermined the strategic alliance relationship and was perceived as a threat against 
the confidence of Turkishness. This led to the growth of Ulusalcilik and anti-
Americanism since the American- led invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, the former 
councillor of the foreign minister Abdullah Gul, Ahmed Davudoglu, stated that 
Turkey is part of the Western security system but outside the welfare share ofWestern 
economic system (Davutoglu, 2004). Turkey is faced with a conflict with U.S on the 
Kurdish question in Iraq and heated negotiations with the EU on Cyprus. However, 
both are considered untouchable rocks on Turkish state foreign politics' red line. 
According to a recent political survey, the public opm10n on the Westernisation 
politics of the Turkish state shows a very ambiguous reflection in the graphics below. 
Figure 4.1: General trends of Turkish public opinion (2007) 
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In the first graphic, 22% of Turks favoured improving relations with Iran in 2002 and 
the positive tendencies dramatically increased to 28% in 2007. On the other hand, 
anti-Americanism was very high at that time. Nevertheless, the positive politics of 
Washington against the PKK in 2007 dramatically decreased anti-Americanism to 9%. 
In the second graphic, 34 % of the Turkish people defined themselves as secular in 
1999. However, the identity definition of Turks as Muslim dramatically increased to 
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45 %in 2007. In the last graphic, Turkey's multi-dimensional politics became more 
prosperous and GDP per capita jumped from US $ 2, 675 to US $ 6, and 548. 
However, there was a dramatic decrease in support directed to the AK.P government 
for EU politics. While the number was 65 % in 2002, this figures decreased to 49% in 
2007. The influence of the public on foreign policy of Turkey is not essential due to 
the virtual state understanding of the Turkish elite who believe that the priority is 
always the security of the country within the western system. Even General Kilic' 
proposal to ally with Russia and Iran could not find any support in Turkey's security 
environment (Olson, 2006). In fact, Turkey's alliance with Washington is not a 
political engagement but rather a constructive systematic alliance in the international 
community. Therefore, non- signature political parties can change the patron and 
client relationship between Turkey and the United States. The graphic shows the 
material engagement between Turkey and the Western security system. 
4.3.1.1 Overview of Turkey's strategic setting in the Western security system 
Following the accession to NATO in 1952, Turkey and the U.S signed their first 
military agreement in 1954 (Mackenzie, 1983). However, the situation was re-
examined after the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in 1974. US military aid to 
Turkey was essential its ngagement in the Western security system. During the years 
1950-74, the average military aid to Turkey was $165 million per annum. However, 
the Turkish government announced that the 1969 Defence Cooperation Agreement 
(DECA) and all other agreement with the U.S lost their legal validity. Turkish demand 
was for halt of the operations at Belbasi, Diyarbakir, Karamursel and Sinop which 
must be placed under the full control and custody of Turkish armed forces.But this 
restriction could not become reality due to structural engagement with NATO. In fact, 
during the embargo period the military aid only dropped to US$ 130 million per year 
(Duke, 1989:274). Ultimately, the Jimmy Carter government managed to lift this 
restriction on security and intelligence operations in Turkey by the signing of a new 
DECA, so the arm embargo was lifted in 1978. This new DECA agreement came into 
force on 18th December 1980 and became the main document governing the US 
military presence in Turkey until 1990. Turkey - US Transit Terminal Agreement 
allows US aircraft to utilise Incirlik Air Base for in support of the UN multinational 
force in Lebanon in 1984. The supplementary agreements also permit the United 
157 
States to participate in joint defence measures at 12 locations and also authorises US 
administrative and support organisations and activities outside these installations. The 
agreement between George Shultz and Turkish foreign minister V ahit Halefoglu was 
renewed on 16th March 1987. In this context, Turkey received loans and grants of 
$868 million between 1985 and 1986 and $590 million in military and economic aid. 
Moreover, the Pentagon trained Turkish officers under the aegis of the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes and provides over $3 million of 
training assistance annually to Turkish security staff. There are almost 5000 US 
military personnel in Turkey. Following a meeting between the Turkish ambassador 
in Washington, Sukru Elekdag, and Michael Annacosts, the US Undersecretary of 
State, the military base leases will be extended on a year-by-year basis (Duke, 
1989:280). However, the US Congress reduced to 40% the military assistance to 
Turkey by cutting $913.5 million. In fact, the situation was clearly related to systemic 
changes in the international community. Turkey's new engagement with the Western 
security system became more concrete after the economic and military training 
agreement with Israel in 1996. The presence of US military installations on Turkish 
territory is the main component of the engagement with the Western security system 
by Turkey. There are three security systems of NATO on Turkish territory: radar, 
military bases and missile defence. 
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Table: 4.7. US military forces and installation in Turkey 
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The UHF radar system in eastern Turkey became operational in June 1957 (Zabetakis, 
and Peterson, 1964). This array of long-range radar systems in city of Diyarbakir 
monitors Russian military movements and missile testing and also provides 
communications with another key part of the US intelligence network, Croughton in 
the United Kingdom. A second electronic listening post was located along the Black 
Sea coast on the army site Sinop and in the city of Trabzon. The German-type 
demodulators immediately provide clear analogue signals for the channels of missile 
data in Kasputin Y ar and Tyuratam in Russia. Many other smaller installations 
support these two bases, acting as relays or transmitters for the US Defence 
Communications System (DCS). The deployment of these US land bases is for 
tactical fighters in the Eastern Mediterranean at from which US fighters rotate 
activities from Aviano, northern Italy, and Torrejon, Spain. 20% ofthe 6th Fleet's fuel 
needs are also supplied from these bases where the US Logistics Group, Turkey 
(TUSLOG) is located. The other TUSLOG major facility is the Loran-C station at 
Kargaburun in the city of Izmir where US aircraft and sea vessels monitor the 
Mediterranean Sea (www.merhabaturkey.com). The air- to- ground bombing and 
strafing range is used by US F-Ills in the city ofKonya. In addition, the combat zone 
in the city Mus which are only 500 miles from Tehran and 700 miles from Abadan, 
control Iran's activities in the Persian Gulf(Duke, 1989:288-91). 
NATO's Southern Region is of high common interest between the US and Turkey due 
to its potential for aiding the situation in Bosnia and the Balkans. Turkey willingly 
sends personnel to the region, including more than 2,000 to Operation Joint 
Endeavour (IFOR) and about 1,400 to aid the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. 
Moreover, the country sent almost 800 armed personal to Albania to help with the 
peace campaign there, and the Tirana airport operation. Turkey's role in the 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the Lebanon is essential for the 
systemic setting ofTurkey (Muftuler-Bac, 2000). 
According to the SIPPRI Yearbook report, the main foreign arm suppliers for Turkey 
are U.S, Germany, and France. Since 1980, Turkey has spent over US $30 billion to 
develop its defence capability (SIPRI, 2008). 
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4.3.1.2 Turkey's weapons of mass destruction capabilities and program 
There is a single 5 MW research nuclear reactor at the Kucuk Cekmece Nuclear 
Research and Training Centre, as well as a 250 KW reactor at the Istanbul Technical 
University. The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA supervises both facilities' 
operations. The country does not have any apparent enrichment capacities although 
studies of potential relevance are conducted in Turkish universities, into nuclear fuel 
properties and their fabrication. The Department of Chemical Engineering, Middle 
East Technical University (METU) has taken part in operations alongside the Turkey 
Atomic Energy Agency (T AEK). The Department of Chemistry, Cumhuriyet 
University, has attempted fuel fabrication and uranium experimentation. However, 
Turkey's strategic nuclear capabilities are under the supervision ofNATO and IAEA. 
Turkey has 90 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs deployed by the United States at the 
Incirlik Air Base and has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 6 
February 2000 (Kibaroglu, 1997). These nuclear bombs were transferred from Akinci 
Air Base and Balikesir Air Base to the Incirlik Air Base where they continue to be 
earmarked for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. Turkey's ballistic, tactical cruise 
missiles and delivery capabilities can be classified as tactical cruise missiles, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, ground attack aircraft and air-launched standoff missiles 
(www.camegieendowrnent.org;www.armscontrol.org;Cirincione and Grotto, 2005). 
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Integrated map: 4.1. lncirlik Air Base, Turkey (2002) 
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Note: lnclrHk air base, Turkey (13 December 2002): This base is located in southern Turkey (37°00'N, 
35°26'E) near the Syrian border. There are 58 Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) on the base, 25 of 
which are equipped with WS3 vaults for nuclear weapons storage. The vaults, which have a maximum 
capacity of 100 weapons, were completed in 1998. Prior to that, nuclear weapons were stored in the 
weapons storage area. The base stores 90 B61 nuclear bombs, 50 of which are for delivery by US F-
16C/Ds from the 39th Fighter wing, with the remaining 40 earmarked for delivery by the Turkish F-16 
fighters of the 4th wing at Akinci and 9th wing at Balikesir. Source: Space Imaging. 
Turkey's strategic fighter and ground attack aircraft include 121 F-16C, 24 F-16D; 
93 F-4Es (65 in service with planned upgrades to F-4E Phantom 2000), 54 , F-4E 
Phantom 2000s, 63 F-5AIB, 44 NF-5A/Bs, and cooperation in the F-35 JSF project. 
(http://www .cns.miis. edu/researchlwmdme/turkey.htm) .Additionally, Turkey' strategic 
relations with Israel resulted in eo-producing Popeye-2 air-launched standoff missiles 
with a 305km range and a 360kg payload in cooperation with the Israeli firm Rafael 
(Pipes, 1997; Jerusalem Post, 18 May 1997; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
23 June 1997; Alon, 2005; Sariibrahimoglu, 2002).The Turkish Defence minister, 
Hilmi Guler, reported that Turkey has 230,000 tons of thorium reserves and 9,200 
tons ofuranium reserves (Demir, 1997: Sokolski, H., P. Clawson, et al 2005). Guler 
noted that, while current technology in Turkey is more suited to uranium, thorium 
would be considered in the future as a nuclear fuel (Turkish Brief, 2007). According 
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to the report, Turkey's thorium reserves comprise 14% of the world's reserves, 
estimated at 344, 000 tonnes. 
4.4.0 Overview of nuclear ambition of Iran in the construction of messianic 
strategic culture of security 
The US-Iranian relations go back to the December 1943 Tehran conference, 
convened to devise strategies against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin. The Pentagon talks in October 1947 
between the US and Britain acknowledged the importance of the Middle East for 
Western interests, the strategic value of oil reserves and the necessity to impede 
Soviet expansionism in the region. Thus, Britain and the US agreed that the 
independence of Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy would have to be preserved to protect 
vital American and British security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean (Kibiroglu, 
1997). Under the guidance of the US, France and Germany, Iran stepped on the long 
and painful path towards possession of a nuclear capability during the Pahlavi period 
(Poneman, 1981; Gigerenzer, and Todd, 1999). However, the Iran-Iraq war and the 
rhetoric ofKhomeini suspended Iran's strategic nuclear program until the 1990s. The 
messianic leadership of Iran re-launched the nuclear program and cooperated with 
Russia and the Asian nuclear markets, such as North Korea, Pakistan and China. 
4.4.1 US, French and German strategic partnership on nuclear proliferation of 
Iran 
The legacy of Iran' nuclear program relies on the nuclear contract with United States 
in 1957. The Atomic Energy of Iran (AEOI) and the Nuclear Research Centre (NRC) 
were established as the main institutions of the nuclear strategic program under the 
supervision of the United States. In 1959, Iran purchased a 5MW research reactor 
from an American company (AMF), which became operational in 1968 after ten years 
of the agreement (Ehteshami, 1989: 125-128). Iran has been a signatory of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1968 and ratification was in 1970. 
Following the founding of the Atomic Energy Agency, Shah Pahlavi intended to build 
23 fission plants using American collaboration (Barnaby, 2007).The U.S-Iran 
partnership moved forward after the momentum of 1973 and the American based 
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company Stanford Research Institute carried out nuclear energy fuel production 
(Rahimi, 2003). Iran then entered into a safeguard agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 15 May 1974 (Clawson and Eisenstaedt, 2006). 
Tehran tried to diversify its dependency on its nuclear program and signed an 
extendable ten-year nuclear fuel contract with the French company (Framatome) to 
build two 950 megawatt reactors in the southern city of Ahvaz in 1974 
(http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com). The engagement of the German company 
KraftWerk Union, a subsidiary of Siemens, to construct two 1,200 Mw (e) Pressurised 
Water Reactors (PWR) at Bushehr in 1974 was another stage for the nuclear ambition 
of Iran. Washington wanted to neither maintain the initiatives in the nuclear projects 
in Iran as part of their reliable alliance. Therefore, the Carter Government decided to 
allow US material to be converted into fuel in Iran for its own reactors and for pass-
through to third countries with which they had agreements after the National Security 
Decision Memorandum 292, dated 22nd April 1975 (National achieve in 
www.ford.utexas.edu). These friendly relations with Western countries encouraged 
the Shah to conclude another four contracts to build nuclear power stations by 1979, 
the year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Despite payment to the Crafter Union 
Company for two Bushehr reactor (85 % of it is finished), the new regime of Iran 
suspended the nuclear program and this resulted in the withdrawal of the foreign 
companies from Iran in March 1979 (Zarif, 2007). Moreover, both reactors were 
severely damaged when, between 1984 and 1988 in the Iran-Iraq war, the Bushehr 
reactors were bombed repeatedly by Iraq. 
4.4.2 Development of Iran's nuclear program 
Iran resumed its nuclear power programme in 1991 under a bilateral agreement with 
China for the supply of two 300 Mw (e) VVER units (http://www.greenpeace.org). 
Although the agreement was confirmed in 1993, it was never realised (Gill, 1998). 
An agreement was signed between the Atomic Energy authority of Russia and the 
AEOI to finalise the Bushehr reactor unit one, through the installation of a 915-MWe 
VVER-1 000 pressurized water reactor in 1995 (Mizin,2004). In Iran, most further 
construction has happened since 2000 and has included the unveiling of factories 
producing uranium gas, a completed centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment and a 
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complex to house over 50,000 centrifuges (Albright and Hinderstein, 2004 ). 
Nonetheless, serious impediments in time have occurred, likely due to US influence 
on Russia with the intent of slowing the supplies. The Russians have stated that 
Bushehr will not begin functioning until November 2007 (Quillen, 2002). Thus, Iran's 
present intentions to construct 7 reactors with a total power capacity of 7,000 
megawwats are seen as ambitious (Quillen, 2002). The Khatami administration stated 
its goal of providing 6000 Mw within twenty years of the September 2002 
announcement (Cordesman and Rodhan, et al. 2006). Iran received natural uranium 
in 1991, which has not been made known to the Agency, and which was converted 
into uranium metal in 2000 (Cordesman and Rodhan, et al 2006). Following the 
discovery of the underground facilities in Natanz and the heavy water factory at Arak 
in August 2002 as well as fuel production facilities at Is fah an, the country's nuclear 
goals attracted global coverage (BBC News, 30 March, 2005). The IAEA director, el-
Baradey accused of Iran breaching the provisions of non-proliferation law. Due to 
international pressure, Iran had to allow to IAEA to conduct an inspection of all its 
nuclear facilities in September 2003. All of Iran's facilities, except the Kalaye plant 
and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003 (Kerr, 
2003; world-nuclear.org). Despite American demands to forward the Iranian issue to 
the United Nation Security Council, England, Germany and France troikas impeded 
American demands. Though the IAEA accepted that there are some platinum issues in 
the Iranian reactor, they announced that Iran has no nuclear programme. On the other 
hand, Iran signed an additional protocol of NPT in September 2003. Despite the 
cooperation of Iran with the IAEA, the question of concealment forced the IAEA to 
implement stricter procedures after revelation of Iran's connection with the nuclear 
black market and Pakistan's key nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan. In October 2003, a CIA 
operation on the Italian coast of the Mediterranean Sea captured four containers full of 
10,000 gas centrifuges and related manufactures devices which were compatible with 
nuclear warheads.This provided United States with material to use against Iran in the 
international community (Fallows, 2004; History Channel, 2005). 
Although Iran provided 10,000 pages of document related to nuclear activities in 
May 2004, el-Baradey was not satisfied and accused Iran of not cooperating with the 
IAEA. The tension between Iran and IAEA them increased after Iran's foreign 
minister, Kemal Kharrazi, announced that "Iran would not stop the nuclear program 
165 
that requires the recognition ofthe international community." Iran removed the IAEA 
seal from the Natanz plant and produced centrifuges (Cetinsaya, and Kose, 2006). On 
the other hand, Iran signed the Paris Agreement with EU's perestroika on 15111 
September 2004 and Iran agreed to suspend the uranium enrichment program for the 
second time. However, the Iranian president explained that "the peaceful nuclear 
program of Iran could not be stopped (Cetinsaya, and Kose, 2006) and signed a 
nuclear fuel agreement with Russia in April 2005. Iran also found the economic 
package of EU 's perestroika to be unacceptable and humiliating. Iran announced the 
start of a nuclear enrichment program in Isfahan. On the other hand, Russia offered 
Iran to conduct nuclear enrichment in Russia rather than at Isfahan in Iran. The 
following year after Ahmedinejat's speech at the UN in September 2005, the IAEA 
voted that the nuclear issue of Iran be transferred to the UN Security Council on 4th 
February 2006. The president of Iran, Ahmedinejat, announced that Iran had achieved 
uranium enrichment and was now a nuclear state on 11th April 2006. The Iranian 
president wrote a letter to George W. Bush to normalise Iran-U.S relations on 8th May 
2006. However, after the concealment of Iranian nuclear activities from IAEA, the 
conflict between U.S and Iran became critical. Therefore, the last UN Security 
Council Resolution 1803 in March 2008 decided to extend sanctions against Iran by 
claiming that Iran continues to enrich uranium. The sanctions require other 
restrictions on the import of dual use nuclear technology for peaceful or military 
purposes. The resolution also added 13 names to the existing travel ban and asset 
freeze on companies and individuals thought to be engaged in Iran's nuclear program 
(UNSR, 2008) (www.globalpolicy.org). 
4.4.3.0. Nuclear capabilities of Iran 
There are 439 nuclear power plant units that are an important source of energy with an 
installed electric net capacity of about 372 GW in operation in 31 countries around the 
world as of 1st April 2008. The nuclear power plants (NPP) produce about 17% of the 
world's electricity. There are 35 nuclear power plants under construction which will 
provide 29 GW (www.euronuclear.org). There is no Islamic country with nuclear 
capacity except Pakistan. In fact, the nuclear programme of Pakistan is also under 
control and A.Q. Khan is under home-arrest (Sokolski, 2008). 
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Integrated Map 4.2 :World-Wide Nuclear Power Reactors, April (2008) 
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The nuclear ambition of Iran is not only a self-sufficiency security issue but also 
indicative of its struggle for attain a messianic status quo in the Islamic world that 
would have provided it with Iran self-confidence and also increase its deterrence 
capacity. In fact , Iran lost 40% of its arms during the Iran - Iraq war, which led it to 
build a domestic arm industry and resume the nuclear program after the 1990s 
(Cordesman, 1999:55). 
However, the nuclear capability of Iran is limited to the Bushehr reactor, which is 
under construction and two further planned proposed (!AEA, 2008). The map shows 
the most significant nuclear projects. There are mainly a few nuclear research centres 
and some industrial complexes in various locales: The Tehran Nuclear Research 
Centre, the Kelaye Electric Company.The Tehran Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the Natanz, and Karaj Nuclear Research Centres with 
more centrtes of Lashkarabad, Arak, Anarak, Gachin, Saghand, Farayand Technique, 
Pars Trash, the Kolahdouz Industrial Complex in Tehran, the Lavizan-Shian Physics 
Research Centre,and the Parchin Military Complex, Ardkan (Greenpeace 
International, February 2007). 
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Integrated map 4.3: Nuclear infrastructure of Iran 
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In addition, Iran has primary long - range and middle - range rockets and missile 
systems. The long range missile systems of Iran have become a deterrent and enhance 
the prestige of the messianic identity of the Islamic regime of Iran. 
Table: 4.8.Iran's Long Range Missile System 
DESIGNATION NUMBER DETAILS 
SCUD -B Normal 2-5 
Launcher ) 300 km (Shehab -
1) 490 
SCUD -C 500 km (Shehab -2) 273 
6Launcher 
ltones warhead (estimated 100 SCUD-B modified to 500 
km) 
Estimated 100 and modified to 600 km 
NODONG 600 km.? 24missile North Korea SCUD-D modified to SCUD-C 
AI Husyin 650 km 1? 
M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15) 600 km 1? 
Shehap -3 1200-1300 km ? 
Shehab -4 2000 km range 
Shehab-5 , 5,500 km range 0 
Shehab-6 1 0,000 km range 0 
It might be stolen from Iraq 
China -Iran origin 
20 tested imi tated from Korean NODONG 
imitated form Russian SS-4 2200- Pound payload reached 
to Europe, made up by Russ ian help 
Propellant liquid 
Propellant liquid 
Sources: Balbay, 2006. (Note: When he was custody of Ergenekon, he confessed that he rece ived hi s 
sources from one of the Turkish Am1ed General Staff. Therefore, I rely on his data to imply T urkish 
point of view on Iran 's nuclear ambition. 
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Modifications have been made to the Scud-B missile, originally capable of carrying a 
1 tonne load for 300 kilometers (International Defence Review, November 1988: 
1427), how extended to 5000 km. Its utility is solely in attacks on urban areas; it 
could only pose a significant threat or be a deterrant if tens of thousands could be 
lunched - Iran only has 490. The development continued with the Shahab-2 using 
liquid propulsion (like the North Korean Scud-C) and Shahab-3. The long-range 
variants such as Shahab 4,5 and 6 utilise liquid propulsion also and are in 
development by Russia and Korea. Iran has provided funds for the research into North 
Korea's Nodong-1, with a capability of 1,300 km, enabling it to reach Israel from Iran. 
There have been reports of systematic problems with the programme including 
financial and engineering errors; it was only tested in May 1993, and only about ten 
launchers having been produced in North Korea and deployed within its army. There 
is no information on Iran's receipt of the missiles themselves, but it has been given 
the technology behind it as recompense for the support in development (Potter and 
Jencks, 1994:47-74:, Middle East Defence News, 18 May 1992:1-2; Defence Week,l 
May 1995, pp. 1- 14; www.iraqwatch.org). Though Iran's middle range rocket and 
missile systems have no deterrent capacity, they play a very effective role in frontline 
security zones of messianic identity in Lebanon, especially in the Hezbollah - Israeli 
war in 2006. During this asymmetric Israeli-Hezbollah war (between Ith July and 
14th August 2006), the latter fired in excess of 5,000 short and medium missiles, with 
over 10,000 remaining (Kulebi, 2008). The organisation's stockpile is said to include 
Fecr-3 (43 km range and 240 mm) and Fecr-5 (75 km range and 320 mm) and Zelzel-
2 (250 km range and 600 mm). These are claimed to have been given by Iran, with the 
exception ofthe Grad (50 km range),Raad (70 km range) and Hayber 1 (100 km range) 
received from Syria (Kulebi, 2008). 
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Table: 4.9.Iran's middle range rocket and missile system 
DESIGNATION NUMBER 
FROG-7 ( 1-2 launcher ) 70 KM rocket 100 
CSS-8 (150 KM. middle range) 120 
Missile 120 (130 KM middle range) ? 
s-24 
MUSHAK -120 (130 KM middle 
range) 
OGHAB 1-2 (45 -120 KM) 
SHAHIN 1-2 ( 14-20 KM Rocket 
NEZAET 1-2-3 (45-70-100 KM) 
? 
? 
250 3 launcher 18 Rocket 
10 (Shah in -2) 
350 
10 IRAN -130/ 160( 130 KM ROCKET) 
FECR-3, 5, 6 (45-60 KM ROCKET) 15 
M-18 (80-120 KM) 
M-09 
M11 
TUNDERBOLT 280 KM (Iran) 
HOSEE 8 KM ( Iran) 
ZELZAT-2 (Rocket) 
ARASH (21.5 KM. Rocket) 
HASEB (8.5 KM Rocket) 
BM -21 Rocket 
Long range Rocket 29 KM 
NOUR 18 KM (Iran (rocket) 
CSSA 130 KM 
C,801 
C-802 
Sources: Balbay, 2006 
12 
? 
? 
? 
20 
DETAILS 
Russian 
Chinese 15 KG warhead 
Local ( from air to land ) 
Local 
Local 
Local tactical top 230 mm 
Local tactical top 333 mm 
Local 
Local similar to Nazaet 
Local 
Local 
Chinese 
Chinese 
Local 
Local 
Local 
Local 100 mm 
Local107 mm 
Loca1122 mm 
Local ; 122 mm 
Local ;tactical top 
Chinese 
Chinese 
It is assumed that Iran has a self- sustaining capacity the technologies shown in the 
table 4.9. Production of missiles with solid propellant started with Oghab and Sahin-11 
and artillery rockets like Fecr, Nazeat, and Zelzel with assistance from China. It was 
expected that Iran would develop a missile with a 2000 km range through 
improvement of its Shahab-3 missiles, but it is also important that Iran haa succeeded 
in buildings different platform echnology. Iranian authorities consider the nuclear 
project as a point of national pride and a propaganda device. 
During the Shah era, Iran was the fourth biggest military power in the world due to its 
arms purchases from the United States. Iran had the most sophisticated F-14A Tomcat 
and F-4 Phantom supersonic fighters, more than 70 AH-1 Cobra Attack and 35 CH-47 
heavy-lift helicopters at that time. Iran lost this status after the Revolution and started 
to purchases the foreign arm equipment worth US $ 13,623,000,000 from Russia and 
China and North Korea since 1980 (SIPRI, 2008), it has developed its own arms 
industry. However, the air defence system of Iran is not capable of defending against 
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air strikes by United States (SIPRI, 2008). Iran only has 48 defence aircraft; 40; 
Cessena, 1; F-27, 5; Shirike, 2; Mystere-Falcon and 395 Helicopter. Iranian 
bombardment aircrafts are 266 in total. 12; F-06 Shamyang (Chinese made), 103; F-4 
Dl E Phantom, 33; SU-17/22, 89; SU-24 Fencer = Attack, 7+28; SU-25 Frogfoot 
(close support), 5; MIG-23/27, 24; MIR-1 Mirage (Multi purpose) (Balbay,2006), 
(Eisenstadt, East, et al. 2000). 
4.4.3. 1. Turkey's approach to Iran nuclear stand-off 
The position of Turkey on the nuclear crisis of Iran in the international community 
resembles the situation of hostage and economic sanctions under ILSA. However, 
Turkey's policy against balance of power change in the region led to a more 
complicated situation, because a nuclear - armed Iran would dramatically challenge 
Turkey's role in the region. Therefore, the Turkish defence minister, Vecdi Gonul, 
announced that Iran's stance on Armenia and Azerbaijan was not aligned with the 
Turkey's interests. Tehran's alleged work on nuclear, chemical and biological 
weaponry had demaged mutual relations due to the threat to the region (Sokolski and 
Clawson, 2004). The Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, during a conference in 
Ankara on 19th November 2004 stated that his country wished the region to remain 
nuclear-free and that Iran had a long-term position in the region. Such comments 
displayed a rift between the defence and foreign departments of Turkey with regard to 
Iran's danger level. Turkish and Israeli military and civilian functionaries portray Iran 
as a common risk andagree on their collaboration against this threat. 
On the other hand, Turkey played mediator role during the talks between the EU and 
Iran on the nuclear issue. Ankara hosted EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, the 
head of the IAEA, Muhammad Baradei, and Iran's former nuclear negotiator Ali 
Larijani. Turkey does not oppose any peaceful nuclear activity in Iran but is applied as 
conflicts between Iran and the US. Turkey's policy of non-confrontation with the 
international community does not allow the issue to become a negative factor between 
the two countries (Arslan, 2007). The policy may even legitimise Turkey's ambitions 
of nuclearisation with Western help. 
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4.4.3.2. Ali Reza Asgari affairs 
The mysteries of the Ali Reza Askari event created a low intensity diplomatic conflict 
between the two countries after the disappearance of a retired general of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps, a former deputy defence minister and a former member 
of the Iranian President Muhammad Khatami's cabinet on 7th February 2007 after 
flying from Damascus, Syria. Reports say that two other people had reserved a room 
for Asgari at the Ceylan Hotel in Istanbul for three nights, but that after arriving, 
Asgari reserved a room at the cheaper Hotel Ghilan. Because of claims that Israel was 
behind the disappearance, security was boosted at the Israeli embassies and for senior 
officials abroad. On 6th March, the Turkish Foreign Minister said that Turkey was 
conducting an extremely broad investigation (Y eni Safak; Aksam; Hurriyet, 15 March 
2007). According to the Iranian newspaper, Asgari was captured by a joint team of 
Mossad and the CIA and then tortured by them. Iranian officials believe that the last 
Israeli attack an Syrians missile bases was conducted based on information provided 
by Asgari. The event also gave rise to the prime time TV series named the Valley of 
the Wolf, but the mystery still continues unclear. 
In comparing the military capacity of both countries, Turkey is always on the sides of 
the West on security matters and is a significant customer in the Western arms market. 
Iran consistently longs for regional power status; however, Tehran is a significant 
customer of the Russian and Asian arms markets. Iran's arms technology is a reliant 
on local production to decrease dependency on foreign supplies. Both Iran's and 
Turkey's air defence systems are insufficient to protect against air attacks by a Great 
Power. All nuclear and cruise missiles in Iran are at the technology level of the 1960s. 
However, Turkey has the use of two strategic weapons, the F-16 and the F-35 (Guay, 
2007). It's relations with Israel are also of a systemic necessity because Turkey has to 
buy the computer programmes for the F -16 aircraft and other related military 
technological data systems (Burwell, 2008). 
4.5.0 Conclusion: the definition of Turkish and Iranian strategic culture of 
Security 
172 
The reconstructed state identities of Turkism and Iranianhood are a narrow expression 
of their national identity in territorial, cultural and political senses, but it is the wider 
nation a state identity which affects interstate normative structures, such as security in 
international relations. The variations in state identity, or changes in individual 
identities, affect national security interests and state policies. The norms of statehood 
are superior to the demands of society in the strategic culture of security. This 
supports our argument that the norms of statehood in Turkey and Iran are rooted in 
concern for national security. The different forms of oligarchy in Turkey and Iran do 
not allow the application of Wendt's social theory. The norms of state and society are 
rather shaped by national security interests or flow directly from the security policies 
of the state. Therefore, the reformation of Mustafa Kemal and Pahlavi and the later of 
the Islamic revolutionary state from above are valuable in defining a state's identity 
and changes an individuals identity in society. The state regime can be classified as 
authoritarian in the context of the virtual state of Turkism and Iranianhood. 
Secularism, Westernisation and nationalism defying the Ottoman and Persian legacies 
and attacking the former state's background to build a Westphalian state that supports 
nationalism, defines what Turkishness and Iranianhood is at this time. 
On the other hand, the nationality dilemma lies behind the demographic aspects of 
settlement in Iran and resettlement in contemporary Turkey. The theories of Justin 
McCarty (1995) and Karpat (1978) note that the expulsion of Ottoman Turkish-
Muslims immigrants focused on the peninsula as their homeland (vatan).This 
enhancement of the peninsula's Muslim and Turkish demographic base came at the 
expense of its Christian communities. After the Balkan War, the Empire lost 69% of 
its population and 83% of its territory in Europe. The withdrawal of the territory from 
an empire made Anatolia a final refuge as well as the immutable homeland of Turks 
and other Ottoman Muslims. Under the umbrella of the Turkishness political force, 
this territorialisation in Anthony Smith's nationalism theory found an echo in Turkey 
in the compromising deportation of the CUP's and the massacres of the Greeks and 
Armenians, by emphasising Young Turks common religion, shared history, and joint 
territory. However, the revisionist policy of the contemporary Turkish state limited its 
territorial and Turanist connection with the National Pact. Therefore, Turkey could 
not produce a policy to impede the deportation and the ethnic cleansing of the Soviet 
regime in its peripheral zones during WWII. Unlike the Ottoman collective religious 
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theory, Kemalist nationalism compels sanctions against political Islam and disregard 
for the Alevi religious identity. Turkishness is instead associated with the 
commitment to secularism, and voluntaristic -linguistic forms of citizenship. Iran is 
perceived as a national security threat to Turkey's vulnerable religious foundation. 
Therefore, secularism is defined as the strategic culture of security by the state 
establishment. Therefore, the legacy recognition of Turkish and Iranian state identity 
is based on the general principle not to interfere with the internal affairs of others. On 
one hand, there is a gap between Turkish citizenship and Turks-by-nationality. 
According to Ziya Gokalp, the nation is a community of individuals united by a 
shared culture, based on common education, morality, socialialisation and aesthetics 
so that Kurds can be Turks if they are assimilated, by speaking the Turkish language 
and socialising within Turkish culture. However, the failure of assimilation politics 
challenges the Kemalist and territorial nationalism of contemporary Turkey. Foreign 
interference in Turkey's Kurdish question is considered a national security threat by 
Turkish government. Therefore, geopolitical competition in Mesopotamia has 
worsened the relationship between Turkey and Iran and weakened the alliance 
between Turkey and US and Israel. 
On the other hand, the Twelver Shia religious identity definition of contemporary Iran 
manages to manipulate the gap between Iranian-citizenship and Iranianhood by 
nationality by creating a common religion, shared history, and joint territory. The 
nuclear ambition of Iran, therefore, is part of the strategic culture of security of 
Iranian nationalism. The cement of religious settlement in Iran is not only related to 
Islamic revolution but also dates back to the Safavid nationalism of religion in the 
Iranian society. Iran's competition in the Shia crescent is not a territorial claim, but 
rather an attempt to gain status in the international community. 
The nuclear ambition of Iran and Turkey's pro-Israeli politics in the Western security 
system are not perceived as strategic threats by either side. Therefore, neither capital 
saw each other as a national security threat but the relationship is very vulnerable to 
both enmity and amity if either state interferes with the internal affairs or offends the 
regime ofthe other. Hence, Turkey's alliance with NATO and Iran's nuclear ambition 
serve as a measure of the strategic culture of security between two neighbours. This 
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regional and international settlement mainly preserves the legacy omnibalancing 
relationship of middle-power states with super - powers, etc. 
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PART 11: EXPRIMENTAL MODEL FOR TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran and its relative political influence in regional politics 
are considered to be a transnational movement. The secularist ideology of Turkey and 
new political tendencies in Iran are also main dependent variables of this contentious 
relationship. By virtue of being internal threats, cross-border Kurdish nationalism and 
internal terrorist activities are part of this category, which presents a particular set of 
transnational factors in the examination of Turko - Iranian relations. These factors are 
dealt with in three different chapters. 
Chapter Four analyses religious institutionalism and agent groups in Turkish and 
Iranian societies, which resist the counter - revolutionary export policies of one 
another. The myth of Khomeini and its effect on diplomatic relations is examined, 
alongside other major factors such as the Turban Affair, the translation of 'Satanic 
Verses', the Sincan issue as well as Jafari and Alevi politics; all forming a part of the 
proposed experimental model for Turko - Iranian relations. Chapter Five deals with 
the unresolved political murders in Turkey, a micro analysis of THB is a clear 
example of managing an internal conflict in the context of omnibalancing theory. 
Moreover, the military insurgency campmgn by the PKK is one of the most 
significant variables of contention between Turkey and Iran, as discussed in Chapter 
Six. The domestic, regional and international dimension of Kurdish nationalism has 
become the main political card used by Iran against Turkey. During the Iran-Iraq war, 
Iran managed to keep Turkey as a neutral by exploiting the PKK insurgency while 
Tehran diminished the rising power of Turkey in the Middle East, he Central Asia and 
the Caucuses in the post Cold War period. The emergence of a Kurdish regional 
government in Kurdistan-Iraq and the military activities by PJAK' within the Iranian 
territory resulted in cooperation against the Kurdish militant movement. Turkey and 
Iran conducted joint military operations against the headquarters of the PKK and the 
PJAK in Qandil. The transnational movement of Kurdish nationalism has become an 
independent variable in regional politics, but for purposes of precision, this analysis 
will focus on the impact of Kurdish nationalism on Turko- Iranian relations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION: 
SECULARISM OR REVOLUTION 
5.1. Introduction 
The religious and secularist ideological differences intensified the diplomatic crisis 
between the two neighbours twice, in the 1980s and 1990s. The compounding of the 
ideological confrontation and the trajectories ofboth societies' religious roots formed 
the mindset of foreign policy-makers and, as such, the main ideological and religious 
circumstances of Turkey and Iran will be considered in this chapter. The alternative 
ideological and religious formation of the two different religious and political 
identities became more prominent in the last three decades in which religion took a 
Messianic form of Shia in Iran while the secularist way of life grew in Turkey. In the 
context of a low-level representation of Sunni politics since the last century, the 
emerging _revolutionary politics of S_hi 'i enclaves is ~hallenging to the pivotal states in 
the region. As previously explained in the theoretical framework section, Steven 
David's omni-balancing theory gives great credit to the perception of external and 
internal threats. Therefore the alternative religious and ideological regime theory is 
considered here not only as an external threat but also as an internal one due to 
vulnerability in each society. This chapter will explain how two regional players 
interfere with each other's internal affairs and consider the outcome of this internal 
threat. David's omni-balancing theory basically argues that internal threats are 
perceived as more dangerous than external ones by middle-power state because they 
invite external power interference and become external threats at the national security 
ofthe country. 
As part of the experimental model for Turko-Iranian relations, this study will review 
the trajectories of the religious and ideological factors of the two different identities, 
divided into two sections--Shia and Sunni. The sectarian classification covers the 
revolution and counter-revolutionary politics and religious political identity of the 
Turks. The next section presents a micro level of analysis for the religious and 
ideological confrontation around the myth of Ataturk and Khomeini, the Satanic 
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verses, the Turban Affairs, Jerusalem Night, the Xingjian Affairs and Ja'feri and 
Alavi crisis. 
5.2.0. Overview of the Apocalyptic Politics of the Shia Religion 
Shiite means 'a partisan' or follower of the Ali who was accepted as the first 
legitimate Imam or Caliphate, and successor of the Prophet in Shia belief. Their 
rejection of the Three Rightly-Guided Caliphs (632-61) is the conflicting 
interpretation of Islamic history; Hamit Inayet emphasises that the Sunnis have since 
moved away from the ideal state, whereas, for the Shia there is movement towards it 
(Enayat:1982:24). The major concealment of Imam Muhammad in 873 and his 
mysterious meeting with 'Suferai Erbaa' and following the last man meeting (Lesser 
concealment), Ebul Hassan Ali b Muhammad es-Samarri in 940 produced the doctrine 
of 'Return' in Shia belief (Kohberg,2003: 135-52). The link between the 'Return' and 
the ultimate global sovereignty of the righteous and oppressed has made Shia 
historicism a potential tool of radical activism. Inayet claims that anticipation of 
'Intizaar' -or the 'Golden Age' pacified-the Snia social movement which led them to 
systematize the 'taqiyye' when they are expecting Anka's idealism to be the realm in 
the religious politics (Enayat, 1982:25). From a religious-political point of view, the 
disparities vanished by the enshrinement of constitutional Islamic government (Erkilet, 
2004:351). Khomeini's "velayet-e faqih" or "Imam", allegedly the only one who 
grasps the 'inner meaning' of the Quran and what Archangel Gabriel conveyed, is a 
significant part of the Shia political setting. After the revolution, the Ja'feri proposal 
ofNadir came on the agenda to develop Islamic ecumenism as an interaction between 
Muslims to strengthen the 'taqrib' movement in the twentieth century - a Unitarian 
rapprochement between the two antagonists (Erkilet, 2004:350). 
As mentioned about the religious sphere of Iran's influence in Chapter Three, Shi'ism 
is divided into three main groups: the small group of Ismailis in India, the followers of 
the Seventh Imam, and the Zeydiye, who make up 40% of Y emenese population. 
Shi'ism constitutes 90% oflran's population and 60% ofthe Iraqi population. Shi'ism 
also remains geographically peripheral in the Arab world, in Lebanon, the United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey etc (Erkilet: 
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2004:350). The general Shia population includes 20% of all Muslims. Therefore, the 
Shia population is one of leading factors in Middle East politics. 
The leadership of the Twelver Imams is basically the 'raison d'etre' of Twelver 
Shi'ism. The innocence of the Imam is the main line of division between Sunnite and 
Shia beliefs. The duality of naqil (narrative) and aqli (rational) demonstrates the 
difference between Shia and Sunnite jurisprudence. Shia is considered mostly close to 
the Mu'tezile school, due to the issuing of ijtihad. One believes that there is no big 
difference in the practising of Islam between Twelver Shia and Sunnite Islam because 
Imam Ja'fer Sadik's method and ijtihad's constitute the Shia's jurisprudence. 
The legitimacy of the state in Shia belief is very disputable in both the Akhbari and 
Usuli schools. The criticisms by Ahrned Ardebili (d.l526) and Muhammad Bagir 
Majlisi (d. 1699) against the Safavid legitimacy were reviewed by Ali Shariati who 
emphasised the differences between the Safavid Shia and Ali 's Shia (Hussain: 1985). 
His ideological religion and Usuli School's political thought have held power in Iran 
since 1979. In contrast to the Usuli, Akhbaris political thought could not recognise the 
leadership of the Ayatollah in the government (Cole, 2001 :59). This internal Shai 
discourse highlights the importance of Velayat-e faqih after the invasion of Iraq. 
Khomeini developed his rationale and pragmatist political theory in Kesfu'l Esrar 
(Revealing of Secret) in 1942 and completed his Velayat-e Faqih thesis in al-
Hukumah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Government) in 1971(Khomeini, and Carpozi, 1983). 
Contrary to traditionalist approaches, he offers that taqiyyah cannot be an excuse for 
clergyman to renounce political involvement, given the principles of valayat, jihad, 
amr hi al-maruf and nahy an al-munker. Khomeini conceptualises the 
theoretical/doctrinal justifications of the velayat-e faqih in the absence of Hidden 
Imam; he claims that the legacy of clerics in governing is, therefore, not disputable. 
While implicitly rejecting the subtle Shia Nash (revocation) in theory by using the 
temporarily rulings of clergy, it is insisted that an Islamic government be created to 
provide universal justice in the world until the Mehdi 's arrival. Article 121 of the 
Constitution ofthe Islamic Republic oflran allows the elected Valayat-e Faqih to take 
power in the state. Unless one of the clerics takes power in an election, Article 107 
places the leadership of clerics in the Guardian Council (Algar, 1979). Khomeini 
explained the power of the Valayat-e Faqih in government, as holding the power of 
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the prophet and his successor Ali, therefore obedience to the leader is obligatory for 
Muslims. According to Joyce Wiley, political authority in Iran lies with this figure 
(Joyce, 1993:135). 
Table: S.l.Political authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Council 
Gove ent 
Ci,zens 
The figure signifies the difference between Shia and Sunni understandings of religious 
hierarchy. Faqih (Imam) was replaced with the prophet, which was contrary to the 
Sunni understanding of religion. However, the inter ulema relation on clergy-state 
continued to surface in the internal discourse in the provisional government; 
Sheriatmedari stated that "In Islam there is no provision that the clergy must 
-- - -
absolutely intervene in matters of state, the ulema's political activity could be justified 
only in extraordinary circumstances and marji-yi taqlid should not demean himself as 
a political officer, although a third-ranking clergyman, to participate in politics"(Iran 
Times, 25 May 1979). The opinion of Mutahhari overlaps on this issue, as he suggests 
that the role ofmmji-yi taqlid in the Islamic government is one ofbeing an ideologue 
not a ruler (Milani, 1988 :267). However, this difference is simplistic and a theological 
debate cannot be allowed to distract from the social stability of the state. The 
opposition of the Kurdish cleric, Husain, and the theological debate between Iraqi 
Shia and Iranian Shia clerics has generated a significant contribution to the analysis of 
Shia politics in this study. Whilst Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammed Bagir al-Sadr imparts 
a constitutional dimension to Khomeini's principle of valayat-e faqih, he was 
executed in 1980. Ayatollah Khoi and his successor al-Sistani did not give any ground 
to Khamenei's velayet-i faqih definition (Yann: 1995:116; Rahimi, 2004; Nakashs, 
2003:137) 
The religious roots diversified in Iran after the failure to deliver the promises of 
revolutionary politics. Hence the Islamic government turned to an apocalyptic vision 
of Shia politics which presumes the return of the cult of Mahdi (Hidden lmam) to 
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establish a world government. Khamenei belongs to the school of Mashhad, which is 
different from the school ofNajaf and Qom. Instead of a rational approach to religious 
texts, the school interprets the text with the idea of Imam and apocalypse and a 
superstitious version of Shia. However, Ahmedi Nejat belongs to a secret society 
which believes in the return of the Hidden Imam and the end of the clerical 
establishment, because the clerics consider themselves as the representatives of the 
Imam in his absence. In comparison to Ahmedi Nejat, Khamenie is certainly less 
apocalyptic but both groups have a common consensus to support Iran's nuclear 
programme. On the other hand, this new policy approach is opposed to the perception 
of Ali Shariati, who is waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam and Khomeini 's 
politics ofVelayeti Faqih. The essence ofKhomeini's revolutionary message was the 
rejection of the messianic interpretation of religion (Khalaji, 8 January 2008). His 
theory tries to legitimise an Islamic government for the present without waiting for the 
Hidden Imam and provides a jurist rule in the name of the Hidden Imam, stating that 
believers need not stay out of politics before his return. The Apocalyptic Politics of 
the Shia religion in the state support of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (SCIRI) and the Badr Brigade organization is a great game between the US and 
the pivotal states in the Middle East. The features of Shiaism 's potentially alternative 
religious theories stand in contast to the Turkish Islamic model. This study does not 
consider the influence on Iran's and Iraq's politics but touches upon the related 
connection with Kurdish nationalism. In the next section, the study deals with the 
capability of the revolution against the counter-revolutionary manipulation of 
international community but excludes the internal counter-revolutionary activities of 
SAVAK. 
5.2.1 Revolution versus counter-revolution 
The Iranian Revolution was basically manufactured by aShia and Marxist (Tudeh 
Party) anarchist coalition in 1987 (Moghadam, 1987). In the first stage of the 
revolution, whilst revolutionaries proclaimed the formation of 'God's State' in Iran, 
the international community wanted to perceive it as a nationalist revolution against 
the Pahlavi monarchy, but Khomeini's critics of the Westphalia nation state and 
nationalism accused them of playing an imperialist game of divide and rule to exploit 
the Islamic countries' natural sources - an essential paradigm of the Third World 
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country politics. He believed that the unity of Muslim nations is one of the essential 
elements oflslam (Zengin, 1988:73 ). Therefore, the revolution was seen as necessary 
not only for Iran but also as an essential step for the other (Islamic) nations. Khomeini 
ensured that Iran did not aim to control other Islamic countries but rather to support 
any struggle against imperialism. As part of such an anti-imperialist bloc, the 
revolutionaries aimed to establish a military, economic and political bloc against 
Christendom (Zengin, 1988:72). This religious political rhetoric is the new expression 
of the Pan-Islamist policies of the Ottoman state in the 191h century, but it is more 
factual than the previous one and forms a challenge to the capitalist and communist 
regimes in the international system. Abrahamian (1993: 15) pointed out that Khomeini 
does not qualify as a fundamentalist because he both implicitly and explicitly accepts 
the existence of the territorial nation state by talking in terms of an Iranian land and an 
Iranian nation (Abrahamian, 1993). Ehteshami suggests that his utilitarianism placed 
Islam in service of the Muslim community's temporal needs rather than the supreme 
spiritual dictates of Islam. The charismatic leadership in Weberian terms influenced 
the Iranian constitution of 1979 and its 1989 reforms (Abrahamian, 1993: 15). The 
first phase of Iranian foreign policy which celebrated "na sharghi na gharbi" (neither 
east nor west) achieved a negative equilibrium under Mosaddiq (Abrahamian, 
1993: 15). In this context, the Iranian foreign ministry announced that Iran was no 
longer a Western ally through the "CENTO" on 1 i 11 January 1979 and also cancelled 
the 1959 Soviet-Iran defence agreement on 151 November 1979 (Ari, 1996:142). At 
this critical time, the Ecevit government sent the foreign minister, Gunduz Okcun, to 
Iran (Brifing, 13 June 1979), and Turkey recognised the legitimacy of regime within 
24 hours on 13th February 1979 and declared that its policy was to develop relations 
with the new regime of Iran and not to interfere with its internal affairs. After the 
American embassy take-over and seizure of 52 American diplomats as hostages in 
Tehran (Carswell, 1981) and following the American economic embargo imposed on 
Iran, Turkey (Demirel government) preferred to condemn Iranian behaviour which it 
considered an act of defiance of the global enemy's 'world arrogance' in the 
mechanism of export of revolution. But it rejected US demands for the use of the 
Incirlik base in case of a military intervention inside Iran (Brifing, 26 December 
1979). This decision might be closely related to the 1974-1978 US arms embargo on 
Turkey and also related to the rising role in the region for the Western security 
purposes. Bolukbasi (1992) claims that "even though the Turkish government rejected 
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the request by the Americans, their policies worked in paralleled to maintain the need 
for the strategic alliance relationship in the Middle East" (p.17-8). Because the 
military government suppressed the growing Marxist and religious radicalism in 
Turkey, America found a secure place to use their communication devices to monitor 
the activities of the Soviets and Iranians. As mentioned earlier, the F -16 aircraft deal 
and the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) were signed in 1980. 
The United States launched the counter revolution, which refers to a policy of trying 
to reverse a revolution, and by extension, policies designated to prevent revolutionary 
movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power 
(Halliday, 1992:207). The activities encompassed reversal, demolition, suppression, 
containment in the region to manipulate the Islamic character of regime in the 1980s. 
The CIA spent $30 million in the mid-1980s, founding anti Khomeini groups in the 
region, while the Saudis poured $25 million on a failed coup attempt in 1982. 
Between 1979 and 1982 Baghdad squandered $150 million to overthrow the 
Khomeini regime late in the Iran-Iraq War (Crenshaw, (1995). The armaments ofthe 
regional countries grew- the United State supplied four AWACS aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia, (Cordesman, 1981) and Israel expended its nuclear technology. In the 1990s a 
commitment to international militancy fostered clashes between Iran and the United 
States. Thus Iran was cast as a rogue state by the United Nations which sanctioned the 
application of a dual contentment policy. In the 2000s, Iran retained its international 
status quo as an "axis evil" member for the West. 
Whilst the United State lost an important ally in the region, the Islamic Revolution 
created as alternative political theory to impede the expansion of the Soviet Union 
(Halliday, 1992). The new regime contained elements for a fundamentalist movement 
in the Islamic world; however, it had a different rhetoric than the Selefi Islamic 
movement in the Arab world and the characteristics of the Iranian Islamic revolution 
which distinguished it from French, Russian, Chinese, and Turkish revolutions as an 
alternative regime theory in the Middle East was highlighted (Halliday, 1999). The 
Turkish secular establishment feared that the new regime of Iran would inspire 
/establish ties with the reactionaries (irticacilar) to weaken Turkey's western outlook. 
Instead of religious arguments by Iran, these young radicals of the Islamic movement 
in 1990s subscribed to the political version of Iran's revolution. The different rhetoric 
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and perceptions signify that neither the Turkish state nor the Turkish Islamists 
understood the realities of Iran or the Middle East. Even though the Iran-Iraq War 
postponed the ideological conflict temporarily, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, 
undiplomatic behaviour and misperceptions of each side's social realities created a 
two-time diplomatic crisis in political relations in 1988 and 1997. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had to pursue pragmatist policies towards Turkey to 
ensure it remained neutral, as it needed to acquire iron urgently. However the military 
government launched a counter-revolution process against the pro-Soviet leftist 
movement and the rising Islamist fundamentalism from Iran. The critics at the foreign 
ministry of Iran characterised the Turko-Iranianian relationship in the first stage of 
revolution by reference to Ibrahim Y azdi, who wrote three articles claiming in the 
Kayhan newspaper that the military coup took the power against the rising Islam in 
Turkey with the help of the American-supported military forces, so that the 
government had to help Turkey's Islamist movement in this transition period 
(Halliday, 2007). In an echo, Y azdi proposed a federation of Muslim countries (BBC, 
24 July 1979). However, the Turkish Ambassador was instructed to warn his Iranian 
counterpart that this kind of criticism has interference in their internal affairs. 
Iran did not apply any systematic revolutionary politics towards Turkey, but 
supported small groups whose personal connections did not have a place in Turkish 
society. Iran's revolution also diminished the expansion of the Soviet regime in the 
Middle East and strengthened Turkey's position in the Western security system. 
5.3.0. The overview of the embedment of Sunni politics into secular religious 
ideology 
Sunni political thought is outlined by Al-Mawardi (1 031) who defined the caliphate as 
a necessity derived from the divine law rather than reason (Al-Mawardi, 1983). The 
doctrine of the Quraysh tribe in Sunni political thought is a version of the "Imamiyye" 
but the Turkish caliphate's implementation is very close to Ibn Taymiyya's political 
theory which offers the unity of the umma and the methodology of law in "al-Siyasa 
al-Shariyya" based on power coercion and similarity with the Lutfi Pasha proposal 
for the legacy of Caliphate of Ottoman. Whilst the ideal state of Muslim society is a 
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recession from the ideal state (asr-i saadet) in Sunni, it is the course of progress to the 
ideal state in Shia political ideology. The differences between two versions on the 
issues of the Imam's or caliphate's ismat (innocence) are highlighted in al-Ghazali's 
(1111) political theory. He suggests that the devout Muslim should avoid the court 
and company of an unjust ruler, and should rebuke him: by words if he can safely do 
so, by silence if words might encourage rebellion ( al-Ghazali, 1829). 
Despite the Turkish people's generally evident reliance on Hanafi-Maturidi theology, 
the Ottoman state preferred to apply its Es'ari passive political theory which provides 
civil obedience and shelter to the heterodox Sufi order in Turkish society. The 
continuity of this tradition is partially diverted in the new Turkish state's religious 
establishment. Turkish secularism uses the Hanefi-Maturidi theology, with the theory 
of irade-i cuziyye (the man who creates his own action in general philosophy of this 
religious theory) which allows civil disobedience against injustice rulers; this 
develops a self-identity for Turkish Islam (synthesis) integrated with secular religious 
etatisme (Y orukan, 1953 ). Due to an unofficial social contract between the and the 
religious establishment (Minister of Religious Affairs, jemeats, and tarikats), the 
Turkish Islamic movement could have promoted an alternative regime theory but it 
preferred to ally itself with the modernisation program by integrating in a global 
system under the surveillance of the Jacobin branch of secularism. However, this 
orthodox stance of the Minister of the Religious Affairs and the religious groups 
ignored the reality of Islam and the Alevi and Ja'feri who compose a quarter of the 
population of the country. Contrary to the fundamentalist movement in the Islamic 
world, the Turkish Islamic movement is based on Sufi-oriented liberal thought much 
punctuated by the tolerance of Rumi, the love of Yunus and the reasonableness of 
Haci Bektas-i Veli. The response of the balance of power to the Turkish Islamic 
model is to export the liberal democracy throughout the Middle Eastern countries (the 
Great Middle East Project) have been the subject of scholarly discussion. Sociologist 
Nilufer Gole suggested that the clash between Islamism and secularism is the struggle 
for a centralised control (GcHe, 1996). In considering liberalist aspects of secularism, 
Delanty employs Habernas's public sphere concept- which is a space in society, seen 
to reside between the civil and the state's domain while remaining a domain for 
discourse (Habermas, 1991 ). Turkish laicism is different from Anglo-Saxon 
secularism. The questions are - Where are the limits of the public sphere? or Who is 
185 
its owner? Whilst the secular state-establishment claims that schools and state offices 
belong to the state authority and, therefore, can set scarf rules, Islamists claim that 
these places must respect personal privacy. The legacy of the state depends on this 
liberal commitment but the state bourgeoisie perceives these public critiques or 
demands as penetrating the secular-establishment of the absolute state. Therefore, 
Turkey's public sphere loses its strictly public nature and the state penetrates this 
private domain: amounts to re-feudalism (Habermas, 1991). Both Turkey's secular 
and Iran's Islamist regimes unfortunately lack the liberal political thought and space 
to maintain state authority rather than privatise this property. Secularism is generally 
based on withdrawing jurisdiction of the religious authority (Berkes, 1998). In this 
vein, Alev Erkilet classifies the Islamic movement in Turkey. She suggests that there 
is no Islamist movement to promote the sacred law and forces of change in Turkey. 
Ercument Ozkan's Hizbuttahrir caliphate proposal however, is exceptional, which is 
contrary to Turkish Islamic tradition. However, this remains marginal in the Islamic 
environment. 
In brief, the nature of the Turkish Islamic synthesis is mostly parallel with the secular 
establishment on the issue of Kurdish nationalism so that Kurdish nationalism could 
not exploit any rhetoric to revolt against the state in an Islamic environment. Rather, 
the Kurds are organised within left-wing organizations using the socialist rhetoric 
since the Sheikh Said rebellion. The Turkish religious establishment does not allow 
any revolutionary interference with society. Hence, this study explains the main 
characteristics of the Turkish Islamic model by exemplifying the roots of the various 
Islamic groups and their approach to revolutionary fluctuations in the region. 
5.3.1 Islamic political identity in Turkey 
The construction of the Turkish religious identity is based on various roots, which are 
completely different from the messianic roots of Iranian religious identity. Turkish 
authoritarian modernisation also provides a new form of Turkish Islamic synthesis in 
which these reformation programmes from above generate religious groups integrated 
with secular state establishment. These Islamist groups provide a great contribution to 
the modernisation of Turkey. However, Kemalist republican nationalism could not 
replace the multi-level appeal of Islam--it had to bandwagon with traditional Islam to 
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balance the threat emergmg from the radical Islamic movements. The relations 
between these Islamist groups and the secular establishment resembles the metaphor 
of 'mistress relations'. This study excludes the process of Islamic resurgence before 
the military coup d' etat in 1980s and focuses on the escalation of a new semi-
peripheral conservative class against the rising fundamentalist movements from the 
Islamic world. The theoretical form of Turkish Islamic synthesis (TIS) accepts 
authoritarian regime principles in general, but not the hostile revolutionary model of 
Iran. Religion is considered the essence of culture and social control, which must be 
fostered in school but should not be used for political aims. Hence the military 
government is committed to religious education in state and private schools. However, 
the incorporation of the Islamist parties and the state establishment has reduced the 
impact on political ideology of such business associations as MUSIAD, Islamic banks 
(Kuwait Turk, Faisal Finans), private schools (Gulen's schools), Imam Hatip Schools 
(Tapper, 1991) and Quran courses, (Cakir,and Bozaslan 2004) and Islamic media 
which jolt the status quo of the secular bourgeoisie, and stimulate the modernised 
Islamic awareness which is now challenging the Kemalist establishment at the 
political economic, cultural, and social levels (Ataman, 1999). However, the military 
interference with internal politics by using a post-modern military coup d'etat (the 
28th February process) curtailed the rising power of the semi-peripheral class in 
Turkey. Subsequently centre-periphery relations were more oppressive. The Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) leadership is continuing its legacy on the basis of 
Kemalist and liberal rhetoric. However, the creation process of liberal political 
Islamic model of AKP was undermined by the constitutional crisis in 2007 and the 
justice coup in 2008. Thus, the study concludes that neither a religious political 
ideology nor a militarist type of Islam could be accommodating in the Turkish Islamic 
model of understanding. The Turkish-Islan1ic synthesis did not result in Islamist 
fundamentalists like Hasan al-Banna, Syed Qutb, Abul Ala Mawdudi, or Ali Shari'ati. 
The country's Muslim intelligentsia originates largely in writers and poets such as 
Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Nurettin Topcu and Sezai Karakoc - supporters of Turkish 
Islam. These individuals see Islam as a 'melting pot' for integration of ethnicies in 
Turkey but they do not offer any direct resolution of ethnic entity recognition (Yavuz, 
2003). On the other hand, the other Islamic groups (associations/communities) 
constitute the traditionalist Islam and political Islam which is considered within this 
category. But the pro-Sunnite Islamic radical group, IBDA-C (The Islamic Great East 
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Raiders' Front) is exceptional in Turkey and have not found any logistic support from 
society so far. 
5.3.1.1 The formation of biamic groups against revolutionary Islam 
Islamic groups are divided into Sufi-oriented and Islamic Jama'ats in Turkey. In this 
section, the author tries to explain the lack of success of Iran's revolutionary export 
policies. Even though Iran did not apply a systematic revolutionary politics towards 
Turkey, there is no place for the revolutionary model in Turkish Islamism. 
According to Hilmi Ulken, Turkish Sufism differentiates itself from Persian Sufism 
by stressing morality over an anthropomorphic (human-centred) understanding of 
religion (as cited in Yavuz, 2003). The basic Sufi-oriented Islamic movement in 
Turkey supports the redefinition of Islamic and changes the values system in the 
society. Therefore, the Turkish construction of Islam is certainly based on Turkish 
culture, political history and geography - giving rise to a model of secularism. The 
role of the Sufi-order mostly characterises Turkish-Islamic self .. determination, which 
is the continuity of Ottoman imperial non-governmental organisations. Even though 
the Kemalist leadership abolished Tekke and Zaviyeler (Sufi orders and their lodge) 
in 1925, the Sufi groups went underground to form a counter revolutionary movement 
against Kemalist reformation. The multi-party system provided a space in the society 
to integrate with the secular system of Sufi-order (Kara, 1977). The state did not 
refrain from using Sufi communities to impede radicalisation in the newly urbanised 
cities (Bulac, Aksam 25 Sep 2006). Instead of promoting an alternative regime theory, 
the Sufi-orders became a part of the secular shrines of Turkey, such as the Iskender 
Pasha Group - one of the pro-Sunnite Nakshi Sufi orders which have been very 
influential in Turkish politics during the last 50 years (Cakir, 1995). Prior to the 
advent of the revolution, Turkey's political Islam was monitored by Sheik Mehmet 
Zaid Kutku of the Iskender Pasha mosque in the suburbs oflstanbul (Gurdogan, 1991). 
The group prefers to integrate into the system and manipulate the radical tendencies of 
Islamists (Erkilet, 2004). This policy played an important role in avoiding terrorist 
activities in the 1970s but led to the political participation of the Islamisst in Turkish 
democratic politics by actively supporting of Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order 
Party), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) , and Refah Partisi (Welfare 
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Party) which twice achieved a coalition government in 1974 and 1997 (Kavli, 2003). 
Erbakan became the first Islamist prime minister in Turkey's democratic history, but 
he and his party were banned in the 281h February process in 1997 (Onis 1999). Even 
though his political roots and ideology still remain politically active with Saadet 
Partisi (Felicity Party), the achievements of the AKP changed their Islamist political 
theory (<;akir and <;almuk, 2001 ). The ideology of Erbakan is summarised as national 
outlook and just order. His claims of an Islamic unity under an Islamic NATO and an 
Islamic EU reflect similarities with Khomeini's political theory. Erbakan successfully 
manipulated the religious dispute between the two opposite perspectives and 
emphasised the political role of revolution, placing it opposite semitism and 
imperialism. Erbakan's movement is a kind of disintegrated political model against 
state formation and religious order in Turkey (Cakir, 1994). Additionally, the other 
Sufi-order, the Adiyaman group, played a balancing role to create a Sunnite periphery 
balance against Shia expansionism from Iran and PKK terror activities in southern 
Anatolia (Cakir, 1995). 
On the other hand, the Islamic groups demonstrated a different picture from that of the 
Sufi groups but also had unofficial contacts or engagements with the secular 
establishment. Despite the personal struggle of Said Nursi against the Kemalist 
reformation, his "risale-i nur" (Epistle of light) became the main religious text to 
inspire the Islamic movement in Turkey. Said's general ideas are considered in the 
context of a Sunnite interpretation of Holy Quran but his reconciliation of the 
positivism with Islamic science is essential for the Islamic model ofNursi's groups in 
Turkey (Mardin, cl989). In opposing Sheikh Said's ethnic religious political theory, 
Nursi focuses on the positive nationalism of Islamo-Turkism as long as that 
nationalism could be used in the service of Islam (Yavuz, 2003). The continuity of 
pan-Islamism is perceived as an alienation from the Kemalist-establishment and a 
subversion of the Turkish society. However, the followers of Said Nursi are divided 
into various sub- Islamist groups and became part of religious theory of the TIS 
(Bonner, 2004). The most influential groups among them in the Turkish politics is the 
Gulen movement which captured domestic and international attention. For instance, 
former prime minister Ecevit stressed the importance of Gulen's schools in Central 
Asia and Azerbaijan to diminish the influence of Iranian fundamentalism; making this 
a valuable part of this study (TDNs, 9 June 1999). Nilufer Narli (1999) pointed out 
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that the relationship between Nursi and Gulen was at one time that of a disciple of 
Said Nursi, a religious leader associated with radicalism on the Kurdish issue. 
However, Gulen now avoids being identified with Nursi and has founded his own 
religious society, known until recent times for its moderation and loyalty to the 
secular state. It is interesting that despite being pro-Sunnite and nationalist in thought, 
Gulen uses Shia methods and proposals to organise his group. He claims that "if 
religious missionaries receive their wages from the state, they cannot be treated as 
religious actors in society." He implies that economic independency is essential for 
the Islamic movement; therefore, he established a financial network system, such as 
the Shia clerical web amongst the public. Gulen also benefited from the counter 
revolutionary politics of state against Iran and liberal economic policies of 
conservative governments by gaining economic independency--so that Gulen groups 
now sponsor many Turkish private schools in many countries (Yavuz, and Esposito, 
2003 ). It also runs an organisation called Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi (Journalists' 
and Writers' Foundation), which holds inter-faith seminars and supports the daily 
newspaper, Zaman, as well as various television channels and radio stations 
throughout Turkey (www.axt.org.uk/antisem). The second method of Gulen groups is 
Taqiyye (concealment)- intended to infiltrate the state- central establishment. But it 
is essential that Gulen movements have no direct conflicts with the secular 
establishment. They avoid involvement in politics and prefer to support the 
conservative parties rather than Erbakan's party. Gulen proclaimed that the headscarf 
is a part of religion but education is more essential, (Yurtsever, 1998). Therefore the 
followers of Gulen took off their headscarves at university, supporting the idea that 
the public sphere belongs to the state authority. It is accepted that the Gulen 
movement is very hostile to the Iranian type Islamization or Salafi-type of Arab Islam 
in Turkey (Calislar and Celik, 2000). His Jerusalem proposal and anti-semitist 
transnational habits also contrasts with political Islam (Erbakan) and Iran's 
rapprochement on that issue (Gundem, 1998). The concept ofTIS takes a new form in 
his moderate Islamic theory. It is undeniable that transnational missionary activities of 
the groups in many countries serve the political aims of Turkey and also present an 
alternative model against the Shia and Selefi Islamic fundamentalist politics. Whilst 
the Gulen movement partially lost their support in the government after the 28th 
February process in 1997, the American government sheltered them in the United 
States and promoted them as a moderate Islamic model against terrorism (Unal, 2002). 
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Even though the group creates a bridge between the and Islamist worlds, the secular 
establishment expressed its mistrust of this dialogue. Similarly an Islamist journalist 
in Zaman (Gulen group's press), Ali Bulac, by Medina Vesikasi (Medina Record) 
proposal occupied the scholarly discussion, on the topic ofliving in peace in the same 
territory demonstrated that Islamic groups could not aim to establish an Iranian-style 
Islamic state (Meeker, 1994:197 -205). 
Another amazing explanation which signifies the relation between Islamic groups and 
the state came from Ismail Amasyali who is one of the decision-makers of the 
Suleymanci Islamist groups in Turkey which runs domestic and international 
networks. He said that "Islamic groups are not a party or Sufi groups but they are 
established for the social needs of Turkey by intelligent and wealthy people and they 
aim to live as part of the state regime and system" (Hurriyet, 22 May 2007:3). 
Therefore, Islamic groups never go to conflict with the military and constitutional 
organisations. 
The only Islamist group which applauded the Iranian Islamic revolution was the 
Radicaller (Fundamentalist) in the 1980s and 1990s. Bulut (1993 :426) claims that 
these small Islamist groups number about 300 in Turkey and that some of the group 
members financed the jihad in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Most of them have 
generally rejected the traditionalist Islam identity construction of the state, Sufi-based 
Islam and other religious traditionalist groups, but the Turkish state has allowed them 
access to the necessary Sunni fundamentalist resources or books as such Sayyid 
Qutb's Ma'alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones) to impede the Shia political rhetoric in 
Turkey. Though Rusen Cakir claims that political Islam ended after the 1990s, the 
reason for their demise is based on their marginal and anarchical complex identity. 
Hence, the groups could not survive in the Turkish community and vanished in the 
Islamic environment in western part of Turkey after the 28th February process in 1997. 
However, these radical Islamic groups have found more secure places in the Kurdish 
society such as within the Turkish Hezbollah in south-eastern Anatolia. It is a fact that 
the radical movement contributes to the Islamic intellectual life in Turkey and breaks 
the traditionalist Islamic groups' hegemony by translating Iranian and Arab Salafi 
books. They are creating a great awareness in Turkish intellectual life and causing the 
intelligentsia's transition from the left-wing to right wing-- now they are the 
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alternative rulers of the state. There were some intellectuals connected with the 
Iranian government as such the Mehmet Metiner, Atasoy Muftuoglu and Nurettin 
Sirin in 1980s and 1990s, and pro-Iranian press produce small periodicals "Sehadet" 
(Martyrdom), "Girisim" (Activity), "Yeryuzu" (the earth) and "Iktibas" (Citation) 
which capture the attention of these small radical groups (Cakir, 1995). However, 
Khomeini's letter to Gorbachew which emphasised the Sufi-orientation of Islamic 
understandings, namely that religious theory is opposed to the Salafi model of Islam, 
led, following his death, to the cutting of links between radicals and Iranian 
revolutionaries. 
Thus, the Turkish Sufi oriented and Islamist-positivist theories of Said Nursi and the 
liberal Islamic Gulen groups could not permit the promotion of any revolutionary or 
Salafi militant political models in Turkey. Secondly, Iran has no influence on Alevi 
society which is seen by the society in general as having a separate religious identity. 
The connection to the radicals was also cut off by Khomeini's death. Hence, only 
Twelver Ja'feri groups are now open to Iranian religious influence in Turkey--but 
they are under supervision by the state and are forced to go to Najaf for religious 
training rather than to Qum. The revolutionary activities of Iran in Turkey are dealt 
with by giving a micro analysis of five cases in the next section. 
5.4.0 Religious and ideological confrontation: the politics of export of the 
revolution 
Khomeini's main aim was to create a systemic revolution and export policies to other 
Islamic countries. Hence the revolutionary state operates its politics under the 
supervision of the Ministry of the Irsad-i Islam (Yalcin, 1995) and the Iranian 
embassies abroad. Khomeini (as cited in Zengin, 1988) stated that "Our revolution has 
been exported to the world in spite of all the opposition the trend has encountered". 
He also said "Do not say our revolution must not be exported" (p.27). The Imam 
Khomeini has himself reiterated several times that the revolution's concept is the 
same as the soft spring weather. It does not recognise borders and frontiers, it will go 
through them. However, the Iranian doyen of foreign policy, Ramazani, points that 
the legitimate means for exporting the revolution was unclear (Ramazani, 2005). 
Despite its universalistic discourse, the critics of Menashri suggest that Khomeini's 
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Islamic government concept did not present a blueprint for the unification of the 
whole Muslim people nor did Khomeini lay down specific guidelines for a new 
scheme of foreign relations (Menashri, 200 l ). 
The adventure of Iranian revolutionary policies IS eventually being adapted to 
changing global developments and the internal economic, political and social 
constraints in Iran (Erkilet, 2004). In the course of revolution, the foreign policy of 
Iran aims to defend the Islamic regime, to guarantee regional security for Iran, to 
export Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries. Shia communities of the Gulf, 
and especially in Lebanon, were chosen as a first target for the export of revolution to 
establish a peripheral security zone in the region. In this vein, Turkey is considered a 
second target country for the revolutionary activities of Iran. However the realist and 
idealist approach to the export of revolution divided Iranian politics into conservative 
and reformist. Whilst Khomeini, Khamenei, Hussein Mosavi and Rafsanjani prefer to 
use soft power for the revolution export policies, idealists, the more doctrinaire group, 
then led by Ayatollah Montazeri, advocated a hard power in way of exporting 
revolution, referencing Khomeini's earlier words literally. These activities were to 
include political and military intervention in support of Islamic revolutionaries in 
other states, violent activities directed against US and other western targets, and 
covert actions against the conservative Arab governments and opponents of the 
regime. 
In 1984 the relative balance between internationalist militancy and diplomatic 
accommodation shifted. The Iranian foreign ministry set out to remove radical 
elements from embassies abroad and proponents of revolutionary internationalism 
within the state; a unit of Revolutionary Guards was put in charge of militarist groups 
abroad to impede corruption, subversion and counter revolutionary activities. It was 
mainly for these reasons that Mahdi Hashemi, who was involved in such activities, 
was executed in September 1987 (Green, 1995:552-4). After Khomeini, Rafsanjani 
gave up adventurist policies against neighbouring countries and returned to a 
moderate course in its relations with the countries of the region, because the growing 
internal difficulties stemming from the ongoing war with Iraq, economic deterioration, 
domestic dissidence and a power struggle within the regime started to create a sense 
of disillusionment and posed a challenge to the stability of the regime after the failure 
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of militarist revolutionary export politics at the end of the Iran-Iraq war m 1988. 
Iran's revolutionary activities in Turkey escalated dramatically, because its 
dependency on Turkey was spontaneously reduced and ideological bipolarity initiated 
its dominance in the two countries' relations. Both countries' press attitudes were very 
oppressive and unfriendly to each other and this was called a 'press war'. However, 
the initiatives of the Khatemi government were applauded by the Turkish press and 
the state apparatus; nonetheless, the situation is again critical under the leadership of 
Ahmedinejat as a neo-conservative Islamist (Ehteshami, and Zweiri, 2007). 
The revolutionary rhetoric of Iran is exceptional in political theory. Using religious 
symbolic terms to challenge Turkey's alliance, such as the "Greater Satan" for the 
United States and "Lesser Satan" for Israel, attacking the Turkey's symbolic secular 
establishment (Ataturk), the issue of headscarves, the Salman Rushdie Affair and 
Jerusalem Night have provided a critical understanding of Turkey-Iran religious and 
ideological confrontation, as set out in the next section. 
5.4.1 The myth of Ataturk's and Khomeini's confrontation 
Ataturk and Khomeini are main figures of the new imaginary state identity which has 
formulated two different political theories against Western imperialism. These 
alternative regime myths had caused a diplomatic crisis when no bilateral visits 
occurred until the end of the 1980s. The new regime of Iran perceives Ataturk as an 
ally of Reza Shah, an arch-enemy of Islam and worse than a communist dictator who 
changed the country's path from an Islamic tradition to Western culture by abolishing 
the caliphate and promoting anti-Islamist modernisation (Fuller, 1991 :203). Kemalism 
is also presented as a modernisation model for Islamic countries by active 
participation in western cultural, economic, political and military organisations (Kili, 
1981: 15). However, Khomeini 's myth challenges this secularist modernisation 
(Abrahamian, 1993). Therefore, this alternative regime theory makes relations 
complicated in the bipolarity system of the Middle East (Tulumen, 1998:87). 
Khomeini's direct criticisms of Ataturk's secularist modernisation programmes (as 
cited in Zengin, 1988) toughened the ideological dispute, such as in a speech given on 
241h August 1986. "The clergy has to believe that they had to obey the tyrants, 
oppressors, and the holders of naked power. Certain lackeys preferred to obey Ataturk, 
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who destroyed the rule of Islam, instead of obeying the orders of the prophet. How 
can a reasonable mind accept this? Today, the clergy in Turkey who are the puppets 
of Paranoiac forces, teach the people the orders of God and the prophet, but at the 
same time call on them to obey Ataturk. ... How can one argue that this is consistent 
with the notion of Islamic rulers, whom God ordered us to obey? Obviously, Islamic 
rulers in the real sense can only be those who follow the order of God and his 
messenger" (pp.168-9). Turkey's diplomatic response was severe to that kind of 
internal interference in secular politics. To this end, the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Vahit Halefoglu visited Tehran on 26-30 August 1986 and gave warnings to his 
counterpart to use diplomatic language and not to interfere with internal affairs. 
However undiplomatic actions may have been, merely fleshing out the existing 
ideological divide between the two countries became the general attitude of 
diplomatic envoys from Iran. Prime Minister Musavi publicly criticised the reforms of 
Ataturk and refused to pay homage at his mausoleum - a protocol requirement for 
visiting dignitaries - during his visit to Turkey in the summer of 1987. He declared 
that he would rather be visiting the Mawlana shrine in Konya. However, Prime 
Minister Ozal did not respond to his undiplomatic behaviour due to growing 
economic ties with Iran. However, the chief of the general staff, Necip Oztorun, and 
his colleagues, as protectors of regime, responded that "this was nothing short of a 
personal insult" (Robins 1991 :55). They were particularly outraged by the deferential 
treatment shown by Ozal toward the Iranian Prime Minister. In fact, Musavi was 
being consistent with the clerical tradition in Iran, in the state of revolutionary 
resentments and its aspirations. 
A senes of ideological diplomatic cnses occurred between the two countries in 
November 1988 when the Iranian Embassy in Ankara refused to follow all other 
foreign missions and lower its flag to half-mast to commemorate the 501h anniversary 
of Ataturk's death. This was severely criticised by the Turkish press and was 
described as "unforgivable insolence." In November 1988, a supporter of the Islamic 
regime attempted to kidnap an Iranian opposition leader and smuggle him back to Iran. 
The boot of the assailants' car failed to work while the man was driven across 
Anatolia. Staff at the Iranian embassy was accused of involvement in this affair. The 
incident showed that Iran was prepared to use Turkish territory to settle scores with its 
opponents and use its diplomatic mission to that end (Robins, 1991 :56). However, in 
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June 1988, Turgut Ozal instructed all flags to be lowered to half-mast as a sign of 
respect for the recently deceased Ayatollah Khomeini. The other revolutionary 
propaganda manifestation was heard on the Voice of the Islamic Republic, an Iranian 
Radio broadcast, which harshly criticised secularist establishments such as 
communism and pagan states and called on the Islamist groups to fight the secularist 
state authority in Turkey on 2ih November 1986 (Tekin, 1997). 
In addition, the Turkish press often focused on the Shi'i nature of the Iranian 
revolution and its propaganda activities against the Turkish regime. Some articles 
attacked Khomeini personally, with one journal claiming sexual improprieties when 
he was in exile in Bursa, Turkey. In retaliation, the Iranian daily 'Islamic Republic' 
responded by saying "How much do the Turks respect our live leaders that they 
expect us to respect the rotten bones of their dead leader Ataturk" (as cited in Metiner, 
2008).The humiliating of Khomeini in a cartoon produced by Bedri Karaman 
published in Hurriyet newspaper created another diplomatic incident so that Iran 
demanded a diplomatic apology from its Turkish counterpart but Cetin Emec, who is 
general editor of the Hurriyet newspaper, did not do so while diplomatic pressure 
highlighted the crisis between two countries. Both sides have complained about the 
vitriolic attacks directed at them by the opposing press. 
Ataturk and Khomeini still remain the main figures for the Islamic World. Turkey 
presents a Western type of identity while Iran exemplifies the politicised Islamic type 
of identity. In the next section, the Salman Rushdie event provides a description of 
another ideological dispute in bilateral relations. 
5.4.2. Satanic verses' translation by Aziz Nesin: Sivas and Basbaglar events 
Salman Rushdie was announced as a mahdur ad-damn (one whose blood is invalid or 
forfeit) on 141h February 1989 by Khomeini 's edict. Halliday (1999) suggested that 
this edict was an essential stage of export of the revolution (p.207). Iran evaluated this 
affair as an attack on the identity of the Muslims by liberalism, an enemy of Islam 
(Hampsher-Monk 1991 : 162). After the Turkish longstanding leadership of the Islamic 
world, Iran is now revealed as a protector or representative of theMuslim identity in 
the Islamic world. However, Ruzin (1989) suggests that Iran sacrificed its domestic 
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priorities for the sake of foreign policy objectives (p.201 ). Though Turkey stuck with 
a secularist identity (not a liberal one), suspicion was raised on Turkey's desired 
membership of the European Union in 1992 (Ihsan, and Kidwai 1991). The Iranian 
ambassador in Ankara, Monusher Mottaki, expressed Iran's dissatisfaction with the 
lack of a firm stand against Rushdie's Satanic Verses in the Jerusalem Night in his 
speech in the city of Konya on 1 01h April 1988 (Hurriyet, 21 April 1988). Iranians 
exerted pressure to have the book banned and the Iranian council (Ali Asghar Shaft) 
in the city of Erzurum distributed copies of the Khomeini fatwa to the muftis 
throughout eastern Anatolia for dissemination among the Kurdish Alewi population 
(Nokta, 2 April 1989). When the Turkish authorities discovered that Iran had sent the 
religious propaganda leaflet as a diplomatic paper to the Iranian consulate on 151h 
March 1989, the Turkish foreign ministry emphasised that the new principles of a 
diplomatic mission would state that more than 50 kg ofbaggage would not be allowed 
into Turkey without an examination by Turkish officers. As a consequence of these 
two events, the Turban affair arose in April 1989, dealt with in a subsequent section. 
Turkey announced that Manushehr Mottaki is "persona non grata" and Iran had to 
call back its ambassador from Turkey. Moreover, the legacy ofKhomeini's fatwa was 
not accepted by Turkey but the Turkish government had been on the right side of the 
Selman Rushdie affair -not only banning the book in Turkey but also publicly 
criticising the author for trampling upon the genuine feelings of Muslims around the 
world. Prime Minister Ozal took to uttering such enigmatic statements as, "A crazy 
man threw a stone in the well, and a thousand intellectuals are doing battle to get it 
out". While Ankara did sign the OIC communique calling for a ban on the book, no 
legislation to this effect was introduced (Der Spiegel, 6 March 1989). Turkey was the 
only Muslim country where the book remained quietly legal. The big protest rally 
against the Satanic Verses in Istanbul on 41h March 1989 was effective in Turkish 
foreign policy. Despite unofficial critics of him, the Social Democrat Party leader, 
Erdal lnonu, announced that "killing somebody for what he has written is simply 
murder" (The Economist, 18 March 1989). Middle East editor of the Cumhuriyet 
newspaper Ali Sinnen called Khomeini "a nearly 90-years-old man who still thirsts 
for blood as a terrorist activist and waxed nostalgic of the Shah" (Cumhmiyet, 22 
February 1989, and 24 March 1989). Altan Oymen also labelled the Iranian regime as 
"a terrorist administration" (Cumhuriyet , 26 February 19891; Milliyet, 22 March 
1989). The only religious criticism came from Mehmet Hatipoglu, a professor at the 
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Theology Faculty at Ankara University, who suggested that Khomeini's fatwa is un-
Islamic (Olson, 2005), but neither religious criticisms nor intellectual research was 
produced in Turkey about the Rushdie Affair. A satirical author, Aziz Nesin, vowed 
to translate Selman Rushdie's Satanic Verses into Turkish, and to publish it to some 
experts. Pragmatist leader Rafsanjani ar!:,TUed that the fatwa was a religious verdict, but 
did not accept the death edict (Tehran Television, 8 June 1989). After Khomeini's 
death, Iran did not take it seriously and a repeated order would not be accepted even if 
issued, just as in the case ofNesin's order (Sick, 1985). Rafsanjani resisted repetition 
of another Rushdie Affair, this time with Turkey (Olson, 2004) in light of Turkey's 
potential for gains in the Iranian market, and in view of the strained diplomatic and 
trade relations between the EEC and Iran (Boruvali, 1989:90-91 ). Yusuf Ozal (brother 
of the prime minister) called the Satanic Verses affair "a blessing on Turkey from 
God" but this cynical delight did not last long, and was replaced by a dilemma. 
Though Iran had no direct connection with the events of Sivas and Basbaglar, the 
Turkish government operated manipulation politics against the possible religious 
influences of II"_an in Turkey. The tragic event of Si vas, _a fault lin~ city betwe~!l tht;: _ 
Sunnite and Alevi populations, in which the Islamist rioters set fire to the Madimak 
Hotel, and accused those at the convention of spreading atheism on 2nd July 1993, 
brought considerable attention. Thirty-seven people lost their lives in this act. 
However, Aziz Nesin managed to escape from the hotel fire. Anger between the Alevi 
and Sunni population increased after the genocide of Basbaghlar, when in the village 
near Erzincan city, thirty-three people were murdered in a mosque in revenge for 
Sivas-Madimak by Alevi militants on 5111 July 1993 (Hurriyet, 8 August 2005). The 
state court decided to issue a death sentence for the 33 radical Islamist who were 
involved in the Madimak massacre in June 2000. 
In fact, the religious verdict ofby Khomeini politicised the Salman Rushdie affair and 
broke relations with the EU countries. However, this strengthened Turkey's liberal 
orientation towards Western culture. Whilst the verdict increased the rogue image of 
Iran, there was no chance it would overshadow the Satanic Verses affair. The 
intelligence connection of Aziz Nesin, revealed after his death, also highlighted 
Turkey's state sponsored terrorism activities which manipulated the sectarian 
differences by creating a terrorist-image in society, especially in the events around 
Madimak (Sabah, 25 August 2007). 
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5.4.3. Merve Kavakci Affairs: Turban (Headscarf) war 
Kemalist project of modernisation provided a symbolic value to the new identity of 
women/men integrating them into western civilisation by adopting the Headwear Law 
of 1925, the Turkish Civil law of 1926 and Electoral Rights in 1934 (Toprak, 1981 ). 
State-modernisation aimed to engineer a civil society at this stage. However, rather 
than providing modernisation facilities at a public place, Kemalist modernisation 
prefered to change the identity of the gender that would be considered essential for the 
creation of a liberal society (Tickner, 1992). However, the new engineered bourgeois 
class became more autarchic in opposition to the peripheries' preferences and held 
central power to protect the militarised secularist policy. For instance, the founders of 
Turkey's first women's research centre at Istanbul University, Necla Arat (Radical 30 
April 2007), noted that "we are here to defend Turkey's secular structure, to stop 
those who want to change it step by step" (p. 5). But this authoritarian type 
modernisation has been challenging after Turkey's engagement with the global 
system in 1980s. This provided space for the Tl.ITkish-Islamic synthesis in which 
Islamist women were legitimised by the veil. Nilufer Go le focused on the issue of the 
turban, which she calls a clash between central and periphery in the sharing of the 
state's wellbeing (Gole, 1997). On the other hand, the debate between reformist and 
conservative movements in Iran coincidently was seen as the other side of the same 
coin with regard to the state centralisation. The tension-ridden struggles between 
organs of state and social movements resulted in demands for an ideal autonomous 
public sphere (Navaro-Yashin, 2002). Whilst the Iranian regime obliged the wearing 
of chador in the public sphere (streets belong to the state), Turkey enforced a ban on 
the wearing of the turban in the state organs (universities, offices belonging to the 
state). 
The headscarf question first broke out in 1981 and has raged on and off ever since, 
after the military seizure of power in Turkey. President Kenan Evren delivered a 
televised speech in which he branded Islamic resurgence as a subversive threat 
comparable to communism and banned the headscarf on 201h December 1982. This 
decision was perceived as an act against Islam in society (Milli Gazete 11 January 
1983). However, the issue emerged again at the end of 1980s in which Iran was 
closely interested in the "turban affair" in March 1989 and protested against Turkey's 
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law on dress code at the Constitutional Court, which banned the wearing of Islamic 
attire in schools (Resmi Gazete, 5 July 1989). Rallies were organised in Tehran and 
resulted in 150 deputies' signatures to a letter to condemn the ban of the headscarf to 
support Islamic tendencies in Turkey. The tension peaked between Turkey and Iran 
when Manochehr Mottaki, the Iranian ambassador to Turkey, declared (Ghasemi, 
1995) that "Iran is considering to implement economic sanctions against Turkey" as a 
consequence of constitutional resolution in Turkey (pp.237-8). He was then 
announced as a persona non grata by the Turkish foreign ministry and both sides 
recalled their ambassadors. 
In fact, once the system was installed, Turkish and Iranian woman did not benefit 
from justice, and gender injustice was legitimised in the opposing regime's theory. 
Whilst French secularism was in power in Turkey, Iran's liberalist demonstration in 
Tehran condemned gender discrimination against the Muslim woman. The case of 
Merve Kavakci internationalised the turban issue and emphasised the duality of 
Islamic women's identities. Merve Kavakci was elected a dep~ty of the Turkish 
parliament from Fazilet Partisi (Felicity Party) in April 1999. She wowed to wear the 
headscarf at the swearing-in ceremony for MPs in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. Prime Minister Ecevit and his cabinet booed and verbally abused her 
personally upon entering the parliamentary chamber. She was later compelled to 
withdraw from the assembly and was stripped of her Turkish citizenship by Turkey's 
highest administrative court on 201h September 1999. Although she could re-claim her 
Turkish citizenship, she was not able to take her parliamentary seat in the Assembly. 
Kemal Kahrrazi, the Iranian foreign minister stated that "Iran does not like Turkey's 
secular policies, hence respect for peoples' values and beliefs' is required to establish 
democracy" (TDN, 18 May 2000). On 8-9 May hundreds of Iranian students, most 
likely prompted by Iranian officials, demonstrated for the right of Turkish women to 
wear the turban and other Islamic attire. Turkey was quick to go on the attack against 
Iran during Kavakci affair. Prime Minister Ecevit claimed (as cited in Olson, 2004) 
that "Iran tries to export its revolutionary ideas into Turkey" (p. 85). In response to 
Faziye Rafsanjani's supporting letter, the daughter of former president Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and a member of the Iranian parliament, Kavakci responded that "we 
wanted no support from a country such as Iran where there is no freedom" which 
demonstrated the differences in gender identity definitions in Turkey and Iran. This 
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was certainly a clear evidence of women in society, claiming that democratic rights 
were vital for the new modem identity of Muslim woman (Tehran Times, 13 May 
1999). In the same vein, the Iranian response to the closure of the pro-reform "Sal am" 
daily by the judiciary in July 1999 provoked large-scale demonstrations in Iran. In the 
aftermath of these demonstrations, Prime Minister Ecevit stated that "violence is a 
natural reaction of the Iranian people to an oppressive regime. The Iranian people 
have a rich historical and cultural background. They cannot be expected to bear the 
out-dated regime of oppression for a long time" (Hurriyet, 14 July 1999). The 
opposition to the Iranian women's demands for the right to throw off the chador is a 
critical subject in evaluating both societies' contradictions. However, it is obvious that 
both regimes have failed in creating a liberal or a welfare society. 
The terrorist attack in the Danistay (State Council) brought new tensions between the 
Islamists and secularists on 17th May 2006. The incident occurred after the state 
council's final decision on the Aytac Kilic case that prohibited the wearing of the 
headscarf in class and at state offices. President Ahmed Necdet Sezer criticised the 
Islamist newspapers for trying to attack secularist establishments on 13th February 
2006. The funeral of Mustafa Ozbilgen became a battlefield between secularists and 
Islamists. Demonstrators bawled " ... Turkey is secularist and remains secular. .. "; 
" ... Turkey will not be Iran" (Tehran Times, 19 July 1999). On the other hand, the 
columnist Can Dundar wrote a speculative article in his column in which he claimed 
that the murderer, Alpaslan Aslan had received a military education in Iran between 
1995 and 1997 through a connection with THB ( Milliyet, 18 May 2006). But this was 
not accepted in the Turkish press. With regard to the presence of the US in the region, 
most journalists warned that somebody was trying to create political conflict between 
Turkey and Iran. This attempt was not acceptable for Turkey's national security. 
In April 2007 the presidential candidate Abdullah Gul was given a military muhtira 
(warning) due to his wife's wearing of a headscarf, and his religious background. 
Demonstrations against the growing power of the AKP party were organised by the 
secular civil organisation such as Necla Arat, and Nur Serter, who at the Caglayan 
meeting, encouraged another military coup d' etat while Turkey was at the edge of its 
European Union candidacy (Arat, 1992). Howe (2002) claimed that the headscarf 
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issue polarised the Turkish nation. The justice coup also caused the renewal of the 
turban law in March 2008. The constitutional and justice coup attempts signified that 
the secularist establishment had openly excluded an Islamist identity in the state, 
which could bring about structural changes in society. 
From the point of view of Turkish Western-type modernisation, the headscarf issue is 
the most sensitive issue for the secularist establishment and the peripheral identity 
struggle. Merve's Kavakci' response to Faize Rafsanjani provides a critical analysis 
of two different forms of identity in which neither person would accept the other's 
religious theory or morality. Turkish modernisation from above has failed to 
transform society towards a liberal outlook and the turban issue threaten the secular 
establishment, as an essential model contrary to Kemalist modernisation. As 
mentioned above, this created a direct diplomatic crisis that shows that secular 
establishment sees revolutionary policies or reactionary movements as being more 
dangerous than Kurdish nationalism. The other religious dispute also related to the 
revolution export pol!cies of Iran, described in the next section. 
5. 4.4. The Jerusalem Memorial Night and the Sincan (Xingjian) Affair 
After Israel declared that a unified Jerusalem was its capital on 23rd July 1980, the 
diplomatic representation of Israel was formally confined to the deputy-secretary level 
on 28th August 1980 (Robins, 2002: 239). A demonstration in Konya, a central-
Anatolian city with long-standing Islamic traditions, was led by Necmettin Erbakan, 
the head of the Islamic party and an ally of the ruling coalition. One account stated 
that he spoke to the demonstration asking Turkey to move away from Israel and for 
Muslims to take back Jerusalem and stating that a campaign had begun to finish 
Western influence on Turkey. Posters and banners attesting to the power of Allah and 
the importance of Sharia were unfurled and the protest included the incineration of 
Israeli, American and Soviet flags - the countries portrayed as 'Satans' (Tirman, 
1997). On the other hand, the dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1996 caused a 
change in Turkey's foreign policy, with the Turkey-Israel tie becoming the entente 
axis in the Middle East. However, Turkey's foreign policy route changed after the 
Erbakan's (the Refahyol government) seizure of power on 28th June 1996 (Yalcin, 
1997; Onbir, 1998; Arcayurek, 2003). Whilst Erbakan tried to improve the 
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relationship with Iran, military pressure broadened security ties with Israel. The 
contradiction between state and government was revealed at the highest level when 
the municipal leader of Sincan, Bekir Yildiz from the Welfare Party, organised the 
'Jerusalem Memorial Night' on 31 January-2 February 1997. The memorial was 
initiated by Ayatollah Khomeini and had been held in Iran every year on the last 
Friday of Ramadan. It was also the anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Sincan's mayor Bekir Yildiz, invited the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, Mohammed 
Reza Baqer,i and PLO representative in Turkey, Muhammad bin Yasini, to speak. The 
organisers put together a gala occasion for which they put up posters of Abbas Musavi, 
Musa Sadr and Fathi Shakaki who were Hezbollah and Hamas leaders in Lebanon, 
and among the Palestinians (Olson, 2004). Baqeri criticised (Babak, 2006) Israel in 
his speech: "The English gave birth to this illegitimate child and the Americans raised 
it. They (the Americans) are still helping it to grow and providing it with force in its 
(Israel's) war with the Arabs. If America had not protected it, this illegitimate child 
would not have lived" (p.49). 
The Sincan event created a political firestorm in Turkey on 4th February 1997 when 
the T AF send 50 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other military vehicles 
through Sincan's Ataturk Boulevard. Prime Minister Erbakan tried to prevent the 
expulsion of Baqeri and other Iranians from Turkey. After Erbakan's ouster ofMesut 
Yilmaz, the leader of the Motherland Party said that "Baqeri is a terrorist not a 
diplomat." He demanded that Baqeri and Muhammad Reza Rashid, the head of the 
Iranian consulate in Istanbul, be sent home immediately on 19th February. Hence, 
Baqeri and Muhammad Rashid were immediately declared "persona non grata" and 
expelled from Turkey. In addition to this, Said Zare, head of the Iranian consulate in 
Erzurum, was also expelled on 1st March 1997 due to his criticism of Deputy Chief-
of-Staff General Cevik Bir who declared that Iran was a "state that supported 
terrorism" in Washington D.C., during the Turkish - American Business Council 
meeting in February 1997. Iran's foreign ministry summoned Turkey's ambassador 
and told him that Bir's remarks in Washington were ugly and inappropriate for a 
Turkish official. Iran retaliated for the expulsion of its diplomats by evicting Osman 
Koruturk, Turkey's Ambassador to Iran, and Ufuk Ozsancak, the Turkish consul in 
Urmiya( Olson, 2004) 
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After this event Onur Oymen, the undersecretary of the foreign minister, (TDNs, 1 
February 1997) pointed out Iran's support of terrorism which could not be a part of a 
friendly neighbourhood relationship. He stated that "we can choose our friends but we 
can not choose our neighbours" at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. He 
also emphasised that cultural linkage of Turkey and Iran, where half of the Iranian 
population speaks Turkish and also has a very strong cultural and ethnic linkage with 
the Turkish people. In a realistic political manner he said that "Turkey's dependency 
on oil is essential to maintain good relations with Iran" (p.3). 
In brief, the myth of "Jerusalem" as a religious phenomenon has the power to 
captivate the masses. In opposing Gulen's interfaith proposal, both Erbakan's party 
and Erdogan's party supported Iranian and Arab political thought on the status of 
Jerusalem. Turkey is still keeping its embassy in Tel Aviv rather than Jerusalem due 
to this contention. On the other hand, Iran directly supports Palestinian groups against 
the Israeli state and wants to "wipe Israel from the map" of the Middle East. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the experimental confrontation of religiou~ ~ispute and 
politics is dealt with in the next section. 
5.4.5 J a 'feri and Alevi politics 
After the abolition of the Janissary in 1826, the properties (Tekke and Zaviyeler) of 
the Bakteshi order were transferred to the Nakshi Sufi orders, which was the main 
transition of religious power from folk Islam to a Sunni state establishment. As 
mentioned above, the new Turkish republican religious policy was based on a state-
controlled pro-Sunni establishment that ignored the realm of the Alevi population. In 
addition to this, State Minister Namik Kemal Zeybek announced that the Ja'feri 
population in Turkey is estimated at about three million, in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (Aksiyon, 11 April 2004). The assimilation politics of folk Islam 
in Turkey was driven by three different sources the scholar Esad Cosan (leader of the 
Iskender Pasha Nakshi order) claimed that the Makalat was written as a Sunni 
religious text (Cosan, 1990). However, Yasar Nuri Ozturk tried to define the Alevi 
identity in terms of the Turkish Islamic synthesis but did not rationalise it in the 
Turkish community (Ozturk, 1995). Secondly, the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
supported the Jaferisation of the Alevi in the city of Corum which was chosen as a 
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pilot area for the assimilation policy (Cakir, 1998). Thirdly, the secular establishment 
made unofficial social contract with Alevi --the main supporters of the Kemalist 
secularist state against the oppressive pro-Sunni politics that interrupts Iranian 
influence in Anatolia, and also impedes radical Islam ism in Turkey. N amik Kemal 
Zeybek pointed out that Turkey's suspicions about antagonism are groundless, 
because the Shia did not come from Iran, that nation did not protect its identity from 
the Islamisation and the religion represents the same realities in a different manner of 
expression (Tercuman, 6 May 2007). It is unfortunate that Turkey has faced tragic 
sectarian civil disturbances in the last three decades in the cities of Maras and Corum 
in 1978. This left the nation divided over the Madimak and Gazi events, along the 
lines of Sunni/Shia, secular/ religious. The complex status quo of Alevis in Turkey 
was apparent after the muhtura (military warning) in April 2007. They consolidated 
their social contracts by emphasising the continuity of the secular establishment at the 
Chaglayan and Tandogan meetings. 
The importance of religious minority issues in Turkey and Iran was highlighted in 
1998 after the 28th February process. The chief inspector for religious affair, 
Abdulkadir Sezgin, filed a report for the state court which accused Iran of paying the 
salaries of Ja'feri imams in the province of Igdir on 5 March 1998. He implied that 
Iran was using 300 imams to export its revolutionary policy. In response his 
accusation, Huseyin Y esil (leader of the imam in Igdir) severely criticised the 
religious discrimination by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, arguing that public 
denotations supported the 200 mosques' expenses in Igdir province (Hurriyet, 3 
March 1998). The leader of the Ja'feri community in Istanbul, Selahattin Ozgunduz, 
complained that they had to send their children to Iran to be trained in Ja'feri religious 
theology, but the Turkish authorities then suspected the students ofbeing Iranian spies 
while religiously discriminating against the community. The issue of the Turkish 
Ja'feri population was discussed at a high-level conference of Shia and Sunni scholars 
in Istanbul on 14- 15 April 2007 (Ay Gazete, 16 April 2007). Following the Sunni 
coalition summit in Ankara, and Saudi versus Iranian influence in Iraq, Ayatollah 
Mekarim Shirazi emphasised the importance of unity in religion on 23rd February 
2007 (Ay Gazete, 16 April 2007). 
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On the other hand, unofficial contract between Kemalist and Alevis cut off the Iranian 
religious influence on the Alevi population. The integration of the Baktashi and Alevi 
populations still remains a potential source of political power in the Republican 
People's Party in Turkey. Turkey's pilot Jaferisasition policies also signify that the 
Turkish state prefers to see Twelven Shiism rather than Alevi antagonism in society. 
There are no tendencies by the Turkish state to use the Sunni religion as a foreign 
policy tool in real politics. 
5.5. Conclusion 
While religious and ideological confrontation was experienced in five different cases 
between the two reluctant neighbours, the alternative religious theory of Iran 
intensified under the political Islam. This created a great amount of excitement in the 
Islamic environment of Turkey. Although the Velayeti faqih religious theory of 
Ayatollah Khomeini gave a great deal of credit to the Tagreeb movement, the 
messtantc religious theories of Khamenei and Ahmed Nejat increased Persian 
religious nationalism. In this vein, the counter-revolutionary activities of the regional 
and super powers against political Islam certainly managed to a manipulation of this 
internal threat for the regional state as well as Turkey. The ideological circumstances 
in Turkey depended on positivism and capitalism as alternative theories to Islamic 
political theory. In reality, Iran could not implement an Islamic political model but 
underwent a pragmatist management process. As argued above, the Islamic groups in 
Turkey are part of the secular system and their relationships cannot be defined as 
alternative regime theory against the secularist model of the Turkish state, but only as 
the remains of an inefficient secular oligarchic system. In the context of this theory, 
both states consider the state concept superior with regard to public choice and 
security to that of individual liberty. This reality reflects a different side of the same 
coin, as an oppressive organic state. Hence, both states' internal threat perception on 
religious and ideological issues is more intensive than other ethnic conflicts and 
competition in the region. The five micro analyses in this chapter provide an answer 
to the question ofhow ideological and religious settings created two diplomatic crises. 
Despite their lengthy bureaucratic association with foreign policy, these cases 
exemplify the undiplomatic behaviours of two middle-power state and also show the 
weakness of realist politics, as neither country follow a realist political model when 
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the ideological and religious disputes arose. As an alternative approach to the 
religious and ideological problems in the two states, I consider that these religious and 
ideological issues can be distinguished from ethnic nationalism despite these being 
internal factors in both countries. Therefore, this study will detail these issues 
separately. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
6.1. Introduction 
THE PORTRAITS OF RELIGIOUS TERROR 
IN TURKO-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
The architecture of terror is one of the instruments of middle-sized state centralisation 
policies. Using the potentiality of a society for violence as a counter-terror strategy 
has allowed Turkey to counter anti-regime groups and also permitted it to take control 
of these groups' activities. The politics of terror from above, driven mostly by the 
headscarf issue in Turkey, were spontaneously perceived as an attack on the personal 
identity of Muslims by Islamists. Dress codes and turban affair should not be 
underestimated in Turkish and Iranian politics as such a conflict between good and 
evil, recalls memories of Prophet Muhammad's war against the Jewish people in 
Medina. There will always be unsolved political murders even in a strict secular 
environment but the prime suspects here are always connected with radical Islamist 
groups and Iran. Turkish secularists have managed to convince the public to be 
concerned about the Islamic revolution in Iran and the political Islamic tendencies in 
Turkish society. The portrait of religious terror also magnifies the dangers of 
suspicion in politics- assassinations relevant to the two countries' relations are always 
analysed to better understand these dynamics. A micro level analysis of political 
assassinations and of the Turkish Hezbollah mainly aims to answer the question of 
how the state manipulates or transforms religious issues into political terror. However 
the author has tried to avoid the conspiracy explanation in this section. Rather than 
using a purely theoretical approach, the author has mainly aimed to present the power 
of religious and ideological circumstances in real politics within Turko-Iranian 
relations in the last three decades. The study applies Steven David's omnibalancing 
theory which explains the operational measurements of religious terror as an internal 
threat by a middle-power state. 
6.2.0 The tapestry of political religious terror in Turkey 
The concept of terror is derived from the French Revolution in general; politics of 
terror were also adopted by Ittiahad-Terakki Firkasi (Community of Union Party) in 
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Turkey. Counter terrorism (Ergil, 1980) was systematised in Turkey as part of the 
NATO operation Gladio, through recruiting pan-Turkism movements, known as Gray 
Wolf. As mentioned above, a Turkish Islamic synthesis could not harbour any terror 
activities or compel revolutionary politics in society, but terror in Turkey originates in 
ideo-ethnocentric charismatic sources, that aim to set up an independent Kurdish state 
in the Middle East (Chasdi, 2002: 13). However, the Marxist ethnic recession of the 
and KONTRA-GEL could not be supported by any Kurdish Islamist groups or Sufi 
groups. Therefore, the functioning role of Islamic groups in the society impedes the 
alliance between Islamist and pan-Kurdish nationalists. The fact that on four 
occasions military coup d'etats occurred in Turkey makes it clear that 'irticaci' 
(reactionaries) are a bigger threat than Kurdish nationalists. However, the structure of 
society has changed since the 1990s and the new post-modem type of Muslim identity 
(Kurdish Radicals) is challenging the state apparatus on various levels. The 
availability of power for these unorganised social protest groups is defused by 
counter-terror strategies which apply terror from above, for instance by using Turkish 
Hezbollah terror tactics. The stripping of Kavakci of her Turkish citizenship is a 
valuable historical fact in understanding Turkish state policy. Even though she was an 
elected deputy of Turkish Parliament, and had no ties with any terrorist organisations, 
she was stripped of Turkish citizenship, while the citizenship of militants and guerrilla 
leaders is not disputed. The unsolved political murders are always focused on by the 
strictly secular, anti-religious authors and academicians who always link them to Iran 
and religious groups under suspicion. The mass media of Turkey and politicians have 
accused Iran of being a state of terror many times after each assassination (Olson, 
2004). It is a fact that there are a few Middle Eastern Islamist groups involved in 
Turkey's internal terror, such as Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Da'wa Party, Hizbuttahrir, 
Rabita and Kaplancilar. However, the security forces have announced that there are 
600 illegal organisations within Turkey but most of them are mafia and ethnic and 
ideological organisations based in Turkey (www.tem.iem.gov.tr). The major internal 
terrorist organisations motivated by religion are the Turkish Hezbollah and the Islamic 
Great Orient Raiders (IBDA-C) which are pro-Sunni military organisations. This 
study excludes the IBDA-C because they do not have any connection with Iran and 
are against Shia religious theory. 
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6.2.1.0 Unsolved political murders in Turkey: Iran as the usual suspect 
The Association for Turkey's Journalist announced that 62 journalists have been 
murdered since the 1920s (www.tgc.org.tr) The prime suspicion has been cast on 
religious groups, which have possible connections with Iran, which undermines the 
imroved relations between the countries, including through the press war and low 
level diplomatic relations in 1990s. The power of the media is the main determinant 
factor in these cases. The study scrutinises the unsolved political murders to consider 
the possibility oflran's terror engagement in Turkey and the reliability of both sides' 
arguments by explaining the key political murders in the following section and also 
considering how Turkey manages its counter-revolutionary politics. 
6.2.1.1 The assassination of Professor Dr. Muammer Aksoy 
Prof. Aksoy was the founder of Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi (the Association of 
Ataturk's thought), a speaker of the 1961 constitution, supporter of the national petrol 
case against petrol law in 1954 and a rival of the Turban Affair, as a strict secularist 
left-wing intellectual. He was assassinated on 31st January 1990 (Milliyet, 2 February 
1990). Islamic Action and the Islamic Revenge organization were the main suspects. 
However, former retired Turkish intelligence officer, Mahir Kaynak, claims that this 
was not carried out by Islamists because they fear that the involvement in any kind of 
action could be provocative, especially when the turban affair was so controversial in 
the Turkish parliament. In fact, there is no concrete evidence of an Iranian connection 
in this assassination. 
6.2.1.2 The assassination of Cetin Emec 
Cetin Emec was the chief editor of the Hurriyet newspaper, assassinated in front ofhis 
property on 1st March 1990 (Milliyet/ Hurriyet, 8 March 1990 ) Due to this event Irfan 
Cagrici, the leader of the Islamic terror group, Islamic Action; was arrested in March 
1999 when he was receiving money transferred from Iran. Later the court decision 
announced the death penalty was issued on 23rd June 2000 (Hurriyet, 25 July 2000). 
The connection with Iran brought on a crisis between Turkish and Iranian officials as 
well as among the mass media of both countries. Cakir provides more information 
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about the connection between Iran and Cagrici by claiming that he had a very close 
relationship with the Iranian consulate in Istanbul and had also received military 
training in Iran (Cakir, 2001). It is certain that the connection oflranian revolutionary 
groups with small group or individuals in Turkey always increases diplomatic tension 
between the countries. 
6.2.1.3 The assassination of Turan Dursun 
Turan Dursun was an atheist religious researcher who was assassinated on the 
outskirts of Istanbul in September 1990 (Cumhuriyet 6 September 1990). The pro-
Iranian weekly newspaper in Turkey, "Vahdet" (Unity), announced that Turkey's 
Salman Rushdie was dead. Selahaddin Es who is an immigrant from Turkey and the 
presenter of Iranian Radio compared his death to the case of Ahmedi Kesevi who was 
an atheist activist in Iran, murdered by Fedaiyani Islam in 1953. One of the prime 
suspects in the Dursun case, a member of Islamic Action, Mehmet Ali Seker, 
explained that he went to Iran for military traini~g, provided in Qum by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard (Aksam, 25 December 2000). The brouhaha of an Iranian 
connection continued as it is the usual suspect for Turkish politicians and the press. 
The only forensic proof is was that the German-made CZE rifle was sold by Iran. 
6.2.1.4 The assassination of Professor Bahriye Ucok 
Bahriye Ucok who was a lecturer at the Theology Faculty in Ankara University and a 
well-known anti-Islamist activist, especially on the headscarf issue, was assassinated 
by a postal bombing on 6th October 1990 (Milliyet 8 October 1990. Cumhuriyet 14 
October). Even though she had been trained by bomb experts of the Turkish 
Intelligence service, the explosion killed her (Y eni Safak, 16 December 2005). The 
case still remains unsolved. 
6.2.1.5 The assassination of Onat Kutlar 
Kutlar, who was the prominent writer for the Cumhuriyet newspaper and cinema 
director was killed by a gun shot in the Marmara Hotel in Istanbul on 11th January 
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1995 (Kutlar, 2006). There were suggestions of an Iranian connection, but the case 
remains unsolved. 
6.2.1.6 The assassination of Professor Ahmet Taner Kislali 
The other symbolic attack targeted Kislali, who was a prominent secularist figure 
opposing the Turban affair and a well-known professor in the Political Science 
Faculty in Ankara University. He was assassinated by a car bomb in Ankara on 21st 
October 1999 (Cumhuriyet, 22 October 1999). One day after his assassination, the 
crisis between the two countries emerged again--three Iranians were detained at 
Istanbul airport in connection with this case, while alleging fleeing the country. 
Deputy Prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz declared that the Iranians were the organizers 
of the crime (Cumhuriyet 23 October 1999). The Iranian president, Khatemi, pointed 
out that "Zionist elements in decision-making body in Turkey are always active. 
Whenever the Turkey - Iran relation improves, secularist and Zionist circles try to 
undermine the growing relations ofTurkey and Iran" {Tehran Times, 24 October 1999; 
p.2). In general, this Iranian defensive rhetoric and accusations of a Jewish connection 
are very valuable to understand the two countries' political behaviour at times of crisis. 
6.2.1.6 The assassination of Necip Hablemitoglu 
Necip Hablemitoglu, the associate professor in Ankara University in the Faculty of 
Political Science, was murdered in the capital on 181h December 2002. His studies 
focused on Islamic groups, especially the Gulen movement and the German charity 
foundation as well as its connections with gold mines in the province of Bergama. 
This increased the suspicion in the Turkish press of Iranian involvement 
(Hablemioglu, 2007). However, the investigation found some forensic evidence to 
connect the crime with Turkish Gladio in a house in Umraniye in Istanbul in 2007. 
6.2.1.7 The assassination of Ugur Mumcu 
One of the key political assassinations in Turkey was the symbolic attack on U gur 
Mumcu, who was a well-known journalist on the Cumhuriyet daily newspaper. He 
was murdered by a car bomb in Ankara on 24th January 1993. After the incident, 
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President Turgut Ozal responded that this was a provocation against the Turkish state, 
when he was visiting the United States (Zaman, 25 January 1999). A Turkish Grand 
National Assembly member, Bulent Caparoglu, drew attention to the unsolved 
murder's connection with the headscarf issue saying "whenever this issue comes to 
the agenda of Turkish Grand National assembly, one of the secularists is assassinated 
such as Emec. Dusun, Ucok etc." He pointed out that "Whoever convinced Evren to 
dispose of the headscarf decision in 1989, they are certainly the perpetrator of these 
political murders." (Caparoglu, and Duzdag, 1999). 
The assassination of Mumcu created a crisis between secularists and Islamists. The 
secularists said it could divide Turkish society on the anniversary of the death. While 
they continued to claim an Iranian connection with Islamic terror organisations in 
Turkey, the unsolved political murders' research commission carried out a serious 
debate in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1993. MP Adnan Keskin addressed 
the research commission report on 4th June 1997. However, it was unfortunate that the 
commission report could not clear up any cases but merely raised suspicion over 
foreign and 'deep state' terror connections. The Turkish interior minister, Ismet 
Sezgin, claimed that Turkish intelligence services had found some evidence on the 
killing of Mumcu to connect it with terror organisations located in Iran. He also stated 
that these organisations were involved in the murders of <;etin Erne<; and Turan 
Dursun. These claims and those by another interior minister, Hikmet Cetin, seriously 
damaged the countries' relations. However, (the then) Prime Minister Demirel called 
for a 'cool headed' approach to the Iranian linkage in order to not disrupt bilateral 
relations unnecessarily. About 200.000 people shouted 'Mullahs to Iran' at Mumcu's 
funeral, which signifies that press influence, is a main factor in Turko-Iranian 
relations. However, despite growing public pressure, Turkey continued to pursue a 
moderate and pragmatist policy towards Iran due to the economic interdependency 
theory. Hence Turkey avoided imposing visas on Iranian citizens and sustained its 
political and economic relations with Iran. Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs diplomatically refrained from accusing Iran of involvement in illegal 
activities in Turkey by arguing that there was no concrete evidence of an Iranian 
connection. 
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However, in response to Turkish accusations, Ali Akbar V ala yeti, former foreign 
minister of Iran, in an interview to Turkish TV, denied Iran had planned activities 
against Turkey, and proposed to discuss these 'mutual allegations' within the 
framework of the common security committee. Yet, he also said that even if there 
were any groups in Turkey, which desired an 'Iranian mode'" and were inspired by its 
values, this did not mean that Iran encouraged or directed them. Similarly, Erk 
newspaper in Iranian Azerbaijan claimed that the perpetrators of political murders in 
Turkey are mainly the CIA and Mossad (Erk, 14 February 1993). However, Resalat 
newspaper printed the news on Mumcu without giving any comment in Tehran 
(Resalat, January 1993). Newspapers in Israel also stressed that terror caused tensions 
between Turkey and Iran (Davar and Haanetz, 20 February 1993). 
Unsolved political assassinations clearly play a negative role in bilateral relations. 
Turkish accusations against Iran and the power of the press are very valuable in 
understanding the character of Turkey-Iran relations. In fact, there was no clear 
connection to Iran with regard to these political assassinations, but the Turkish press 
and politicians tried to damage the revolutionary export policies of Iran by linking 
religion and terror. On the other hand, there is an ongoing operation by Turkish 
security forces against the Ergenekon terror group, which has connections with the 
unresolved political murders. In the next section, the operations of Turkish Hezbollah 
are described; the study draws a bloody picture of religious terror and uses the 
information to support the theoretical framework of how Turkey operates against 
internal threats. Iran directly interferes with Turkey's vulnerable aspects to reduce 
Turkey's regional power capability on the domestic and international levels. 
6.3.0 The counter terror operation by Turkey: Turkish Hezbollah 
Even though the legacy of counter terror strategies is disputable in international law, 
the Turkish state has played this dangerous game against Kurdish nationalists for 
some time (Orttung and Makarychev, 2006). These counter violence strategies also 
create enormous fear in society. They demonstrate the brutal nature of religious terror 
and damage the fluctuating rise of Islamism in Turkey in 1990s. These forces are still 
capable of creating another insurgency campaign against the secular state 
establishment in Turkey. 
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6.3.1 The origin of the Turkish Hezbollah 
The origin of Turkish Hezbollah is disputable. There have been five critical articles 
which highlight the mysteries of radical religious terrorism and counter terrorism 
strategy of the state. John Nugent supports the idea that counter-terrorism by Turkish 
security forces successfully managed to devastate the Islamist groups (THB) in the 
country. However, the leader of THB, Isa Altsoy rejected the claim saying that their 
actions are not counter-terrorist in his book manuscript. He argues (Altsoy, 2006) that 
the Islamist movement against the Kemalist oppression and PKK terrorists was driven 
by their own Kurdish Islamic synthesis without any internal or external connection 
with the Iran model. However, Professors Bulent Aras and Bagcik's critical article 
claims that the connection between the security forces and THB is a good example of 
counter-terror management in international relation (Aras and Bacik ,2 002). 
Although the origin of the Turkish Hezbollah is very ambiguous, the prominent 
Turkish journalist Cakir believes that Islamic radicalism in the Kurdish region 
produced the violence by the Islamists against the PKK and state apparatus. Similarly 
Faik Bulut and Farac claim that the anatomy of the THB is the product of the 1980 
military coup d'etat. Pro-nationalist people in the prisons and also isolated people in 
the urban areas have created the new violent face of Islamic radicalism in Turkey. 
There is potential civil disobedience against the state's terror operations and the 
PKK's terror activities in the region. The question is who monitored this sensitive side 
of the society? As usua, Turkish security officers and the Turkish press directly 
accuse the Iranian terror networks. However, due to the direct targeting of the Nurcu 
groups and the PKK leadership, moderate Islamists realise that this organisation 
attacks the religious leaders and pious business classes in Turkey. The pro-Islamist 
author Dilipak pointed out that the THB is a well-organized contra-guerrilla outfit in 
his article (V ahdet, 4 December 1990). Both the PKK and the Islamists agree that the 
state-made alliance with the THB is eliminating the rising ethno-religious sentiments 
and ideo-ethno nationalism in the region. It is unfortunate that policy-makers such as 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller admit that they sacrificed everything to fight terrorism. 
However, Land Forces' commander Muhittin Fusunoglu defines the THB as a 
religious group against THE PKK in the Kurdish region. But President Demirel 
admitted that the state sometimes cooperates with illegal organisations. Mehmet Agar, 
who was the chief of the Police forces by the time, also admits to some security staff 
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cooperation with the THB to aid the war against terrorism in the region. Thus one can 
see that the Turkish security forces have an unofficial agreement with THB--they aim 
to control radical tendencies in Kurdish nationalism and growing radicalism of the 
Kurdish Islamists in the region. 
6.3.2 The emergence of Turkish Hezbollah 
The organisation was formed after the September 1 i 11 military coup and around the 
time of the Iranian Islamic revolution by a small Sunni Islamist Kurdish group in the 
Vahdet Bookstore in the city of Diyarbakir in 1980. They gathered at a second 
meeting in the city of Batman in 1981. After the third meeting in the province of 
Kasimpasa in Istanbul, the group split into the 'Ilim' (scientists) faction which 
advocated using violence to achieve the goal of an Islamic state, and 'Menzil' 
(rangers) who advocated religious education and a more peaceful movement towards 
an Islamist state. The leader of the 'Ilim' faction opened the Ilim Bookstore in the city 
of Batman in 1987. However, the leader of the 'Menzil' faction, Fidan Gungor 
launched his activities at the Menzil Bookstore, but due to ideological differences, the 
Menzil faction did not support the fight against the PKK. The group was eliminated 
by its counterpart and the leader of the group was killed in 1991 (Hurriyet, 24 January 
2000). Iran only has connections with small religious groups in Turkey. For instance, 
one of the religious leaders of Menzil groups, Mulla Musa Guzelsoy, received 
medical support from Iran but then he died there (<;akir, 2001 ). 
In the early stage of its development, Turkish Hezbollah members received military 
training in PKK camps, but this collaboration did not last long and the two groups 
became brutal enemies {Aras, and Bacik, 2002). The THB accused the PKK of 
murdering Muslims, cooperating with Armenians, serving communism, and seeking 
to dive the Muslim community (www.cdi.org/program). The friction was initiated 
when the PKK abducted Serif Karaaslan' family and killed his father Sabri and his 
mother Hayriye in the province of ldil in Simak city. By the end of September 1991 
both sides lost 13 people. After this, Halkin Emekci Partisi (HADEP -Public Labour 
Party) leader, Feridun Yazar, complained that obscure powers were attempting to 
create a civil war in the region. The Undersecretary of Turkish Intelligence, Teoman 
Koman, claimed that this is Islamist terror (Cumhuriyet/ Nokta, 14/2 December 1990), 
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but former Turkish Intelligence Services' author, Mahir Kaynak, (Milliyet, 14 
October 1990) suggested that this is merely a provocation. Similarly, Nazli Ilicak, 
who is a prominent journalist, pointed out that "Real Muslims cannot commit this 
kind of homicide. It is absurd to establish any connection between Islamists and 
terror" (Tercuman, 17 March 1990). On the other hand, the secular response arose 
from the University of Bosporus in Istanbul in which 139 academic staffs expressed 
their opinion publicly that "terrorists could not destroy our secularist belief and 
Turkey could never be Iran" (Cumhuriyet, October 1990:p.1 ). The revelation of the 
new face of Kurdish Islam was restrained by the state successfully so that Turkey 
managed its internal threat at the first stage and then targeted the external connections. 
6.3.3 The operations of Turkish Hezbollah 
THB launched its brutal assassination against PKK cadre in the Kurdish provinces as 
part of an internal conflict against the Partiya Kafirin Kurdistan (Kurdish Infidel Party, 
PKK), which raged between 1991 and 1995, reaching its climax in 1993. As result of 
the conflict, both sides lost over 700 close sympathisers or militants. The report 
demonstrated that 500 of these attacks were conducted by the THB but 200 of them 
were executed by the PKK. Ultimately, in March 1993, the ceasefire and cooperation 
protocol was signed to end the conflict and both sides proposed the new arrangement 
struggle for joint operation against Turkish state (Cumhuriyet, 16 February 1993). The 
leader of the THB, Huseyin Velioglu, and the PKK official, Nizamettin Tas, signed a 
peace agreement at the Keleresh camp in Iran under the auspices of the Iranian 
intelligence service SAVAMA on 13th November 1998 (Milliyet, 25 January 2000). 
The other mediation effort came from Sheikh Osman and Ethem Barzani, the leaders 
of the Kurdistan Islamic movement in Iraqi-Kurdistan and the Iraqi Kurdish 
Revolutionary Hezbollah party, respectively (Cakir, 2007). On the other hand, the 
THB completed its mission by killing more than 1500 people who were conservative 
Kurdish religious class members and operators of Kurdish religious charitable 
foundations. After the abduction of a small Kurdish Nurcu-Group and a friend who 
belonged to the Zebra foundation, the THB tried to eliminate not only radical Kurdish 
Islamists but also moderate Islamist groups. The THB also murdered 200 prominent 
Kurdish businessmen as a result of their policy. They also killed 22 leading Kurdish 
religious clerics who taught the strict orthodox Shafi jurisprudence in Kurdish and 
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Arabic in Kurdish madrasa (seminary education). The widespread madrasa education 
is seen as the main artery of Kurdish national identity in the region (Kara, 1996 and 
Bulac ,2005). After the Baktashi Sufi order closed, the arrival ofSufi Naqshbandi and 
Qadiriya orders to enforce Islamic identity resulted in the creation of a strong clergy 
class of sayyeds, meles and Sheikhs (Zinar, 1988). Due to the PKK and THB 
operations, these religious classes' power weakened in the region and the society is 
now open to the discourse of secular Kurdish nationalism. 
6.3.4.0 The crackdown on Turkish Hezbollah 
The THB received public attention for the first time when the grenade attack on the 
Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople occurred in April 1997. Since 1993, the state 
security forces continued their sophisticated operations after the key hit man, 
Abdurrahman Tunc, surrendered and asked for protection from the head of the 
Diyarbakir Police, Gaffar Ozkan. Tunc provided a large amount of intelligence 
information on the THB military's and other groups' logistics. Until 1999, the 
security forces conducted 500 operations against the THB. The most significant were 
the Beykoz operations which purged the THB in 1999. The Turkish security forces 
also continued other operations in various cities in Turkey such as Diyarbakir, Mardin, 
and Batman. During intensive raids, they seized 20,000.000 pages of secret files by 
Hezbollah in March 1999 (Aras and Bagcik, 2002). The police also discovered 20,000 
members' personal data information on a computer disc in an operation in June 1999. 
After the summit of police and gendarme forces for joint operations against the THB 
on 20th December 1999, the security forces tracked one of the absent businessmen's 
credit cards to a small house in the Beykoz district. As a result of a five-hour police 
raid, the leader of the Hezbollah, Huseyin Velioglu, was killed and key lieutenants of 
organisation, Edib Gumus and Cemal Tutar, were captured on 17th January 2000. The 
Beykoz cell was a treasury of documentary, computer, video and forensic evidence. 
Tortured and mutilated bodies of Hezbollah victims were taken out of the basement as 
well as identification cards, photographs and videotapes of their torturous 
interrogations and lastly 60,000,000 pages of secret Hezbollah documents were found 
at the cell (Cakir, 2007). The confessions of two THB lieutenants provided other 
locations all around the country. Police uncovered dozens of corpses of missing Kurds 
and Islamists and evidence of the interrogations of THB victims in several houses. 
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THB Mediterranean regional director, Mehmet Emin Ekici , was captured and 
provided information on the location of other bodies across Turkey. The military 
leader of the organisation, Mahmut Demir, was also arrested in Ankara. 
Figure 6.1: The incident Hezbollah involved (1), The number of Arrested THB members (2), 
Turkish Police Forces Operation against THB (3) 
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The director of counter-terrorism operations, Suleyman Ekizer, reported that from 
January 1992 to November 2001 security forces conducted 3801 operations which 
resulted in 1691 incidents and 1450 terrorist deaths . On the other hand, security forces 
lost 251 personnel but arrested 4000 Hezbollah militants, solving 400 unresolved 
political murders in all around Turkey. As explained above, the figures above indicate 
the main statistics in this regard. 
6.3.4.1 The assassination of Police Chief, Gaffar Ozkan and JITEM leader, Cem 
Ersever 
The governor of OHAL (state of emergency), Gokhan Aydemir, received a report 
from Gaffar Ozkan including 20,000 biographies of Hezbollah members and 
sympathisers and their logistics connections. Aydemir established a Special 
Intelligence Assessment Unit to control the activities of 9 radical Islamist groups and 
93 left-wing terror organisations in the country (Hurriyet, 13 October 2002). The 
assassination of the chief of the Diyarbakir police, Gaffar Ozkan and five security 
officers created an enormous stonn which demonstrated that the THB was not 
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completely finished with Beykoz operations. This assassination also brought the 
suspicion of state supported terrorism and implied other external connections to the 
THB. The commander of the Turkish Air Force, Faruk Comert, admitted that the state 
had used the THB against PKK, as counter-terrorism. These political murders have a 
likely connection with the three top security officers' killings: the land forces 
commander, Esref Bitlis and Cem Ersever, a high level intelligence officer. The case 
of Cem Ersever is mentioned in the Susurluk report (Mete and Kaynak, 2005). His 
solicitor, Emir Emin, pointed out that the relations between Ersever and Velioglu 
were clear in his statement. The death of Cem Ersever after his interview at the 
Aydinlik newspaper showed signs of state counter-revolution strategies. His body was 
found in Elmadag in Ankara by local security forces. The deaths of Esref Bitlis and 
Gaffar Ozkan have the same connection with Ersever and other state undercover 
organisations but still remain unsolved. 
6.3.4.2 Vali Sarman affairs 
The governor of the Batman pr-ovince, Salih Sarman, had imported $2.8 miliionworth 
of weapons into Turkey, which brought accusations regarding the the absence of arms 
equipment to transfer to the THB (Radical, 11 February 2000). In addition to the THB, 
Batman governor Sarman recruited Kurds and established the Batman Joint Special 
Armed Forces (Batman Karma Ozel Harekat Birligi) against the PKK. Due to the 
missing arms' case and illegitimate affairs, he was jailed and later published his 
memories that explained how to operate such a state policy, though Chief of Staff, 
Dogan Gures, said that he did not know the governor of the Batman province (Sarman, 
2007). However, State Minister, Eyup Asik, accepted that Hezbollah had existed for 
more than ten years, and was aimed at destroying the PKK. He also admitted that 
Hezbollah had made a great deal with security officers against the PKK (Aras and 
Bagcik, 2002). As a result, the Turkish state gained control and cleaned the province 
from THB and PKK militias through this undercover operation. 
6.3.4.3 Suicide attacks by the THB 
For the first time another terror method, revealed as a threat for the national security 
of Turkey, was connected with the THB. PKK/ CONGRA- GEL did not use this tactic 
before the THB. Between 30 June and 15 July 1999, fifteen suicide attacks occurred 
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and caused numerous casualties, including those of women and children. Dogu Ergil 
pointed out that it was the first time terrorists had attacked children and women in a 
suicide attack in Turkey (Ergil, 2001). However, suicide attacks by terrorist groups in 
Turkey have not continued at present and have not attracted any public attention to the 
regiOn. 
6.3.5 Al-Qaeda connection 
After 9111, the THB was considered as the perpetrator of attacks with four bombs, 
which killed over 60, and wounded 700 people. The targets were a well-known British 
Bank, HSBC, the British consulate and a synagogue on 15th November 2003 (Pryce-
Jones, 2003). While the THB maintained their status quo as a local terror group, 
chosen targets related to the West were symbolic and captured the attention of 
international journalists and terror experts (Boycott and Smith, et al 2003). Operations 
to investigate al-Qaeda connections in Turkey continue. After the Gaffar Okkan 
incident, a brouhaha was raised and Prime Minister Ecevit and interior minister 
Tantan considered the international connections of the THB. Whilst Ecevit claims 
that the order came from Germany, the Interior Minister, Sadettin Tantan considered 
three sources--Germany, Russia and Iran (Cakir, 2007). The active leader of the THB, 
Isa Altsoy, lives in Germany and published the THB's first manuscript (Altsoy, 2006). 
Its activities centre around 20 mosques in different European countries. Its 
underground activities are continuing in the Kurdish region and city centres. Rusen 
Cakir says, based on internet sources, that Hezbollah made a public announcement 
that it does not have any type of organisational, political, or operational relationship or 
cooperation with al-Qaida. In fact there is no evidence to demonstrate that the THB 
has any connection with al-Qaida operations in Turkey (Cakir, 2007). 
6.3.6 The question of the Iranian connection 
As the usual suspect, Turkish security officers accused Iran of providing military 
training to 92 Hezbollah members who had been arrested by Turkish security forces in 
the 1990s (Kislali, 1996). Former president Evren proclaimed that Hezbollah has been 
active since the 1980s and their connection with Iran is not disputable because Iran 
has always been an enemy of Turkey from the time of Selim the Grim (Hurriyet 24 
221 
January 2000). As mentioned in Chapter Two, this statement is a great example in 
support of the argument on the paradigm shift and approach to foreign policy-making 
in bilateral relations. The other accusation of the emergency governor in South-
eastern Anatolia, Aydemir, was that Iran provided guerrilla warfare training to the 
THB and operated espionage activities inside Turkey-as the THB platform matched 
Iran's goals, their operations, tactics and methods resembling those used by Iran. 
Additionally, the chief of police in Ankara, Kemal Iskender, said that all Hezbollah 
leaders receive military trainings from the revolutionary guards. He also stated that 
"Iran's secret service is (deeply involved in) this work" (TONs, 9 May 2001). 
Additionally, due to suspicious connections to Iran with the THB, the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Ismail Cem, and the Interior Minister, Sadettin Tantan, accompanied by 
General Ali Aksiz, head of the intelligence department of the Gendarme, and 
Muzaffer Erkan, head of the intelligence department of Turkey's security directorate 
visited Tehran and Tabriz on 9th May 2001. However, the Iranian officers rejected the 
accusations. Though Rusen Cakir offered some personnel-based evidence about the 
THB and Iranian officers in his recent article, there is no concrete evidence for an 
Iranian connection with THB. The leader of the FP (Felicity Party), Recai Kutan, gave 
a speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly stating that "the creation of the 
Hezbollah is similar to the state's cooperation with organized crime and international 
terrorists such as the Susurluk event. Why did those who regulate the democratic 
balance run their tanks through Sinjan instead of sending them against the 
Hezbollah?" (Atakli and Tamer, 2000 and Ulsever, 2000). This last connection 
between the THB and Iran was revealed in the Turkish press. A journalist, Tuncay 
Ozkan, elaborated on the story of the THB leaders, Abdullah Velioglu and Isa Altsoy. 
Both of them used Iranian passports to travel to Germany (Ozkan, 2001). Hurriyet 
newspaper wrote that the leader of the THB, Isa Altsoy, was captured in Germany but 
this was still not confirmed by German authorities (Hurriyet, 7 November 2007). 
6.3.6.1 Turkish soldiers' affairs 
After Khatami's seizure of power in Iran, diplomatic relations and bilateral visits 
between the sides increased in the 2000s. For instance, since the Islamic Revolution, 
the first visit by the president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Hikmet Cetin, 
occurred in Iran on 3 rd August 1999. On the other hand, Kemal Kharrazi' s second 
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visit to Turkey coincided with the arrest by Iranian troops of Turkish soldiers on 
Iranian territory. Iran accused Turkey ofbombing Iranian villages. However, the crisis 
was solved after a meeting of Iranian Ambassador Lavasimi with the Turkish foreign 
ministry's undersecretary, Turkel Kurttekin. During the same day, Lavasimi had 
joined the second meeting with the Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu to 
resolve the arrested Turkish soldiers' problems (Anodolu Ajansi, 3 August 1999). 
This event provided Iran with a counter-balance to Turkey's pressure and accusations 
during the U gur Mumcu Hope operations. 
6.3.6.2 Ugur Mumcu Hope Operation 
The Operation for Ugur Mumcu Hope coincided with Kemal Kharrazi's third visit on 
17th January 2000, which caused damage to the improving relations between the two 
neighbours. Due to the brutal violence of the THB, Turkish society became very 
sensitive to Islamist and Iranian connections in political murders (Hurriyet, 20 
January 2000). As the usual suspect, the Turkish policy-makers and media directly 
accused Iran, claiming it had a connection with the Selamcilar terror group, who were 
under investigation for the unsolved murders of 17 well-known secular elite 
representatives. Yusuf Karakus, Hasan Kilic and Arig Tari were arrested as prime 
suspects. According to police reports, their testimony supported the Turkish 
allegations - they admitted they received military training and financial support from 
agents of Iranian intelligence in the Jerusalem Warriors Organization (Qod's Force), 
attached to the Revolutionary Guards (Belgenet, 1997). In a press conference on 1 ih 
May 2000, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "Iran had been providing shelter 
to separatist terrorists for years and is still trying to export its revolution. Supporting 
the separatist terrorism in Turkey could be seen as interference in our domestic affairs. 
Unfortunately, certain separatist terrorists and fundamentalist organizations in Turkey 
have, in different ways, benefited from Iranian support and have been exploited by 
Iran in its policy of exporting its revolution." However, the Foreign Minister, Ismail 
Cem, who advocated a moderate and pragmatist policy (as cited in Olson, 2004) 
stated that "this kind of approach and attitude against our neighbours damages our 
relations. We have realized the distinction between the former government and the 
new reformist Khatemi government" (p.61.). On one hand, in early June 2000 the 
Turkish media announced that the head of security forces for Rafsanjani, Ahmed 
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Behbahani, was the coordinator of terrorist activities by Iran inside and outside the 
country and had turned himself over to the MIT (National Intelligence Agency of 
Turkey), (Milliyet June 5, 2000). The statements were attributed to Behbahani, who 
was revealed by the MIT and CIA to as an impostor. Nevertheless, the mainstream 
Turkish media went on accusing Iran of conducting covert activities in Turkey 
(Milliyet, 7 June 2000). However, in contrast to his previous accusations, Prime 
Minister Ecevit used a softer tone in relation to Iranian affairs. He said that "we need 
[primarily] to prove that Iranian extremists or agents contributed to the assassination 
of prominent Turks." However, Foreign Minister of Iran Kemal Kharrazi criticised the 
statement by the Turkish Prime Minister at a July 2000 demonstration in Tehran. He 
said that is unacceptable to accept the interference in Iran's internal affairs. The 
Iranian media also pointed out that the growing Islamic trend in Turkey was of no use 
to the Islamic revolution regime in Iran. Robert Olson considered other negative 
dynamics of Turkey-Iran relations. He claims that Turkey cited accusations regarding 
a Jewish spy and a bombing raid to pressure Iran into severing its relationship with the 
PKK and the THB, which were consjdered Turkey's internal and e~ternal threats. Iran_ 
was satisfied that the Turkish state created the THB for its own counter-terrorism 
purposes, to weaken the PKK and Iran's political influence in northern Iraq (Olson, 
2004:61). The allegations by both sides increased dramatically because of the Turkish 
bombing raid on Iranian territory, THB operations, and Ecevit's remark supporting 
the July reformist demonstrations against the Iranian regime in Tehran in 2000. 
However, these disputes did not result in a diplomats' expulsion, as in 1989 and 1997. 
Both sides are now familiar with how to manage conflict resolution (Olson, 2004:60). 
On the other hand, the ongoing operation by Ergenekon would explain the unresolved 
political murders in Turkey. The European Stability Initiative briefing in April 2008 
elaborated on the conspiracy theories regarding Turkey cases and criticised the future 
of Turkish democracy. There is no inclusion of an Iranian connection in this analysis 
(Alpay, 2008). 
The process is an important step for the secularisation of the Kurdish region, to 
control growing Islamization and Kurdish nationalism. The Turkish Intelligence 
service could find out the foreign connections of terrorism in Turkey. However, the 
legality of the state's counter terrorism actions and the unsolved murderers are still 
crucial issues to the public and for Turkey's human rights record. With regard to 
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counter-terrorism actions against PKK/ KONGRA-GEL, the THB demolished the 
power of the PKK after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Kurdish Madrasas 
(seminary education) were completely closed and leading scholars were murdered by 
both the PKK and the THB. Even though some Iranian officers have connections with 
the THB, which always casts a shadow on relations between the two countries, the 
situation continues to revolve around suspicions against Iran. It is correct to state that 
some social motive does exist for Iranian support of the terrorist actions. The 
emergence of the new THB was clear in Diyarbakir after a 1 00,000-people 
demonstration in Diyarbakir in February and April 2006. The new face of the THB is 
now a soft power approach rather than violence, such as Gulen's activities in the 
region under the Civil Initiative (Sivil Insiyatit) organisation in various cities 
throughout Turkey. It is also said that the THB have a weak connection with the AKP 
government against the PKK insurgency which is still a potential power in Kurdish 
religious nationalism. 
6.4. Conclusion 
The result of this analysis is a moderately optimistic finding that is likely to not only 
pertain to the dark side of counter-terrorism but also provide operational 
measurements of the internal threat with regard to the Turkish security forces. This 
study argues that the predominant goal of re-establishing security cannot be 
compromise the national security of the state. The dangers of counter-terrorism 
strategies warrant considering even more costly alternatives in the future in relation to 
political protests in the region. The study proposes alternatives for dealing with the 
serious danger of an organised crime campaign of state terrorism within the 
framework of international law, because the portfolio of state actions and the core of 
state legitimacy affect public choices in a middle-power state. 
The creation of a secular archetype in the Kurdish region would certainly increase 
popular secular nationalism, which is in competition with secular Turkish nationalism, 
following the closure of the seminary schools and the measures against the 
conservative business classes in the region. On the other hand, the ignorance of 
Iranian policy-makers of the dark side in Turkish politics is evaluated as one of the 
significant flaws in conflict-resolution in the last 20 years. One can also conclude that 
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the perception of an internal threat (religion and ideology) is the main impediment to 
trade between the two neighbours despite the compulsory interdependency relations 
addressed in Chapter Ten. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL KURDISH NATIONALISM 
ON TURKO- IRANIAN RELATIONS 
7 .1. Introduction 
The roots of Kurdish nationalism arose from the role of notable Kurdish families in 
the Ottoman Empire and the competing loyalties and shifting boundaries evolving 
through the identity definition of Kurduyati, "Kurdish nationalism", in the 
environment of tribal societies and the new secular Kurdish nobility class in the 
context of Turkish politics. The creation of the "Ayan" class who were new and 
smaller political units within the vilayet (province) which was administered only by 
Muslim nobles, who assumed local authority over Christian millet leaders, played a 
significant role in the politics realm of the Ottoman Empire (Hourani, and Khoury, et 
al 2004). Through the lower house (Meclis-i Mebusan) and the upper house (Meclis-i 
Ayan), locals and Kurdish notables found a new way to participate in Ottoman 
politics. Hakan Ozoglu argues that the Kurdish Semdinan and Bedirhani families were 
the leaders of the Kurdish nationalist revolt in the 19th century which generated 
Kurdish nationalism, later characterized as cultural, religious and military forms of 
rebellion. For instance, the revolts of Bedir Khan Pasha by the Bedirhan family in 
1847, and Sheikh Ubeydullah from the Semdinian family in 1880-81 used religious-
based nationalism to achieve Kurdish territorial integrity. The role of the Kurds in the 
military unit, the Hamidiye Regiment (Hamidiye Alaylari), and the intelligence unit, 
Teshkilat-i Mahsusa (1895-1915) and political participation by the Committee of 
Union Progress (CUP) created a two-dimensional movement in Kurdish and Turkish 
nationalism (Ozoglu, 2004). For instance, two of the four founders of the CUP, 
Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sukuti, were Kurds. Among the participants in the 1902 
Young Turk Congress in Paris were Bedir Khan and Hikmet Baban (Ozoglu, 2004) 
while Said Nursi was the first speaker in the Salonika congress of the CUP (Vahide, 
1992). The publication of the first Kurdish newspaper in 1898 and the cultural and 
political activism of Kurds in Istanbul in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908 were cultural manifestations of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century. 
Kingship and religious ties existed among the members of the "Kurdistan Teali 
Cemiyeti" or the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK) which was 
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established in December 1918 and was shut the following year by the CUP due to the 
rise of Turkish nationalism following their defeat in the Balkan War between 1911 
and 1912 (Ozoglu, 2004). Hakan Ozoglu argues (Ozoglu, 2004:85-117) that the 
increase in Kurdish nationalism was part of the collapsing empire which ended with 
the re-distribution of the Ottoman part ofKurdistan through the Sevres Treaty, and the 
Ankara agreement in 1926 (Olson, 1989). The Kurdish people were ultimately divided 
among Middle Eastern nation states - Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. However, the 
notable tribal system protected the cultural identity of the Kurds and separated them 
from their Turkish, Arab and Persian neighbours. 
The shifting political space in the nation state system and the new identity definitions 
are critical in analysing Kurdish nationalism, because the Kurdish notables did not 
constitute a harmonious group - which Kurduyati fractured by the long-standing 
disputes of notable families and which was limited by the Islamic concerns of the 
Naqshbandi Sufi order. Therefore, most of the early revolts against the Turkish 
Republic in 1925 and 1937-38, the Iraqi state (Sheikh Mahmud, 1918-19 and 1922-
24), and the Pahlavi monarchy (Smail Agha Simko, 1919-22 and 1926) were led by a 
tribal and feudal nobility who were accepted as the agents of a new secular 
establishment in Pahlavi's Iran, Turkey and Iraq. One of the privileges enjoyed by the 
Turkish Kurd nationalist movement as compared to the others, it is also essential to 
review in order to understand Kurdish nationalism and to explain the establishment of 
the nation state system of Turkey under a Turkishness identity. This has been 
constructed by secular Turks-Kurds' imaginary society project such as that by Ziya 
Gokalp, a founder of Turkish nationalism. Abdullah Cevdet was another revolutionary 
modernisers of contemporary Turkey and with a Kurdish background. 
Even the first modernist regime, the Kurdish Republic (Mahabat Rebublic) of 1946, 
was a compromise between the landed, tribal, and religious elites, on one hand, and 
the urban middle classes, on the other. The 1961 revolt against the Iraqi state, which 
Kurdish nationalists consider a "revolution," began as a resistance by the feudal 
nobility against the land reforms of the state regime, but the Sufi-oriented tribal 
system of Iraqi Kurds united under the aegis of the Barzan family, and formed the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party in the 1970s. The rebellion and its suppression created a 
direct interaction between Iranian and Iraqi Kurds. The legendary leader Mustafa 
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Barzani's political activities in Iran and Russia, and lastly his death in the United 
States in 1979 were the first diplomatic activities of the sub-nation group movement 
of the 1970s. The Iranian version of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran originated 
from a similar feudal systemic Kurdish nationalism. On the other hand, the formation 
of Komeley Shorishgeri Zehmetkeshani Kurdistan (Revolutionary Organisation of the 
Toilers of Kurdistan) standing for "Komala" in the 1970s was one of the radical 
separations between feudalism and nationalism in Iran; this new organisation, formed 
by young urban intellectuals inspired by Marxism and Maoism, advocated the 
elimination of feudalism through radical land reforms and the liberation of urban 
workers. In Turkey, too, the leadership of the nationalist movement, which re-
appeared in the 1960s, was transferred to urban intellectuals, radicalised in the 1970s, 
and organised in different, mostly ephemeral, organisations, one of which emerged as 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, in Kurdish acronyms). In reaction to the feudal 
Kurdish notable families' coalition of militant secularism in the nation-state system, 
the military insurgency campaign of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) started in 
the 1980s and culminated in the 1990s. This was different from the Sufi-oriented 
religious Kurdish rebellion of Sheikh Ubaydallah in 1880 (Kilic, 2006), and Sheikh 
Said in 1925 (Olson, 2000). Therefore, the PKK started its military campaign against 
Kurdish people to move an imaginary Kurdish society from a tribal to a unitarian 
society, through a secular model, aiming to have it revolve around a federalist 
structure with a Kurdish state bound up with Turkey, Iran and Iraq (White, 2000; 
Chasdi, 2005) defines the PKK as an "ideo-ethno-nationalist charismatic" insurgency 
group. The military nationalist leadership of the present PKK portrays itself as the 
main 'revolutionary moderniser' in the Middle East. The PKK targeted the break-up 
of the secular Kurd-Turk coalition in the nation system and revealed it as an eternal 
threat for the secular state-establishment in Turkey, because the ruling elites are happy 
to keep a duality system of society and state glued together by religious tradition. 
Turkey benefited from the Kurdish feudal system in Iraq by making alliances against 
PKK in the 1990s, because the PKK movement is not only a threat to Turkey but to 
all feudal systems in the region. The Marxist/Maoist social engineering project of the 
PKK was welded this religious and tribal attachment of Kurds to the state.It has 
resulted in the main crackdown on all manifestations of Kemalist identity. The 
establishment of a political headquarters in Damascus ( 1980-1998) and military 
headquarters in Beqaa Valley (1979-1988) transformed secular Kurdish nationalism 
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into a transnational movement. However, the PKK had no relations with Syrian, Iraqi 
and Iranian Kurds until 1990s, though they launched the military insurgency 
campaign against Turkey in 1984. In general, Kurdish nationalism has been exploited 
as a pawn on the regional chessboard by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, whose 
governments have acted as a regional polarity system in the Middle East in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The West became involved in the Kurdish question with the "Operation 
Provide Comfort" and "Oil for Food" programmes, and the creation of safe havens in 
Northern Iraq after the Second Gulf War in 1991 and pawned tripartite security 
commission between Turkey-Iran Syria. 
Turkey's Kemalist identity dilemma, and Iran's religious national identity 
enforcement in domestic and foreign policy must include an analysis of the Kurdish 
problems on the difficult relations between the countries and the European Union/ 
United States. This requires a reconsideration of the basic tenets of Turkish militarist 
secularism-nationalism and the Iranian religious political discourse (Taspinar, 2003 ), 
because the recent growth of the PKK and PJAK has revitalised the buried body of 
Turkish nationalism (Ozcan, 2005), and the Islamic regime of Iran in the region. A 
rapprochement between these two countries was enforced by military co-operation 
against the PKK-Kongra-Gel and PJAK in the operation at Qandil in 2007. The US-
led invasion of Iraq and the development of capitalism have also been significant 
factors for state-formation in Kurdistan-Iraq. 
Kurdish nationalism is the prime political movement which requires the application of 
Omni-balancing theory by Steven David in analysing the middle-power state, as 
explained in Chapter One (as cited in Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). The 
challenge of Kurdish military insurgency against the feudal system of Kurdish society 
and the secular Kurdish-Turkish coalition is considered to be an internal threat which 
is still manageable. However, as an external threat, a cross-border unification of 
Kurds seems to be no longer manageable. Whilst being on the periphery, transnational 
Kurdish nationalism became the main independent variable in the regional system. 
Hence, this study is based on the politics of a Kurdish nationalist movement within 
the broader context of Middle East regional politics. It also focuses on its impact on 
the Turko-Iranian relationship, with a secondary emphasis on developing Kurdish 
nationalism in Kurdistan-Iraq. I believe that the outline of Robert Olson's valuable 
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works made significant contributions to a modem historiography of the Kurdish 
question, which is helpful in clarifying the impact of Kurdish nationalism on the 
regional, domestic and international levels of political analysis within the three main 
phases of the Turko-Iranianian case study. These are: from the Iranian Islamic 
revolution to the Persian Gulf War (1979-1991 ); the emergence of a Kurdish 
Autonomous Region (1991-2003); and state formation in Kurdistan-Iraq (2003-2008) 
(Olson, 2005). 
7.2.0 The formation ofEthno-Kurdish nationalism: from the revolution to the 
Persian GulfWar, 1979-1991 
The military campaign by the PKK, and the rise of secular nationalism in Kurdish 
regional politics overlapped with regional developments such as the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran (1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the military 
coup d'etat in Turkey (1980), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon (1982) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990). In response to these 
developments, Kurdish groups (I<f>P-PUK-PKK~KDPI-Komala) made -alliances with 
regional states and the other irredentist militant sub-groups. The dynamics of Kurdish 
nationalism can be seen through three levels of analysis: international, regional and 
domestic. Within this section the study will focus on the domestic and regional 
foreign policies of Kurdish groups and their impact on Turko-Iranian relations during 
the Cold War. 
Figure 7.1 below explains the internal and external triangle system in the environment 
of Kurdish nationalism. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iran-Syria axis supported the 
Kurdish group against the Iraqi government, and Moscow-Tehran and Damascus used 
the PKK as a regional political card against Turkish interests in the region. There was 
no cooperation between Turkish Kurds and Iraqi-Kurdish groups in Iraq and the 
Beqaa Valley, but Iran-Iraq Kurds were very close to each other. While Turkey-Iraq-
KDPI relations were very cooperative regarding the Kurdish question until end of the 
First Gulf War in 1988, US/European Union-Iraqi relations were concerned with 
cooperation against the Islamic regime of Iran in the aftermath of the Anfal genocide 
campaign by Saddam Husein regime, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
During this time the Western powers penetrated Kurdish regional politics. 
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Figure7.1: The dynamics of Kurdish conflict and cooperation (1979-1989) 
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The domestic political change in Iran and Turkey redesigned the religious and ethnic 
policies to suppress the recession of the Kurdish entity. Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-
1989) used the religious political discourse against the sub-groups ethno-nationalism, 
but did not refrain from using the military coercion against the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI). Komala's demanded a "de facto" autonomy from Iran and the 
KDPI leader Dr. Abdul Rahman Qassemlou and the Sunni religious authority; Sheikh 
Ezzedin Hussein presented an "eight-point plan" for the new autonomous status of 
Kurdistan-Iran (Whitley, 1983). But their demand was refused by Khomeini who 
declared a holy war against what he called the "atheist people of Kurdistan" in 
August 1979 (Koohi-Kamali, 1992: 171-192). The 18- month armed conflict resulted 
in the deaths of ten thousand guerrillas including civilians and five thousand 
Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) (McDowall, 2004:262). The Kurdish revolt in the 
first stage of the Islamic Revolution created two main concerns on the Turks-- the 
spreading of Kurdish nationalism and the sovereignty of Iran. The solidarity between 
Iranian Kurdish groups (KDPI-Komala), the Iraqi Kurdish groups (KDP and PUK) 
and the Iranian guerrilla groups (Mujahideen-e Khalq and Fadaiyan-e Khalq 
organisation based in Iraq) contributed to a joint response against the new Iranian 
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regime. The expert on Kurdish affairs, McDowall, argues that five thousand PKK 
guerrillas fought alongside Iranian Kurds. But this is disputable ( McDowell, 1992), 
because there are few political connections between Iranian and Turkish Kurds - at 
least they did not exist until the establishment of PJAK. Turkey feared that a power 
vacuum in Iran would increase Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, the Turkish General 
Chief of Staff, Kenan Evren, visited Baghdad to coordinate the two countries' 
response to the Kurdish rebellion in Iran (Taspinar, 2005), but Colonel Sayyad 
Shirazi's series of highly intensive attacks against the KDPI forces resulted in 
withdrawal by the Kurdish guerrilla forces from the cities of Mahabad, Sanandaj and 
Kamyaran to Iraqi territory (Entessar, 992:130). As a result of the Iranian 
achievements during the Kurdish revolt, Turkey reduced the number of troops in the 
Turkish-Iranian border. The Turkish military government (1980-1983) pacified the 
Kurdish and leftist organisations inside Turkey to consolidate Iraqi and Turkish 
security concerns in 1982. The military government's counter revolutionary 
programme against Iran's revolutionary- export policies and the rising fundamentalist 
movements emanating from Islamic countries led to squashing of the Islamist/ 
Turkish nationalists groups,and a military strengthening of the state capacity in the 
1980s. In the period 1981-1982, 80 thousand Kurds were reportedly arrested in 
Turkey and two thousand more were detained in custody 1983 (Entessar, 1992). 
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Kurds became marginal 
instruments of the Iraqi government and five thousand KDPI guerrillas were sheltered 
in the military camps in Bahirka, Bekhma, and Pisdar and the cities of Suleymaniye, 
Erbil, Harir, Koysancak and Baghdad. They also opened a political bureau in Kirkuk 
while Iraqi the government suppressed its own Kurds during the war (Entessar, 1992). 
Meanwhile, cooperation between Hafiz Esad and the Iraqi Kurdish groups 
strengthened the power ofMesut Barzani, who recovered his father's former territory 
in Kurdistan-Iraq (Brifkani, 2000) while his opposite, the Kurdish leader Jelal 
Talabani's political power was rising in northern Iraq. As the result of the Syrian-Iran 
alliance against Saddam's forces, the logistic support oflraqi-Turkish Kurds are either 
critical or not in Turko-Iranian relations during the Second Cold War period. 
Therefore, the politics of Turkey diversified under the leadership of Turgut Ozal 
(1983-1991-3), who reconstructed the internal and external politics of Turkey, to the 
benefit of "Black Turks" (Islamists and Kurds) ( Ataman,2002). Though the Kemalist 
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elites (white Turks) had questioned the direction of Ozal's liberal policies, who 
outlawed laws 163 and 141-142 promoting Turkish Islamic synthesis, religious and 
ethnic rights, there were those who still considered the main threat to the secular state 
to be Ozal's attempts to provide religious and ethnic language rights (Bolugiray,1992). 
The origins of the PKK and its foreign policy with regard to regional states and the 
other separatist groups go back to the class struggle between the elite notable Kurdish 
families and the secular Kurdish movement in modern Turkey. In fact, there has been 
no discussion about the origins of Komala, the KDPI, the KDP, and the PUK but the 
politics ofPKK and PJAK are disputable. Pro-nationalist scholar, Umit Ozdag, claims 
that the PKK is the project of an Iranian-Syrian alliance in the 1980s (Ozdag, 2003). 
However, the amateur, left-wing journalist Ugur Mumcu believes that the PKK is the 
child of the "deep state" parvenu groups linked with a sub-NA TO organisation (V akit, 
6 January 2007) such as the Turkish organisation Ergenekon (Duzel, 2003). In fact 
Kurdish nationalism has its origins in the nation state system and the ethnic 
discrimination by regional countries trying to undermine society's structure. 
Giinter and Olson claim that the PKK achieved a sustainable connection with the 
Syrian President, Hafiz Assad, interconnection with Armenia, and used including 
through the Nagorno-Karabakh situation to strengthen its relations with Iran, Greece 
and Greek Cyprus. These connections include financial aid, military training and 
weapon smuggling (Kurubas, 2004:95-185). Gunter has pointed out (as cited in 
Barkey, 1996:33) the critical relationship between the PKK and the sub-national 
terrorist groups such as "Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) (Barkey, 
1996:33). For instance, the military cooperation agreement between PKK with 
ASALA in Lebanon was signed on 6th April, 1980, against Turkey (Ozoglu, 2006). 
The PKK also received guerrilla training from George Habbash of the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine and Naif Hawatmeh of the Democratic Front. It is 
reported that Ahmet Cibril trained the 300 PKK members for guerrilla warfare in 
1981-1982 (Ozdag, 2007). 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iran war which continued for 8 years played an effective role 
in the development of Kurdish nationalism and had a negative impact on Turko-
Iranian relations. The war created a power vacuum in northern Iraq to be exploited by 
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PKK militants, while the Israeli invasion of Lebanon removed the sub-nationalist 
groups from the Beqaa Valley (PKK, Hezbollah, and PLO) in 1982, forcing the 
relocation of PKK militants towards Northern Iraq in which the absence of power 
provided an operational setting for their forces, these were deployed in three modes: 
defence, balance of forces, and attacks into Turkish territory from northern Iraq 
(Chaliand, 1994:48). Therefore, prior to the PKK-KDP accord in July 1983 
(www.krg.org), Turkey attacked the PKK and KDP camps in northern Iraq with seven 
to eight thousand troops, penetrating up to 25 miles into Iraqi territory and capturing 
several hundred PKK members in May 1983 (Ozdag, 2007). Iran preferred to remain 
silent during this first Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, but combined Iraqi-
Turkish attacks on Kurdish villages forced Barzani's KDP to make alliance with Iran 
to counteract this new threat. This allowed Iran to recapture Hajj Omran in Iraq in 
July 1983 (Entessar, 1992: 132). However, the Iranian Kurds were able to take such 
advantage of Iraq's surprise attack on Iran less than a year later that they created a 
security zone in a substantial part of Iranian Kurdistan in 1983. However, Iran not 
only regained territories captured by Iraq but also virtually pushed the KDPI out of 
Iran, except for Hawraman, in which the KDPI was reduced to desultory guerrilla 
warfare. On the other hand the developments in northern Iraq concerned Turkey, 
especially the negotiations between Saddam and Talabani for the new autonomy law, 
publicly revealed in November 1983.However, this co-operation was terminated on 
18th October 1984 (Entessar, 1992: 132). Therefore, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal sent 
his foreign minister Vahit Halefoglu the Baghdad to solve the Kurdish issues in 
northern Iraq. The 'hard talk' between Iraqi and Turkish governments resulted in the 
signing of the "Turkish Iraqi Border and Security agreement" on 18th October 1984. 
The agreement was the continuation of the 1928 border agreement, Sadabat Pact, 
Baghdad Pact and the 1981 border agreement. Turkey was "hot pursuit" rights which 
allowed Turkish troops to hold back the terrorist guerrillas of PKK, PUK and KDP to 
30 km of Iraqi territory. However, Turkish-Iraqi cooperation was criticised by the 
Iran-Syrian axis due to the alliance of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Turkey's 
similar request from Tehran was refused, but Iran preferred to make a security 
agreement requiring each country to prohibit any activity on its territory against the 
other's security (Olson, 1996). The agreement was signed by Ali Tanriyar, and second 
chief of staff, Necdet Oztorun on 28 November 1984. On the other hand, the 
cooperation between Barzani and Ocalan increased the PKK's capacity to infiltrate 
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Turkish territory directly from Syria and through Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, the PKK 
embarked on its armed propaganda (Gunter, 1990:71) strikes on the Eruh-Semdinli 
districts on 15 August 1984. The appendages of the PKK enhanced its propaganda 
activities in Turkey (Ozcan, 1999:42) and the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan 
(ARGK) and the Metropolitan Revenge Brigade increased the hit and run operations 
into Turkish territory (Ozdag, 2007). 
The KDP-Iran alliance's attacks on Iraq and PUK forces concerned Turkey in the 
integration of Iraqi Kurdish land such as the seizure of Kirkuk and its oilfields. 
Turkey openly threatened Iran in the critical war period by accusing Tehran of aiding 
anti-Iraq Kurdish groups in Iraq. Turkey reminded Iran of its historical claims on 
Kirkuk and Mosul, but the crisis was ultimately resolved by the Iranian foreign 
minister visit to Ankara in October 1986. The foreign minister of Turkey, Halefoglu, 
ensured that Turkey would stay neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, but wanted the Kirkuk-
Iskenderun oil pipeline to remain immune from either direct Iranian attacks or those 
conducted by Iranian-supported Kurds. Even though Iranian foreign ministry officials 
did not give any assurances, Iran did not attack the pipeline during the course of the 
war but the issue of security of pipeline remained a point of contention between 
Tehran and Ankara. 
After the Turkish air force bombed a number of Kurdish villages in northern Iraq on 
the pretext of destroying PKK camps in late 1986, the Iranian government filed a 
bitter protest with Turkish authorities over the bombings of the Iraqi Kurds. Tehran 
organised a conference on the cooperation of the Iraqi people in December 1986; the 
conference brought together the representatives of anti-Saddam elements including 
Kurds. Although Iranian officials did not directly address the Turkish claims on 
Mosul and Kirkuk, Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani openly accused Ankara of 
planning to seize the Kirkuk oilfield by saying that controlling the oilfields of 
northern Iraq would means control of the million of Kurds in northern Iraq (Olson, 
2001). 
The Kirkuk and Mosul disputes aroused much scholarly discussion on Kirkuk and 
Mosul dispute. Whilst Graham Fuller (Fuller and Lesser 1993; Entessar, 1992) 
express the same opinion on Iranian fears that oil is still an important factor for 
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Turkey's intention, Halliday (1993) and Berkay (1993) claimed that oil was not a 
prime concern for Turkey's policy in northern Iraq. However, Olson argues that Iran's 
feared that the extension of Turkey's security borders a few hundred miles to the 
south and east would encourage Azeri nationalism in Iran increased Turkish influence 
an Iranian domestic politics (Olson, 2001). However, Turkey had given up the 
Ottoman territorial claim so as to avoid interference in Iran's internal affairs. 
Ankara's mam policy was driven by one goal--to eliminate any influence that 
encourages Turkey's Kurds to seek autonomy or independence, because Turkey's 
internal Kurdish problem were becoming increasingly tense. The third PKK congress 
was held in Damascus. Syria from 25-30th October 1986. It aimed at destroying the 
"temporary village guards system"( Tapan,2007), and its incumbent activities which 
were relatives who are seen as difficulties for the development of the organisation and 
looting and setting houses on fire between 1987 and 1988.The PKK called it 'the 
revolutionary propaganda policy.' As a consequence of the PKK's brutal guerrilla 
strategy, kill one, frighten ten thousand, (Tse-tung, 1967).Turkey had to implement 
state emergency laws in eight major Kurdish cities in 1987, and improve its relations 
with the KDP. 
While the PKK lost its alliances in northern Iraq, Talabani and Ocalan signed a 
memorandum of understanding in Damascus on May 1988, which made the PKK a 
close ally of the Iran-Syrian axis. Similar alliances between the PKK and left - wing 
organisations such as the Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol) and the Turkish Worker's 
Peasants Liberation Army {TIKKO) made the PKK a leader of Kurdish forces in 
Turkey in 1989, because, at that time the PKK directly targeted Kurdish collaborators 
with the Turkish state to break up the feudal system and to punish agents of the state 
in the Kurdish region. Hence, the Turkish military launched the third heaviest series 
of air attacks over PKK bases and Kurdish villages in northern Iraq in 1987. Due to 
strategic relations with Kurdish groups, critics in Iran were now more critical than 
ever, calling the Turkish incursion the genocide of Kurdish people (Ataman, 1999). 
However, the situation became even more severe between Turkey and Iran after Iran 
formally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598-a cease-fire between Iran 
and Iraq on 18th July 1988. Regional powers and sub-national actors in the Kurdish 
political fray changed; Iran acquired more flexible capability to use the Kurdish cards 
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against Turkey by allowing the opening of an ERNK branch in Iran and handing over 
the 20 KDPI camps to PKK control in Iranian Kurdistan in 1989 ( Gunter,1997:95) 
The consequence of the Iran-Iraq war for Iranian Kurds was more drastic because 
They held a poor position in Iran and Tehran executed the members of Komala on the 
ground that communists are, by definition, apostates ( Mohaddessin, 1993). But even 
if Tehran seemed to be more tolerant in its relationship with KDPI, the veteran leader 
Abd-al Rahman Qasimlu was assassinated during secret talks with government 
representatives from Tehran in Vienna in July 1989 (Report from Kurdistan, April1, 
1988:10-12) 
Suha Bolukbasi (1989:95) pointed out that Ankara's attitude towards the Islamic 
Revolution was very successful in coexisting with Iran, namely maintaining active 
neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war and taking advantage of the war to expand its 
economic ties with Iran and Iraq. Turkey's decision to cope with Iran was mainly a 
deliberate attempt to prevent Tehran from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
On the other hand, Iran was very successful in playing the Kurdish card against 
Turkey's historical claims to weaken its influence in Kirkuk and Mosul and northern 
Iraq, generally. The Iran-Syrian alliance was also an important barrier against the twin 
threat of Turkey and Israel (Olson, 2001), but after the ceasefire Kurdish nationalist 
were deserted again under the Iraqi government. This time, the nation was faced with 
an intensive ethnic cleansing campaign in Anfal, headed by Ali Hassan al-Majid, a 
cousin of Saddam Hussein, and nicknamed Chemical Ali, between February 23 and 
September 1988 (Report from Kurdistan, 8 March 1988:8-11). 
7.2.1 The operation of the Anfal genocide campaigns: transition from sub-group 
action to the sub-nation self-determination 
The Iraqi government conducted eight brutal campaigns in the areas controlled by the 
KDP and the PUK in the aftermath of a ceasefire with Iran, which allowed the transfer 
of two thousand troops with air support for use against their own Kurdish citizen 
(McDowall, 1992:127-8). The Iraqi blames dropped chemical bombs including 
mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, in the final Anfal raids in north-east 
Iraq. According to this report, the Iraqi government killed 180,000 through mass 
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summary executions and the widespread use of chemical weapons. 2,000 villages 
razed and the rural economy and infrastructure ruined with 1,754 schools, 270 
hospitals, 2,450 mosques, 27 churches destroyed and the deaths of 4,000-5,000 
civilians (PHRS, 22 October 1988; FRCR, 21 September 1988). This campaign not 
only caused the alienation of the Kurdish nation from the Iraqi state and 
internationalised the Kurdish issue but also created an influx of half a million Kurdish 
refugees entering into Turkey and Iran in August-September Channel 4, 1989). 
Turkey accepted 60,000 Iraqi Kurds in August but 17,000 of them were voluntarily 
transferred to Iran in October 1988. They were settled in tent camps near the cities of 
Mardin, Diyarbakir, and Mus. Turkey called migrants displaced people but not 
refugees" (Laizer, 1991:112). Turkey's main concern was that this interaction 
encourages common identity awareness between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds as well as 
placing an economic burden on Turkish economic stability. On the other hand, Iran 
received more than 300,000 Kurdish refugees in that period. Hence, the better 
estimate is that half a million Kurds were removed from their home to some holding 
detention camps as a result of this brutal campaign. Even though both Iran and Turkey 
requested UN financial help, the UN only pressured the Iraqi government to announce 
a general amnesty for the Kurdish people to encourage their return to Iraq. Some 
stayed in Turkey and Iran but many of them immigrated to Western countries which 
made Kurdish nationalism an international question (MRG, 1989). In fact, the Anfal 
genocide legitimised the sub-group entities' national identity but the systemic setting 
did not give the necessary help against the Iraqi government's ethnic cleansing of the 
Kurdish nation. For instance, Talabani's first visit to Washington, demanding an 
autonomous Kurdish state, did not receive any support from Secretary of State George 
Shultz in June 1988. 
On the other hand, due to turmoil after the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, the Iraqi government 
cancelled the Turkish "hot pursuit" right to invade northern Iraq and made a secret 
deal with the PKK to exert pressure on Turkey's water policies. The Iraqi government 
announced that Baghdad did not recognise the Syrian - Turkey water protocol which 
was signed by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and Hafiz Esad in 1987. Turkish-Iraqi 
relations were uneasy prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Prime Minister Yildirim 
Akbulut's visit on 5-7 April 1990 to Baghdad demonstrates that Turkish-Iraqi 
relations could not solve this unease but only put further strain on their relationship. 
Therefore, the new reshuffle and regional political change such as the Iran-Syrian 
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alliance and the rise of a rogue Iraqi regime forced Turkey to improve its relations 
with Israel. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal accused Syria of being a terrorist-supporting 
country and threatened to breach the contract of 1987 which guaranteed the Euphrates 
and Tigris water flow quota in October 1989. However, the Syrian response came 
from the brother of Hafiz Esad-- Jamal Esad who was the main liaison with the 
separatist groups in the Beqaa Valley, and who said that the Kurds had to establish 
their own state in the region, including Turkish territory in November 1989. At this 
time 5,000 Syrian troops and 1,200 tanks and SAM missiles were located in Lebanon 
along with three military divisions in the Beqaa Valley. Nevertheless, Turkey 
reopened its embassy in Tel Aviv in February 1990. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused systemic changes in the region on 2nd August 
1990. According to the UN Resolution 666 to attack Iraq, Turkey was actively 
involved in the GulfWar crisis in 1991. Through the Yumurtalik-Kirkuk oil pipeline, 
Turkey lost 1.5 million barrels of oil per day in imports from the Mediterranean port 
( Hurriyet 4 August 1990).Turkish Grand National Assembly' Decision 108 allowed 
the deployment of US forces on Turkish soil to attack Iraq on 12th August 1990 
( TGNA report, 14 Aug and 7 Sept 1990). Ozal called on the "Poised Hammer" 
forces to deter any possible Iraqi attack against Turkey--42 aircraft were deployed at 
the Erhac air bases in December 1990 and 100.000 Turkish troops were mobilised on 
the Turkish-Iraqi border in September to send troops to the Persian Gulf prior to the 
any Assembly Decision, but the Turkish assembly later suspended the sending of 
troops to foreign countries with assembly decision 126 (TGNA report, 17 January 
1991). Turkey allowed the deployment of 41 American aircraft to the Incirlik 
installation; the aircraft launched an attack on Iraqi bases on the same day. However, 
Iran pursued active neutral politics against Saddam's regime (Oran, 1996:42-3). 
On the other hand, the Kurdish group tried to take advantage of the autonomous status 
in Iraq. Though Talabani made his second trip from Damascus to Washington on 12th 
August 1990 and demanded an increase in the number of coalition troops to 35,000 in 
northern Iraq, as well as cooperation to topple the Saddam regime on behalf of the US. 
A meeting was held between Talabani and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Claiborne Pell along with the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism John Kerry. However, due to the fear of possible use ofSaddam's chemical 
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weapons, the KDP's leader, Masoud Barzani, aimed to keep Kurdish areas out of the 
war zone by not opening a second front against the Saddam regime. The Second Gulf 
War normalised Iran-Syria relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
the international community while Iraq was isolated from the international system by 
being seen as the aggressor in the Iran-Iraq war. 
As a result of the Iran-Iraq war, Kurdish nationalist joined allied themselves with the 
Iran-Syria axis to minimise Turkey's regional influence and to keep Turkey as an 
active neutral player during the war. However, Saddam's attack on the Kurdish region 
and the invasion of Kuwait brought Western powers into the region, allowing the 
Kurds to be independent players in the Middle East. As a result of the Gulf War in 
1991, Turkey returned to the Middle East began diplomatic relations with Israel and 
also formed an alliance of Kurdish groups in Kurdistan-Iraq in 1990s. Iran was not 
happy about Turkey's active involvement in the territory of Iraq. In addition to their 
issues competition in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Kurdish question became 
the most dynamic issues between Turkey and Iran in the Middle East. 
7.3. O.The emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region: From the Persian Gulf 
War to the US-British led invasion of Iraq (1991-2003) 
The figure 7.2 below highlights the main turning point of the Kurdish issue in the 
regional politics. At the end of the Cold War, the Kurdish question became a 
transnational issue, with each Kurdish groups acting as a regional player in northern 
Iraq. Due to the internal war between the KDP-PUK, Turkey became the main shelter 
and guarantor of the Kurdish autonomous region. On the other hand, the PKK 
received logistic and military support from Iran, Syria and Iraq. Together with 
Barzani's Pashmarga, Turkish armed forces conducted lethal operations against PKK. 
In opposing the Turkish Armed Forces-Pasmargha coalition, the 'diplomatic dance' of 
Talabani caused tensions between Turkey and Iran. The international political 
diplomacy of Kurdistan's independence process subsequently began in Dublin, 
moved to Ankara, and Washington them through tripartite security commissions 
between Iran, Syria and Turkey.But no diplomatic results were achieved. 
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This section focuses on how super - power involvement assisted Kurdish nationalism 
in the bringing about of a de facto Kurdish state accommodated within four main 
processes: the silent process (1990-4); the Dublin process (1996); the Ankara process; 
the Tehran process (1997); and the Washington process (1998). Secondly, this study 
tries to explain how Turkey gained the initiative in regional politics by being an ally 
of the United States. 
Figure 7.2: The dynamics of the Kurdish Question conflict and cooperation (1991-2003) 
US-EU 
Line of tension = red 
Line of co-operation = green 
Line of fluctuating relations = blue 
So 
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7 .3.1.0 The silent process: recognition of the Kurdish entity 
Super - power involvement in the Kurdish issue began with Operation Desert Shield 
as it transformed into Operation Desert Storm the elimination process of the Saddam 
regime in regional politics and the restoration of the al-Sabah family in Kuwait 
(Doganay, and Fikret 1994:203-298). After the American and UN announcements of a 
ceasefire on 27th February and 2nd March 1991, Turkey was positioned at the side of 
the American- led alliance by giving up anti-revisionist policy model and improving 
its relations with the KDP and PUK in northern Iraq, (Turan, 1993:126). But the long-
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term Kurdish politics of the U.S undermined Turkish influence in the region (Hurriyet 
27 March 1995). Therefore, Prime Minister Ozal wanted to oust the Saddam regime, 
so as to recover the "National Pact" by taking over the Kurdish region in Iraq. 
However, predictions by Ozal did not become reality-- to invade Iraq or become the 
protector of the Kurdish nation {Torumtay, 1994). In fact, the active politics of Turkey 
and active neutral politics of Iran eliminated the effects of the rising rogue power, Iraq, 
in the Middle East. However, the United States' second stage of operations in the Gulf 
was in conflict with the regional countries' Kurdish politics; George Bush called on 
the anti-Saddam regime elements (Shia and Kurdish groups) to topple the Saddam 
regime in February 1991. The majority of the Shia rebels forced the Iraqi troops to 
move from north to south, creating a power vacuum in northern Iraq which 
encouraged the Kurdish groups to stage the second largest rebellion against the Iraqi 
regime (Observer, 31 March 1991:21; Kurdistan Focus, 1 January 1993). 
In opposing the Kemalist establishment, President Turgut Ozal launched the 
controversial "silence process" to take the initiative in Kurdish politics by solving the 
Kurdish question. In the first stage, President Ozal and Prime Minister Demirel sent 
their envoys, Cengiz Candar and Ismet Imset, to negotiate with PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan in the Beqaa Valley. Talabani and KDP secretary Muhsin Dizai want to 
Turkey as mediators between Ocalan and Turkey and held a talk with foreign ministry 
and intelligence officials on gth March1991. President Turgut Ozal had taken the 
necessary military precaution to expand the liberalisation process by solving the 
internal Kurdish question. In that scenario, Ozal planned to use the pro-Kurdish 
Worker's Party ofthe People (HEP). 
However, the situation changed on 28th March 1991, when the wrath ofthe Iraqi army 
embarked on an effort to eliminate the country's Kurdish population by using 
helicopters after a UN decision allowed Baghdad to use helicopters and land forces 
but not aircraft. Iraqi troops recaptured Kirkuk, Dahuk, Erbil, Suleymaniye and Zhao 
and removed the Kurdish, Suryani and Arabs populations, driving them through the 
Turkish and Iranian borders (Yinanc and et al 1999; Lichfield, 1991 :21; Hardie-
Forsythe,1992:1).However, Turkey closed its south-eastern border knowing that it did 
not have enough financial resources to provide food, shelter, and health care for the 
Kurdish refugees. Instead of accepting the refugees, Ankara proposed a plan to 
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establish a security zone in northern Iraq where the Kurds would be protected- in a 
"no-fly zone. " It is estimated that half a million Iraqi Kurds crossed into Turkey and 
1.5 million Kurds entered through the Iranian border, with some 35,000 becoming 
permanent refugees who created an international humanitarian crisis in April 1991. 
Ankara-Tehran-Barzani's demand for financial and security help from the UN and the 
EU to avoid the same situation as in 1988, was responded to by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), which immediately passed Resolution 688 to carry out 
humanitarian help on 5th April. This coincided with the European Community's 
emergency summit in Luxemburg which aimed at endorsing a proposal by British 
Prime Minister John Major to establish a safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq 
(Bulloch and Morris, 1993:27-49; Laurence, 1991:61) 
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and safe haven in northern Iraq (February 1991-18 
July 1991) allowed Western powers to take initiatives on the Kurdish question; 
George Bush firstly extended the no flying zone from Dahuk in the north of the 36th 
parallel, located just south of Irbil, to supply security and financial help in May and 16 
April 1991 (Bozarslan, 1993:61). The PKK was not happy to see this Turkish -
Western coalition and began to attack their base in early July 1991. Therefore, 
Turkish security forces launched a massive five - day operation against the PKK bases 
in northern Iraq on 7 August 1991. Moreover, Ozal wanted to continue his silence 
policy and take over the foreign initiative after talks with Talabani in June 1991 and 
January talks in the following year between President Ozal and Talabani-Barzani. 
This was one of the main milestones in the recognition of a Kurdish entity. Prior to 
this joint Turkish-Pesmerga operation against the PKK, Gendarme Commander 
General Esref Bitlis and Security General Necati Dogru signed the hot pursuit 
agreement with Kurdish groups. Ozal's double - track policy provided the Turkish 
Special Forces with opportunities in northern Iraq but also the chance to support the 
Kurdish autonomous regional government. They even considered a possible federal 
solution for Turkey's Kurdish question. Ozal aimed to pacify the PKK during the fifth 
congress, held from on 26-31 December 1990, which overlapped with the Kurdish 
self - determination serhildan movement (public demonstration), in Southeast 
Anatolia. For instance, the Newrooz demonstrations on 21 March 1992 resulted in 57 
deaths, signifying that the new political power of the PKK which organise the public 
masses against the government ( Feeney , 1992), but their hope for possible political 
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solutions were facilitated PKK's ceasefire which was extended until the Kurdish New 
Year celebration in 1993. 
Map 7.1 :Iraq: No-fly Zones 
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The no-fly zone in Iraq arose as part of the cease-fire agreement ending the Gulf War of 1990-1991. 
Initially it involved only the northern line at the 36th parallel. This was initiated to support 
humanitarian operations to the Kurds in the north by preventing Iraqi military operations in this area. 
The southern no-fly zone was created in 1992 and was extended to the thirty-third parallel in 1996. It 
was intended to protect the Shiite Muslims in the southern areas from Iraqi fighter aircraft. Sources: 
online at: http://www.af.mil/art/index.asp?galleryiD=177&page=8 
Whilst Iran downplayed Kurdish issues, the stationing of five thousand US, British 
and French troops, called the Combined Task Forces (18 July 1991-31 December 
1996) in the Turkish province of Silopi made Turkey a regional power in the Middle 
East (Hurriyet, 14 July 1991). However, the presence of Western powers under the 
media-bestrewed name Operation Poised Hammer produced negative reactions in 
Turkey due to these forces' stationing in Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish foreign 
ministry had to explain the status quo and the main duties and principles of the task 
force (Milliyet, 25 July 1991 ). However the mandate for the allied air force in Incirlik 
had to be renewed by the Turkish parliament every 6 months--It was 32 times 
renewed by the assembly.The CTF was disbanded after the Kurds started to receive 
support from Tehran or Baghdad and this time the Turkish parliament refused to 
renew the allied mandate. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan stated that the CTF is 
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abolished. It is now history for us" (Hurriyet, 25 December 1996:29). However, the 
plan was replaced by a similar operation Northern Watch that continued the activities 
ofOPC under a somewhat reduced mandate and without further French participation. 
One of the main effects of the foreign forces in the Kurdish region was to encourage 
the de facto sovereignty of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (27 May 1992; 27 May 
1994) in Northern Iraq, although the Turkish Turkoman Front did not join the election 
in northern Iraq (Qadir, 1992). Due to Turkey's fear of a possible PKK filling of the 
power vacuum in the northern Iraq, President Ozal supported Kurdish parliamentary 
elections, held on 19 May (Stansfield, 2003; Gunter, 1993). Barzani's KDP and PUK 
receive 44.58% and 44.33% of votes in this election. Talabani's assistant. Fuat 
Masum, became the first prime minister of the Iraqi Kurdish Front in Erbil on 4th July. 
Barzani emphasised that the Kurdish people had the right to make their own decisions 
under the Iraqi constitution on 6th October 1992. Turkey's close relations with the 
Kurds concerned Iran after a joint Turkish Pesmerga operation into northern Iraq on 
October 4 -12 November 1992. Under the guidance of Ozal (Bolugiray, 1993 :295-320) 
the cabinet accepted the adoption of Terrorist Act and the suspension of the 
Language-Ban-Act of 1983 and, later, Turkish policy - makers had to recognise the 
Kurdish reality (Imset, 1995). 
On the other hand, Iraqi parliamentary speaker, Sadi Mehdi Salih, visited Ankara to 
discuss the Kurdish parliament, but the IKF parliament speaker, Cevher Namik, 
assured him that the Kurdish regional government respected the unity of Iraqi territory 
and aimed to set up a democratic regional autonomous state for the Kurdish people in 
northern Iraq (Oran, 2005:116-117). Even though Barzani stated that relations with 
Turkey were vital for the Kurdish nation, as a signed to the outside world, the Kurdish 
parliament's decision on the status quo of Kirkuk undermined Kurdish-Turkish 
cooperation and also forced Turkey to review relations with Iraq and Iran. 
On the other hand, from an Iranian point of view, the post-Cold War Iranian politics 
on the Kurdish question centred on military options; the General Secretary of the 
KDPI, Dr Sadiq Sharafkandi, together with a member of the central committee and 
the representative of the KDPI in Europe Fettah Abduli, and the KDPI representative 
in Germany, Humayun Ardalan, were murdered by the Iranian intelligence operatives 
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in Berlin in September 1992. Barzani and Talabani condemned the Iranian covert 
action against Iranian Kurdish leaders. The leader of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan 
to Kemal Burkay said that "The silence in the face of years of ruthless terrorism by 
the Iranian regime is entirely incomprehensible and encouraging the Iranian regime 
to continue its assassination. " The new leader of the KDPI, Mustafa Hijri said that 
the killing of individuals will not or cannot affect the forward march of Kurdish 
people toward liberation. Hence the common identity feeling of the Kurds in Iran, Iraq 
and Turkey overlapped with this internal dynamic of Kurdish nationalism in 1990s 
(Resideyan's personal archive) 
7 .3.1.1 Low intensity conflict with the PKK 
After Ozal's unfortunate death, the secular establishment returned to an authoritarian 
track under the coalition governments from 1993 to 2002. The chief of the general 
staff told President Demirel that Turkey has in a low intensity clash with the PKK, but 
the regional security setting was related with the post-Cold War reconstruction in the 
Middle East. Turkey reopened its embassy in Baghdad in 1993 and the Khabur 
crossing point in August 1994. Though the regional state had to acquiesce to U.S and 
EU support for an autonomous Kurdish federative state, Tehran and Ankara (along 
with Syria and Iraq) signed security protocols to avoid the rise of a Kurdish state 
(1993-1994) in Northern Iraq. The essence of the 1992 security protocol was a 
decision taken on the basis of the tripartite security agreement-- conferences related to 
which were held at ministry level and with lower ranking foreign policy officials, 
every six months. Their goal was to not allow any terrorist organisations, such as the 
PKK and the Mujahidin Khalq Organization to gain power. The protocol was signed 
by Ankara--Tehran-Damascus on 30 November 1993 (Olson, 2004). Therefore, the 
PKK's ceasefire between 17th March- 08th June 1993, awaiting a possible democratic 
solution, did not resolve the Kurdish issue, but rather increased military conflict in 
Turkey. Turkey's policy became more severe against the politicising of Kurdish 
nationalism, such as in the context of the 57 unsolved murders and the killing of 
Democratic Labour Party's MP, Mehmet Sincar, which created serious tensions in the 
Kurdish region in July 1993. The internal politics ofthe Kurdish question in Turkey 
were very intensive and failed to deliver a democratic solution. For instance, the DEP 
was banned on 16th June 1994, and 6 MP's fled to Europe and took part in the 
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foundation of a Kurdish Parliament in Exile at the Hague on 12th April 1995.8 MPs 
ended up with harsh 15 - year sentences. The other Kurdish party, HADEP, had 
already been established on 11th May 1994, but Turkey managed to secure a ban on 
the PKK in Germany on 26th November 1993. 
When Turkish armies combined with an air attack into northern Iraq on 9th October 
1993 and renewed attacks on 26/30 November and 18th December 1993, they 
managed to suppress the Kurdish rebellions. However, Iran-Turkey relations were 
strained due to Kurdish issues, but the foreign policy delegations' meetings increased 
the security communications, to recover both countries' initiative on the Kurdish 
question. The representative of President Rafsanjani, Golam Hosseini Bolandijian, 
ensured that Iran would take measures for PKK members to be shot regardless of 
whether they are wearing PKK uniforms or are smugglers (Olson, 2005). However, 
the security relations remained uncertain for both parties. In response to the 1994 
Turkish-Iranian security protocols, Iranian president Rafsanjani evaluated the security 
protocols by saying that "The regional security is great importance to both countries. 
We are interested in saving that the security in Turkey. However, this should be based 
on reciprocity. The activities directed towards Iran by the Iranian rebels operating 
out of Turkey must be discontinued. In this sense our co-operation will be directed 
according to, the abandonment of Turkish policies" (Pope, 1993). Despite suspicion 
between three - partite parties on the security protocols, Turkey received some 
positive responses from Iran. For instance, the interior minister Nahit Mentese 
announced that Iran had turned over to Turkey 28 members of the PKK, 10 of whom 
were dead. But this cooperation did not mean that the hot pursuit right given to 
Turkey because of Turkey's demand for bombing the PKK bases located around the 
areas of Mt. Ararat and Mt. Tendurek (lesser Ararat) near the Iranian border was not 
officially accepted by Iranian foreign ministry. The visit by the Iranian interior 
minister, Mohammed Besharati on 13th June, only gave guarantees to Turkey to 
prevent PKK members crossing from northern Iraq to Iran, and from Armenia and 
thence to Russia.But he did not confirm permission for a bombing raid by Turkey at 
the press conference but rather stated that Iran would cooperate with Turkey at every 
level against their common enemies on 16th June 1994 (Hurriyet 17 June 1994). 
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The Turkish interior minister, Mentese, offered assurances that Turkey would not 
allow any group operating from Turkish territory to harm the Iranian government. 
Turkey's first presidential level visit to Iran after the Revolution received wide media 
coverage in both the Iranian and Turkish press on 15-17 July 1994. President 
Demirel's and Rafsanjani's talk focused on the Kurdish question. Both countries 
agreed not to allow a Kurdish state to arise. In this vein, a delegation of senior Turkish 
diplomats visited Tehran with a dossier chock-full of evidence of terrorist activities of 
PKK. The amendment to section eight of the Anti - Terrorist Act on 25th October 
1995 could not resolve the Kurdish question. In the aftermath of the civil war between 
Kurdish groups, Turkey repeatedly made military incursions into northern Iraq 
involving 35,000 soldiers against PKK positions between 20th March and May of the 
same year. Turkish-Iranian politics relating to Kurdish affairs became contentious in 
Northern Iraq. Ankara accused Iran of providing logistical support to the PKK to 
establish more bases in northern Iraq, which legitimised the Turkish military 
incursions into Northern Iraq in June and gave rise to the possibility bombing Iranian 
territory, but Turkish policy - makers refrained from such drastic action. These 
strained relations dominated the first foreign ministry level talks at the 7th tripartite 
meeting in Tehran on gth September. Tehran and Damascus denounced Turkey's 
spring incursion into Iraq as violating the territorial integrity of Iraq and threatening to 
fragment the country but the three foreign ministers reaffirmed their decisions: to 
oppose the division of Iraq, to stand against terrorism, and to impede the stockpiling 
of weapons in northern Iraq (Olson, 2004). The fluctuating relationship between 
Turkey and Iran was evident during the visit of the Iranian minister of economic and 
financial affairs, Mortaza Mohammed Khan, on 7th November. President Demirel 
stated that Western powers aimed to form a Kurdish state by supporting the 
separatists. He stated that Turkey and Iran should not be competitive with each other 
and fully agreed with the decision of the seveth talks held in Tehran. During this visit 
Khan emphasised the importance of improving economic relations. The Turkish 
foreign secretary Onur Oymen, visited President Rafsanjani's envoy on 1st December 
1995 and both countries took the initiative on Kurdish nationalism. The civil war (in 
1994 and 1996-8) between the Suleymaniye and Erbil governments increased the 
Turkey-Iran competition in northern Iraq. A double economic embargo by the UN and 
the Iraqi government increased the dependency of Kurdish groups on tax revenue 
from the Khabur border crossing between Turkey and the Kurdish region. 
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Whilst Turkey became an ally of the KDP, which strengthened the economic power of 
Barzani, by spending tax revenues estimated at $200.000 to$ 300.000 KDP's per day, 
Iran allied with the PUK. In fact Talabani's tax revenue was not as high as Barzani's, 
from the border crossing with Iran. On the other hand, the Talabani-Iran alliance 
provided Iran with the military initiative in Northern Iraq in 1995. 
7.3.2 The Dublin Process: International recognition of the Kurdish entity 
Turkey was not happy about the power vacuum in northern Iraq after the friction of 
the Kurdish civil war. Turkey used its initiative in the Western coalition as a mediator 
to end the internal war between Barzani and Talabani. The two Kurdish leaders came 
together under the guidance of the United Task forces in Silopi/Turkey in June 1994. 
However, Turkey lost the initiative on the Kurdish issue after the meeting of these two 
leaders was held under the French authority in Paris in July 1994. The Turkish foreign 
minister, Mumtaz Soysal, pressured the French government to cancel the second 
Kurdish initiative meeting in France, which demonstrated that Turkish-EU relations 
seem to be in conflict on the Kurdish issue (Oran, 2005). Even if there was some 
consensus on the Turkish and French initiatives, the peace talks could not put an end 
to the Kurdish civil war; Talabani invaded the KDP-controlled city of Erbil in order to 
gain advantage in negotiations over revenue- sharing, but Barzani's response was to 
launch an intensive war against him in December 1994. The Balkanisation of the 
Kurdish issue transformed Kurdish nationalism to the point that Turkish could not 
overcome the evolution of the internal threat into an external one. Turkish initiatives 
were terminated after the failure of the silence process under President Turgut Ozal. 
Therefore, the United States took the initiative on the Kurdish politics after the civil 
war peaked in June-July 1995. The US threatened Kurdish leaders with the abolition 
of the Combined Task Forces and achieved a peace negotiation between the Kurdish 
groups in Drogheda/Dublin, in which U.S foreign ministry official Robert Dutch, 
Barzani's representative, Sami Abdurrahman and Iraqi National Congress secretary, 
Ahmet Celebi joined the conference on 9-11 August 1995. While Turkey was an 
observer at the talks, Tehran's position was more severe on the Kurdish initiative after 
the American dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran. Even though Turkey was 
actively involved in redesigning Iraq and was the main participant in Northern Watch 
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to disarm the northern Iraq (Hurriyet, 13 August 1995:25), the United States became 
the main guarantor ofKurdish nationalism. However, the Kurdish "de facto" state had 
to recognise the authority of Iraq, which coincided with Turkey's Iraqi politics in the 
first Dublin conference. However, the Syrian-Iranian axis was not happy to see the 
Turkey's initiative involvement with Western powers in regional politics. Therefore, 
Iran-Syria-Talabani supported the PKK attack on the KDP territory, organised to take 
control of the Khabur border crossing. The war between KDP-PKK and PUK-KDP 
continuously breached the peace accords which were signed under Turkish-French 
and US initiatives. After the failure of the ceasefire in following the second Drogheda 
meeting on 12-13 September 1995, Turkey's relations with Iran and later Iraq 
worsened. Iran launched its regional game by strengthening its relations with 
Talabani. The conference stated that "PKK is not a terrorist but sometimes they apply 
violence activities in the conference." The report signified that Turkey-Iran relations 
were becoming strained in the four-sides meeting of the PUK-Iran-Syria-Ocalan axis 
on lOth September 1995. In the aftermath of the failure of Turkey's Kurdish policy, 
Turkish foreign minister, Emre Gonensay announced that "Talabani and Barzani no 
longer have valid Turkish passports" ( Hurriyet, 4 April 1996:1 ). On the other hand, 
due to Turkey's role in the Dublin process, Turkey-lraq relations deteriorated due to 
the closure of Iraqi embassies in Ankara and Istanbul on 31st October 1995. 
7.3.3 Tehran and Ankara process: low intensity regional conflict 
Tehran's attempts at taking the initiatives on the Kurdish issue was a good example of 
Turko-Iranian competition in Mesopotamia, especially during the five - day peace 
talks between KDP representative, Sami Abdurrahman and PUK representative, Fuat 
Masum on 5th October 1995. The Iranian commission was in charge of disarming 
Erbil and solving some other issues. on 11th October (Oran, 2005: 175-77). The Iran-
Kurdish rapprochement not only provided Iranian troops with a place in Northern Iraq 
as a peace force in November 1995 but also restored the Hezbollah camps in the 
Beqaa Valley which had been destroyed by the Israeli Operation Grapes of Wrath, 
during the sixteen-day military blitz against Lebanon in 1996 (Kirisci and Winrow 
1997). However, the alliance between Iran-Talabani became more significant against 
foreign forces and the growing influence of Turkey in the region. The deployment of 
5,000 Iranian forces which contained Hezbollah and Shia militants in some parts of 
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northern Iraq also undermined the U.S dual containment policy (Cetinsaya, 2006). 
The militia had fled to Iraq and were now under the control of Ayatollah Bakr al-
Hakim, who was a member of the Supreme Assembly in the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (SAIRI) (Cetinsaya, 2006). Even though Talabani announced that this joint 
taskforce would be formed against Saddam, the presence of Iranian forces in northern 
Iraq was clearly aimed to destroy the Western initiative in the Middle East.The sub-
group alliance in Turko-Iranian relations became real in the form of Iran-PUK-PKK 
and Turkey-KDP in northern Iraq. Ankara's policy against the Iranian presence in 
Northern Iraq includes its Iraqi policy, in which Turkey launched its historical claims 
by highlighting Turkoman rights in the region. The leader of the Turkoman Front, 
Aziz Kadir, provided intelligence information on Shia forces in Iraq. He claimed that 
the Iranian government paid him a salary to control the Iraqi Shia region. The 
diplomatic officer of the KDP in Ankara, Safa Dizai, ensured that the KDP had 
nothing to do with Iranian military deployment but that this was entirely Talabani's 
decision. He also criticised Iran and Talabani for breaching the authority of Iraqi 
National Congress (INC). After the PKK launched an attack on the KDP forces and 
seized some border crossings between Turkey and Iraq in August 1995, the Tehran-
PUK-PKK alliance not only threatened Turkey's internal security but also Turkey's 
EU accession. Meanwhile, PKK guerrillas used Iran and Northern Iraq to travel to 
European countries. 
Thus, Kurdish nationalists were able to establish financial and broadcasting 
installations in Western countries. On the other hand, after the Islamic government 
seized power in Turkey, the first time bilateral relations reached a peak but the 
Kurdish issue remained uncertain during the Erbakan government (28 June 1996-18 
June 1997). In hopes for a possible political solution from the new government, the 
PKK announced another unilateral ceasefire between 15 Dec 1995 and 16 August 
1996. On 21nd February 1994 the leader of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, 
said that "the children of this nation for centuries have started their classes with 
prayer. They came and abolished this prayer. What did they put in its place? I am a 
Turk, I am right, I am industrious. When you say that, a Muslim who is ethnically a 
Kurd has the right to say, oh really I am a Kurd, I am more right, and more 
industrious. After this parliament passes into the hands of believers, all these rights, 
without spelling blood, will be realized, " Therefore, the Diyarbakir court ruled that 
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Erbakan had incited racial hatred and religious enmity in this speech, violating Article 
312 of the Turkish Penal code (Hurriyet, 11 March 2000). However, the politics of 
PKK were not met positively by the Islamist government. Therefore, the PKK 
changed its military propaganda tactics by using, for the first time, three suicide 
bombers in the city of Tunceli, Adana, and Si vas in July, but the capture of fourteen 
Turkish soldiers by PKK members created prominent public attention on Kurdish 
issues. However, one of the thirty Kurdish MP's of Erbakan's Islamist Party, 
Fethullah Erbas and the chairman ofhuman rights association, Akin Birdal, convinced 
the PKK to release eight Turkish soldiers in August and six more in December 1996. 
Erbakan's eastern foreign policy aimed to establish a big-four axis of Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria to solve Kurdish question. This was rejected by the Western - oriented 
Turkish foreign policy makers, especially the T AF, who claimed that Turkey should 
stick to a realist policy and not romantic/religious nationalism. In fact, during 
Erbakan's visit to Tehran in early August 1996 to February 1997, despite some 
economic and political success, Kurdish politics in both countries were under mutual 
suspicion. Whilst Turkey insisted that Iran was giving sanctuary to the PKK and 
charged Iran with supporting the PKK-KDP cooperation, providing a potential 
corridor via northern Iraq between Syria and Iran, Iran pointed to the Mojahidin-i 
Khalq Organisation in defence. After the Rafsanjani-Erbakan talk, Rafsanjani said 
that Erbakan was talking through the mouthpiece of the Jewish lobby, which was the 
bankrupt legacy ofthe Erbakan's romantic Islamist foreign policy (Houston, 2001). In 
fact, Turkey was not happy to see the expansion of Iranian influence in the northern 
Iraq ever since 1995, because the Iran-PUK-PKK axis was capable of transferring 
Russian weapons from the Central Asian arms market to northern Iraq, so that the 
KDP-Baghdad-Turkish axis's attack on the PUK's territories increased the possibility 
of a hot confrontation between the two counties on 31st August. So both Tehran and 
Ankara encouraged the Islamist Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) led by Sheikh Othman 
who resided in Ranya. He attended the wedding ceremony of Ihsan Dag, the Ankara 
branch director of Erbakan's Welfaree Party on 11-12 August 1996. Despite 
Erbakan's pro-Iranian and pro-Islamist policy, the Kurdish policies of both countries 
became more intensive between the Erbakan and Rafsanjani governments. 
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On the other hand, Barzani's invitation to Iraqi troops to eradicate the Iranian 
presence in northern Iraq on 22nd August gave a new initiative to the Iraqi 
government. Tarik Aziz stated that Iraq had a right to defend the unity of the country 
from foreign occupation and, as such, the presence of the CTF was illegal and the 
demanded their withdrawal. The KDP-Baghdad forces attacked Erbil to defeat the 
Iranian forces from 50 miles inside of the Iraqi border on 31 August 1996. However, 
the KDP-Baghdad-Ankara axis against Tehran's PUK ally erupted in conflict and 
surprised U.S policy makers. Therefore, Foreign Minister Warren Christopher's letter 
to the Turkish foreign minister, Tansu Ciller, demanded that the Iraqi involvement in 
the Kurdish issue must be stopped. Turkey's position is critical on civil war between 
Iraqi Kurdish groups and KDP-Baghdad alliance, but Turkey preferred to force Iraq to 
halts its rogue policy in the fragile region as Ankara would not allow the US to use its 
bases for sorties into Iraq (Hurriyet, 1 September 1996: 16). On the other hand, Iran 
had to react slowly against this new development in the region; President Rafsanjani 
emphasised that Iran was able to offer some help to the PUK forces after they fled 
from the KDP-Baghdad attack. In fact, Talabani's forces received help from Iran and 
had recovered their former territory by the end of the year. 
The regional game between Iran and Turkey led the US to neglect the KDP-Baghdad 
alliance because the presence of Iran in Northern Iraq challenged the Western 
coalition, which extended the no-flying-zone in northern Iraq through a Tomahawk 
missile attack from Jordan to northern Baghdad on 3rd September 1996. The United 
Kingdom security minister, Michael Portillo, announced that the no-flying zone 
extended from the 32nd to the 33rd parallels. However, after Clinton's election in the 
US, the operation was stopped when Clinton said that the operation had been was 
fulfilled successfully (Hurriyet, 2/4 September 1996:14 /13). In fact, Baghdad's new 
initiatives resulted in further violation of Turkoman interests in the city of Mosul and 
Kirkuk, which created tension between Baghdad and Ankara. 
The civil war between the Kurdish groups further increased the likelihood of causing 
a possible war between regional countries. Therefore, Ankara offered a new peaceful 
solution called the 'Ankara process', to make progress in the Kurdish question. 
Barzani came to Ankara to negotiate a new arrangement under the guidance of the 
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United States on 18th September 1996. Under the guidance of the US foreign policy 
deputy minister, Robert Pelletram, and the official in charge of northern Iraqi affairs 
on behalf of England, Frank Baker and the observer of the Turkish foreign ministry, 
Kurdish groups agreed to accept the new arrangement, so as to end the hostilities on 
18th September 1996. However, Turkey's demand for 'temporary dangerous region 
settlements' within a 15 mile radius in northern Iraq was not accepted by either the 
allied forces or the Iraqi government. After the acceptance of this new initiative, 
Turkey made another military incursion into northern Iraq, which caused to halted the 
first stage of the Ankara process in May. On the other hand, Iran was strongly 
opposed to the Ankara process and stated that the aim of negotiations was to create a 
spying base and a spring board to carry out malicious schemes in the region, such as 
the creation of another Israel. However, the Turkish foreign ministry and Robert 
Pelletrau reached the peaceful agreement on Kurdish question on 23 October 1996. 
Further peace talks occurred between Syria and Iraq to open the Banyas oil pipeline in 
December 1996, which had been shut in 1981. The Erbakan government sent its two 
top ministers to try open the Yumurtalik-Kirkuk oil pipeline in the following month, 
but both peace talks failed to reach a settlement due to the UN economic embargo 
against Iraq. Prior to these visits, the PKK also announced its sabotage attack on the 
Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline on 19th September 1996.1t neither had done this action. 
As a consequence of Erbakan's foreign policy, Turkey's relations with its neighbours 
and Western allies worsened. Erbakan's regional Kurdish politics could not also solve 
the civil war between Kurdish groups. Therefore, the EU cancelled its foreign aid to 
Turkey over the protracted human rights issue on the Kurds on 19th September 1996 
and, similarly, the US stopped its arms deals with the Turkish military. The attitudes 
of the super - power and the regional powers demonstrated the influence of systemic 
and regional circumstances on Turkey's internal politics. Therefore, the 28th February 
1997 National Security Council meeting, named the '28 February Process was 
convened and ousted the Erbakan government in June 1997. The Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis was terminated with the closure of Imam-Hatip secondary schools, the 
closing down of private Quran courses, and the imposition of a dress code in state 
institutions. A Sanliurfa MP from Erbakan's party, lbrahim Halil Celik, stated that" ... 
the military has not managed to cope with 3500 PKK members, how would they 
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manage the 6 million Islamists? If they are against the wind, it will come to their face. 
I will hit back whoever slaps my face. I am an Islamist to the every end, I want to 
Sharia law to come" (Akpinar, 2001: 168-9). However, his statement could not 
represent the domestic Islamist policy of Erbakan which did not accept any violent 
acts against the state establishment. Therefore, Erbakan's signature to the new 
National Military and Strategic Concept was not a surprise in the Islamic environment 
in Iran and Turkey. The 28 February Process followed the new National Military and 
Strategic Concept throughout April and May and was focused on the possible 
Kurdish-Islamist axis against the state-establishment. As mentioned in Chapter Five, 
Turkey charged Iran with interfering in Turkey's internal affairs with regard to 
Kavakci, THB, and the events in Sinjan as well as the unresolved political murders. 
This resulted in a second expulsion of ambassadors since the Revolution. During the 
28 February Process, two events dominated Turkey-Iran relations, including the 
Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq. 
The assassination of the KDPI's EU representative, Sadegh Sharatkandi, party 
representative to the German branch of Fattah Abdouli, Homayun Ardalan and four 
other opposition leaders of Iran in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin on 1Oth April 
harshly damaged the international reputation of Iran. A German court accused the 
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenie, and President Rafsanjani of planning state terror 
against the Kurdish national leaders. This caused the termination of diplomatic ties 
between the EU countries and Iran. The Mykonos verdict also spelled the end of the 
critical dialogue that the EU countries had with Iran, their opposition to the dual 
containment policy of US. On the other hand, the event did not create any strain in the 
relationship between Turkey and Iran but rather restored the February and March 
crisis. A foreign ministry spokesman, Onur Akbel, explained that Turkey-lran 
relations are different from Turkey's relations with Germany and other EU countries. 
During the 1990s, Turkey conducted twenty-nine cross border incursions into 
Northern Iraq to eliminate the PKK militants but the operation in May comprised fifty 
or sixty thousands troops equipped with two hundred or three hundred tanks crossing 
125 miles Iraqi territory, destroying PKK's warehouse and caves. Three thousand 
militants were captured and ten thousand KDP troops. Turkish army's power against 
the Islamist government became clear after the general chief of staff, Ismail Hakki 
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Karadayi announced that he had not even told the Prime Minister about the incursion, 
to impede a possible leak of the news to the PKK through the government. However, 
the government dealt with the establishment of the Developing Eight (D-8), and the 
T AF continuously accused Iran of sponsoring terrorism. For instance, the T AF 
announced that fourteen PKK militants were captured in the border village of Dam bat 
in Iran but fifty militants managed to cross the border into Iran in August. Ankara's 
further accusation against Iran for logistic and arm equipment transfers from Russia, 
Syria, Greece, and Greek Republic resulted in a near-hot confrontation between the 
two countries after two Turkish helicopters shot down a Russian-made SA-78 land-
to-air missile on 4th June 1997. Ultimately, Turkey and Iran preferred a diplomatic 
solution. President Demirel and Rafsanjani had short talks at the Economic 
Cooperation Organisation (ECO) summit in Ashkhabad. The talks mostly focused on 
the Israel-Turkish alliance and Iran's interference in Turkey's religious affairs but the 
deputy foreign minister, Alaaddin Borojerdi, and foreign ministry deputy secretary, 
Onur Oymen, held five hours of talks to work out a possible solution at the High 
Security Commission on 9-10 June 1997. On the same day, the governors ofVan and 
Khoy districts had come together at the 14th border security sub-commission. 
Borojerdi informed them that President Rafsanjani would attend the D-8 meeting on 
15-16 June 1997, but many Turkish politicians were very critical about the D-8 
project. The first meeting was held in Istanbul, but the leader of the Motherland Party, 
Mesut Yilmaz, accused the Erbakan government of the murder of 13 Turkish soldiers 
in a skirmish battle at the Iranian border. On 18 June, he further threatened Iran by 
saying that if Iran provided missiles to PKK militants, it would certainly cause a war 
between the two countries on 18th June and labelled Iran as the number one enemy for 
Turkey. After the D-8 meeting, Erbakan left his post and Yilmaz was promoted to 
form a new coalition government, but his party paid the price by losing the parliament 
in the 2002 election. As a consequence of the military conflicts between Turkey and 
the PKK, 20,822 PKK fighters and 4,239 members of the security forces were killed; 
9.277 members of security forces were injured; 4,276 civilians were killed; 5.083 
civilians were injured; 3,223 schools were shut down in the war zone; and about 3,00 
villages were destroyed (Hurriyet 13 August 1997).1n addition, the economic losses 
were estimated at around $8 -1 0 bn a year and decreased Turkish influence in the 
Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the EU (Olson, 2004: 
127). 
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7.3.4 The consolidation of regional bipolarity: Turkish-Israeli alliance 
After the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights in November 1981, Syria and Iran 
signed trade and economic protocols in Tehran in March 1982. This was done as a 
balancing act against Iraq, Israel and Turkey. The intensive conflict between Iranian 
backed militant groups and Syrian forces in Lebanon after the public emergence of 
Hezbollah in September 1984 marked a new watershed. Syria's close ties with the 
Soviet Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council provided an extra push to this axis in 
the Middle East. Whilst the evacuation of Israel from Sinai in April 1982 signified the 
implementation of the Camp David accord, it still gives Israel a prominent position in 
the region. An anti-Israeli war effort in the form of a relatively small contingent of 
some 800-1000 Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) sent to the Beqaa Valley gave the 
Iran-Syria axis a fundamental foothold against the Iraqi and Israeli revisionist policies. 
After the Cold War, Syria and Egypt jointly signed the the Damascus Declaration to 
isolate Turkey from regional politics in 1991. Syria, offensively, raised the water 
proposal for the Euphrates River in the Arab League and GCC summits in 1994. It 
also supported the PKK guerrilla operation in the Taurus Mountains and in the city of 
Hatay which increased the tensions between the Iran-Syria and Turkish-Israel axes in 
1995. PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, challenged the TAF by saying that the region 
would become another Bohtan (Kurdish battlefield; Siirt, Hakkari, Van) (Ozdag, 
2007:42), and force Turkey to build up contra-guerrilla forces and a village guard 
system in the region of Cukurova (Hurriyet 17 September 1995). Olson explained that 
Ankara was hesitants to use military action against the Syrian-Iranian axis until 1998 
became. Turkey did not want to attack a major regional triangle country, Egypt, when 
it was involved in peace negotiations with Israel because, if Turkey attacked its 
relations with the entire Arab World could be harshly damaged (Olson, 2004:107). 
However, the Turkey-Israel alliance emerged as a regional axis against the Syria-Iran 
alliance after the signing of the secret security agreement on terrorism on 13th March 
1994 and the Military Training Agreement between deputy chief of staff, Cevik Bir 
and the director-general of the Israeli ministry of defence in February 1996, which 
further improved Turkish-Israeli ties. However, the Defence Industry Co-operation 
Agreement on 28th August 1996 created a shift in power within the Middle East and in 
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the domestic politics of Turkey which became evident two weeks after Prime Minister 
Erbakan's visit to Tehran. The Israeli ambassador, Zvi Elpeleg, visited to Hatay city 
with intelligence and military officials on 24-25 May and the Prime Minister's 
internal trip to the same city to celebrate the anniversary of the annexation of Hatay 
from Syria in April 1997 challenged the Syrian-Iran axis. Yilmaz continuously 
accused Syria of being a bandit state which sought to divide Turkey. He said that 
"Turks are a patient people, but when their patience runs out, their response is 
harsh " (Hurriyet, 22 April 1997). 
As mentioned earlier, Turkey-Iran diplomatic relations were ended completely after 
the Sinjan Affair. The chief of Staff, Ismail Hakki Karadayi's visit to Israel aimed to 
discuss the Russian missile transfer from Iran to Syria on 24th February 1997. 
However, the deputy chief of staff, Cevik Bir's statement ruined Turkish-Iranian 
relations by saying that Iran is a state that supported terrorism in the meeting of the 
Turkish-American business Council in Washington (TDNs, 25 February 1997). 
During the visit of the Israeli foreign minister, both Tansu Ciller and David Levry 
emphasised that Syria and Iran were the "headquarters of terrorism", which threatened 
Turkey and Israel on 4-5 May. President Benjamin Netanyahu and the Turkish 
defence minister Turban Tayan also stressed that Turkey-Israel pacts were directed 
against terrorist-supporting countries such as Iran and Syria and accused them of 
stockpiling ballistic missiles. The Iranian-Syrian axis harshly criticised the Turkish-
Jewish alliance (Tehran Times, 4 May 1997). The toppling of the Erbakan 
government coincided with the visit of a five-vessel naval battle group to the Israeli 
port of Haifa following the Denizkurdu-97 (Sea Wolf-97) exercise. Turkey also 
improved its relationship with the American Jewish lobby (Anti- Detamation League, 
ADL) to gain the initiatives against the Armenian lobby in the United States. In 
December, the Israeli defence minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, was welcomed to Ankara 
while President Demeirel's ICO summit in Tehran was being criticised by Tehran. 
Prior to the "Horizon" (Safak) operation in October 1997, the Turkish press reported 
that Semdin Sakik had moved into Hatay from Syria with forty PKK guerrillas by 
passing the Amanus mountains, Samandag, Hassa, Iskenderun, Dortyol, Erzin in 
September (Hurriyet, 27 October 1997). In January 1998 Israel-Turkish-American 
vessels took part in operation Reliant Mermaid, a controversial air-sea rescue 
manoeuvre in the eastern Mediterranean during which Turkey received criticism from 
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Syria, Iran and other GCC countries. Iran-Syria offensively called the Ankara-Tel-
Aviv alliance "a satanic alliance" when Turkey and Israel reached agreement over 
missile production and other technology cooperation (TDNs, 24 December 1997). 
The Turkish military-political solution reached its highest level of achievement after 
Turkey-KDP forces achieved the capture of a prominent PKK leader, Semdin Sakik, 
in northern Iraq on 13th April 1998. His confession at the Diyarbakir trial also 
supported Turkey's charges of state-support linkage by Syria and Iran. Foreign 
minister Ismail Cem's visit to Tehran reduced the tension between two countries 
while the US launched the Washington Process to take the leading role in Kurdish 
politics. The Turkish National Security Council discussed the possible economic, 
diplomatic and military attack options on Syria (TDNs, 26 September 1998). The 
Jordanian delegation at the strategic dialogue meeting which took place in Tel Aviv in 
June 1998 cemented the Turkish-Jewish alliance against Syria's initiatives on the 
Kurdish issue. 
Turkey's further pressure on Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan increased 
Turkey's role in the Middle East in October 1998. Land forces commander Atilla Ates 
revealed Turkey's undeclared war (September-October 1998) against Syria by saying 
that they had tried to co-operate with Syria but had not received a positive response. 
With its patience with terror-supporting states expended, it had to make sure that it 
was capable of giving the necessary answer to the hostile behaviour of the Syrian 
government. If Turkey did not receive a positive response, it was stated, it would take 
necessary actions against its enemies (TDNs 26 September 1998). On the other hand, 
Syrian deputy prime minister, Abdulhalim Haddam's visit to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and the United Arab Emirates and Foreign Minister Faruk el- Sara's visit to 
Moscow, to gain Russian and Arab support against the Turkish-Israeli alliance, did 
not receive the necessary support. Even though Iraq and Libya assured them that they 
wiould support Syria in this conflict, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran sought to work 
out a possible diplomatic solution. 
Syria moved troops 30-40 km from the Turkish and Israeli borders in October. 
President Demirel openly declared Turkey's demands at the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly on 1st October, saying that if the Syrian government insisted on its hostile 
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relationship with Turkey,It held the right to take action against that terror-supporter 
country. On the same day, the chief of staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu clarified that Turkey 
and Syria were in an "undeclared war." After Turkish troops arrived at the Syrian 
border on the 5th October, all diplomatic relations ended between Turkey and Syria on 
the 16th October. Ultimately, Egypt's and Iran's mediation efforts to stop the war 
between Turkey and Syria were successful. One day before Husni Mubarak's visit to 
Damascus and Ankara, Mesut Yilmaz directly accused Syria of being the 
headquarters of terrorism in the Middle East and called for the Syrian government to 
hand over the terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan (TDNs, 4 October 1998). Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, Amr Musa and Iranian foreign minister Kemal Kharrazi played a 
very important role in the mediation of the Turkey-Syrian conflict, which resulted in 
the expulsion of Ocalan from Damascus on 1 7th October 1998 and the Adana 
agreement which was signed by foreign minister secretary, Ugur Ziyal and the 
president of security General Adnan Badr AI- Hassan, on October 19-20, 1998. 
Syria's acceptance of the PKK as a terrorist organisation forced it to prohibit all 
activities of other active terror groups or logistic organisations in Syrian-controlled 
areas. Olson argues that Turkey's action against Syria relied on the politicising of the 
Kurdish parliament-in-exile in the European countries. However, the situation in Iraq 
was still very critical when the United States and Great Britain began a massive air 
campaign named "Operation Desert Fox" against key military targets in Iraq on 16 
December 1998. 
After 19 years' shelter in Syria, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan travelled many 
European states, including Russia, Greece and Italy to find another base. Though 
some European politicians, including Germans, Italians, British and French, openly 
visited him, he was arrested in Rome on 12 November 1998. Ocalan requested that 
Rome grant him political asylum, but neither the Italian government nor any EU 
countries gave support under the Anti-Terrorism Act. However, the Greek and 
Russian authorities refrained from arresting Ocalan. Ultimately Ocalan was captured 
with a Greek Cyprus passport at the Greek embassy in Kenya on 16th February 1999. 
Turkey clearly received US aid in its capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, 
expelled from Syria in 1998 under the imminent threat of Turkish military action 
against Syria. However, the attendance of President Ahmet Sezer at the funeral of 
Hafiz Esad, on 7 June 2000 normalized Turkey-Syrian relations. The new president, 
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Bashar Esad rejected the demands from the chief leader of the PKK chairmanship 
council, Cemil Bayik to relocate the PKK camps in Syria. The capturing of the 
terrorist leader changed the internal political tendencies of Turkey as well. The 
National Movement Party became the major coalition partner with Bulent Ecevit's 
DSP and Mesut Yilmaz's MP, but they did not implement capital punishment in 
Ocalan's case. Furthermore Turkey's initiative in regional politics normalised the 
relationship between Turkey and Iran; while Turkey announced that Sencar Ozsoy 
was appointed as its new ambassador to Iran, and Tehran confirmed that Muhammad 
Hussein Lavasani would be Iran's ambassador to Turkey on March 1999 {TDNs 22 
January 1998). 
Despite the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Khatemi and Ecevit 
governments, a Turkish incursion into northern Iraq in February, and the report of 
Turkish security forces and PKK militants crossing of the Piransehir, Sardost and 
Osmaniye districts signified that Iranian officials had handed over PKK guerrillas 
who were captured in Kermanshah/ Divanderre to Turkish officers on 10 April 1999 
(Balbay, 2006: 230). Turkey made a further incursion into Iranian Salmas-Keleres 
territory, forcing the militants to move to northern Iraq in June. A Turkish intelligence 
report claimed that PKK militant camps had been organised in the Sehidan and 
Dolamper mountains--a strategic location for border crossings between Iran-Iraq and 
from Turkey by Iran (Balbay, 2006: 230). Though Turkey increased the tension 
between the two neighbours by bombing the border village of Piranshahr, killing at 
least five people and injuring tens of others on 18th July 1999, Iran downplayed the 
tension by saying that the incident was a possible mistake. However, five days later, 
the infiltration of the Turkish Army in Qatour to cut off the transit route from 
Armenia to Iran was faced with Iranian forces' presence across the border. A 
statement by Ecevit regarding the summer student revolt in 1999, in which he said 
that demonstrations were a natural reaction by the Iranian public against an oppressive 
regime, annoyed the Khatemi government. Turkey further charged Iran with 
deliveries of logistics, including medical and food supplies to PKK camps in 
Sardasht-Sazgaz Mountain and Urumiye. This reaffirmed the intense relations 
between the neighbours on 22 December 1999 (Balbay, 2006). Nevertheless, both 
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countries successfully managed to defuse tensions by conducting a high-level meeting 
which resulted in a border security agreement. 
Until Erdogan government's seizure of power in 2003, Turkey's counter terror 
strategy (THB) and the Israel-Turkish alliance strengthened Turkey's charges against 
Iran and undermined Iran's regional alliance with Syria. While Turkey downplayed 
the PKK claim that "we behave a democratic republic within the framework of the 
unitary state system", on 26th June 1999, Turkey lost its initiative in Kurdish politics 
by attacking Turkish Kurds in northern Iraq because they had established their camps 
in the Qandil Mountain's Dol a Koge regions. The formation of the Democratic 
Working Groups {Turkiye Calisma Gruplari) empowered the more educated 
professional militants to manage the new civil disobedience model against the state. 
But Turkish security forces captured more than seventy members of the organisation 
in August 2000. Turkey also secured special sanctions from the EU Council signed in 
Brussels on 27th December 2001 in fighting against terrorism, which included the 
PKK being listed as a terrorist organization, Therefore, PKK abolished itself on this 
date and replaced itself with KADEK, the so-called Kurdistan Democratic and 
Freedom Congress but resumed terrorist attacks until lOth April2002. 
7 .3.5 The Washington process 
After the failure of the silence approach, the Dublin and the Tehran-Ank:ara processes, 
Washington directly assumed the initiative on Kurdish nationalism in early 1998. 
David Welsh, the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs, 
visited Iraqi Kurdistan on July 1998 and met with Barzani and Talabani, inviting both 
leaders to Washington DC for talks. The previous Shaqlawa-Koysinjaq meetings 
culminated with the Washington Agreement of 17th September 1998 which was 
signed to create a federative Kurdish political entity within a united, pluralistic, and 
democratic Iraq by Talabani and Barzani. The relation between the cities of Erbil, 
Suleymaniye and were Dohuk normalised but the unification ofK.RG could reach one 
government system-a goal still due to be completed following the US-led Iraqi 
invasion (Stansfield, 2003: 5-7). 
263 
Prime Minister Ecevit's statement supported the conspiracy theories of the Ugur 
Mumcu about the origins of PKK by saying that "I could not understand why the 
United States delivered the terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey (Narli, 
2000:107-127). In fact Turkey had to stop the military incursion into northern 
Iraq.They undermined its influence on regional politics and state formation in 
Kurdistan-Iraq after the failure of the March resolution of TGNA not to allow the 
American troops to invade Iraq. Barzani did not join the meeting of Iraqi opposition 
groups in Washington in August 2002, due to being in an alliance with Turkey, and 
because Iraqi Kurdish groups had lost 3,000 men when fighting the PKK (Aras, 2004: 
168).whic was them challenging the Turkish initiatives in the region. He demanded 
that the Peace Monitoring Forces (PMF) consisting of some 400 troops, comprised 
mostly of Turkoman and Assyrians but commanded by Turkish officers, should be 
removed from Kurdish regional government territory as it created friction between 
former state-to-government alliances. The force was established to secure a ceasefire 
between the two Kurdish groups after the Washington Accord in 1998. However, the 
state-formation in Kurdistan-Iraq was the result of the Washington process, in which 
the United States took an initiative on the Kurdish Question. Turkey maintained its 
influence in northern Iraq until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Bahadir, 2007). 
The onset of Khatemi' s "thermidor politics" improved Turkish-Iran relations but 
resulted in the nuclear-proliferation attempts by Iran (Wells, 1999). 
The regional and systemic development provided ample space for Kurdish 
independence in northern Iraq, but it became vulnerable to external penetration in the 
1990s. Turkey's and Iran's "double- track" policy and security meetings every 6 
month failed to ensure cooperation against foreign influence and Kurdish nationalist 
ambition. On the other hand, the emergence of the Kurdish regional authority in 
northern Iraq brought about a civil war between the Kurdish groups, which gave an 
opportunity for involvement to Turkey, and its Western allies, in Kurdish politics. 
Turkey benefited from being part of the Western security system; along with the 
coalition of TAF-Pasmargha forces, the Sandwich Operation resulted in fatal damage 
to the PKK militants in northern Iraq. The proxy alliance relationship with Kurdish 
groups delivered practical results for the T AF. In this regard, Turkey placed 2,000 
peace troops in four different locations in Northern Iraq, to take control of peace and a 
possible civil war between the KDP and the PUK. When the internal war broke out 
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between the Kurdish groups, 3,000 people were died, 30,000 were injured and 
100,000 were driven to remove from their lands (lhsan, 2001 :90). 
After the Turkey-Syrian 1997 cnsts on the Kurdish question between the two 
neighbours and following the capture of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan in 
1999, the Turkey- Israeli alliance diminished the power of the Syrian-Iran axis--which 
was the driving force for Kurdish nationalism in regional politics between Turkey and 
Iran after the Cold War. Neither the Tehran not Ankara process brought any 
diplomatic results for either in the mid-1990s. However, the parties realised that 
Kurdish nationalism could not be controlled because the liberal rhetoric of Western 
countries did not sympathizes with Turkey's and Iran's military solution and ethnic 
assimilation after the Washington process, because the Kurdish diasporas in Europe 
and the United States have provided the financial support and political support for the 
military Kurdish movement into northern Iraq. 
Integrated Map: 7.1.Kurdish Autonomous Region as of early 2003 
Turkey 
0 so 
Syria 
Iran 
36 N 
Sources: Global Security org, "Kurdish autonomous region as of early 2003" online at: 
http://www. glo balsecurity. org/mili tary/world/war/images/kurdistan _ contro l-map2003 .gi f 
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7.4. 0. State formation in Kurdistan-Iraq: from occupation to withdrawal (2003-
200?) 
Since the American-led invasion of Iraq, Turko - Iranian relations have faced three 
types of paradoxes: how to deal with the state-to-state situation (Iraq-US-UK), state-
to-government (KRG) relationships; and how to manage regional cooperative and 
competitive relationships between each other after Iraq became a war zone between 
Shia and Sunni; Kurds, Arab and Turkoman: how to provide shelter for al-Qaida and 
the PKK. However, this study will focus on the impact of state formation in 
Kurdistan-Iraq in Turko - Iranian relations. The capacity of middle-power -states to 
act independently offer a prime example such states' capability against a super power 
in the Middle East. The role of capitalism and super power engagement in regional 
politics assisted the unification process of the Suleymaniye and Erbil governments. 
Turkey became a primary economic partner of the KRG and a way to the Kurdish 
people from the outside world. The emergence of PJAK as a proxy has normalised 
Turko-Iranian relations since 2004. 
Figure 7.3, an outline of the regional and systemic circumstances of the Kurdish 
Question in the wider context of Middle East region is portrayed. After 9/11 and 
following the American-led occupation of Iraq, the Turkey-Iran-Syria triangle became 
more cooperative on the Kurdish question. The failure of the 1 March memorandum 
in the Turkish parliament in 2003, the policy differences between America, Israel and 
Turkey became more visible. As a historical fact, the US has not recognised the 
Lausanne conference so far, especially on the Kurdish issue. Hence, Wilson's 
principles are essential for American liberal politics on the Kurdish question. He 
recommended a Kurdish independent state. At the present, the George Bush 
government sees Iraqi Kurds as an ally against the internal and regional states. Tel 
A viv gives military and logistics support for the liberation of Kurdistan and also 
wants to see a peripheral Kurdish state in the region. This figure 7.3 includes different 
picture in regional politics and super power penetration into region due to Kurdish 
nationalism. On the other hand, after the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, 
the military and political power of PKK decreased, but co-operation between PKK-
KongraGel and PJAK would be the first systematic contact between Turkish and 
Iranian Kurds for four hundred years. The situation for the Kurdish regional 
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government seems to be one of multidimensional politics-- for the survival and 
representation of the Kurdish liberation movement. Up to now, the systemic and 
regional circumstances did not allow Kurds to establish a "de facto Kurdish state" but 
rather enforce to integrated federative Kurdish Regional government of Iraq in the 
Middle East. 
Figure: 7.3.The dynamics of the Kurdish question conflict and cooperation (2003-2008) 
Line of tension = m! 
Line of co-operation = green EU& Russia neutral 
Line of fluctuating relations = blue 
Sources: compiled by author 
7 .4.1.0 The dichotomy of the super -power and middle-power politics of rising of 
Kurdish nationalism 
The Turkish-American alliance has experienced ups and down during the half century 
since the Jupiter/Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the arms embargo in 1974. This 
time, the Turkey-US relations faced a more systematic problem when American 
forces captured 11 Turkish Special Forces (TSF) troops along with 19 Turkomen in 
the headquarter of the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF) in the city of Kirkuk, because the 
267 
"bag" affair ( cuval olayi) was perceived as very offensive against the Turkish Armed 
Forces by most of the public. The chief of staff, General Hilmi Ozkok stated that 
"This incident has unfortunately created a biggest loss in confidence over fifty years 
of the alliance relationship" (The New York Times, 7 July 2003). However, the 
American Special Forces' squad commander claimed that Turkish Special Forces 
were planning to assassinate the newly elected Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk, without any 
evidence. The Pentagon clearly punished the Turkish armed forces but Washington 
and Ankara were quick to overcome this unfortunate accident with Turkey's active 
participation in the US- led Wider Middle East Initiative (WMEI) and Wider Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative (WMENAE). This was affirmed in the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative (ICI-Istanbul Isbirligi Grisimi), issued at the conclusion of the 
summit in 2004 (Olson, 2006). The project mainly aimed to democratise Arab 
countries and Iran through regime change, but Turkey only expanded its economic 
relations with the GCC (Olson, 2008), and moved forward with its own 
democratisation in the accession process of the European Union. With the exclusion 
of Turkey from Iraqi affairs, Washington made an alliance with the Iraqi Kurds and 
supported the Kurdish guerrilla fighters, especially the PKK's sister organisation, 
PJAK, to undermine Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. The American and Jewish 
connections also put to question Turkey's alliance relations with Jerusalem and 
Washington. The American-Kurdish coalition forces captured Kirkuk and commenced 
an attack on the Sunni city ofTal Afar-a predominantly Turkoman-Shia city of some 
200,000 population, from September 2004. This created tensions between middle-
power and super -power states in Iraqi relations. The Turkish foreign minister 
Abdullah Gul, accused the coalition forces of harming civilians but the secretary of 
state, Colin Powell, found this criticism to be unfair and exaggerated. Moreover, Iraqi 
Turkoman Front representatives, Ahmet Muratli and Faruk Abdurrahman, further 
claimed that the coalition forces had conducted an ethnic cleansing against the 
Turkoman population. The Turkish side also accused the mayor of Tal Afar Abb al-
Khaliq of a Kurdish bias, as his policies had made systematic demographic changes in 
the city by bringing in Syrians from Syria (Hurriyet 12 September 2004). A member 
of the Turkish parliament from the Justice and Development Party, Mehmet Elkatmis, 
further called this operation a "genocide campaign by the United States. " It is 
obvious that neither Turkey non Iran was happy to see a super-power neighbour act in 
the Middle East. The presence of a super power caused an increase in Turkish 
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nationalism and also caused fluctuations in the nuclear ambitions of the Iranian 
Islamic regime. The Iranian anger at Washington was due to an onslaught on Fallujah, 
Najaf, Kufa, Samarra and Ramadi, to promote further involvement by Tehran in the 
civil war in Iraq (Elkhamri, 2007). Despite the United States' disarmament of the 
Mujahidin-e Khalq organisation in 2003, and adding PJAK to its global terrorist list 
along with PKK-Kongra-Gel, Tehran-Washington cooperation was still minimal in 
Iraq. On the other hand, Ankara and Washington set up a new co-ordination system, 
which aimed to provide intelligence information between Ankara-Washington-
Baghdad-Irbil against sub- PKK groups. Unfortunately, General Joseph Ralston, who 
had been vice-chancellor of the joint chiefs of staff from 1996 to 2000, and a former 
NATO commander and General Edib Baser, a land forces commander who retired in 
2000, could not achieve any progress against the PKK insurgency campaign in 
Northern Iraq. Therefore, Washington and Ankara terminated this co-ordination unit 
in June 2007 (Laciner, 2007). The systemic circumstance of Turkey's alliance 
relations with the Western security system was tested in Afghanistan and Lebanon, 
especially over the largest strategic arms deal between the two parties. 
On the other hand, Turkey's relationship with its proxy ally, Israel, went sour after 
the Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh's' statement publicised the issue 
of Israeli-Kurdish cooperation in northern Iraq (Hersh, 2004). The prominent Islamist 
journalist, Fehmi Koru claimed that Israel wanted to use northern Iraq as a spring 
board to other places in the Middle East (Y eni Safak, 22 June 2004). Turkish Prime 
Minister Tayyib Erdogan condemned the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Y asin 
and Israeli operations in Ranya and the Gaza strip as "act of state terror" in May 
2004. The Israeli ambassador to Turkey immediately denied all the claims. However, 
Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul calmed the tension by saying that it was 
necessary to trust Israel's statements that they were not involved in northern Iraq 
because Israel and Turkey are the only two democratic countries in the region. Gul 
also rejected the theory of Henry Barkey, who claims that an independent Kurdish 
state within Iraq would be beneficial to restoring Turkish-American relations (Barkey, 
2004), (TDNs, 2 June 2004). George W. Bush's June visit to Turkey and Olmert's 
July visit seemed to confirm the view that Washington would not allow Turkey to 
challenge Israel's geo-strategic value to theUS but found Ankara's effort to achieve 
geopolitical balance in the Middle East to be understandable. Thus, relations between 
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Syria and Turkey in 2004 and the Turkish mediation effort between Damascus and 
Tel-Aviv in 2008 further challenged the Tehran-Damascus alliance (Aras, 2008) --
the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah Gul, and Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan made trips to Damascus on a number of occasions. In response, the 
Syrian minister, Farouq al-Shara and Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro 
visited Ankara yet Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's visit in January 2004 had the 
most significant pacifying effect on relations (Aras, 2008). On one hand, Turkey's 
invitation of the Hamas leader in Syria, Halid Masal, was another problem for the 
troubled alliances during the war, but the economic and military ties between Turkey-
US and Israel overcame the strained relationship for the Justice and Development 
Party government. While the US encouraged Turkey's economic relations with 
Baghdad to rebuild Iraq so as to undermine opposition against the KRG, Iran's 
economic relations with regional countries were limited due to the sectarian influence 
of Iran in Iraq. Despite the deterioration in Israeli--Turkey relations, they two 
countries agreed to the Industrialised Qualified Zones (QIZs) plan. The unknown 
future of Iraqi-Kurdish politics directly affects Turkey's relations with its alliances, 
Israel and the US and its neighbours, especially Syria and Iran. Hence, the slow talks 
between Tehran and Washington have to be evaluated as a special regional scenario in 
which Iran is a significant player on the Iraqi question. 
7.4.1.1 Turkey's and Iran's relations with the government of Iraq and the 
Kurdish regional government 
The short- term American-Iranian quasi-cooperation in toppling the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan was terminated after George W. Bush's announcement of the metaphor 
of the "axis of evil" in January 2002. The process of state- building in Iraq and 
Kurdistan-Iraq, the dichotomy of US-Iran and Anglo-Iranian minor talks and dialogue 
continued in the hidden context of the Iranian religious influence on Iraqi affairs, 
especially the mediation role of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Shia leader of the Iraqi 
Hawza (BBC monitoring, 8 August, 2004). Despite the harsh relationship between Tehran 
and Washington, they kept discuss resolution of Iraqi security and stability in May 
and September 2007. However, nuclear ambitions and a possible Pentagon air attack 
on Iran than discouraged future cooperation. The other Shia leader in Iraq, Muqteda 
Al-Sadr organised political and military activities against the occupation of the allied 
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forces in an example of the balance of power in Iraqi politics. Compared to Turkey, 
Iran is a better able to use these religious and political ties to penetrate the internal 
affairs of Iraq. British officials claimed that Iran supplied the bombs and arms to the 
Shia Muslim insurgents in southern Iraq (Kemp, 2005). On the other hand, the new 
domestic setting resulted in structural changes in the Iraqi state. Hence, with a secular 
Shia religious background, Iyad Allawi was appointed as prime minister of the Iraqi 
Interim Government by the Iraqi government council on 28th March 2004. The 
process of state-building in Iraq includes the Shia and Kurdish identities but 
minimises the political influence of Iran and Turkey. The Iraqi interim government 
also prepared the temporary constitution named the Transitional Administrative Law 
in March 2004. The election on 30th January 2005 and the appointment of Jalal 
Talabani as president of Iraq caused further movement towards Mesut Barzani being 
sworn in as the new president of the Kurdish regional government in April 2005. The 
last draft of the Iraqi constitution was voted on 18th October 2005. The following 
month, the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance won the election that resulted in the 
distribution of power between the Kurds and Shia but excluded the Turkomen and 
Sunnis in the state. President Jalal Talabani appointed Nouri al-Maliki to a form the 
government on 22nd April 2006. Since the permanent government was formed in Iraq 
and Kurdish regional government in Kurdistan-Iraq, the state--to-government relation 
has been at a weak level between Turkey and Iran. However, Iran managed to 
maintain its relations at the state-to-state level. Both Iran and Iraq made high level 
diplomatic visits to each other. For instance, Tehran entertained the Iraqi president in 
November 2005. However, Turkey's diplomatic interactions were limited to the 
ambassadorial level even though Turkey received two visits from Prime Minister 
lbrahim al-Jaaferi in May 2005 and February 2006, hosted Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki in September 2007, and lastly received Talabani on lOth March 2008. The Iraqi 
Conference of Neighbouring Countries in Istanbul in 2005 and the International 
Ministerial Conference of the Neighbouring Countries of Iraq at Sharm al-Sheikh in 
2007 to stabilise Iraq did not result in a resolution. The slow talks among 
neighbouring countries at foreign ministry level would have made more progress. 
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7.4.1.2 The settlement of Ankara-Erbii-Tehran trouble triangle: Turkish 
presence in northern Iraq 
Turkey pursued active politics on Iraqi- Kurdish issues during the 1990s. With the 
active engagement of Ankara, the T AF established four permanent military bases in 
northern Iraq. These military units not only gather intelligence against the PKK, but 
also keep an eye on Iraqi Kurds should they move for greater autonomy or even 
independence. Ankara did not consider the Kurdish group as an external threat to 
national security as long as they are weak and divided in northern Iraq. However, 
Turkey's influence on Kurdistan-Iraq relations has weakened after the US-brokered 
peace accord was signed between Iraqi Kurdish groups in 1998. Following the capture 
of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, United States took control of the 
Kurdish question prior to invading of the Iraq. With Washington support, the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups (KDP-PUK) agreed to work in joint session of the Kurdish parliament 
in Irbil in March 2003.After the fall of the Baghdad government, Kurdish groups did 
not only take the initiative in Iraqi politics but also consolidated the power of the 
Kurdish regional government in Kurdistan-Iraq. After the elections, Iraqi-Kurdish 
alliance parties sent 77 deputies to the interim government of Iraq. The American-
Kurdish alliance also resulted in the presidency of Jalal Talabani for the Iraqi states. 
The election of Mesut Barzani as president of the Kurdish regional Government in 
Erbil (Hawler) in 2005 increased the power capacity of Kurdish-state formation in the 
northern Iraq, even though the unification agreement between the PUK and the KDP 
could not unify the ministries of permerga, finance, and the interior under the Erbil 
government. 
Barzani had his own policies on coordination between Ankara-Washington-Baghdad-
Irbil, and aspirations for the Kurdish independent state. Hence he had ordered that the 
Kurdish tricolour (red, green and yellow) flag replace the current should flag as flown 
on all government buildings in the Kurd-controlled region. However, Iraq's prime 
minister, Nuri al-Maliki, rejected these nationalist demands against the unity oflraq in 
September 2006. On the other hand, the KRG allowed the taking over of 
responsibility for security in three Kurdish provinces from the US forces in May 2007. 
Moreover, the Kurdistan regional government signed production sharing contracts 
(PSC) covering petroleum exploration in Kurdistan-Iraq, and creating a dispute 
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between the two authorities (Pedro van Meurs, 2008). In spite of Turkish involvement 
with oil companies, such as Pet-Oil and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TP AO), 
Turkey's fears in relation to using oil in the Kurdish state formation in Iraq increased. 
Hence, Turkey eased its oppressive economic policies against the Kurds of northern 
Iraq. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Pet-Oil and Jalal Talabani signed a 40 - year oil 
contract which is still valid after the invasion of Iraq (TDNs, 16 October 2007). The 
Turkish and Irbil governments arranged flights (Fly Air) from Istanbul to Irbil and to 
Sulaimaniye in Kurdistan-Iraq to increase business and cultural interaction. The Irbil 
government also allowed Turkish citizens to have without any visa restrictions to 
northern Iraq. The economic relationship with Turkey and the KRG was proclaimed 
by the Irbil chamber of commerce of the 440 overseas firms registered there, 321 were 
Turkish, with the second largest group being German with 45. It is thought that 
approximate 600 Turkish firms have business in northern Iraq, which undertook with 
contracts worth US $ 1.5 billion in 2005 and over US $3.5 billion in 2008. 
Table 7.1: Turkish economic and cultural presence in northern Iraq (2003-2007) 
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The lion's share is taken by the leading companies of Turkey: Tepe Group (building 
the Suleymaniye University); Mak-Y ol (building Arbil airport for $480 million); 
Gunay Insaat and Cevikler (building viaducts in Suleymaniya). While Merinos owns 
80 % of the carpet market, Turkish food sector giant Ulker is competing with the 
Sabanci holding in food. Turkish exports constitute up to 80% of the retail volume at 
the Nazemall Shopping Centre in Arbil.Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund 
(OYAK) supplies Iraq's cement, construction materials and paper demands. The 
KDP's foreign policy representative, Safeen Dizayee, and Arbil's chamber of 
commerce chairman, Daarel Celil Hayat, states that "Turkey should take a leadership 
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role in the area by sending businessmen instead of troops. Turkey won 't send the 
military troops to northern Iraq" (TDNs, 12-19 April 2007). Robert Olson (2004) 
claims that this economic dependency enhanced the state formation process of 
Kurdistan-Iraq. Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani expect to "come to an 
understanding" with Turkey via the lobbying power of the capital. However, 
politically, excluding Turkey to form the Kurdish regional politics increased the 
tension between Turkey and the Kurds, and anti-Turkish demonstrators took to the 
streets of a Kurdish town in February 2003 and when the deputy foreign 
minister ,Ugur Ziyal, visited Washington to guarantee that Turkey could send 10.000 
troops into Iraq to support the coalition forces, this caused criticism from the Kurdish 
groups in 2004. Hence, Turkey's recognition of a de facto Kurdish state relies on the 
Iraqi constitution, which Turkey called it the Kurdish Regional Authority rather than 
Kurdish Regional Government (Official letter from Turkish Embassy in London). 
There is no Turkish diplomatic representation in Erbil but there are have been Turkish 
tank battalions based in Bamermi and around 2000 Turkish Special Forces troops in 
Batufa, Kanimasi and Dilmentepe since 1997. The mission of Turkish troops 
generally was to provide security between the PUK and the KDP before the US 
invasion of Iraq. However, after the invasion, the troops not only coordinate the 
relations between Baghdad-lrbil-Washington-Ankara but also arrange Turkey's trade 
relations with the Kurdish regional government. It is unfortunate that US-Iraq forces 
and Turkish troops cannot provide security for Turkish labour in Iraq. It is estimated 
that 150 truck drivers have been killed by Iraqi resistance forces so far.The Iraqi 
resistance forces attacked Mosul on 17 December which resulted in 22 people 
including 14 American soldiers and 5 Turkish special forces being killed and renewed 
another nationalistic rage against the US and the Kurds. The First Army Corps 
General Hursit Talon noted that "the attack had taken place in a country controlled by 
a country we consider to be a friend and ally" (TDNs 21 December 2004). 
However, Iran was the first country which opened a fully accredited consulate in 
Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan-Iraq (www.krg.org). The consulate was opened before 
the American invasion of Iraq but become more functional after the occupation. 
Despite the political relations between Tehran and Erbil, Iran's economic presence is 
minimal in northern Iraq. Iran's economic connection with Erbil and the Baghdad 
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government cannot be measured officially; it may be higher than the IMF data 
suggests, given in Figure 14 below. 
Figure 7.4: Turkey and Iran exports I imports to Iraq (2001-2007) 
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According to the latest data revealed by the State Institute of Statistics (DIE), 
Turkey's exports to neighbouring countries have reached $18.4 billion with a 43.5 
percent increase in the first six months of this year. Among its immediate neighbours, 
Iraq ranked first with a 2.7 percent increase in Turkey's exports during the same 
period, followed by Greece (2.2 %), Bulgaria (1.9%) and Iran (1.2%). The Turkey-
Iraq commercial ties were at about $3 billion in 2006 and predicted to achieve $5 
billion by 2008. Turkey is the chief supplier of Iraq's refined oil demand. In 2005, 
50% of Iraq's and 90% of northern Iraq's oil supplies came in through Turkey. More 
than 10 million tonnes were sold to Iraq by Turkish firms between January 2003 and 
January 2006. Such firms have an active part in the area since the Iraqi government 
was overthrown, with a total volume of$3.5 billion. The cumulative worth of projects 
done by these companies forms a significant chunk of the reconstruction efforts there, 
including 275 megawatts of electricity, with planned increases to 1200 mw, which 
constitutes a quarter of the country's needs. 
One can argue that Turkish-Kurds small businesses and Anatolian capital improved 
the northern Iraq market and politically influenced the balance of power in Turkish 
domestic politics. With the 28 February Process (post-modem military coup d'etat), 
275 
the Kemalist oligarchy excluded the Anatolian business groups, especially the 
Kurdish companies, from the privatisation of the state sector. Now, Iraqi Kurdistan 
seems to be another open door for Anatolian capital and Kurdish businessmen. 
However, the Turkish state establishment is not very pleased with the growth of 
capital of the Kurdish business class, but Turkish military incursions into northern 
Iraq are undermining the growing business class in the region due to the PKK-
KongraGel's military campaign commencement after a five year unilateral ceasefire. 
7 .4.1.3. The Kirkuk question 
The question of Kirkuk goes back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Lausanne conference and lastly, the Ankara agreement in 1926. The oil-rich region of 
Kirkuk was recorded as the personal property of Sultan Abdul Hamid 11. At the 
Ankara agreement, Turkey completely withdrew from Middle East politics but also 
cut off the cultural and political ties between Iraqi Kurds and Turkish Kurds by 
excluding Mosul and Kirkuk from the national pact. Turkey abandoned its historical 
claims and protector role of Turks in Soviet Russia and the Balkans. The Turko-
Kurdish alliance also failed to maintain the guardianship of the Kurdish and 
Turkoman nations against the Ba'ath party's oppressive politics in Iraq. As mentioned 
above, Turkey's active politics during GulfWar in 1991 was aimed at getting Kirkuk 
and Mosul back from Iraq. Meanwhile, the Turkish foreign minister, Yasar Yakis 
reclaimed Turkish right under the Ankara agreement prior to the US invasion of Iraq, 
but this neo-Ottoman political approach further excluded Turkey from regional 
politics after the failure of the March memorandum in the Turkish parliament in 2003. 
The situation changed under the leadership of Tayyib Erdogan, of the Justice and 
Development Party. The internal dynamics in Turkish politics and the power struggles 
between the militarist secular and the moderate secular (liberals and Islamists) 
determine regional politics in Turkey, especially on the issue of Kirkuk. The new Iraqi 
government regulates the status of Kirkuk, granted in Article 53 by the TAL but the 
demographic change of Kirkuk concerns Turkey, because the referendum about 
Kirkuk will be held in May 2008 which could define the political and economic status 
of the city. In order to take the initiative Turkey announced its Kirkuk doctrine 
consisting of four points: Land Forces commander Ilker Basbug spoke out that (1) 
Iraqi unity should not be threatened; (2) Kirkuk's oil revenue must be distributed in an 
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equal and just manner; (3) Turkey had a blood ties with the Turkoman; (4) Turkey's 
ties with Kirkuk relied on historical consideration; if the security situation reaches a 
stage of serious risk, Turkey has the right to take the requisite preventive actions 
against Kurdish expansion (Hurriyet, 10 July 2004). However, Turkey's historical 
claim on Kirkuk and ethnic guardianship politics on Turkoman could not work 
effectively despite the economic dependency of Iraqi Kurds. The Kurdish entity now 
perceives Turks as the 'archenemy'. Therefore, the Iraqi Government council member, 
Mahmud Osman stated that "These people (PKK) are not terrorists but they are 
simply requesting their democratic right in Turkey. " On the one hand, the prime 
minister of the KRG, Nechervan Barzani stated that the Turkish Special Forces were 
no longer needed after the Saddam regime was toppled, but Ankara threatened the 
Kurds with military measures if Kurdish forces attack Turkish bases in Bamermi, 
Batufa, Kanimasi and Dilmentepe on 22 January 2004 (Hurriyet, 28 January 2004). 
On the other hand, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Erdogan held a 
meeting on 23 June to discuss Turkey's concerns on Kirkuk issues. Talabani ensured 
that "Turkoman and Kirkuk would have been a symbol of the integrity of 
Iraq "(Hurriyet, 23 June 2004), but Kurdish demands for the cities of Makhmur, 
Shiwan, Qara Hanjir, and Qadir Karam in the province of Kirkuk were considered to 
cross Turkey's red lines in the region. Due to tensions between Turkey and KRG, 
Prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani and Talabani held talks with Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul to discuss this issue on 7th September 2004. Both sides agreed 
that the safety of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, which is protected by 10,000 
Pesmarga forces, was essential for good economic relations (TDNs, 23 December 
2004). On the other hand, Land Forces commander Ilker Bagbug, highlighted the 
military's opinion on Kirkuk's referendum, saying that "the election will make the 
Kirkuk question almost impossible to resolve through a fair and lasting solution in 
this state "(fDNs, 27 January 2005). The demographic changes in the region 
increased the concerns of Turkish parties, because the Iraqi trade ministry record 
demonstrated that 350,000 Kurds had entered Kirkuk and its provinces since the US 
occupation (Hurriyet 27 January 2005). 
The consensus is that 1957 is the most reliable year to evaluate the demographic 
figure for Kirkuk, which contain Kurdish, Assyrians, Turkoman, and Arabs, but with 
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Kurds people composing the majority of population with 64 % at that time. 
Population transfers from other cities in northern Iraq intended to relocate the 
deported Kurdish population during the Baath regime. 
The ethnic breakdown of Kirkuk census conducted In 1957 
10.000. 4% 
48 .000. 17% 178,000. 64% 
•Kurds 
•Turcomen 
OArabs 
o Assrian-Cheadean 
Sources: compiled by author in from in the North, a new war may pit Kurd against Arab" Associated 
Press NBC World News available online at http://www.msn.com/id/17136209/page/2/ 
Turkey uses diplomatic tools to maintain its guardianship role on Turkoman people 
and political engagement with Iraqi internal affairs. Hence, Ankara openly announced 
that Turkey would not tolerate a possible civil war in Kirkuk. In this regard, the 
Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, clarified the Turkish attitude in his statement. 
He stated, that "you may not wish to embark on a road but developments force you to 
take certain action, governments do not have the luxury of ignoring sentiments" ( 
TDNs, 23 January 2005:3). Similarly, Prime Minister Tayyib Erdogan criticised the 
duality of American politics of the Middle East in Davos Economic Summit in 
Switzerland held in 1 February 2005. He said that "Turkey won't allow this 
geography to be delivered to chaos that will last for many years " (TDNs, 1 February 
2005:2). Turkey's pressure and diplomatic power varies. For instance, under secretary 
of defence for policy, Douglas Feith, and Turkish land forces commander General 
Ilker Basbug held a meeting in February to discuss the various scenarios regarding the 
Persian Gulf, the civil war in Iraq and the Kirkuk question. Despite reiterating the 
importance of Turkey-U.S cooperation in Iraq, Feith neither accepted Turkey's 
military incursion request into northern Iraq nor affirmed Turkey's Kirkuk doctrine. 
He stated that Kirkuk was a problem that Iraqi people can solve (Hurriyet 2 February 
2005:1). In fact, Turkey did not have enough bargaining power against the super -
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power at that stage. Washington encouraged Kurdish nationalism-- President of the 
K.RG, Mesut Barzani said that Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with Kurdish identity. Neither 
Turkey nor any other country has any right to say anything about Kirkuk or about any 
other Iraqi city .... and an independent Kurdish state is indeed going to be established 
but I do not know when it will be established. The preference of the people of Kirkuk 
will become clear following the election. A referendum will be conducted in 
accordance with the desires of the people (Middle East Report, 26 January 2005). In 
fact, Mesoud Barzani aimed to increase his political influence as a political leader of 
the entire Kurdistan. Therefore, the Turkish general chief of staff, Y asar Biiyiikanit, 
and the Erdogan government have repeatedly said that Turkey would start a cross-
border operation to fire at PKK-KongraGel bases in Northern Iraq if the United 
States or Iraqi government fail to take any action to eliminate the PKK-KongraGel 
camps. During the constitutional crisis on 28th April and the general election in July 
2007, the possible military incursion into Northern Iraq and the Kirkuk issue 
dominated Turkish internal politics. The leader of the Democratic Society Party's 
branch in the mainly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, Hilmi Aydogdu created internal 
tension by saying that the two sides in this war would be Turkey and the Kurds in 
Iraq. There are some 20 million Kurds in Turkey, and the 20 million Kurds would 
regard such a war as an attack against them. Hence, any attack on Kirkuk would be 
considered an attack on Diyarbakir (Associated Press, 4 February 2007).1n response 
to DTP's common identity linkage with Iraqi Kurds, Mesut Barzani found the 
opportunity to become involved in Turkey's internal Kurdish politics directly for the 
first time. He said that if Turkey interferes in Kirkuk, Turkey's internal politics will be 
trespassed on as well. However, both the DTP and Barzani's struggles to take the 
initiatives in Kurdish politics was defeated by the Justice and Development Party 
which increased its vote share from 34% in 2002 to 4 7%. The AKP seemed to have 
persuaded the predominantly Kurdish southeast region and doubled its vote from 
around 26% to approximately 53%; Erdogan's party won 53.5% of votes in Van, 63 
%in Agri, 65.2% in Adiyaman, 60% in Urfa, 71 %in BingOI, 60% in Bitlis and 41 
%in Osman Baydemir's fort, Diyarbakir. This means that almost one in two citizens 
in Diyarbakir voted for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), but this doesn't 
mean that those who did not vote for AKP voted for the DTP 
(www.secim20007ntvmsnbc.com).The other positive gain in Turkey' Kurdish politics 
is the postponing of the Kirkuk referendum, mandated under article 140 of Iraq's 
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constitution. The new scheduled referendum will be at the end of May 2008. Sami 
Kohen (Milliyet, 15 September 2007) wrote that this decision is the outcome of the 
pressure coming from several countries including Turkey and various elements in 
Iraq. Ultimately, the United Nations took the initiative to delay the referendum 
demanded by the Kurds for the future of Kirkuk. United Nations' envoy, Steffan de 
Mistura, offered a solution to the Kirkuk dispute at a meeting held in Salahaddin on 
9th June 2008. In fact, Kirkuk is the mother of all issues in Iraqi internal affairs, due to 
having one of the largest oil reserves in Iraq (Weinberg, 08 May 2008). Turkey's 
main concern is that Iraq's Kurds want Kirkuk's oil revenue to fund a bid for 
independence that could encourage the separatist Kurdish guerrillas in Turkey who 
have been fighting for autonomy since 1984. 
According to the Government of Iraq (Goi), the country has around 9 fields that are 
considered "super giants" (over 5 billion bbls reserves) as well as 22 known "gianf' 
fields (over 1 billion barrels). The concentration of super-giant deposits in south-
eastern Iraq constitutes the largest explored area, globally, and makes up 70-80% of 
the state's known reserves. About 20% of the reserves lie in northern Iraq in the 
Kurkuk, Mosul and Khanaqin areas. Ownership over these fields is a rock of 
contention between Kurds and other powers in that region. KRG has signed thousands 
of oil contracts with foreign countries, including Turkey's TPAO and the Iranian 
national oil company (EIA, 2006). 
However, the Iraqi government opened six oil fields to international bidding on 30th 
June 2008 as the nation attempted to boost its daily production by 60% and Iraq's oil 
minister, al-Shahristani, said that the new contracts would raise Iraq's production by 
1.5 million barrels per day. Iraq currently produces 2.5 million barrels per day and 
hopes to raise that to 4.5 million by 20 13(Sameer, 2008). The Petroleum Contracts 
and Licensing Directorate of the Ministry of Oil announced the outcome of the pre-
qualification process of the International oil Companies (IOC), which submitted their 
qualification documents within the period 9 January to 18 February 2008 
(http://www.oil.gov.iq/pcld-outcoming.pdf). However, both Turkey and Iran were 
excluded from the 35 international and 6 Iraqi companies' oil bids, scheduled to be 
signed during the next year (International Herald Tribune, 30 June 2008). The Turkish 
Prime Minister's, Tayyib Erdogan's visit to Baghdad on 11 July 2008 was the first by 
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a Turkish prime minister since 1990. Erdogan conducted discussions with al-Maliki 
and President Jalal Talabani, culminating with the signing of a "high-level council for 
strategic cooperation " pursuant to which the heads of security, energy, trade, 
investment and water resources will together convene a meeting thrice annually. The 
heads of state will convene at least yearly to consider progress. Iraqi President Jalal 
Talabani also set out a a certificate formally permitting the state Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation (TPAO) to look for oil and gas in Iraq (Today's Zaman, 12 July 2008). 
Integrated map 7.2: Iraqi super- giant oil field bid 
200 ..... 
6.5bn 
....... 
Sources: (Financial Times, 30 June 2008) 
The Kirkuk question is still the most difficult situation in Iraqi as well as Turkish and 
Kurdish politics. Iraqi Kurdish leaders were not happy about the new report by UN 
officials who had called for a phased solution to the Kirkuk issue where Kurds, 
Turkmen and Arabs are to run the province through a power-sharing arrangement 
(New Anatolian, 17 June 2008). The solution certainly relies on the oil sharing 
agreement between Iraq and the international companies which Turkey and Iran have 
no direct involvement. Therefore, the initiatives of the UN are a main factor in the 
Kirkuk Question. 
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4.2 The mystery of Partiya Jiyana Azadi ya Kurdistane (Party for Free Life in 
Kurdistan, :PJAK) 
The origins of the PJAK are still ambiguous in the regional political environment of 
the Middle East. An Iranian expert at the Centre for Eurasians Strategic Studies 
(ASAM) in Turkey, Arif Keskin, claims that the PJAK is an offshoot organisation of 
the PKK seeking a new vision in regional politics (Keskin, 2007). Both are members 
of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (KCK), designated as a terrorist 
organisation by the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the governments of 
Iran, Turkey and the United States. The political leader of the militarised Iranian 
Kurdish separatist movement, Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi, who was born in Iran in 
1941, (Stafan Buchen et al,2008) is a former member of the KDPI and now lives in 
Cologne with a German passport under surveillance or protection of the 
Bundesnachtrichtendienst (BND) (German foreign intelligence service) and the 
Verfassungsschutz (domestic intelligence service). As mentioned above regarding the 
Mykonos verdict, Germany now agreed to release the Iranian nationals, Kazem 
Darabi, and Abbas Rhayel who were convicted of assassinating the Iranian Kurdish 
leaders at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992 (Timmerman,2007), but allowed 
PJAK's to hide in Germany. The PJAK leaders and Haji Ahmedi explained the ideas 
ofthe organisation in 1993 during an interview at the U.S-based Persian TV (Rojhelat 
Times, 19 September 2007). However, due to PKK-Iran relations, the emergence of 
the organisation was postponed until US-led occupation of Iraq. As mentioned above, 
Iran used the PKK as a proxy political card against Turkey. For instance, Iran's 
cultural minister published Abdullah Ocalan's books and Tehran allowed the 
establishment of Kurdish institutions in Iran. With Iranian support, the PKK attempted 
to establish a Kurdish city named Mokriyan near the Turkish border in Iran. On the 
other hand, Iran does not refrain from killing guerrillas of the Komala (Komala-Jani-
Kurt) and the KDPI, which have both been pacified in regional politics since 1991 
(Keskin, 2007). It is estimated that there are 1 ,000 Kurdish Iranian refugees in 
northern Iraq (Iranian Refugees' Alliance, 1998 ), and propaganda facilities such as 
ROJ TV increase the popularity of PJAK among the Iranian Kurdish nationalists. 
PJAK influences Shia Kurds (33% of Kurds) as well as Sunnite Kurds by using the 
PKK's political and military propaganda tactics in Iran. It is estimated that 5 million 
Kurds live in the West Azerbaijan province, Kurdistan Province, Kermanshah 
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Province and Ilam Province (Iranian Refugees' Alliance, 1998). PJAK has around 
3,000 troops based in northern Iraq, but claims that tens of thousands of activists are 
working inside Iran to promote a Kurdish identity, democracy and women's rights 
(Renard, 2008). The military fighers Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan (HRK) are trained in 
hit-and-run tactics and armed with Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, 
Russian-made sniper rifles and machine guns (Mervan,2007). Half of the members of 
PJAK are women, who are gathered under a branch named the Eastern Kurdistan 
Women's Union (YJRK). PJAK declared its aims are to unite the Kurdish and Iranian 
opposition, to change the oppressive Islamic regime in Iran and to establish a free 
democratic federal system for Kurds and the Iranian peoples (www.pjak.com/). The 
group began its activities as a student- based human rights movement in 1997 and 
held its first congress under the name PJAK on 25 March 2004. 
Haji Ahmedi confirmed the PJAK connection with the US intelligence officers. He 
said that American and Israeli officers visited them from time to time in the Qandil 
Mountain (Kurdish news paper, 11 September 2007). According to Robert Baer, a 
former CIA operative with close ties to Kurdish northern Iraq: I understand that the 
US provides intelligence to P JAK so that they are better able to protect themselves in 
any conflict with the Iranians. Their force protection intelligence is given to them 
through the Delta Forces (Stefan and Buchen and et al 2008).0n the other hand, the 
secretary general of Komala, a long-standing Kurdish-Stalinist party, Abdullah 
Mohtadi, told the Pittsburgh Tribune Review: "If PJAK can be an independent party, 
we welcome them. But they are just taking their orders from somewhere else. They 
are just like PKK ... It does not help the Kurdish movement in Iran, and it doesn't help 
the Iraqi Kurds" (Seymond, 2007). In fact, most PJAK "engagements" appear to be in 
West Azerbaijan, rather than in the two Kurdish majority provinces of Kurdistan and 
Kermanshah. Thus, the Azerbaijan people in Urumiye established the Defence 
Committee of Western Azerbaijan against the activities of the PJAK and the PKK in 
the region (www.bati-azerbaycan.blogfa.com/).Therefore,a possible armed civil 
conflict between Azerbaijanis and Kurds would create a national security threat to 
Iran. 
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7.4.2.1 Turkey-Iran High Security Commission: escalation of PJAK and PKK 
military insurgengy campaigns in Iran and Turkey 
PJAK launched a military insurgency campaign against Iran two days before Syrian 
President Bashar al-Asad's visit to Tehran on 4-5 July 2004. The guerrillas attacked 
the Iranian security forces and killed 20 soldiers and they lost 4 PJAK militants in the 
towns of Salmas and Khoy (Reuters, 6 July 2004). The Iranian government reported 
that PJAK killed at least 120 revolutionary guards in 2005. The dozen sorties by 
guerrillas from its camps in the Qandil Mountain and from its underground cell in Iran 
itself killed more Revolutionary Guards in 2006 than in the previous year. 
Furthermore, the PKK returned to using violence following a five -year unilateral 
ceasefire in May 2004. Now because both PJAK and PKK are internal threats for 
Turkey and Iran, this can improve Turkey-Iran security relations. The Iranian deputy 
interior minister, Asqar Ahmedi, met with Turkish military and intelligence officers to 
discuss possible joint-actions against the PKK and PJAK in Ankara. Iran's 
ambassador to Turkey, Firuz Devlatabadi, announced that Iran intended to declare 
PKK-Kongra-Gel as a terrorist organisation on 29 July after the 10 Turkey- Iran -high 
security meeting in Ankara on 13 July 2004. During the visit by Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan on 28 to 30 July, Erdogan held talks with Iranian Foreign Minister 
Kemal Kharrazi, President Khatemi, and the President of the Expediency Council, 
Rafsanjani. Both countries decided to take military action against both PKK-PJAK 
and the Mojahidin-i Khalq (MEK) organisation, and signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on security matters on the issues of the PKK, Mojahideen-e Khalq and 
Kurdistan-Iraq. However, the Iranian ambassador Develetabadi in Ankara stated that a 
joint military operation with Turkey would require too much paperwork to be 
considered in the near future (Al-jazeara News, 1 August 2004 ). 
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Table 7.2: Iran-Turkey High Security Commission (the deputy of interior ministerial level) 
(Generated by author) 
Iran-Turkey High Security Commission ( the deputy of 
Years interior ministerial level) Place Outcome 
I st 30 August 1993 Bekir Aksoy, Mohammed Besharati Ankara 
25 September 
znd 1994 Bekir Aksoy, Mohammed Besharati and Hasan Habibi Ankara 
25 December 
3rd 1995 Ahmet Mithat Balkan Gholam Hossein Bolandian Tehran 
4th 12 July 1996 Mehmet Agar, Alaaddin Burujerdi Ankara 
5th 9-10 June 1997 Onur Oymen, Alaaddin Borojerdi Tehran 
6th 13 August 1999 Yahya Gur, Gholam Hoseyn Bolandian Ankara MoU 
7th 16 Ocober 2000 Saim Kotur , Abdulvahid Musevi Lari Tehran MoU 
8th 23 October 200 I Muzffer Ecemis ,Gholam Hoseyn Bolandian Ankara 
Muzaffer Ecemis ,Aii Asghar Ahmadi and Abdovahed 
9th 29 June 2002 Mousavi-Lari Tehran 
lOth 12-13 July 2004 Sahabettin Harput , Ali Asghar Ahmedi Ankara MoU 
21-23 February 
11th 2006 Sahabettin Harput ,Muhammed-Baqer zolgadir Tehran MoU 
12th 14-18 April 2008 Osman Gunes , Ali Akbar Mohtaj (Iranian) Ankara MoU 
13th 0 I April 2009 Tehran -
150PKK 
guerrilla 
given to 
Turkey 
Sources: compiled by author 
There are three institutional security bodies organising the security and border eetings 
between Turkey and Iran: the Turkey-Iran High Security Commission (deputy interior 
ministry level), Turkey-Iran Joint-Security Commission (security forces level 
meeting) and Border Security Commission (border security and governor of 
province), but the High security commission at the deputy interior ministry level is the 
most significant for this study's purposes (Hurriyet 1 April 2008).The Turkey-Iran 
High Security Commission was first established in 1988 and it was ratified under the 
Security Cooperation agreement in 1992. The commission held its first round serious 
talks in a bid to secure the foundation of security cooperation over the extradition of 
criminals and anti-drug trafficking in 25th September 1994 (Xinhua News Agency, 28 
September 1994). Iranian government was worried about the US support for anti-The 
Iranian groups in Turkey because the Clinton administration had approved a $20 
million covert action plan to destabilise the Iranian government. President Demirel 
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assured the deputy interior minister for security and disciplinary affairs, Gholam 
Hossein Bolandian, that Turkey would not allow anti-Iranian elements onto Turkish 
soil. Thus, the Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Ahmet Mithat Balkan, said that no 
change in the governments of the two countries would affect Tehran-Ankara ties 
(Xinhua News Agency, 25 December 1994). However, the !ran-Turkey High Security 
Commission meetings could aid in the increase of Turkish-Iranian security ties, 
because during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran's logistic support to small groups 
to carry out attacks inside Turkey tolerated the organisation's activities inside Iran and 
provided a safe haven for PKK militants being pursued by Turkish security forces, 
which impeded security cooperation. After the diplomatic crisis in 1997, the sixth 
session of the Turkey mentioned in Table 7.2 witnessed an intense dispute on Turkish 
Hezbollah, MEK and border crossing issue on 22nd Although they signed a MoU at 
the end of the meeting (IRNA, and BBC Monitoring, 13 August 1999), Iran verbally 
accepted that Turkish Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation at the 8th session of the 
commission meeting in October 2001(Radical, 25 October 2001).Nevertheless, the 
situation has been updated since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took the 
power in November 2002 and particularly since the establishment of PJAK in 2004 
has the commission's security cooperation improved dramatically. For instance, after 
the signing of the MoU on 29th July 2004, Iran officially classified the PKK as a 
terrorist organisation and delivered 22 PKK militants to Turkey (Hilal, 2004). On the 
other hand, PJAK escalated its hit- and -run assault tactics against Iranian forces in 
2006. Turkish and Iranian officials gathered in Tehran for the 11th round of the !ran-
Turkey High Security Commission meeting to actively cooperate against PJAK and 
the PKK in February 2006. The Turkish deputy interior minister Sahabettin Harput 
and his Iranian counterpart, Muhammed Bager Zolgadr signed the MoU and described 
it as aconstructive agreement to eliminate all terror in the region (TDNs, 23 February 
2006). On the other hand, the alliance relationship between Turkey and US and Israel 
became very weak after the revelation of the connections between Washington-Tel 
Aviv and PKK-PJAK. Journalist Seymour Hersh also claims that PJAK is covertly 
supported by the United States and Israel. They receive arms, training, and targeting 
information in order to create internal pressure in Iran (Hersh, 2008). However, the 
White House has dismissed or ignored Hersh's reports and the Israeli government has 
officially denied any involvement with PJAK. However, in early 2006, Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice sought US$75 million in extra funding for so-called pro-
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democracy activities to finance anti-government propaganda and opposition groups 
inside Iran (Today's Zaman, 1 July 2008). The leader of PJAK, Haji Ahmedi visited 
Washington DC in the summer of 2007 and had talks with low-level US officials, but 
could not achieve any practical results. This increased suspicion of American covert 
activities in the region. Especially when PJAK shot down an Iranian military 
helicopter that was conducting forward bombing operations in August-which 
increased for the first time the Turkey-Iran security co-operation in 2007. However, 
Ankara's relations normalised with the Iraqi government and the Bush administration 
after the signing of the MoUs in July and November 2007. The US started providing 
intelligence about the PKK and PJAK to Turkey, leading to the latter's harsher stance 
in its propaganda materials in relation to the US. Therefore, after April 2007, Ahmed 
denied that the PJAK was receiving support from the US We have no relations with 
the Americans, and Iran 's claim that we have an alliance with America is not true 
(Jenkins, 2008). Haji Ahmadi told the foreign reporters at the Kurdish Institute in 
Brussels that the military intelligence information which was given by the US to 
Turkey, is used against Iranian Kurds with the intention of combining military actions 
by Turkey and Iran. In fact, Turkey provided the intelligence about the rebel locations 
around the Qandil Mountain which Iran used to directly attack the PJAK's camp and 
Kurdish villages in northern Iraq despite the US presence in Iraq. The Suleymaniye 
government claimed that Turkey and Iran were bombarding the Kurdish villages--
Keste, Hakurk, Sidekan and Hineke, Guli in Batufa on 7 June 2007 (Hurriyet, 8 June 
2007). However, there was no evidence of Turkish-Iranian joint operations into 
northern Iraq. The 12th meeting of the 2 -year- old bi-national !ran-Turkey High 
Security Commission constituted the first senior-level gathering in the security field 
between Iranian and Turkish officials: an eight-member Iranian delegation was led by 
the deputy interior minister Abbas Mohtaj, while Turkish negotiators were headed by 
deputy interior minister Osman Gunes and included representatives of the national 
intelligence organization (MIT), the Gendarmerie Command and the Foreign Ministry, 
(TDNs, 15 April 2008). During the meeting, the delegates examined the joint military 
operation against the separatist threat, the PJAK and the PKK in northern Iraq. The 
commander of the Turkish land forces, the second most powerful man in the Turkish 
armed forces, General Ilker Basbug clarified that Iran and Turkey had been 
conducting coordinated simultaneous operations on their respective borders ... We are 
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sharing intelligence, talking and making plans with Iran (Milliyet, Hurriyet, 6 June 
2008). 
On the other hand, the relationship between the PJAK-PKK and the KRG was getting 
worse after the Turkish and Iranian shelling of northern Iraq.The KRG understood 
that because of the presence ofPJAK -PKK elements, Turkey and Iran were making 
military incursions into Iraqi territory. KRG announced that Iran is a very important 
neighbour with a very long common border. He said that We will not allow any armed 
group to attack any neighbouring countries from the territory of the Kurdistan Region 
(Al-Sharq al- Awsat, 10 May 2008). In response to Barzani, the PJAK leadership 
recently accused Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister of the Kurdistan regional 
government (KRG), of collaborating with Turkey and Iran, warning that this could 
lead to a "national tragedy" for Kurdistan-Iraq on 11th May 2008. In a press 
conference in Sulaimaniya, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani also warned the PKK and its 
Iranian offshoot, the PJAK to stop attacks on Turkey and Iran from Iraqi bases. He 
said that we will never let these groups hide in our territory, attack neighbouring 
countries and then come back here, and these organisations must stop this behaviour. 
Otherwise we do not want them on our soil (Renard, 2008). 
7.4.4.2 Financial sources of PJAK and PKK 
According to research at John Hopkins University conducted in 2004, it is estimated 
that 80 - 90 % of drugs come from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran is a major transit 
corridor for opiates and hashish smuggled from Afghanistan and eventually through 
Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Europe and Russia (Cornell, and Swanstrom 
2006). The question becomes how the PKK (3,000-3,500 guerrillas)-PJAK (2,000-
3,000 guerrillas) evolved from an idealistic and poverty-stricken movement in the 
early 1980s, to a sophisticated organisation with multinational corporation-size 
revenues which they are today (Adams, 1986). 
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Figure 7.6: Financial sources of PKK (generated by author) 
Estiamated Annual Income Sources of PKKKongraGel 
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Sources: PKK revenues reach 500 mln Euros' TODAY'S ZAMAN with wires Istanbul, 12 March 2008, 
online at: http://www. todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?Joad=detay&link= 136169 
General, Ergin Saygun, Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff, gave a speech on 
the second day of an international conference on terrorism organised by the Turkish 
military at the Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism in Ankara on March 
10 and 11 2008. He claimed that the PKK has a yearly income of 400-500 million 
Euros obtained from drug-dealing, human-trafficking, smuggling and donations. 
According to his classification, the PKK gains € 200-250 mn from drug - dealing, 
100-150 million from its various smuggling activities and 15-20 million from 
donations. Saygun indicated that the PKK provides arms not only to its members but 
also to the terrorists of other organisations (TDNs, March 13, 2008). Jane' s 
Intelligence Review suggests a smaller revenue for the PKK from various countries 
and sources which is estimated as $200-500 million annually during the 1990s but 
decreased to tens of millions during the early 2000s because of the withdrawal of 
support by Syria and Iran. Turks were estimated to control 70% of the heroin arriving 
in the UK and 80% of the French heroin traffic (Jane's Intelligence Review, 13 Marc 
2008), (Chilluffo, 2000; BBC News, 13 December 2000). Michael Braun, the 
assistant administrator and chief of operations of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) also claimed that the PKK receive a great share from the 
international drug market which is estimated $322 billion (Hurriyet, 22 July 2008). In 
Europe, the PKK controls 2 news agencies, 4 TV broadcasting stations, 13 radio 
stations, 10 newspapers, 19 magazines, 3 publishing companies and a variety of 
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internet websites. The PKK-PJAK uses these broadcasting agencies for political 
propaganda to recruit guerrillas. The PKK also helps the establishment of many 
Kurdish small businesses, Kurdish cultural centres,and families in the Kurdish 
diasporas in Europe to increase their income around to around $50 million annually 
(BBC News, 14 November 2002). Max-Peter Ratzel, Director ofEuropol, emphasises 
that the establishment and management of small companies is one of the more 
significant sources of terrorists' income (Brady, 2008). Cagaptay and Eroglu observe 
that the PJAK was formed by PKK members who settled in Iran before the 2003 Iraq 
War (Ogiityii, 2007). The two organisations have no disagreements on issues of 
political objectives and have similar financial sources. Both have bases in the Qandil 
mountains in Iraq. However, there is no information on PJAK's financial sources. On 
the other hand, Turkey and Iran started military operations against the PKK-PJAK to 
curtail their military power in northern Iraq and diplomatic operations to stop their 
economic connections with Europe; in a more recent development in 2005 Germany 
closed the E.Xani Presse und Verlag, the publisher of the pro-PKK newspaper Ozgur 
Politika. Soon afterwards the Welt Press Verlag, operator of Mezopotamia-
Nachrichtenagentur and Roj online, were also closed down. NATO's Terrorist Threat 
Intelligence Unit and its Reinforced Economic Committee issued report reports 
persuading European agencies that PKK activities in the drug market human 
trafficking, and money laundering in Europe were widespread and clearly illegal. 
4.3 Turkish armed forces military incursion into northern Iraq 
Before the US-led invasion of Iraq, the KDP/ PUK had supported more than 20 
operations since 1995, providing Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq against 
the PKK since 1995. The agreement reached between Turkey and the KDP/ PUK in 
1997 is still effective. Thus, the KRG is obliged to comply with the 2007.The MOU 
signed between Iraq and Turkey that provides for joint combating of terrorism, 
including the PKK (CNN News, 18 September 2000). After the visit by Prime 
Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul to Washington, both capitals 
announced that the PKK is a mutual enemy of Ankara, Baghdad and Washington. 
Turkey also agreed the general principles of an MoU with Washington on 4th 
November 2007. Similarly, Turkey and Iran signed the MoU after the High Security 
Commission meeting to conduct joint operations against the PJAK-PKK in February 
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2006. Turkey initiated the first of many air attacks in December 2007, targeting PKK 
outposts in northern Iraq with reliance on US intelligence. Turkish Special Forces 
crossed the border to attack PKK camps in Zap valley in February, whilst Iranian 
artillery fired on PJAK outposts in the Qandil mountains. Turkish military operations 
ended after the US minister of national defence, Robert Gate, came to Turkey for a 
working visit on 3 March 2008 (Candar, 2008). Turkish armed forces explained that 
they had killed 240 Kurdish guerrillas but the army had lost 27 men. However, 
Turkey's slow-going military incursion into Northern Iraq effectively attacked the 
guerrillas camps in Haftanin (6), Melina (7), Zap (16), Gara (5), Avara (5) Hakurk (5), 
Qandil (20), and Mahmur (1). It is estimated that the PKK has over 10, 000 bombs, 
3,000 kalashnikov rifles and stinger missiles in these camps. The Qandi1 mountains 
are 2 km. from the Turkish border but some parts of mountain remain in Iranian 
territory. Turkey can only use air-support from Malatya and Diyarbakir bases (456 
km). 
Integrated map 7.3: PKK camps in northern Iraq 
Sources: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 19 February 2008 
President Talabani, during his visit to Ankara, and Erdogan on his visit to Baghdad, 
agreed to set up a new unit to wipe out the PKK in the regional politics. The Kurdish 
Nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP) tried to act as Turkey' Sinn Fein. In fact, 
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neither the PKK nor the DTP could represent the people of the region, because neither 
party's programmes satisfy the Kurdish population's political and economic demands. 
It can instead be considered a Kemalist-type social engineering attempt in Kurdish 
society. A prominent political leader of the DTP, Leyla Zana, in her speech in the last 
election campaign referenced their religious origin as Zarathustra before the 
conversion of Islam-a reference to a Turkish nationalist project in the 1920s. 
Since 1983, the Turkish armed forces have carried out some 24 incursions into 
northern Iraq at a cost of 628 soldiers' lives. The latest operation has so far claimed 24 
soldiers and three government-funded village guards. Some 4,776 PKK members 
were killed in past operations. Turkey's 28 -year long war with the PKK has been at 
the human cost of 5,595 civilians, 4,749 security, 205 police forces, 1,302 village 
guards and 26,128 Kurdish guerrillas. According to records, 7,620 civilians and 
10,752 security forces were injured during the conflict (Hurriyet 22 June 2007). Cemil 
Cicek explains that Turkey has spent $300 billion during the 28- year war against the 
military insurgency campaign of PKK (Ihlas Haber Ajansi, 21July 2008). On the other 
hand, Iran has lost around 500 soldiers during the conflict with PJAK so far. 
Figure 7.7: TAF and PKK casualties (1984-2007) 
Number of Civilian, Security Forces and PKK casualties between 1984 
and 2007 
30,000 .......--------------------~......--. 
25,000 +-------------~~~-------:--------"'"-:-:' 
20,000 +------...,.-----~-----~~-----~~ 
~ ~ 15,000 
Q) 
"10,000 
5,000 
0 
Civilians Security Police Forces Village 
Forces Guards 
Sources: (as cited Emin Colasan in Huniyet, 22 June 2007) complied by author 
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7 .5. Conclusion 
The alliance relationship between Turkey and Kurds has played an historically 
significant role in expanding Turkish occupation in Anatolia and the Middle East. The 
Turkish-Kurdish axis first gained credibility in the Battle of Manzigert against the 
Byzantine Emperor Roman os IV Diogenes in 1071. The Amasya contract between the 
Ottomans and Kurds against the Safavid in 1514 strengthened this axis until the 19th 
century. The Ottoman-Persian conflict sustained historical competition in the conflict 
zone in northern Iraq and the southern Caucasus. Turks and Iran left behind this 
geopolitical competition in Mesopotamia and Caucasus until the outbreak of the Iran-
Iraq war and the dissolution of Soviet Empire. Kurdiyati, Kurdish ethnic and 
territorial nationalism has been one of the main determinant factors in Turkish-Iranian 
geopolitical competition since 1980. The nation-state system devastated the Kurdish 
national entity in the Middle East. The nation-state system of Turkey ignores the 
Kurdish and Islamist entities within the state apparatus, which was founded by secular 
Kurds and Turkish nationalists. The outbreak of the Iran-Iran war ( 1980-1988) 
gradually influenced the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. The war created a 
power vacuum in Northern Iraq during which PKK militants relocated to this safe 
haven. Despite Turkey being a neutral player, it did not refrain from military 
incursions into northern Iraq during the war. Turkey achieved a "hot pursuit" 
agreement with Saddam's regime and made three major incursions into northern Iraq. 
Iran condemned these activities in the Kurdish region as genocide against the Kurdish 
people in 1987. Turkey's activities in the region also challenged the Iran-Syrian axis 
in the 1980s and 1990s. During the critical time of war, the Iran-Kurdish alliance's 
attack on Iraq concerned Turkey due to the possible Iranian seizure of the giant 
oilfield at Kirkuk. Turkey reminded Iran of its historical claims on Kirkuk and Mosul. 
Turkey and Iran managed this geopolitical conflict; Iran did not attack the pipeline 
during the course of the war. On one hand, Iran used the proxy Kurdish card by 
allowing in PKK militants and providing logistic support for their activities against 
Turkey. However, Iran assassinated the leader of the KDPI, Abd-al Rahman Qasimlu, 
in Vienna in July 1989 (Olson, 2004). Turkey and Iran were very successful in 
coexisting and increased economic ties with each other. Turkey's main concern was to 
prevent Iran from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
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After the Anfal genocide, and the Gulf war in 1991, Kurdish nationalism became a 
transnational issue which worsened Turkey's relationship with Iraq and increased 
geopolitical competition between Turkey and Iran. To take the initiative in the 
regional politics and the new world order, Turkey turned its attention back to the 
Middle East by signing contracts with the de facto Kurdish Regional Authority, and 
military training and economic agreements with Israel. Turkey both challenged the 
Iran-Syrian axis and the Saddam regime in Iraq. However, both Iran's and Turkey's 
peace-keeping attempts failed in the 1990s and both Ankara and Tehran lost their 
control on the militarist and political activities of Kurdish nationalism movement in 
Middle East and Kurdish diasporas in Europe. The major drug traffic route through 
Iran-Turkey and Europe serves as the main financial source for Kurdish military 
insurgency campaigns against Turkey and Iran. On the other hand, the major turning 
point on the Kurdish question was the capture of PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan in 
1999. The PKK has made with them a unilateral ceasefire offer until the emergence of 
PJAK in 2004. Turkey and Iran have got three institutional bodies to solve the 
security issues and the last three meetings of the Iran-Turkey High Security 
Commission provided efficient results for the struggle against the PKK and PJAK. 
Both capitals have been cooperative in sharing intelligence and joint-military 
incursions into the Qandil mountains. However, possible Israel and American air 
attacks to Iran would increase the geopolitical competition between Turkey and Iran 
in the future. Hence, the Kurdish nationalist movement is one of the major factors in 
regional political politics, whether as an active or a proxy actor. 
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PART HI: THE EXPERIMENTAL MODEL IN REGIONALISM 
The domestic roots of instability have been determined by regional politics after the 
collapse of the Soviet empire. In Chapter Eight, ethnic complexities in the Southern 
Caucasus and Islamic extremism show the potential strength of middle-power states in 
regional power competition. Due to the failure of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
policy in their domestic politics, Turkey-Iran was excluded from conflict resolution 
and peacekeeping operations in these Southern Caucasus. 
In Chapter Nine, Turkey-Iran competition is shown to have been based on false 
arguments by Cold War scholars, as no Great Game politics were experienced in 
regional politics. This chapter tries to outline the relevant aspects of middle-power 
competition and pipeline politics in the Great Game relating to Caspian Sea energy 
sources. 
In Chapter Ten, Turkey-Iran economic relations will be classified as regional rather 
than bilateral trade relations, because regional developments primarily influence 
trade contracts such as natural gas agreements with Iran; the Iran-Iraq war improved 
the trade volume between the countries. The institutional capacity relating to the trade 
regimes of middle-powers will also be examined in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE 
CAUCASUS AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKO-IRANIAN REGIOANAlL 
COMPETETION 
8.1. Introduction 
Transcaucasia is separated from Russia by the Caucasian mountains and bordered on 
each side by the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. It is the home for over fifty different 
nationalities, mainly Georgian, Azeri, and Armenian, which have dominant state 
identities, while Abkhazians and South Ossetian, and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians 
claim similar nationalist aspirations, causing the ethnic conflict in the Southern 
Caucasus (Zviagelskaia, 1996:80). The Kremlin directly interfered with the 
Armenian-Azeri conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the Abkhazian-Georgian 
and Ossetes-Georgian conflicts in Georgia in order to control possible ethnic friction 
in the northern Caucasus. Thus it deployed troops and peacekeeping forces in these 
southern conflict zones, which have emerged as a pivotal geo-strategic region within 
which the interests of the US, Europe, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the broader Islamic 
world intersect. In opposition to Russian aggression, the president of Georgia, Edward 
Shevardnadze, and his successor, Mikhail Saakashvili have consistently tried to 
maintain transatlantic aspirations and to secure a Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
from NA TO--supported by most NATO members in Bucharest in April 2008, but 
without current success due owing to Russian pressure. 
On the other hand, the Turkey-Iran confrontation became intense when the 
Azerbaijani president started the pan-Turkism politics following the exclusion of Iran 
from the international oil consortia. The presence of Russian military bases in 
Armenia, and the Iran - Armenian pipeline contract increased mistrust between 
Moscow and Tehran. The policies of Iran and Russia have been to pursue a strategic 
alliance against Turkish and American initiatives in conflict zones. The Russian-
Georgian war in August 2008 has also weakened the pro-western policy of Georgia 
and its quasi-alliance in the southern Caucasus, but reduced the international pressure 
against Iran-Russian nuclear cooperation. 
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On the other hand, both Turkey and Iran are opposed to the Saudi-backed 
fundamentalist movement in the Fergana Valley which is jointly occupied by the 
Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islamic 
fundamentalism has challenged the state authority in Uzbekistan and resulted in an 
unequal civil war in Tajikistan. Over one million Kazakh diaspora members in 
Xingjian represent another significant means of leverage between Sino-Central Asian 
security systems and economic and cultural ties. More than half a million Uighur 
emigres have established a common identity with the Turkic states. Nevertheless, the 
border security concerns of these regional states against militant religious 
fundamentalists and illegal drug traffickers at the border crossings necessitates 
institutionalising security cooperation between the Sino and Central Asian states 
under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Whilst Turkey's soft-
power presence and pan-Turkic organisations have failed to establish friendly 
relations with the potential regional player, Uzbekistan, Iran has a natural 
geographical advantage by gaining observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation. The creation of a Pan-Turkic community from the Adriatic Sea to China, 
and Turkish initiatives involving TIKA, the Turkic Summit and the Great Student 
Project are supported by Washington and Brussels, but Turkey has not been able to 
seize the historical opportunity and Ankara undertook these initiatives in vain. 
The post-Soviet policy in Central Asia can be assessed on its domestic, regional and 
international performance though the Cold War security order remains in the regional 
complex with regard to arm sales, alliances and financial stakes in natural resources. 
Hence, demarcation of ethnicity in the region became the major political card between 
the regional powers. As mentioned in Chapter One, for the regional level of analysis, 
Buzan and Weaver's prediction would explain the political development in Central 
Asia; RSCT dictates that Central Asia will become an independent regional security 
system. However, the Caucasus mini sub-complex is vulnerable to foreign penetration. 
Hence, the competition between Turkey and Russia-Iran materialises in theIR theory 
of regionalism, in general. For the dynamics of internal politics, Tocqueville claims 
that autocratic states dramatically encounter domestic instability when they start the 
democratisation process (Tocqueville, 1968).Hhence the influx of colourful 
revolutions was perceived as a threat for the clan bases politics of the Central Asian 
states. His analytical volume consists of eleven case studies on the theoretical nature 
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of regional disorder in the post-Soviet and post-9/11 situatons. Each of these 
analytical narratives sheds some light on the micro-politics of organised violence 
originating from the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
8.2.0 The ethnic roots of instability in the southern Caucasus 
After the withdrawal of the super- power from the region, the ethnic conflict raged in 
the early 1990s between the contested states of Armenia and Azerbaijan and between 
Russia and Georgia in Abk:hazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia, which resulted in the 
deaths of over 50,000 people, great material destruction, economic hardships and 
transnational crime that have permeated the region in the last two decades. Up to now 
neither the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) nor the Joint-
CIS peacekeeping forces has found a negotiated solution to unfreeze the situation in 
the southern Caucasus. In August 2008, the outbreak of war in Georgian-South 
Ossetia between Russia and Georgia undermined the effectiveness of the Western -
Turkish initiatives in the region. This chapter deals with the ethnic conflicts in 
Nagomo-Karabak:h and the Russia-Georgian conflicts in Abk:hazia and South Ossetia 
as well as the impact of the Russian military presence in the region on Turko-Iranian 
regional competition in this section .. 
8.2.1.0 The ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 
Turko-Iranian rivalry over the Caucasus goes back to the policy of aggression in the 
16th and 18th centuries in the southern Caucasus. According to the Treaty of Amasya, 
1555, and Zuhab, 1639, Armenia was divided into western and eastern portions. In the 
early 19th century, Tsarist Russia took eastern Armenia from Iran and part of western 
Armenia from the Ottomans. Whilst the Turkish massacre (1895-6) and relocation of 
Armenians (191-1918) left an ineradicable imprint on contemporary Armenian self 
determination ( Herzig, 1996), the territorial settlement in 1921 between the Soviet 
Union and Turkey (Treaties of Moscow and Kars) provided Turkey with a guarantee 
of Nak:hichevan's status, separated by Armenian Zangezur, as a potential pretext for 
Turkish intervention. Turkey probably maintains the guarantor position over 
Nagomo-Karabak:h as well. Consequently, Turkey cannot be defined as an outsider in 
the conflict, as any change in the status ofNagomo-Karabak:h or Nak:hichevan would 
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necessitate Turkish approval (Cornel, 1998). Other border disputes with Georgia over 
Adjara and Akhalkalak were also settled to the Armenian detriment (Hassassian, 
1990). However, Armenians never fully accepted this decision, and have repeatedly 
questioned the enclave's status, demanding its transfer to the Armenian SSR in 1929, 
1935, 1963, 1966, 1977, and 1987. On the one hand, Iran lost northern Azerbaijan due 
to the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828 and the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, ceded by 
Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Iran was concerned about the 
potential impact on Iranian Azeris of the establishment of an independent Azerbaijan 
state, and of the calls from Baku for unification of the divided Azeri people. Tehran, 
therefore, sided with Y erevan and Moscow against the Azerbaijani Nationalist Front 
(ANF). Iran and Russia encouraged and financed ethnic groups in Azerbaijan in their 
opposition to state Turkification policies. IfNagorno-Karabakh was to be sovereign, it 
would be a client of Russia within Azerbaijan just as Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
in Georgia. The formation of the Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan axis and Iranian 
revolutionary ideology rely for clarification on the ethno-demographic realm of the 
autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, 4,400 km (Fuller, and Francke 2001). In 
Nagorno-Karabakh between 1921 and 1979, Russian anthropologist Yamskov 
claimed that the Armenian population of the oblast (region) declined from 95% in the 
early 1920s to 76 % in 1979 - that is, 123,000 out of a total of 161,000 
( Yamskov,1991). T. Sarkisian, A. Vartanov, and G. Starovoitova cited the general 
population ofthe region as 133,200 (74%) Armenians and 43,900 (24.4%) Azeris in 
1987. They also give the percentage of the Azeri population in the districts of 
Mardakertskii as 14.8% (6,800), Askeranskii 16.7% (3,000), Shushinskii 90.1% 
(19,000), Martuninskii 22.7% (6,200), Gadrutskii 14.6% (2,100); Stepanakert City 
12.8% (6,800) and in Nagorno-Karabakh ( Starovoitova, and Krupnik, (1988). The 
Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh had a population in 1989 recorded as 
189,000, the majority of whom were Armenians, 76.9%, Azeris, 21.5%, and Russian 
and Kurdish minorities of 1.6 %. 
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Figure 8.1The ethnic division ofNagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan 
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8.2.1.1 Turkey-Iran competition over the outbreak and escalation of the ethnic 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 
The first ethnic strife became apparent in Nagomo-Karabakh after the pro-Armenian 
leadership campaign in Stepanakert, to become part of Armenia in 1988.Trouble 
arose Kremlin ' s decision to annex the status ofthis region on 12 June 1989. However, 
the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet rejected this resolution as unconstitutional and 
Azerbaijan attacked its Armenian citizens in Azerbaijan (Tahirzade, 1997). Nagomo-
Karabakh formally remained under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction until the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union in late 1991. During this brief interlude, the Soviet authorities sided, 
in general, with Azerbaijan but the power transition in Russia changed the balance in 
favour of the Armenians; geopolitical calculations in relation to Turkey and Iran, 
consequently, prompted Russia to support Armenia which, in turn, translated to 
military victories on the ground. The demonstrations near the Azadliq monument 
against this pro-Armenian policy of the Soviet regime resulted in 131 people deaths, 
744 wounded and 400 arrests in Baku during Black January 1990 (Ismayilov, 1995; 
Mesbahi, 1994: 99-114). Russian destabilisation policy towards the region opened a 
Pandora's Box that gradually transformed into a full -fledged war between Azerbaijani 
and Armenia over Karabakh, although both Y erevan and Baku kept the status quo of 
an undeclared war with one another. As a result of this conflict, 250,000 Armenians in 
Baku and 149,000 peoples in Nagomo-Karabakh were drawn into a conflict with the 
Azeri people (Statistiki, 1990). Turkish opposition party leader Suleyman Demirel 
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criticised the Soviet - Armenian slaughter of so many people as a contradiction of the 
Soviet policy of glasnost and perestroika. He said that one cannot remain just an 
observer (Hurriyet, 21 January 1990). The Armenian government's further challenge 
pertaining to the imposition of economic sanctions against the Nachichevans attracted 
the attention of outside parties-- Turkey and Iran. Moscow was critical of the Turkish 
opposition and warned against sending military equipment to Nachichevan for Turkey 
was a grantor state according to Kars treaty in 1921. However, Annenia asserted that 
the Treaties of Gymrui 1920 and the Kars 1921, which detennined the border between 
Turkey and Annenia, were no longer in effect (Ankara Television, 22 January, 1990). 
Azerbaijan has a short border with Turkey, 12 km in length, along with the western 
frontiers of the Nachichevan Autonomous Republic.Hence, Armenian policy seems to 
consist of blockading Azeri lands and cutting off direct links with Turkish territory 
(Ataov, 1992:103). 
The conflict in the enclave of Nagomo-Karabakh initially pushed the Baku 
government closer to Iran, which was considered a powerful ally. But trouble flared 
along the border between the N achichevan exclave and Iran as rioters destroyed 
border installations, an incident which was pushing Iran into the regional conflict. On 
the other hand, Turkey maintained a 'pay-off policy' towards the region in 1989-1991. 
President Turgut Ozal, who was visiting Washington at the time, said that the 
Azerbaijan crisis was more of a concern to Iran than to his country because the 
Azerbaijanis were Shi'a (Hunter, 1995:88). It is estimated that 65% of Azerbaijanis 
are Shia but Azerbaijanis largely ignore this religious aspect. They rather define 
themselves as a secular society after two hundred years of Russian domination. Pan-
Persian nationalists believe that Greater Iran (lran-i bozorg) (Minorsky and Boyle, 
1978) is possible through a unification of northern Azerbaijan, considered an 
historical part of Iran (Nesipli, 2000). In response to Ozal's statement, Democratic 
Left Party leader Bulent Ecevit criticised Turkey's policy neglect as forcing 
Azerbaijan into the arms of Iran (Hunter, 1995:88). Nevertheless, Ozal's trip to 
Moscow, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan opened a new chapter in Turkish 
foreign policy which concluded in technical and economic co-operation agreements 
with Moscow, Alma Ata and Baku betweenll and 16 March 1991(TDNs, 17 March 
1991 ). President Ozal' s visit emphasised Russian superiority in the region and 
highlighted the value of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and of Kazakhstan in Central 
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Asia (Hale, 2000). However, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayeti, who visited 
Baku in November 1991 after a Moscow visit, said that the establishment of a 
powerful Soviet confederation would prevent the West from gaining control over the 
independent republic (Ekici, 2002: 41). 
On the other hand, the power transition in the internal politics of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan resulted in a policy of independence. Heydar Aliyev became leader of the 
Azerbaijani exclave ofNachichevan in 1991(Vasiliev, 1994; TIKA, 2006). However, 
on 2 September 1991, four days after Azerbaijan' s declaration of independence from 
the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast declared its independence from Azerbaijan. 
Turkey was the first county to recognise the independent Republic of Azerbaijan on 9 
November 1991 and the first capital to launch diplomatic relations with Baku after 
talks between Azerbaijani leader Muttalibov and the head of the Turkish foreign 
ministry's office of political affairs, Bilal Simsir on 14 January 1992 (Hunter, 1995). 
Through its ambivalent approaches to regional politics, Iran recognized the Republic 
of Azerbaijan to restore its relations in December 1991 and opened an embassy in 
Baku in January 1992. The independence of Azerbaijan also hastened the 
independence declaration of other Turkic states in Central Asia. During the period of 
euphoria, the Newly Independent States ( NIS) leaders made a round of visits to 
Ankara was made by Nursultan Nazarbayev, Sepermirad Niyazov, Islam Kerimow, 
and Askar Akayev, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kirghizstan respectively (Vasiliev, 1994). In December 1991), the President of 
Kazakhstan announced that 21st century will be a Turkish century (The Economist, 25 
April 1992:60). 
During the Ayaz Muttalibov government (18 May 1990- March 1992) Iran's initiative 
was stronger than that of the Turkish government; therefore, Muttalibov mediated the 
Russian-Iranian relations and made his first visit to Tehran in December 1991. Due to 
the Armenian blockade, Iran agreed to allow Azerbaijan to use Iranian territory to get 
to Nachichevan, and both parties agreed that Nachichevan should become free trade 
zone between the two neighbours (Nesibli, 2000:143). On the other hand, 
Muttalibov's visit to Turkey on 23-24 January 1992 concluded with the signing of a 
$US 2 billion trade and cultural agreement in Baku in the autumn of 1992 and Turkish 
state television started broadcasting in Azerbaijan in the early months of the same 
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year. Muttalibov's second trip to Tehran was meant to link the anniversary celebration 
of the Iranian Islamic revolution and strengthen the Iran-Azeri connections, on which 
he stated that The unification of two Azerbaijan is not impossible (Durdular, 
1995: 128). Though Iran propagated the promotion of Arabic script, by publishing 
newspapers, magazines and books in Baku in the Krill alphabet (Nesibli, 2000:141), 
the Turkish model of development became real and Azerbaijan adopted the Latin 
alphabet on 25 December 1991. The US urging of Turkey to act against the Iranian-
Saudi backed radical Islamic movement in Central Asia coincided with Yeltsin's pro-
Western policy, giving at this stage another advantage to Turkish foreign policy. This 
policy direction coincided with the American strategic policy in the region; when 
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel visited to Washington, George Bush told him that 
Turkey is a mode/for the countries in the region in February 1992 (Hunter, 1995:103). 
The US secretary of state James Baker visited Turkic states and Baku on 12 February 
1992 and also presented Turkey as an economic and political model, urged by NIS to 
integrate with Western economic and political system (Ekici, 2002). Therefore, 
Turkish policy aimed to increase the connections between the Turkic states and 
international organisations to strengthen their independence against the Russian 
hegemony while Iran's position was against Western initiatives and the powerful 
Azerbaijan state. The pan-Turkish element in the Turkic states raised common 
nationalist feelings amongst the Turkic states' leaders. For instance, President of 
Uzbekistan Islam Kerimov said that We looked up to Turkey as an elder brother and 
President Akayev compared Turkey with the morning star, guiding the Turkic 
republics along with the ad hoc organisation of the Azerbaijan Popular Front in 
Azerbaijan. In fact, the euphoric Turkish stance was initiated by the inauguration 
speech of President Turgut Ozal in the Turkish Grand National Assembly where he 
said that The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the USSR provided Turkey 
with a historical opportunity to be leader of the region and Turkey should have not 
missed such an opportunity that appeared for the first time after 400 years (as cited 
by Ekici, 2002:41). 
The situation was critical for Azerbaijan independence after the withdrawal of the CIS 
forces of the 366th Motorized Infantry regiment from Nagomo-Karabakh region. The 
conversation between the Armenian foreign minister, and his counterpart, Ali Akbar 
Velayeti resulted in an offer of Iran's assistance to resolve the ethnic conflict in 
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November 1991 but the proposal was not been taken up by the eithor party (Winrow, 
1995).0n the other hand, Azerbaijan's Prime minister, Hasan Hasanov held talks with 
Turkish Minister of State, Serif Eren and Education Minister, Koksal Toptan, in 
Ankara and signed a mutual education cooperation agreement on 29 February 1992 
(yeogm.meb.gov.tr). Due to Iranian initiatives, the Turkish-Azerbaijani ties were not 
particularly strong until the de facto leadership of Elchibey. But after his seizure of 
power in Baku, Turkey-Azerbaijan cultural interaction resulted in state-supported 
private schools, press services, and television and radio broadcasting, which 
facilitated Turkey's highlighting of the regions geographical difficulties and promote 
the pro-Western and secular education in Azerbaijan. 
8.2.1.2 The failure of the Iranian mediation effort (February to May 1992) 
Iranian mediation efforts began when the ethnic Armenian forces broke through the 
Azerbaijani territory to create a corridor linking Armenia to Nagomo-Karabakh, 
causing the resignation of Muttalibov on 6th March 1992 (Hiro, 1994:64). The next 
visit of the Iranian foreign minister, V elayeti, to Baku and Y erevan, resulted in a 
tripartite presidential summit in Tehran which led to the signing of a short-term cease-
fire, called the "Tehran Memorandum" on 16 March 1992 (Winrow, 1995:93-110). 
President Rafsanjani brought together Ter-Petrosian and acting Azerbaijani president 
Yacub Mamedov on 8 May to sign another agreement in Tehran, whereby the 
economic blockade of Armenia would be lifted. But due to the subsequent Armenian 
conquest of the last Azeri strongholds in Nagomo-Karabakh and the shelling of the 
Azerbaijani enclave of Nachichevan in May 1992, the Iranian unilateral mediation 
efforts were stalled (Winrow, 1995:98). In response to Armenian occupation of 
Shusha on 9 May, and a second corridor, Lachin, on 17 May 1992, the Iranian deputy 
foreign minister, Vaezi, denounced the acts: It is an undisguised aggression by 
Armenia. Hence, Iran considered Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and was 
totally opposed to any change of borders in the region (as cited in Rubenstein, 
1995:99) 
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8.2.1.3 Turkey's intervention into regional conflict 
Turkey's initiatives in the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict began with Prime Minister 
Demirel's visit to Washington on 11 February 1992, during which Turkey wanted to 
use the political power of NATO and the EU for its own interests. On the other hand, 
Turkish President Turgut Ozal's policy was different from that of Prime Minister 
Demirel, who warned the W estem countries in his speech at the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA) on 17 February 1992 that If Western countries support 
Armenia which does not accept any peace talks or negotiations, therefore,on regional 
war will be inevitable between both parties (Taskiran, 1995:164)." Turkey started a 
military exercise in the eastern part of Anatolia which was perceived as threat to the 
Russian presence in the region. CIS supreme commander, Marshall Y evgeny 
Shaposhnikov, stressed that We are carefully watching Turkey's activities in the 
Caucasus (Taskiran, 1995:166). Turkey had been helpful as a member of the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as it sponsored the 
Minsk Group peace process on Nagomo-Karabakh, but after the fall of Lachin on 17 
May, the Nachichevan Majlis speaker, Heydar Aliyev, called for Turkish military 
intervention. In response to the Turkish initiative, CIS supreme commander 
Shapasnikov warned that foreign military intervention in the Karabakh dispute could 
lead the world into Third World War (Hiro, 1993:97). American and European liberal 
rhetoric which pressured Turkey to abandon the economic blockade and provide 
humanitarian aid to Y erevan, created a great tension amongst the Turkish public. 
According to a deal by the Demirel government with Armenia, Turkey whould export 
100,000 tons of wheat to Armenia. Turkey also signed an energy deal with Y erevan 
which required Ankara to supply 300 million kilowatts during the 1992-1993. This 
seen as unacceptable by the Azerbaijan government and the foreign minister of 
Azerbaijan, Tofig Gasimov, stated that Turkey's policy as it is, is a stab in the back of 
Azerbaijan. However, due to public dissatisfaction and opposition critique, the 
Demirel government suspended the energy agreements and Turkey only recognised 
the Republic of Armenia but without starting economic and diplomatic relations, on 
the condition that Armenia withdrew from occupied territory of Azerbaijan. In return, 
Armenia did not recognise the Kars and Gyumri Treaty (1921). Nevertheless, pro-
Turkish-nationalist Elchibey had less faith in mediation and had initially hoped that 
Turkey would become more actively involved in the dispute when he took power in 
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Azerbaijan in June 1992 but his pro-Turkish policy and dream of the Greater 
Azerbaijan increased Turkey's informal political and economic penetration into the 
region (Bayir, 1999). 
8.2.1.4 The failure of the pan-Ttnrkism politics in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
During the Elchibey government (June 1992-June 1993), the political relations 
between Azerbaijan and Iran were virtually suspended, but economic ties between the 
two were consolidated. During a visit by Foreign Minister Tofig Gasimov on 18-20 
August 1992, to Tehran, the two countries renewed economic and diplomatic relations 
by deciding to open new consulates in Tabriz and Nachichevan ( Hezirev, 1992:6). 
Elchibey's speech on 2 February 1993 guaranteed that southern Azerbaijani people 
could be recruited to the state bureaucracy, aimed at decreasing the anti-Turkish 
internal politics of Iran (Cafersoy, 2001). Elchibey made his first foreign visit to the 
Black Sea Economic Corporation Organisation (BSEC) meeting on 24-27 June 1992. 
He said that We consider Turkey as a model on the path of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
(Hezirev, 1992:6). Turkey also provided military training for the Azerbaijan military 
forces. It is reported that 520 military personnel were trained in Turkey. During his 
second nine-day trip to Turkey between 28 October and 5 November 1992, he gave a 
speech at the Turkic speaking countries summit in Ankara on 31 October 1992, but 
his pro-Turkish rhetoric was not applauded by the other Turkic states ( Hezirev, 1992). 
However, Elchibey sent the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) 
director, Sabit Bagirov, to Ankara and the two countries then signed the secret Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline agreement in March 1993. But after the June military coup of Aliyev, 
this agreement was cancelled (Cafersoy, 2001). By April 1993, Armenians had used 
this opportunity and captured Kelbajer with the support of the 7th Russian army in 
Armenia, opening a second corridor between Nagomo-Karabakh and Armenia. 
President Turgut Ozal said that If we do not show our teeth, this question will never be 
solved, which implied a military option could be ordered. Ozal appointed Mustafa 
Afsin who sought legal bases for possible military action against the Armenian 
intervention into Nachichevan. When President Turgut Ozal made his last visit to 
Turkic state in April 1993, he said Turkey is always with Azerbaijan but Armenians 
are forcing our patience in Baku (Hunter, 1995). Since 1993, Turkey-Armenian 
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diplomatic relations and border crossings have been frozen (Henze, 1996). After 
Ozal's death, Turkey abandoned his revisionist policy and returned to a bureaucratic 
policy model towards the region (Uslu, 2003). On the other hand, the relations 
between Russia and the Azerbaijan government were uneasy. Even though the 
Muttalibov government joined the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) in 
December 1991, Majlis speaker Yacub Memmedov did not recognise the agreement, 
and tension between Russia and Azerbaijan grew during the leadership of Abulfaz 
Elchibey because Azerbaijan only joined the CIS summit with 'observer' status 
(Cafersoy, 2001). While the close periphery doctrine (similar to the Monroe doctrine) 
of Russian foreign policy in the near abroad recognized the independence of the 
Azerbaijan Republic in April 1992, Elchibey asked for Y eltsin to remove Russian 
troops from Azerbaijani territory during a Moscow meeting on 12 -13 October 1992. 
1 0,000 Russian troops withdrew ahead of schedule, but left a huge arsenal of weapons 
under the control of Colonel Suret Hussein-a political enemy of the anti-Russian and 
pro-Turkish Elchibey (Cafersoy, 2001). 
As a result of the military coup, Elchibey fled to Nachichevan succeeding, Heydar 
Aliyev, a former Soviet intelligence chief of the Komityet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosty (KGB) in Azerbaijan and a member of Brezhnev's Politburo, who 
eventually become president of Azerbaijan and choose Huseinov as his prime minister 
(Cafersoy, 2001).In 1993, Armenian forces broke the cease-fire and attacked the town 
of Agdam in July and captured Fizuli and Goradiz on the Iranian border. In spite of 
UN Security Council Resolution 822, which called for immediate, complete and 
unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from recently occupied areas of 
Azerbaijan in August, Armenia held on to about one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory 
and caused some 1 million civilians to flee their homes (Durch, 1996). It is estimated 
that 40,000 people were evicted in this conflict (Kanbolat, 2007). Turkey and Iran 
repeatedly warned Armenia after the fall of Goradiz and Iranian troops did crossed 
into Azerbaijan, provoking a strong reaction by Moscow. Azerbaijan's counter attack 
in mid -December provided an incentive for action by the UN Security Council, with 
Turkey and Russia encouraging the Minsk group initiative, set up in 1992. However, 
in September 1993, President Aliyev visited Moscow and announced that Azerbaijan 
would join the CIS (Cafersoy, 2007). After this rapprochement, Kremlin's new 
initiatives to resolve the Nagomo-Karabakh issue brought together Levon Ter-
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Petrosian and Aliyev in Moscow and they came together for another negotiation in 
September and later in the Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) meeting in December 1993 
(Smolansky, 1995:213). In January 1994, Yeltsin's special representative on 
Nagomo-Karabakh, Vladimir Kazimirov, conducted negotiations with officials from 
the Iranian foreign ministry (Smolansky, 1995 :215). After Moscow and Tbilisi signed 
a treaty of mutual assistance, which provided for the establishment of Russian bases 
on Georgian territory and the stationing of the Russian border troops along the frontier 
with Turkey, Grachev announced that Russia wanted to establish military bases along 
the Azerbaijani border with Iran (Smolansky, 1995:215). Nevertheless, in late 1993, 
Azerbaijan-Iran relations entered a new stage as Heydar Aliyev's foreign policy 
priorities switched from Russian-Iranian relations to Turkish-Western ones. Therefore, 
President Aliyev visited Ankara to strengthen his hand against Moscow and Erevan in 
the negotiations (Cafersoy, 2001). 
8.2.1.5 The achievement of Russian mediation efforts: ceasefire in May 1994 
A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek 
under the auspices of the CIS Parliamentary Assembly. Armenian forces had 
resoundingly defeated the Azeri army and gained control of almost all of Nagomo-
Karabakh, leaving it de facto under ethnic Armenian control and freeing the enclave 
from any kind of Azerbaijani rule or influence. In addition, the entire territory 
between Karabakh and Armenia (Kelbajar and Lachin), and areas in the east and 
south of Nagomo-Karabakh (Aghdam and Fizuli to the border with Iran) were taken 
under control by Armenian guerillas. However, no final settlement has ever been 
signed, even though Minsk initiatives have produced 15 presidential talks since 1994 
(Adler, 1998:69-118) Despite the declaration of independence by Nagomo-Karabakh 
after the unliterated a referendum held in the region in December 2006, the 
international community still recognises the region as a de jure part of the Azerbaijan 
state( Agacan,2006). 
The failure of Iran's initiatives in mediation and its pro-Armenian policy irritated the 
Azeri population in Iran, and ended the Caspian energy development project, called 
the Contract of the Century thereby accelerating the growth of Washington-Baku 
relations. After 9/11, Azerbaijan provided airspace and intelligence to support US 
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policy of the War on Terror, thus leading to the lifting of the American aid ban, 
imposed during the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict. But the assembly' s foreign policy 
decision to recognize the Armenian genocide between 1915 -1918 is still an effective 
political card against both Baku and Ankara (Palabiyik, 2007). Tehran followed a 
rational and pragmatic course after the ceasefire. The freezing of the conflict helped 
develop Tehran-Baku relations, especially in trade with Nachichevan and cooperation 
on oil transactions with Turkey. Nevertheless, The Kremlin politics still play a 
deterrent role in the region because Russia still operates a military base in Armenia 
itself. Furthermore, in April 2006, Russia bought Armenian pipelines and a power 
generation facility, exchanging it for a 50% gas discount in comparison to European 
tariffs until 2009. Russia also gained control of the pipeline running from Iran into 
Armenia as the result, permitting it to affect Iranian influence in the Caucasus. 
Armenians were appreciative of the Russian armed forces as a counterweight to 
Turkey's influence, particularly as Armenia is a traditional Russian diplomatic ally. 
The map shows the final border and Armenian occupied territory in Azerbaijan as of 
the ceasefire in May 1994. 
Integrated maps 8.1 : Final border of May 1994 in Nagorno-Karabakh 
Georgia 
Caspian Sea 
Azerbllljan 
From Azerbaijan's perspective, the autonomy of Nagomo-Karabakh undermines its 
territorial integrity. Azeris believe that Armenia wishes to usurp the areas of upper 
Karabakh, and Nakichichevan and accuse it of conducting ethnic cleansing in these 
areas. Baku alleges that the Armenian stance and boycott of Nagomo-Karabakh is 
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proportionate in the light of rebel opposition by Armenian forces, and refusing 
diplomatic efforts with the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), which it does not 
consider as a legal entity. Azerbaijan stated that diplomatic acknowledgment of (NKR) 
by Armenia will be taken declaration of war. Turkey supports all mediation efforts as 
well as Azerbaijan's politics (Szayna, Larrabee, 1995). On the other hand, though 
Armenia supports the resolution of 1989, stating that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of 
Armenia, Y erevan has neither enforced this resolution nor recognised the NKR 
government, fearing that such action may result in war and provoke the surrounding 
countries such as Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan. The eo-chaired mediation efforts by 
the OSCE-Minsk Group will continue, but the situation will unlikely to produce a 
resolution. 
8.2.1.6 The activities of the United Azerbaijan Movement (UAM) 
Azerbaijan and Turkey began to use the Azeri ethnic political card to lessen Iran's and 
Armenia's influence in the region (Cornell, 1999:92). Turkey also has a reason to 
support Azeri nationalism, namely to reduce Iran's support for the PKK insurgency. 
With parallel nationalist intuition, Baku allowed the opening of a headquarters of the 
National Liberation Movement of South Azerbaijan (NLMSA) and the United 
Azerbaijan Movement (UAM) in Azerbaijan. In return, Tehran closed the Shams 
Tabriz newspaper and its chief editor, Ali Hamidian, was arrested by the Tabriz Aras 
court on 11 December 2001(0lson, 2006). Muhammad Ali Johragani's separatist 
activities intensified relations between Azerbaijan and Iran when he began to criticise 
Persian chauvinism and discrimination against Iranian Azeris during his visit of 
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and European countries. His Washington visit was critical as it 
coincided with the Bush government's announcement of an "Axis of Evil." He said 
that 70 million Iranians were grateful for President Bush's 29 January 2002 
declaration that Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea were part of the Axis of Evil 
(Olson, 2004:207-13). In return, Khatami called the Caspean Sea the Mazandaran Sea, 
angering Aliyev during his Tehran visit. Aliyev said There is no such name as the 
Mazanderan Sea on world map. If there is a lake with that name in Iran let me know 
about it (Olson, 2004:207-13). The visit of the Turkish President, Ahmed Necdet 
Sezer with a 120-member trade delegation to Tabriz on 3 June and Tehran on 17-18 
June 2002 diminished the tension between the two countries (Olson, 2004: 148). Sezer 
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held talks with Khatami, vice president Muhammad Reza Aref and Iranian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Muhammad M. Aminzade on issues ranging from improving trade 
relations to security issues. Six months after Sezer's visit to Tehran, Mahmud Ali 
Johragani arrived in Washington DC on 8 August 2003, stayed in Washington 
between August and June 2003 and met with Pentagon officials, Paul Wolfowitz and 
Douglas Feith. He said that the role of the US is to communicate to the Iranian people 
their firm support for their democratic aspirations and human rights and to let them 
know their voice is heard (Olson, 2004). However, Turkey always refrains from using 
the Azeri ethnic political card against its counterpart despite the activities of Azeri 
nationalists in Turkeym, and even though Iran's demographic structure is vulnerable 
for penetration by Turkey. Turkey maintains this policy that respects and ensures 
Iranian sovereignty for the sake of regional stability. Hence, Azerbaijani nationalism 
is not considered a prime issue between Turkey and Iran but the potential capacity of 
Turkish nationalism always results in suspicions by Iran against Turanism ideology, 
which is the main reason for the mistrustful relationship between Turkey and Iran. 
Figure 8.2: Ethnic Groups in Iran 
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Sources: The Institute for National Security in cooperation with Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at 
Tel Aviv University, Iran military balance Online at: www.inss.org.iUupload/(FILE)ll98577424.pdf,· 
compiled by author 
8.2.1.7 Russian military presence Armenia (1992-2017) 
The Russian 1 02nd military base in Gyumri, about 120 kilometers (7 5 miles) from the 
Armenian capital, Y erevan, includes constitutes a portion of the anti-air system of the 
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CIS and was installed in 1995 (http://en.rian.ru/world/20061006/54574689.html). The 
5,000 - person outpost is subordinate to the South Caucasus Russian command and 
wields S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) systems and MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters (Ridder, 2007). 
In 2005, the 102nd military base had 74 tanks, 17 infantry fighting vehicles, 148 
armored personnel carriers, 84 artillery pieces, 30 MiG-29 fighters and a number of 
batteries of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. Russian forces have 29 gendarme stations: 12 
stations in Gyumri, 4 in Ahuryan, 2 in Aragac, 1 in Esterek, 7 in Y erevan, and 1 in 
Kafan. There are 2 in military bases in Nubarasan. According to a 25-year strategic 
military agreement between Moscow and Y erevan signed in February 1992, the 
Russian border command operates on the borders of Armenia with Turkey and Iran 
uses 1500 soldiers (Cababrli, 2004). According to SIPRI databases, Russia has sold 
US$ 531 millions of armaments to Y erevan since independence (SIPRI, 2008). On the 
other hand, this dependency on Russia undermines Armenia's independency process, 
because Moscow bought a military factory at Nairit, the Mars and Hrazdan 
Hydroelectric stations and other 5 major other factories from Armenia on 17 July 
2002(SIPRI:2008). 
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Table 8.1: Russian military bases in Armenia (1992-2017) (Generated by author) 
Number of 
Military bases 
2 
3 
5 
6 
8 
9 
5 
21 
16 
56 
57 
Location 
Gyumri, Big castle 
Gyumri, Kirpic street. 
Gyumri, Kars road 
Gyumri, Bulvar street. 
Gyumri, Cerkesdzor street. 
Gyumri, Sirakaci street. 
Gyumri, Ozanyan street 11 
Gyumri, Plehanov street/20 
Gyumri, Sverdlov street/222 
Gyumri, Kamo street/46 
Gyumri, Bulvar street. 
Gyumri, Bulvar street. 
The city of Ahuryan, Ovuni 
village 
The city of Ahuryan, A~ik village 
The city Ahuryan, Azatan village 
Sources: (Kenjetaev, 1997) 
Numbers of bases Location 
2 
54 
41 
63 
58 
3 
4 
52 
60 
61 
The city of Aragats , 
Kervansaray village 
The city of Aragats, Gehadzor 
village 
The city of Ahuryan , Keti 
village 
Yerevan, Kenakeri street/54 
Esterek/Egvard 
Yerevan, Orbeli street/29 
Yerevan, Siraki/24 Babayan 
street /4 
Yerevan, Babayan street/4 
Nubarasen town 
Nubarasen town 
Yerevan, Ayvazovski street 
/13 
Y erevan, Arinderd steet 
Y erevan, Araratyan street 
The city ofKafan, Ohtar 
village 
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8.2.1.8 Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan (1985-2012) 
The strategically important Russian early-warning system in Azerbaijan maintains the 
global security connection between Russia and the southern Caucasus. The major 
Soviet Union air defence structure, the Daryal-type Gabala Radar Station, was 
constructed in Azerbaijan's Gabala region (320 kilometres northwest of Baku) in 
1978 and began its operations in 1985. It is designed to monitor the launch of inter-
continental ballistic missiles in the southern hemisphere. The speaker of the Turkish 
parliament, Omer Izci, expressed concerns about the Gabala-contract's ongoing 
expansion until 2012 during a February 2003 trip. Nonetheless, the Azerbaijani 
parliament's speaker, Murtuz Eleskerov stated that "Turkey might use this base in the 
future, and the information to be obtained by Gabala might be shared with Turkey" 
(cited in Ogan, 2003). The Daryal-class station can cover range of 7,200 kilometres 
with the capacity to follow ballistic objects and other entities in 2-3 seconds, 
calculated speed, and direction to one millimetre precision. It can cover Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, Pakistan, and India, parts of China, Africa, Australia and portions of the Indian 
and Atlantic oceans. The mid-range and ICBM weapons that can be fired from these 
areas may be tracked with superior accuracy by this installation when juxtaposed 
against satellites. It is said that Tomahawk and cruise missiles fired from American 
ships and plans during the Afghanistan war were located right away by Russia 
through the Qabala installation (Ogan, 2003). It also reportedly yielded intelligence on 
the Iran-Iraq and the second Gulf War. An agreement was signed in 1996 to declare 
the base's affiliation with Azerbaijan (Ogan, 2003). It stipulated a maximum of 1,500 
persons at the installations, both Russian and Azerbaijani, with the latter numbering 
about 500. The Gabala station is a significant card which Azerbaijan wishes to deploy 
against Armenia. Baku wishes to trade Gabala for Russia's alliance on the Nagorno-
Karabakh issue as it considers its position to have been very generous on the base 
previous. Russia is expected to cut Y erevan's support in exchange. Nonetheless, Putin 
stated that The Nagorno-Karabakh problem should be solved through a formula, 
which contains no winners or losers. This brought forth the fact that Russia tries to 
avoid strategic commitments against third party countries including Armenia (Ogan, 
2003). A statement by the Russian Air Force Commander General Anatoli Kornukov 
is useful in understanding the situation, as he stated that CIS air systems completely 
controlled Turkish air space. In February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
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Lavrov stated that Russia will not permit NATO enlargement to the southern borders 
of the country. Putin suggested joint use with the US of the Azerbaijani station to 
solve the US missile defence conflict over Eastern Europe whilst at a G8 summit in 
June 2007. He stated that this installation could detect Iranian experimentation with 
missiles capable of European attack and could nullify the need for US installations in 
the Czech Republic and missiles in Poland. Whilst his delegation looked over the site 
President Aliyev on 10 June corroborated the proposal by considering it to be 
enhancing of his country's ties with the country. However, the officials emphasised 
they would refuse cooperation if any attacks were launched against Iran, as it has a 
large Azeri minority. They also rejected speculation that the US shield will be 
deployed in the country, despite its cooperation with US and NATO. Neither Y eni 
Azerbaijan, MP Mirzazade nor analyst Musabekov believes Iran's reaction to be a 
grievous threat to Azerbaijan. They stated that "it is possible that Iran will not be 
happy with the idea. However, we should know that It [Gabala station] is a defensive 
system (Iran Press, 12 June 2007). After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, 
the possible Russian interference in Azerbaijan will become critical for both Turkey 
and Iran.The Ukraine and Georgia are now major arms-trade partners of Azerbaijan 
while Turkey provides military training, only having sold $US 3 million worth of 
military equipment to Baku in 2001. As a GUAM member state, the Ukraine sold 
$US 250 million arms and equipment to Azerbaijan (SIPRI, 2008). U/1 Infantry 
Company of Azerbaijan also sent 150 military troops for operation in Iraq, whereas, 
the U/1 Support Unit of Armenia only send 46 troops (globalsecurity.org). The 
Pentagon gives practical training to the Caucasian states' military personnel in war 
zones in Iraq. Whilst the US Turkish and Israeli initiatives in Azerbaijan seem to be 
mostly an exhibit of soft power, the Russia-Iran axis has a more systematic 
relationship with Armenia. 
8.2.2.0 The ethnic instability in Georgia and its impact on 'furko-Iranian 
regional competition 
Georgia is located at the intersection of the East and the West and played an important 
role by hosting 150,000 Soviet troops during the Cold War. The post-Soviet and post-
9/11 international order dramatically increased the significance ofTbilisi's new policy 
orientation towards NATO-EU. Georgia transports between 5 and 45 million tonnes 
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of oil annually by means of its ports and the southern Caucasus pipelines from 
Azerbaijan, including possibly oil from Kazakstan and Turkmenistan as well as 
Uzbek cotton, and Kazakh metal ores, now shipped through Georgia. It also has 
control over an important portion of the Black Sea coast which borders Turkey, land 
locking Armenia from the West at the geographic intersection of Turkey, Iran and 
Russia. Its importance has increased since the finale of the Cold War. The Silk Road, 
a massive venture, will one day include roads (TERRACE) railroads (Kars-Tbilisi-
Baku), airports, and communications networks extending from London to China. The 
effect would be to change entirely the economic and political landscape of the region, 
in ways likely to undermine Turkish and Iranian priorities. The rebels usually form 
alliances with one of the blocs, including Abkhazian, Armenian and Ossetes rebels 
placing their weight behind the Eastern bloc of Russia, Armenia, Iran, Greece and 
Turkmenistan in exchange for Caspian Sea oil and pipelines, while Chechnya's and 
Azeris prefer the Western bloc including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan 
and the United States. Despite having Russian peacekeeping forces in the pro-Russian 
Abkhazia at Sukhumi and mixed peace forces in the pro-Russian Tskhinvali in South 
Ossetia, Georgian president Saakashvili's pro-Western policy has faced a train crash 
in Bucharest and a miscalculated attack that led to the deaths of over 2000 Ossetians 
and re-involvement of Russia in the region. Since the declaration of independence, 
Georgia has played no significant role in determining the international borders in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The diagram below, based on the last Soviet Russian 
census in 1989, is valuable in understanding the ethnic instability in the southern 
Caucasus. 
Figure 8.3: Ethnic distribution in Georgia & Abkhazia, 1989 
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8.2.2.1 Abkhazian- Georgian war/conflict 
Abkhazia spans 3,300 square miles between the eastern shores of the Black Sea and 
the main Caucasus range; from the rivers Psou (in the north) and Ingur (in the south). 
To the north, Abkhazia is bordered by Russia and to the south by the Georgian 
provinces of Svanetia and Mingrelia. It was annexed by Russia in 1864, with 60% of 
its population forcibly relocated to Turkey, resulting in empty villages and swaths of 
land. According to the Turkish census in 1945, 8,602 speakers of Abkhaz were 
recorded. It is now estimated that more than half the Abkhazian people live in Turkey 
and regularly apply pressure on the Turkish government against Georgian pro-
nationalist policies in the region. Therefore, Turkey is not considered to be an outsider 
to the Abkhazian conflict. But Ankara and Tbilisi have managed their differences and 
maintained a geostrategic partnership during the war. Georgia's more prolonged war 
with Abkhazian separatists, which broke out in August 1992, ended in Edward 
Shevardnadze's government's defeat in September 1993. This led to loss of the 
Abkhazian Republic in Sukhumi in which separatists achieved an 83 % control of the 
region, the deaths of 20,000 and the dislocation of 200,000-300,000 Georgian people 
from their homes in areas controlled by Abkhaz allies (Mooney, 1995). In the course 
of the conflict, Russian, Chechen, Cossack and Muslim fighters from the north 
Caucasus and Abkhaz volunteers from Turkey fought Georgia. Boris Y eltsin, the 
Russian President, proposed a similar-sized counterbalancing force to end the ethnic 
dispute. Four Russian bases in Georgia and 1,000 CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia to be 
exchanged for Georgian integrity of territory. Georgia had to agree although Russia 
reneged on its end of the deal by supporting the Vladislav Ardzinba group in Sukhumi, 
the Abkhaz capital. 
8.2.2.2 The mediation effort of regional players in the Abkhazian-Georgian 
conflict 
Georgia had to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbouring agreement with 
Russia and agree to join the CIS on 8 October 1993 after a visit by the Russian 
defence minister, Pavel Garachev. According to the CIS security arrangement, the 
Russians agreed to establish four military bases in Georgia's ethnic conflict zones 
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(Bradshaw, 1994). Whilst the agreement on military facilities gave 15,000 Russian 
troops joint use of all Georgian ports, airfields and border guards, which remained on 
the Georgian part of the Turkish border, the Georgian parliament never ratified these 
agreements (Fuller, 2006:26). The peace talks between Georgia and Abkhazia under 
Russian and UN auspices (the UN had been active in Georgia since autumn 1992) 
resulted in the December 1993 signing of a MoU and in May 1994 a ceasefire 
agreement as well as a deal on the deployment of a Commonwealth Independent 
States, Peacekeeping Force (CIS, PKF), to be monitored by the United Nations 
Observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). These arrangements put in place 1,500 
Russian peace-keepers patrolling 24 km-wide security zones.The UN was not a major 
help to Abkhazia regardless of its participation in peace dialogue since 1994 for it 
failed to solve the dispute and integrate Abkhazia back into Georgia. Though the city 
of Batumi was accepted in the National Pact and has guarantor status of Turkey over 
the question of Georgian Muslim minority right in Ajara, and Khemsili Muslim, 
Turkey has supported the Tbilisi government and every solution which the 
counterparts has accepted under UNOMIG ( Stavropoulou, 1998). Morever, the 
foreign minister of Turkey, Hikmet Cetin, visited Georgia in May 1992 and signed the 
diplomatic protocols according to which both parties recognise the legacy of the Kars 
Treaty in 1921 ( Celikpala,2006). Ankara only pressured Georgia to make active 
policies for repatriating the Meskheti Turkish diaspora. However, the demographic 
settlement made it impossible to relocate the returnees due to the fact that Javakhetia 
Armenians compose 60% of the population after the deportation ofMaskhati Turks in 
1944 from the region (Aydingiin, 2002). Turkey commenced active diplomacy with 
President Demirel' s visit to Georgia. Both parties signed the friendship cooperation 
and neighbouring agreement on 30 July 1994 (Hurriyet 14 May 1994; Newspot, 13 
May 1994; Moscow News, 15 July 1994). However, the ethnic conflict and guerrilla 
activities of Georgian guerrilla forces undermined the peacekeeping activities of the 
UN despite some achievement. For instance, between 1993 and 1998, 40,000 
Georgian refugees returned home to the Gali district, where in 1993 they made up 
100% of population after the peacekeepers were deployed in a security zone along the 
Inguri River. On May 19, 1998, Abkhazia transported heavy guns and armour into 
Gali, a Georgian-demographic part of Abkhazia, exiling 30,000 Georgians and 
demolishing homes. Since the CIS-PKF's inception, although there have been 
discussions both within the CIS and the UNOMIG, 1,500 to 2,000 men have 
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controlled the zone of responsibility. But by the end of June 2008, their numbers have 
had increased to 3,000. On the other hand, the UNOMIG observer mission currently 
consists of some 121 observers and the UN Security Council regularly extends its 
mandate. 
Integrated map 8.2: the peacekeeping arrangement of CIS PKF and UNOMIG in the conflict 
zones of Georgia 
BLACK SEA 
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Sources: UNOMIG, 2007 
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8.2.2.3 The Ajara, Javakhati (Akhalkalak) and Meskhetian repatriation question 
and presence or removal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Georgia 
Conflicts perservere between Tbilisi government and Aslan Abashidze, a pro-Russian 
figure in the Georgian region of Ajara near the Black Sea, faciliated by Russian 
military forces stationed there. Georgia has doubts about the feelings and loyalty of 
the Armenian groups in the J avakheti region near Armenia, where a Russian military 
base is located near the town of Akhalkalaki. 
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Figure 8.4: Ethnic distribution in Adjara in 1989 
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The 1989 census indicates that the Ajar Republic contained a total population of 
381,000. Georgians constituted 317,000 of that number. The number of Ajar 
(Georgian Muslims) has been estimated to be around 130,000-160,000 or 34-42% of 
regional population. Most of the Ajar see themselves as Georgian. However, for most 
locals, 'Georgian' means being Georgian. The A jars are Muslim and are therefore, not 
considered real Georgians. Before the election in January 2008 in Georgia, President 
M. Saakashili revealed his conversation with Putin who said that "I would make 
Georgia a second Cyprus" in the summit in 2006 (Kamalov, 2007). Turkey is still the 
guarantor of the Ajara region where most of the population is Georgian Muslim. 
Georgian troops at the frontier in Ajara regions are directed by Asian Abashidze, 
using recruitment within that region. The Russian base in Batumi and Akhalkalak 
sparks further conflicts. At the OSCE Istanbul Summit on 17 November 1999, which 
was a part of the adaption of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, in 
accordance with the Istanbul joint statement, Russia promised to shut the V aziani base 
in Abkhazia and stated in June 2002 that its Gudauta installation was shut, with only 
320 soldiers remaining to aid the Russian "peacekeepers" (Oliker, Szayna 2003 :36). 
It has already done so. Whilst Russia agreed to close down its military bases in 
Batumi and Akhalkalaki at the end of 2003, it only reduced its military hardware to 
241 tanks 153 armoured combat vehicles and 140 artillery pieces. A train composed 
of 32 carriages, moved 60 122 mm artillery shells and parts to a howitzer, totalling 
200 tons of cargo, from the Batumi base on the Black Sea to Russia via Azerbaijan. 
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By the end of 2006 all the heavy military equipment will be removed from 
Akhalkalaki and remaining weapons from Batumi by 1 October 2007 (Nezavisimoye 
Voyennoye Obozreniye, 23-29 November, 2007: p.3). 
Integrated Map: 8.3.Russian military presence in Georgia, (1992-2008) 
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As mentioned in Chapter Three, Meskhetian Muslims, or Meskhetian Turks (Ahiska 
Turkleri) were deported in 1944 from Samtskhe-Javakheti to Central Asia. In 1989 
and 1990 Meskhetians survived a pogrom They were targets of local ethnic violence 
in Central Asia and many of them left Uzbekistan for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Russia and were resettled in Azerbaijan, in Krasnodar and Stavropo, Krai Ukraine and 
in Kabardino-Balkaria in Russia (Calep, 1997:12-16). According to the last Soviet 
census of 1989, Meskhetians numbered 207,500 while current estimates for them are 
between 270,000 and 320,000 (Henze, 1991). In 2001 between 90,000 and 110,000 
lived in Azerbaijan where the state policies of Azerbaijan are more favourable to 
immigrants who are given Azerbaijani citizenship (Matveeva, 2002). Although 
Georgia accepted the conditions for joining the Council of Europe in 1999 that it 
resettles Meskhetians by the end of 2008, the Tbilisi government has been slow in 
executing the promise and also requests a declaration of being ethnic Georgians. 
Therefore, there have been very few applications to date, due to uncertainties 
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regarding the recognition of the ethnic and religious identities of the applicants. On 
the other hand, the prospect that returnees will be faced with another domestic 
problem is met with overwhelming local resentment by Georgians and Armenians in 
their ethnic homelands in the period prior to their deportation. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
wary of upsetting their relationship with Georgia, support the Meskhetian right to 
return, but conditional on its acceptance by the Georgian side. Under the combined 
pressure from the UNHCR, the OSCE together with the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) recommended the passing of legislation allowing repatriation, and a 
draft law was presented to the Council of Europe in March 2001. Meskhetian minority 
organisations such as Vatan, registered in 1994 in Russia, and Hsna, registered in 
Georgia in 1992, and the Union of Georgian Repatriants and the Latifshah 
Baratashvili Foundation were established later in Georgia in order to resettle the 
Ahiska Turks in their homeland in Georgia. After the August 2008 Georgian-Russian 
War in South Ossetia, there appear to be few prospects of any progress toward the 
resettlement of Ahiska Turks in their homeland. 
Integrated map 8.4: Deportation and exile ofMeskbetians (1947-1953 and 1992) 
Note: yellow arrow: deportation in 1947-1953, red arrow; deportation in 1992 
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8.2.2.4 Turkey's and Iran's policy option on the Chechen question and its 
connection with the Pankisi Gorge 
Turkey's rapprochement to the southern Caucasus and support of pan-Turkish 
activities in Tatarstan, Bakirdistan and Chechenya frustrated the Kremlin, for instance 
hosting the Chechen leader Cevher Dudayev and the meeting with Presindent Demirel 
in October 1993 on the verge of the first Chechen War (1994-1996) (Bennigsen, 
1999). Therefore, Russia accused both Turkey and Georgia of harbouring and 
supporting Chechen rebels. On the one hand, the strained relations between Georgia 
and Russi. Goergia rejected the joint-action plan against Chechen militants in the 
Pankisi region of Georgia (German, 2004). Countries which were involved in 
assisting Chechnya included Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, 
the secessionist Abkhaz republic and Tajikistan, as well as the Russian regions of 
Ingushetia, Kalmyk and Astrakhan, particularly areas along the routes to/from 
Azerbaijan through Dagestan. The usage of the ethnic political card against Turkish 
initiatives forced the formation of GUAM and strengthened the Georgian ties of 
Georgia with intensified dialogue at NATO. Proposals were made to work with 
NATO to fund this force within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program, 
which was established by NATO to strengthen ties with former eastern bloc and 
former Soviet states (Chikvaidze, 1994:27). However, after 9/11 Russia became the 
an ally of the West against global terrorism. This gave Russia some latitude in the 
Second Chechen war (1999 to present) against the guerrilla fighters. Still, Turkey and 
US governments were not happy to see Russian jets bombing the Pankiski area of 
Georgia (German, 2004). Therefore, the Bush administration sent a small contingent 
of US military personnel to Georgia to help train and equip Georgian security forces 
to combat the Chechen, Arab Afghani, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups who had 
infiltrated Georgia in 2002 (Soner and Gencsoy, 2007). Hence, Georgia launched a 
second security operation and deployed 1,000 troops (following another in January 
2002) on 24 August 2002 (Nichol, 2007).Regardless, the rivalry between Turkey and 
Russia was dissipated when Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish PM, visited Russia at the 
launch of its attack on Grozny, Chechnya. He did not defend the Chechens and this 
was appreciated as a 'real politik' act in the mutual relations (Reynolds, 2002). The 
countries inked a 4 January 2004 military cooperation agreement resulting in 
exchanges of officers between military academies (Smith, 2002). On 14-15 January 
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2002 the Russian Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, with a significant group of 
officers/intelligence personnel, made a trip to Turkey and spoke to Chief of Staff 
Kivrikoglu {TDNs, 15 January 2002), in the hope that Turkey and Russia could 
achieve stability through cooperation. 
8.2.2.5.0 Ethnic instability in South Ossetia: Georgian-Ossetian conflict 
Ossetes, Tats and mountain Judaists are considered to be Persian-speaking people in 
Caucasus {Tatiana, and Perepelkin, 1996: 80). Hence, Iranian people call them Cenubi 
Persians. The Soviet divide and rule strategy delimitated Ossetia as South Ossetia and 
North Ossetia. The largely Christian people of South Ossetia was established as an 
autonomous region (oblast) within the Republic of Georgia in 1920s but the larger 
number of Ossetians (350.000 in the 1989) lives in the North Ossetian Autonomous 
Republic of the Russian Federation. In the 1980s the population in South Ossetia was 
65,200% Ossetes and 29 % Georgians. In 1989 more than 60 percent of the Ossetes 
population of Georgia lived outside South Ossetia. 
Figure: 8.5. South Ossetia population distribution, 1989 
South Osetla population distribution In cencus,1989 
5,100,5% 
• Ossetians 
• Georgians 
• Others 
Sources: Soviet Cencus, 1989; compiled by author 
South Ossetia declared its independence from Tbilisi in August 1990. Georgian 
autocrat, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, launched a military campaign against the pro-Russian 
Ossetians to crush all efforts at autonomy in South Ossetia. Sending guerrilla troops 
into the capital of Tskhinvali caused 160,000 Ossetians to flee North Ossetia into 
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Russia. Most of the Georgian population in Ossetia was displaced to Georgia and 
replaced with I 00,000 Ossetians living in other parts of Georgia at the end of year 
(Herzig, 1999). Ultimately, in June 1992 a cease-fire was signed between Georgia 
and South Ossetia. The combined peace-keeping forces of Ossetia (1100), Georgia 
(300), and Russia (530), supervised under a Joint Control Commission (JCC), were 
located in the region but the negotiations were not under the auspices of any 
international organisation, though the OSCE had had a resident mission in Georgia 
since 1992--but its mission was always low profile. Neither Turkey nor Iran had any 
policy priorities in the Ossetian-Georgian conflict until the Russian-Georgian war 
began in August 2008. 
8.2.2.5.1 The Russian-Georgian War or Russian peace-keeping operations in 
South Ossetia (8-12 August 2008) 
In a November 2006 referendum, 99 % of South Ossetians voted for independence 
from Georgia, at a time when most of them had long held Russian passports. On 7 
August, Georgian president Saakashvili's miscalculated attack and killing of 2,000 
Ossetians (Chossudovsky,2008), led to the rationalisations of a 5-day Russian military 
invasion into Georgian territory "as an effort to protect the lives and dignity of 
Russian citizens, wherever they may be", as stressed by the Russian President Dimitri 
Medvedev (Chossudovsky, 2008). According to one report, some 34,000 people from 
South Ossetia fled to Russia (Deseret Morning News, 10 August 2008). During the 
five-day Russian-Georgian war between 8 and 12 August, Russia was aware of its 
engagement with W estem countries and Turkey's interest in Georgia. Therefore, 
Russia did not attack any essential Western investment such as the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline the Baku-Tbilisi and Erzurum natural gas pipelines, nor did it 
conduct any air attacks against Tbilisi and the Batumi airport, which are operated by 
the Turkish company, TA V under a management agreement with the Georgian 
government. Ultimately, the five -day war between Georgia and Russia was 
extinguished, but the ceasefire agreement needed skilfully negotiating by President 
Nicolas Sarkozy of France and agreed with his counterparts Dmitri Medvedev and 
Mikheil Saakashvili. The Turkish Prime Minister's subsequent visit to Moscow and 
Tbilisi enhanced Turkey's regional policy options; Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's 
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"Caucasus Pact" idea was considered an opportunity to create an inclusive (Russia, 
Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) new foreign policy approach to solve all 
the frozen or unfrozen conflicts while Ankara hosted the Iran' s President Ahmedinejat 
on 14 August2008. 
Integrated map 8.5: Russia-Georgian War map (8-12 August 2008) 
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8.2.2.5.2 The South Caucasus' external security context in the Russian-Georgian 
war 
Although Georgia is not an official member of NATO, its defence systems and 
military training are fully integrated into NATO procedure. In 2005, the Georgian 
president announced the inauguration of the Senakskaya and Gori military bases that 
were restored by Turkish companies, which fully meet NATO standards in Georgia. 
13 Turkish air forces military officers have provided Georgian pilot training in 
Senakskaya bases since the 1995 (Lebanidze, 2002). The Gori bases have also been 
used to train Georgian troops dispatched to fight under US command at the Iraq war 
theatre (Ria Novosti, 26 May 2006). Georgia has the third largest contingent of 
coalition forcers in Iraq after the US and the UK, with some 2000 troops. According 
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to reports, Georgian troops in Iraq are now being repatriated in US military planes (C-
17 strategic airlifters) to fight Russian forces (Y eni Safak, 15 August 2008). 
However, Americans claim that the C-17 flights carried 30 tons of medical supplies 
and humanitarian aid from Germany to the Georgian capital Tbilisi. Russian forces 
are now directly fighting a NATO-US, trained Georgian army which includes US and 
Israeli and Turkish army staff advisers. According to US military sources (spokesman 
for the US European Command), the US has more than 100 military trainers in 
Georgia. A Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said that there were no plans to 
redeploy the estimated 130 US troops and civilian contractors, who were stationed in 
the area around Tbilisi (AFP, 9 August 2008). The US has also informed Russia as to 
which Tbilisi hotel is housing 17 Marines who were training Georgian troops so that 
the Russians would not attack it, Pentagon officials said (Y oussef, 2008) While the 
NATO and US military advisers did not partake in the military operation per se, they 
were actively involved in the planning and logistics of the attacks. 
The United States of America have provided Georgia with US$30 million in annual 
military assistance, Turkey and Israel have made US$ 1 00 million and US$ 300 
million worth of military equipment since 2000 (Peter, 2008). Today Saakashvili's 
army consists of 30,000 men, and his military budget is 30 times as large as it was 
during the term of former president Shevardnadze. However, the consequences of the 
war opened a Pandora's Box by triggering regional instability in the Caucasus. During 
the five- day war, Armenia breached the security contract between Tbilisi and 
Y erevan by allowing Russian aircraft to bomb Georgia. Hence, the Tbilisi government 
revised once more its relations with Y erevan. They will likely end up in a conflict in 
the Javakheti region (Yillmaz, 2008). Several hours after the ceasefire was announced 
on 12 August, Saakashvili declared that Georgia would leave the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and, following the missile defence system deal between 
Poland and United States announced that this would bring the most severe 
confrontation of two major powers since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia acted as trump cards and gave an opportunity to Moscow as if it 
were the West Bank of the Caucasus and allow for the possibility that Georgia will 
not able to gain control its internationally recognised territory (Kanbolat, 2008). From 
the Russian standpoint, the Caucasus has been a buffer zone near the Turkish and 
Iranian frontiers since the days ofthe Tsars. Washington, Tel Aviv and Ankara, on the 
327 
other hand, are courting Georgia, which they see as a way to curb Moscow's influence 
in the southern Caucasus. However, they have not become involved in any conflict in 
the northern part of the Caucasus yet. Georgia is now also an important transit country 
for arms to Armenia for Moscow and oil being pumped from the Caspian Sea to the 
Turkish port of Ceyhan as well as a potential base for Washington efforts to encircle 
Tehran. 
8.2.3 Overview of the internal and external security resettlement in the southern 
Caucasus 
The multifaceted Russian presence, including a thousand military, peacekeeping and 
border troops in Georgia and Armenia and also 1 ,500 troops at the Gabala radar 
station in Azerbaijan have acquired a continueing status through the signing of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty (CST) by 
Armenia, Russia, and others in 1992 in order to provide mutual aid and ensure the 
security of the ethnic groups in the conflict zones in the region. Although Azerbaijan 
and Georgia withdrew from the SST in 1999, Russia still secured permission for two 
military bases in Armenia and three in Georgia and Russian border troops guard 
Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran, continuing to put pressure on Tehran and 
Ankara. More than 100,000 Russian troops also are stationed nearby in North 
Caucasus. Although Russia has already diversified its foreign policy and attempted to 
strengthen engagement with the West, the Georgian-Russian war in August stopped 
the normalisation of Russian relations with the Western countries and increased 
concern about the security of energy transports through Georgia -Turkey and the 
Black Sea. 
On the other hand, Washington has considered Turkey as a country able to foster pro-
Western sentiments, and to limit Russian and Iranian influence. The Azerbaijani view 
Turkey-Israel as a major ally against Russian influence in Armenia and Georgia. 
Despite having structural obstacles, Armenia is a member of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation organisation, along with Turkey, and the two states have established 
consular relations. Iran is a major trade partner with Armenia, partly due to having 
200,000 Armenian citizens in Iran. In contrast, Georgia has an abiding interest in ties 
with the approximately 1 million Georgians residing in Turkey and the approximately 
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50,000 residing in Iran, and has signed friendship treaties with both states (Nickol, 
2008). Turkey's policy in the Caucasus is mainly dependant on NATO's approval of 
an Intensified Dialogue between Georgia and the alliance that might lead to 
membership, which could minimise the Russian presence in the region. At the end of 
February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russia "will 
not permit" such NATO expansion. The Membership Action Plan for Georgia was 
faced with a serious challenge by the Russian military operation in August 2008. 
Therefore, Turkey did not support Saakishvili's violence which triggered the war and 
did not want to risk its improved relations with Moscow. In the framework of the US 
war on terror, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian forces worked as peacekeepers in 
Kosovo as part of the NATO force, with Azerbaijan also aiding efforts in Afghanistan. 
After Kosovo's declaration of independence, Georgia withdrew its 150 peace-keeping 
forces from Kosovo in April 2008, as it prepared to focus on troop deployments to 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, Azerbaijan (150 in August 2003), Armenia (46 in 
January 2005) and Georgia {2,000 in 2002) dispatched and deployed military troops in 
Iraq. Georgia has the third-largest number of troops in Iraq, after the United States 
and the United Kingdom (Jibladze, 2007). However, Ankara and the Pentagon's 
security capacity in the region was shown to be filled with holes, due to the Russian 
action or so called 'peacekeeping operation' in South Ossetia. 
The ethnic instability is shown in map 8.6 below; in addition to Nagomo-Karabakh 
conflict, Azerbaijan is vulnerable to Russian intervention in Lezgihan (171,400 in 
Azerbaijan in the census of 1989) on the border with Dagestan ( ethnologue.com) and 
open to Iran's influence over Tat in the border with Iran (24,000 Tat reside in 
Azerbaijan in Census 1989) (www.thnologue.com). After the Georgian-Russian war 
in August, Russian leadership clarified that there is no guarantee of Georgian 
territorial unity after Saakashvili's slaughter of his own people. The autonomous 
regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia are now under Russian influence as is the region of 
Javakhati, which open up possibilities for Armenian interference in the region. The 
ethnic Swans in the Pankisi Gorge region still remain in a safe haven for guerrillas in 
the Caucasus. Additionally, the recent war shows that Turkey and Georgia have 
serious problems, especially in the resettlement of Meskhatians diasporas and the pro-
nationalist policy of Saakashvili in the Adjara region. 
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Integrated map 8.6: Population migration and displacement in the southern Caucasus, 1988-2004 
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8.3.0 Religious roots of instability in Central Asia and its impact on Turko-
Iranian regional competition 
The head of the Council of Muftis in Russia, announced that Russia's population of 
144 million contains 23 million ethnic Muslims in Volga-Ural and then northern 
Caucuses today, a rise of 40 % since 1989. An estimated 3-4 million Muslims are 
migrants from former Soviet regions, including 2 million Azeri, 1 million Kazakhs, 
and several hundred thousand Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz (Pipes,2005). By 2020, with 
the present growth rate, Muslims will account for 1/5 of the entire population of 
Russia (Al-Jazeera, 13 January 2007). However, the role of political Islam in Volga-
Ural has been insignificant due to 400 years of Russian political, economic and ethno-
cultural domination, higher levels of industrialisation, urbanisation and subsequent 
secularisation of the population and a large proportion of non-Muslim, mainly 
Russian, population. On the one hand, for historical and social reasons, the 
proliferation of radical Islam has been most intensive in the F ergana Valley, which in 
politico-administrative terms is divided between the Central Asian republics of 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. During the heyday of the Taliban regime 
(1996-2001) Afghanistan had become the epicentre of terrorism with sanctuaries and 
training facilities provided to the likes of AI- Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of 
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Uzbekistan (IMU). Since 1999, the main agents of Islamic radicalism in Fergana 
valley has been Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islamii (Party of Islamic Liberation, HT) and to a 
lesser extent Akramiyya in Tajikistan. Neither Turkey nor Iran is happy to see the 
Saudi -backed activities of radical Islamist groups in Central Asia. Though Tajikistan 
is, religiously, Sunnite and in direct connection with the Fergana Valley, which has a 
different religious interpretation from the Iranian version of Islam, the Tajiks-Iran 
language connection provides Tehran with a cultural sphere of influence throughout 
the region, similar to Turkey's language and cultural connections with Azerbaijan. 
8.3.1 The war on the Iranian periphery: Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and the 
Taliban connection 
Tajikistan is the only country in the cultural sphere of influence of Iran in Central 
Asia. The Iranian deputy minister emphasises that the expansion of Iranian and 
Tajikistani ties was a natural continuation of common history between the two nations, 
which was disrupted during 70 years of communist rule (Rundle, 1995: 114). After the 
independence declaration on 9 September 1991, Iran was the first country starting 
diplomatic relations with Dushanbe by opening the Iranian embassy, at the location of 
which the street name was renamed from Maxim Gorky to Tehran. The statute of 
Lenin was replaced with that of Iran's greatest epic poet, Ferdowsi (Mesbahi, 
1995:112-146). In fact, the Tajik language is very similar to Persian, spoken in Iran, 
and to Dari, spoken in Afghanistan. This cultural lineage encouraged Iran to establish 
the Association for Persian-Speaking Countries which organises cultural connection 
with Tajikistan by adopting the Persian alphabet instead of the Cyrillic (Afrasiabi, 
1994: 117). In response, the Tajik government embraced its historical legacy of 
Samanids and Iranian cultural heritage in Khorasan, allowing Iran to make inroads in 
Central Asia (Beeman, 1999). However, civil war broke out in May 1992 between the 
old-guard supporters of the government, backed by Moscow and a loosely organised 
opposition composed of disenfranchised groups from the region of Garm, Gorno-
Badakhsan democratic liberal reformists and the Islamic Renaissance Party of 
Tajikistan (IR T) (Hiro, 1994). Iran wanted to play the role of mediator in the conflict. 
In the meantime in June 1992, President Rafsanjani said that Iran is ready to become 
involved in negotiations with opposition groups when Nabiev was visiting Tehran 
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(Hunter, 2003). However, anti-government demonstrations in the capital, Dushanbe, 
escalated civil war between pro-government forces and opponents of the Islamic-
Democratic block, who then tried to show their military strength and unity during the 
bloody days of September-October of 1992. During an intense conflict in the winter 
of 1992-93, the conservative Kulyabi and Khojent militias with Russian, and Uzbeks 
assistance restored the former communists to power in Tajikistan (Horsman, 1999). 
Uzbekistan is the only historical competitor of Iran in this conflict zone, because 
Uzbekistani people comprise 23.5% (1,198,000) ofthe Tajikistan population provide 
Kerimow and thus can interfere with Tajik internal affairs (Vesniki: 1990:12).0n the 
other hand, the conflict threatened the domestic stability of Uzbekistan because Tajik 
people compose 4.3% (934.000) ofUzbekistan's population. The Tajiks p comprise in 
Afghanistan consists of 27 % of the population. This divided the nation and inflamed 
ethnic conflicts at the borders of these countries (Vesniki: 1991 ). 
Figure 8.6: Population distribution in Central Asia, 1989 
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Therefore, the Tajik civil war is not regarded only as an internal issue but also as a 
threat to global stability. This vulnerable region forms a regional alliance system with 
sub-national groups. Tashkent had officially set up a close relationship with Uzbek 
general, Rashid Dostum of Afghanistan who received direct economic and military 
aid from Tashkent and Ankara. On the other hand, Russia and Iran aided the other 
member of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. The regional partnership ofUzbek and Turks continued at this first stage 
but Ozal's support for the Erk Party leader, Muhammad Salih, irritated the Kerimow 
government (Y eni Safak, 15 June 2002). While the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-
Tajikistan triangle presents the greatest military danger in the region, Iran became the 
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main protector of the Islamist Tajik opposition groups including Ak:bar Turajanzode, 
who had taken refuge in Iran, making it necessary to bring Iran into the diplomatic 
process. Iran supported the Dushanbe youth movement and played a key role in 
removing the Nabiev government in September, but this policy by Iran was in conflict 
with Russian interests in the region because Dushanbe postponed the signing of the 
Tajik-Russian Treaty on Mutual Cooperation, which was planned for September in 
1992. Iran also gave a US$50 million credit to Tajikistan and provided the cultural 
materials to expand its influence in Central Asia. However, Iranian influence 
increased the instability in the region and internal conflict marked the second 
anniversary of Tajikistan's independence as the people were experiencing the 
bloodiest civil war in the history of the republic in September 1993. As a result of the 
civil war between 1992 and 1997, over 80, 000 people died, over 800,000 have 
emigrated to other states of the CIS, and roughly 100,000 fled or were deported to 
Afghanistan (Mesbahi, 1997). The republic has also lost a significant proportion of its 
own intelligentsia as well as around 150,000 Russian speakers; primarily engineers, 
technicians and skilled workers. Moreover, over 80,000 industrial enterprises were 
destroyed (Bondatrevsjky, and Ferdinand, 1994:46). 
The leadership of Emomali Rakhmon suppressed political opposition and imposed 
strict media controls and the supreme court banned all opposition parties, leaving the 
Communist Party of Tajikistan as the only legal party. Ultimately, CIS' collective 
security council agreed to send troops to Afghan-Tajik border to prevent Islamist 
guerrilla groups infiltrating from their safe haven in Afghanistan in August 1993 
(Moroney, 2004:345). Mesbahi claimed that Iran's foreign policy against the Islamist 
movement is pragmatist because Iran was concerned about the spread or escalation of 
these conflicts as well as the possibility of foreign interference in near its border and a 
refugee flow into Iran (Shahabi, and Farhi 1995). Therefore, Iran started mediation 
efforts with the cooperation of Moscow in August 1995, with Tajikistan's president, 
Imamali Rakhmanov, and Abdullah Nouri, the leader of Tajikistan's Islamic 
opposition, being invited to Tehran, and in the presence of Rafsanjani signed an 
agreement to settle their differences peacefully on 18 September 1994.Nevertheless, 
Islamist rebels took over population centres in south-western Tajikistan in 1996. The 
impressively quick successes of the Taliban in Afghanistan in September 1996 
facilitated Russian-Iranian collaboration. As the Sunni Taliban are hostile to Iranian-
333 
supported Shi'a groups in Afghanistan and its fundamentalist attitudes are an 
embarrassment to Iran, Iran tried to stop the Taliban (Rashid, 2000). It set up a 
regional conference in Tehran, which Russia took part in; Russia's leadership, which 
was worried about penetration of Taliban's influence to Central Asia or even Russia 
itself (20 % of the population is Muslim), supported this platform (Rashid, 2002). 
Primakov's trip to Tehran in December 1996 had this issue at the top of the agenda. 
Ultimately, with Iran's aid, Russia agreed a ceasefire deal between the Tajik 
government and the United Tajik Opposition, signed in February 1997. Involvement 
included by CIS PKF in October 1993, the Russian 999th Airbase in Kant, 
Kyrgyzstan, and the Gatchina Base No. 201, formerly the 201 Motorised Infantry 
Division - which is deployed in Tajikistanis as well as command, intelligence 
gathering, radar, communication, and testing and firing range facilities, also in 
Kazakhstan ( ITAR-TASS, 8 February 2008). 
Integrated map 8.7: Russian military presence in Central Asia 1993-
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The instability in the region resulted in the launch of another post-Cold War regional 
organisation, as leaders of China, Russia and four Central Asian states announced the 
Shanghai Five, to fight ethnic and religious militancy while promoting trade and 
investment in 1996-1997 (sectsco.org ).Meanwhile the murder of 9 Iranian diplomats 
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by the Taliban created a furore in Iran, bringing Iran and Afghanistan close to war on 
8 August 1998. Anger at the militant group led Iran to deploy 70,000 troops on the 
border with Afghanistan and made Taliban-Iran relations extremely hostile prior to 
American-led invasion of Afghanistan (Douglas, 1998). The assassination of the 
Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud dramatically changed the regional 
balance of power prior to the coalition forces' occupation into Afghanistan. Turkey 
was concerned about the regional instability; the Turkish foreign ministry announced 
that We consider the death of Ahmed Shah Massoud as an important loss for 
Afghanistan and added Information about the assassination points to the fact that it 
was not committed only by internal fractions, and this situation will make the solution 
to the problems in Afghanistan more difficult (Turkish press review, 18 October 2001). 
After 9/11, Tajikistan was quick to offer support to the US-led anti-terror coalition, 
and doubled the number of border guards along its 1 ,300-km frontier with 
Afghanistan to prevent movement by al-Qaeda members in July 2002. The US, 
French and Russian troops still remained to prevent the terrorist infiltration between 
the Tajik and Afghan borders and US and French troops received logistic support to 
operate Afghanistan operation from Tajikistan this military bases. Turkey's effective 
role in NATO was not conflictual with Iran, therefore, Iranian Foreign Ministrer 
Kamal Kharrazi and his counterpart Ismail Cem held talk about Afghanistan in 
Turkey on 5 November 2001. (Iran Mania Current Affairs, 6 November 2001). Tehran 
demanded support from the International Security Assistance Force's commander 
General, Hilmi Akin Zorlu who took command in June 2002 (The Independent, 11 
February 2003). Shortly afterwards, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited 
Dushanbe and announced a boost Russian military presence until April 2003 (Olson, 
2002). Although Turkey has no military installation abroad, it plays an effective role 
in the Western security system with Hikmet Cetin twice leading the ISAF in 
Afghanistan between January 2004-August 2006 and its 1,000-plus troops are 
engaged primarily in the reconstruction and enhancement of Afghanistan's 
infrastructure as well as training the Afghan police forces (Frank, 2008). Russia is the 
only main arms trade partner of Tajikistan. According to SIPRI arms transfers' 
database, Moscow sold US$40 millions worth of arm to Dushanbe between 1992 and 
2007 (SIPRI, 2008). 
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8.3.2 The failure of pan-Turkish politics of Turkey in Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan is the second largest producer of gold in CIS and fourth largest producer 
in the world and still claims the legacy of Tamerlane in the NIS. President Islam 
Kerimow is aware that the strategic political culture of his country and its natural 
resources allow him to behave as a regional actor. Though he supported the pan-
Turkish policies of Turkey until 1995, Turkey's invitation of the Erk party leader 
Muhammad Salih created the diplomatic cnsts m 1994 and 
1999(www.muahmmadsalih.info). Kerimow neither followed the path of the Turkish 
model nor the Iranian revolutionary model of Islam but pursued the authoritarian 
secularist model of Ataturk and Reza Shah in 1930s. After ascension by Uzbekistan to 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Iran's participation of the SCO as an 
observer, Kerimow challenged the systemic triangle of Turkey-US and EU. The role 
of China seemed to be competitive with Western interests initially but in the future, 
many political analysts believe that China will become the main competitor for 
Russian and Iran. Up to now, Turkey-US-ED tranquilisation allowed to operate the 
BTC pipeline which bypasses Iran, Russia and Armenia. However, closing by the 
Turkish Minister of Education of schools in 1994 and Gulen's missionary school 
September 2000 and the following Andijon events resulted in strained Uzbek-Turk-
EU and US relations that were exacerbated after the removal of American troops from 
Khanabat military bases in 2005.0n the other hand, the regional system in Central 
Asia is more stable than the Caucasus mini system. The major player in the region is 
Russia, Iran, Turkey and China but the region can be viewed as a dependent system 
(Agacan, 2007). SIPRI arm transfers databases show that Russia exported US $ 12 
million to Uzbekistan since 1992 (SIPRI, 2008). 
8.3.2.1 The stage of Islamic Extremism and the removal of Gulen's missionary 
schools from Uzbekistan (September 2000) 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union from 1989, Fethullah Gulen's group 
moved into the Central Asian Turkic states with small- and medium-size businesses 
and educational institutions. Turgut Ozal (prime minister 1983-89; president 1989-93 
in Turkey), an enthusiastic supporter of this new venture, wrote to the Central Asian 
leaders about the Gulen movement and how these people could benefit the new 
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countries. Despite geographical advantages for Iran, Gulen groups have still 
challenging Iranian revolutionary politics and Saudi-backed Se/eft movements by 
operating private economic, educational and cultural sectors in the CIS (Turkone, 
2005). The Gulen movement was portrayed as an integrated Islamist model and the 
new Turkish - nationalism was supported by Washington and Belgium. Therefore, the 
authoritarian leaders of the new republics are highly intolerant of Islamic activities but 
Gulen's group is very careful not to provoke these rulers. The management of these 
schools in each republic is in the hands of a general directorate (Genel Mudurluk) 
located in the capital city and affiliated to a big education company in Turkey. 
Uzbekistani-Turkish schools are operated by Silm Anonim Sirketi, situated in Bursa 
in Turkey and Kazakh-Turko schools were run by Feza and Selale (in 
Istanbul).Turkmen and Kyrgyz Turkish schools were set up by Sebat (Adapazari) and 
Baskent (Ankara)( Demir, et al2000). Turkish firms in the area operate as subsidiaries 
for the Gulen groups, financing schools' building and running. Nurcu firms were also 
part of the business groups and ran many of these such as Ozbekistan ve Turkiye 
Isadamlari Dernegi (the Association of Uzbek and Turkish Businessmen, UTID) , 
Kirgizistan ve Turkiye Isadamlari Dernegi (The Association of Kyrgyz and Turkish 
Businessmen (KITIAD). Kazakistan ve Turkiye Egitim Vakfi (The Kazakhstan and 
Turkey Education Foundation (KA TEV) is completely Nurcu, but Kazakistan ve 
Turkiye Isadamlari Demegi (the Association of Kazakh and Turkish Businessmen, 
KATIAD) is not directed by Gulen's businessmen. Turkiye Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar 
Vakfi (the Foundation of Journalists and Writers of Turkey), and Asya Finans, which 
intend to find funds for investments in the Turkic republics in October 1996 are 
reputable Nurcu institutions (Balci, 2003). Prime Minister Ecevit said that "these 
schools spread Turkish culture and information about Turkey to the world and they 
are under the continuous supervision of our state" (Anatolia News, 22 June 
1999). The chart shows the soft power of the Gulen groups below. 
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Table 8.2: Distribution of Gulen's School in CIS 
Country or region Number of school number of pupils Teachers from Turkey Universities 
Azerbaijan 16 3133 264 
Kazakhstan 33 4733 412 
Kyrgyzstan 13 1872 146 
Georgia 4 244 
Tajikistan 7 952 70 
Turkmenistan 22 3665 275 
Uzbekistan 
Sources: Oran, 2003; compiled by author 
In contrast, the Turkish state established Turkish International Cooperation Agency 
(TICA) to co-ordinate the public and private sectors to cooperate with the new state, 
especially in education and culture, and technical fields in each NIS (Winrow, 2007). 
However, Turkey's great expectation from the 'Great Student Project' agreement 
between Turkey and Turkic states were not fulfilled in the region especially after 
Turkish-Uzbek diplomatic crisis in 1994 and 1999 (Oran, 2003).Turkey rejected the 
request of the Uzbek officials to hand over the chairman of Erk, Muhammad Salih, 
and Abdurrahman Polat, chairman of Birlik, who fled as refugees to Turkey when they 
were threatened by its Uzbek government (Turksam, 2005). Uzbekistan pulled out all 
of the students studying in Turkey and deported Turkish student who were studiying in 
Uzbekistan in 1994. Tashkent claimed that the students were getting dangerous ideas 
from Turkish groups and the Uzbek opposition in Turkey (Oran, 2003). There is now 
only a single Turkic primary school which provides education services for Turkish 
student in a suburb ofTashkent. However, Turkish state schools in other countries still 
play a very effective role for the transformation of society in which official and non-
governmental schools account for 10% percent of the Turkic states. 
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Table: 8.3. Turkish Ministry of Education Schools in Central Asia and the Caucasus (2007) 
Military 
current 
Turkish personnel 
Country School Staff Student student in 
Graduate educated in 
Turkey 
Turkey University 
Azerbaijan 3 51 785 1202 712 520 
Kazakhstan 2 30 2502 736 552 95 Yesevi University 
Kyrgyz- Manas 
Kyrgyzstan 4 66 3209 1372 794 45 University 
Turkrnenist Turkrnen-Turkish 
an 4 58 3413 1399 570 265 university 
Uzbekistan 14 223 286 5 
Tajikistan 3 208 73 
International Black 
10 
Georgia Sea University 
Sources: Turkish Minister of Education, 1997, pp.229-247, Sabah January 1997: compiled by author 
In fact, the authorities saw Islamic fundamentalism becoming powerful in the Fergana 
valley which is the most fertile and densely-populated in Central Asia, and which is 
divided between Uzbekistan (Andijon, Fergana, Kokand and Namangan), Kyrgyzstan 
(Batken, Osh, and Jalalabad) and Tajikistan (Khodjent). But it is now seen as an 
Uzbek heartland because Uzbek demographic distribution in the region provides a 
great political advantage for Tashkent to interfere with the internal affairs of 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan (www.enews.ferghana.ru). 
Figure 8.7: Distribution of Uzbek population (1989) 
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However the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Fergana 
valley, established by Juma Namagani and Tohir Yoldashev with the aim of 
overthrowing Islam Kerimow's government in 1998, decreased Uzbekistan's 
penetration of the region (Reuel, 2004). The IMU began to move towards the Afghan 
Taliban and Ethnic-Tajik Shah Ahmed Messouds (Northern Alliance) military sectors 
and launched a series of audacious raids into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Erol, 2005), 
But six blasts in Tashkent on 16th February killed 16 and injured over a hundred 
people. Militant figures in exile were observed as part of the inquiry into the attacks, 
including the leader of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Tohir Y oldosh, and 
the military chief, Juma Namangoni, who had pronounced a jihad against the Uzbek 
state in August 1999 (Polat, 2007). The Batken locality in south Kyrgyzstan was 
assaulted by IMU militants trying to get to Uzbek areas and incite an Islamic rebellion 
on 5th August 2000 (Polat and Butkeyich, 2005). Battles between government units 
and Islamic militants in mountains of southern Uzbekistan yielded 15 deaths and 
numerous casualties. United Tajik Organisation leaders and particularly its former 
chief commander Mirzo Ziyiev, currently the minister of rescue and emergency 
situations in Tajikistan, have close ties Uzbek fighters and their leaders, Juma 
Namangoni, considered Ziyoev's right hand man and personal friend (Jones, 2006). In 
an interview with RFEIRL, the Erk (Freedom) party leader, Muhammad Salih, denied 
the accusations of the Uzbek government but admitted that he met Tohir Yoldosh 
several times in Turkey, but did not reveal this fact or the subject-matter of deals 
(birlik.net). Salih also stated that he had acquainted Y oldosh with Zelimkhan 
Yandarbiev the ex-acting president of Chechnya. Yandarbiev, is a fundamentalist 
Islamist and a long-standing friend of Salih (Polat and Butkevic, 2005). In fact the 
absence of the great cleric Abdullah Murzaev, increased the regional tension and 
strengthened the link between Taliban and Chechen fighters and the Tajik radical 
Islamic movement. Turkey's unofficial support of the opposition and Uzbek officials' 
accusation against Ankara, for being a supporter of terror against Kerimow's regime 
harmed the bilateral relations. Uzbekistan recalled its students from Turkish 
universities and in turn, Ankara recalled its ambassador from Tashkent in mid-1999 
(Haeri, 2004 ). Moreover, Turkey invited Muhammad Salih to the 1999 OSCE summit 
in Istanbul, but he could not come to Turkey due to pressure by Tashkent (Erol, 2005). 
Turkey cooperated with Uzbek officials--the secretary of IMU, Zayniddin Askarov, 
who was accused of masterminding the Tashkent bombings (Erol, 2005). On the other 
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hand, Russian president Vladimir Putin abandoned poor relations with Tashkent and 
made a visit to Uzbekistan in May 2000. He responded to his counterpart's request for 
military help by declaring that any threat to Uzbekistan is a threat to Russia (Radio 
Free Europe, 18 May 2008). In contrast, the US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright's trip to Uzbekistan, as well as those ofthe directors ofthe CIA and FBI, in 
spring 2000, provided Kerimow with the opportunity to make a bargain between the 
two great powers (www.civilsoc.org/resource/albright.htm). However, Turkey's 
relations with Uzbekistan were completely frozen after the failure of Turkic-speaking 
countries summits, the sixth of which Kerimow and Saparmurat Niyazov refused to 
attend in Baku, Azerbaijan in April 2000. The closure of the Gulen schools in 
September 2000 completely cut off bilateral relations while the Pentagon requested 
the abandoned Soviet air base Khanabat in Uzbekistan for use in military operations 
against Al-Qaeda and Taliban after 9/11 in 2001(Winrow, 2007). However, the 
groups were mostly destroyed while fighting alongside the Taliban against the 
coalition forces in 2001; the IMU leader Namaganis was killed in Qunduz in 
Afghanistan and the fighters were dispersed. However, Yuldoshev and his fighters 
escaped with the remnants of the Taliban to Waziristan (border of Afghanistan) in 
Pakistan (Rahid, 2007). Whilst Iran sheltered the families of Uzbek and Tajik radical 
Islamists in the Zahidan region, it was in serous conflict with the Taliban government 
and lead to Iranian support of the US-led occupation of Afghanistan until the Bush 
government declared Iran to be in the "axis of evil" in 2001. However, Uzbek-Iranian 
relations were unlikely difficult due to support by Karimov for the US trade embargo 
against Iran in the 1990s and the closer politico-military ties between the United 
States and NATO, after US military bases where located in Khanabat (K2) and 
Kyrgyzstan Manas Airport could mount military operations into Afghanistan 
(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,26 July 2004). On the other hand, the Kremlin convinced the 
Kyrgyz government to allow the Russian Air Force to set up its own base less than 70 
miles from Manas in Kant-which marked the first foreign deployment of Russian 
forces abroad since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 26 July 
2004). The role of Iran in the region was ambiguous, although the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Uzbekistan signed in Tehran six memoranda of understanding (MoU) on 
political issues, security and economic cooperation as well as a campaign against 
terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime on 17 June 2003 (IRNA, 18 June 
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2003). Uzbekistan is important for Iranian heavy trucks which have to use Uzbek 
roads to reach Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and also northern Afghanistan. 
8.3.2.2 Aftermath of the Andijon events (2005): the removal of K2 American 
military bases 
GUUAM, which was formed in 1997, was enlarged by one more member -
Uzbekistan, which joined the group at the GUUAM summit that was held during the 
NATO/EAPC Summit in Washington D.C. on 23-25 April 1999 (www.guuam.org). 
Unlike other sub-regional initiatives like the Black Sea Economic Co-operation 
(BSEC) groups or the Council of Baltic States, GUAM does not embrace Russia or 
countries outside the former Soviet Union (www.bsec-organisation.org). Defence 
cooperation took a quantum leap forward following 9/11 as Uzbekistan suddenly 
emerged as one of Washington's main strategic allies in the anti-terrorism struggle by 
volunteering the Karshi-Kahanabat air bases in October 2001 (globalsecurity.org). 
However, when Edward Shevardnadze played host to Kerimow, who believed that the 
democratisation trends unleashed by Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003 posed a 
threat to his regime, he cracked down on Open Society Institute activities in Tashkent 
(Yukselen, 2004). OSI chairman, George Soros, criticised the decision which he 
described as "stifling civil society. " He also called on the US government to re-
evaluate its strategic partnership with Tashkent (Eurasia Insight, 3 March 2008). 
Subject to approval by the US Congress on human right issues, Uzbekistan could 
receive military assistance ($1 0.5 million) and financial aid package (over $48 million) 
in 2004. However, Uzbekistan abandoned its anti-Russian stand and left GUAM in 
2000 and left the organisation in 2005 (Georgian Times, 12 February 2001). 
Uzbekistan decided to be a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
and hosted its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) event in Tashkent 
(www.ecrats.com). The May 12-13 2005 events in Andijon, wherein Uzbek units are 
said to have killed hundreds of civilians, incited regional attempts to curtail liberties 
and press rights. This came into conflict with the liberal rhetoric of Western countries 
but reaffirmed close ties between Kerimow and Putin (Jonson, 2004; Pottenger, 2004). 
Relations between Washington and Brussels, on the one hand, and Tashkent on the 
other have been in a deep freeze. Uzbekistan strengthened its relations with Russia, 
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and to a lesser extent, China. Tashkent signed a strategic partnership agreement and 
joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization with Russia. On 5 July 2005 
(Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 27 September 2005) the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan), agreed to a Russian-offered plan for deadlines regarding US/coalition 
base removal from Central Asian countries. On July 29, the Uzbek state ordered the 
US to stop operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase within six months (Nichol, 
2005). Tashkent is reported to have responded not only to Russian and Chinese efforts 
but also to US attacks which killed Uzbek protesters in Andijon (Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty 7 September 2005), (Human Rights Watch, 13 March 2005). The only 
Western country to have bases in the country is Germany, at the Kahanabat air bases. 
Berlin supported the suspension of EU sanctions against Uzbekistan during the visit 
of German foreign minister Frank-Waiter Steinmeier in 2006. Despite opposition of 
the US and UK, Germany managed to suspend the sanctions in 6 months and lifted a 
visa ban on the top Uzbek officials in May 2007 (The Economist, March 2007). 
However, a Central Asian "tilt" toward the US post-9/11 was evident, particularly in 
2001 and 2002, with all of the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan signing 
military cooperation and base access agreements with the US, as well as receiving 
significant economic aid packages. Uzbekistan especially benefited from increased 
US interest in the region, receiving not only an initial aid package worth US$150 
million but also the signing of an US-Uzbek "Strategic Partnership" in March 2002. 
The provision of US $3million in military aid to Kazakhstan in March, joint military 
exercises with Kyrgyzstan in July 2002 and the grant of US$1 million in military aid 
to Kyrgyzstan in October 2003, was the American soft-power influence on the Central 
Asian states. Partnership for Peace (PfP) encompassed Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek 
troops, attracting significant military assistance from the US to the region. Later, 
inter-state cooperation efforts in Central Asia in terms of security affairs stimulated 
common military exercises with the participation ofNATO, PtP, the US, CENTCOM, 
Russia and Turkey. However, American security engagement failed after the 
Uzbekistan's closure of the Karshi-Kahanabad bases. In fact, this loss for the 
Tashkent government also meant a loss for the regional governments. Up to now, 
Islam Kerimov's government has not allowed any democratic rhetoric of opposition 
groups and foreign interference, such as the wave of colourful revolutions and Turkish 
and EU support of the Erk party. This was because there is always a risk in 
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democratisation for the authoritarian state, with the leadership group preferring de 
facto authority to the public demand for democratisation. 
8.3.3 Uighur exodus and its impact on Sino-Turko-Iranian relations in Central 
Asia 
Kazakhstan's ethnic tensions result in the impossibility for its government to win a 
direct conflict with Russia as the latter can utilise Kazak wariness of Chinese 
increasing dynamism and the probability of distaste for Chinese influence in the 
Xinjiang region of the China. Uyghur exodus and Han Chinese population transfer to 
Xingjian sinificased Uighur Turks' motherland; almost 5,000 or 10,000 Uighur live in 
Turkey and 500 thousand Uighur Turks also emigrated to the Central Asian republics, 
mainly to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and many of them integrated into 
new societies. In 1990, Uyghur accounted for 47.47%; Han 37.58%; Kazakh, 7.30%; 
Hui 4.50%, and the rest accounted for 3.15%. The major change is the relative 
increase of the Han, mostly through migration. In terms of the Xinjiang 2000 census, 
Uighur account for 45.21%, Han for 40.57%; Kazakh 6.74%; Hui 4.55%; and the rest 
account for 2.93%. China felt threatened by the fundamentalist and extremist the 
Muslim elements in Afghanistan because of its vulnerabilities in Xinjiang and its 
problems with Muslim Uighur. 
Domocrllhk distril>utlon of bzbhsbn, In toto~ 16.74, 2003 census 
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• Manchu • Utbek a Russian 
• Tibetan • Zhuang Oaur • Kazakh • Russian • Ukranian I Uzbek • German • Uighur I Others 
• Taton • Others. 
Sources of Xinjiang: Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region bureau of statistics (XBS). 2001. Xinjiang 
Tongji Nianjian (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook) (XSY) 2001 Beijing: China Statistics Press./Sources of 
(Kazakh); compiled by author 
China has pursued a very pragmatic relationship with Kazakhstan, focusing in the last 
decade on securing energy assets. Initially China was more interested in making sure 
that the independence ofKazakhstan (as well as that of the other Central Asian states) 
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did not pose a threat to security in the Xinjiang province. But once the rulers in 
Beijing felt assured that the Kazakhs would provide no support for Uighur nationalists, 
who in Soviet times had enjoyed sanctuary in the Kazakh republic, their priorities 
shifted. China's reincorporation of Xinjiang in 1949 placed it in control of a 
geopolitical nexus between five great cultural and geographic regions of Eurasia -
China, the sub-Continent, Iran, Russia and Europe. However, throughout the 1949-
1991 period China was nable to take advantage of this strategic position due to a 
number of internal and external factors such as the various political and economic 
crises of the Maoist era and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations (McMillen, 
1979). Therefore, China established a significant security cooperation with the Central 
Asian states, including the Sino-Kazakh Mutual Cooperation Agreement on 23 
December 2002 extradition agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and 
bilateral agreements on cooperation in combating extremism, terrorism and 
separatism with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and for the return ofUyghur separatists in 
September 2003 concluded with the opening of the Regional Anti-Terrorism (RAT) 
centre in Tashkent on 1 November 2003 (Clarke, 2008). The Shanghai group 
conducted a joint military exercise on Kazakh and Chinese soil on 6-11 August 2003 
and completed the Peace Mission 2007 joint military exercises between 9-17 Augusts 
at Chelyabinsk (Interfax, 16 August 2007). A transcontinental railway project, (Kars-
Akhalkalaki-Baku railway) will connect Asian and European railway systems, and be 
a source of hope for an expansion of trade, increasing the Chinese presence in the 
south Caucasus. 
According to the SIPRI arms transfers database, Kazakhstan arm imports include 
US$726 million from Russia, Ukraine US$ 12 million, South Korea US$8 million and 
United States of America only US $25 million (SIPRI, 2008). According to the report, 
the casualties of ethnic conflicts total constituted 74,100 deaths in the Caucasus and 
82,870 deaths in Central Asia since 1989. None of the ethnic and religious conflicts 
could reach a resolution but still remain in abeyance form in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. The Russian-Georgian war has already triggered the first stage of an upcoming 
conflict, with some saying that a new Cold War began in August 2008. 
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Figure 8.9: The casualties in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1989-2008 
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8.4. Conclusion 
The domestic roots of instability in the Southern Caucasus have manifested 
themselves as ethnic -based conflicts that resulted in external power penetration. On 
the other hand, the domestic conflicts in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, are due to religious and global terrorism causes subsequently resulting in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The Sino-Central Asia security and economic 
cooperation endlarged Iran's role in the region but the competition between Chian and 
Russia-Iran is expected to rise in the future. The virtual state concept needs more 
international regulation for the enforcement of law and order in the southern Caucasus. 
The Pro-Russian Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazian authorities could 
serve as clients for Russia inside Azerbaijan and also as a sword of Damocles against 
Tbilisi and Baku's pro-Western policy option. According to NATO's intensified 
dialogue and the United State's policy of global war on terror, Washington and 
Ankara give practical training to Caucasian states' military personnel in the war zones 
in Iraq (www.globalsecurity.org). On the other hand, Russian military bases in 
Georgia and CIS peace-keeping forces have restored a Russian presence in the 
Southern Caucasus and undermine the UNIMOG observer mission in the conflict 
zones. Therefore, they have been no final settlement for the frozen conflicts in the 
region. Iran's foreign policy behaviour on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
cooperation in Chechnya, and the mediation efforts in the Tajik dispute have 
strengthened the Russia-Iran axis, which have pursued a pragmatic policy model 
against the proto-Turkish politics of Baku and growing initiatives of Washington and 
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Israel Meanwhile Tehran has benefited from the American operations after the 
toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam's regime in Iraq. Neither Turkey 
nor Iran could have used the political Islam in the Volga-Ural and or to pass through 
the southern Caucasus due to 400 years of Russian occupation of the Turkic and 
Muslim peoples in the region. The policy of a Turkish secular Islamic model could 
not solicit any political response from the regional entities and failed in Uzbekistan. In 
opposition to the activities of George Soros's Open Society Institute, Tashkent 
considered Gulen schools to be missionaries of the Soros foundation and soft power 
actors affiliated with Turkey which supports a revolution in Central Asia. Hence, even 
though the Yilmaz Government gave the state ministerial post to the Uzbekistani-bom 
Ahmed Andijon, Turkey's policy in Eurasia and cultural identity references to 
Samarkand were not reliable. The Kerimov regime used the military option to take 
control of radical Islamic groups' as such the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan (IMU) 
and brutally suppressed the civil disobedience in Andijon. Neither Turkey nor Iran are 
happy to see the Saudi-backed activities of radical Islamist groups in the Fergana 
valley and Chechnya-· which is understandable in light of the growing economic and 
military cooperation within Turkish-Russian-Iranian relations. However, the 
criticisms of Western countries, including Turkey, targeting the Kerimov regime, 
resulted in the pull out of GUAM and normalisation of its relations with Moscow. 
Though there is a potential competition between Sino and Eurasian states, Russia and 
China managed to establish the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent 
under the supervision of SCO. Hence, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of 
NATO failed in Central Asia just as NATO's intensified dialogue failed in the 
southern Caucasus. For instance, the joint military exercise named Peace Mission 
2007 between 9 and 17 August at Chelyabinsk demonstrated that Eurasia is in the 
process of constructing its own security system (lnterfax, 16 August 2007) 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
THE INFLUENCE OF PIPELINE POLITICS AND MIDDDLE-POWER 
INSTITlJTIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 
9.1. Introduction 
The Caspian Sea is a large circumscribed aquatic entity, around 700 miles from north 
to south and 250 miles east to west, situated between the Central Asian and Trans-
caucasian states. The oil and gas deposits are located in the offshore areas of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan as well as parts of Russia and Iran. 
Uzbekistan, despite not being a littoral nation, is the area's biggest gas outputter and 
so is counted as part of the region for this study. (APS Review, July 2006). 
Hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea constitute one of the largest unexploited oil 
and natural gas reserves in the world, situated strategically in the heart of Eurasia. 
Because during the Soviet period, the energy potential of the Caspian basin was 
closed to the world oil industry and it remained relatively undeveloped. Three 
significant projects lead the way in exploitation of resources in the area- the Kazakhs' 
Tengiz and Karachaganak fields; and Azerbaijan's Azeri, Chirag, and deepwater 
Gunashli (ACG) field. The cumulative production of the projects amounts to 30% of 
the region's production. Azerbaijan declared that it had found new gas deposits of up 
to 15 Tcf and 600 million barrels of condensate in 1999; Kazakstan at Kashagan 
claims practical deposits of 7-9 billion barrels of oil equivalent, with a further 
potential ofup to 9-30 billions in 2000. (www.eia.doe.gov). The strategic geographic 
location of the Caspian reserves and their magnitude has created a power game over 
their control, involving the world's major economic and political interests. Therefore, 
large oil companies are racing to invest billions of dollars to tap the unexploited 
hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea basin. The regional political situation 
created a new bipolar system; whilst Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have become, 
for all practical purposes, US territories of protection under the Silk Road Strategy 
Act 1999, in unified defence against China, Russia and Iran. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus remain geopolitically allied with Moscow 
(www.eurasianet.org). 
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With regard to the influence of Central Asia and the Caucasus on Turko-Iranianian 
relations, this study argues that energy is a primary factor in determining the foreign 
policy-making or relations of the new regional states. However, for Turkey-Iran's 
middle-power state institutionalism the ECO cannot create any alternative regional 
economic and security systems, but rather acts as a ground mediator between the 
international community and its members. This chapter mainly investigates the 
Caspian Sea resource management, the pipeline politics of Turkey, Iran, Russia, 
China and US-EU and ECO's role in the wider politics of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. 
9.2. Caspian Sea natural gas and oil sources 
Biological resources of the Caspian Sea, mainly fish resources, are estimated at US 
$5-6 billion per year (www.worldlakes.org) However, hydrocarbon (oil and gas) 
resources in Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkrnenistan and Russian, located under 
the sea bed as well as the on-shore proven oil reserves of the Caspian littoral states 
constitute 6.9/ 32.2 25 billion barrels, with projected oil reserves estimated at 158 
billion barrels, nearly 15 % of the world's total oil reserves. The proven gas reserves 
amount to 166 trillion cubic feet but estimated natural gas reserves are at about 294.3 
trillion cubic feet. Hence, the Caspian Sea basin is considered the fourth largest 
natural gas deposit in the world (www.cedigaz.org). Global energy needs are 
estimated to rise by more than 50% in the period 1993-2015, including, due to Asia's 
development, creating incentives for new energy sources in Central Asian and the 
Caspian areas. 
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Figure 9.1: Hydrocarbon deposit forecast s in the Caspian Sea and Uzbekistan (Generated by 
author, figure 1 and 2) 
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9.2.1 Caspian Sea resource management: exclusion of Iran from Azerbaijan's 
international hydrocarbon consortia (20 September 1994) 
The 'eternal fires' of Zarathustra have flared from Baku since the sixth century BC 
and the first Azeri oil was extracted by the Nobel brothers' petroleum company in the 
19th century (Goltz, 1998). More recently, Azerbaijan's president, Ebulfeyz Elchibey, 
made an important step towards Western interaction when he visited London and due 
to a subsequent visit of his successor, Heidar Aliev, in February, an agreement was 
concluded on production sharing (with a value of US $8 billion) involving the Azeri, 
and Chirag deep water portions of the Guneshli in 1992 (Cafersoy, 2007). The final 
version of this agreement was signed between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
(SOCAR) and British Petroleum (BP) at the Gulistan Palace in Baku on 20 September 
1994. This agreement, the so called "contract of the century'' inflamed the regional 
disputes on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, because it excluded Russia as well as 
Iran from the final decisions of the international consortium (Halliday, 2001), 
(Karagiannis, 2003). Even though Azerbaijan's president attempted to give a 5% share 
of SOCAR and AIOC to Iran, he failed to persuade the partners ofthe international oil 
consortium, due to the American policy of dual containment against Iran. Therefore, 
AIOC had to step back from offering of a 5% stake in SOCAR in 1995 (Golan, 
1998:16). In response to this, the Iranian media began to call Aliev the "the servant of 
America and Zionism." Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayeti claimed that 
"This would not be in the interest of Azerbaijan and the agreement [with AIOC] is not 
valid until the Caspian Sea' s legal status is solved" (Swietochowski, 1993:118-35). 
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However, Iran's opposition was not taken as a serious threat to the project while 
Russia still remains a major power in the region. Hence, AIOC agreed to give a 10% 
share of PSA to Russian Lukoil, which was part-owned (8%) by the American oil 
company ARCO. The joint venture, LUKARCO B. V, set up with British Petroleum 
also holds a 12.5% share in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and 5% in the 
development of Tengiz, a large oil and gas field in the West of Kazakhstan. Hence, 
Russia's explicit recognition of Azerbaijan's right to extract oil in its sector of the sea 
caused a direct conflict between the post-Soviet Russian state and the private sector 
oligarchy in December 1994 (Loza and et al.2006). The diagram below shows the 
final division of stakes (and therefore division of expenses) among the eleven final 
multinational signatories. 
Figure 9.2: The oil companies stakes on Azeri Chirag Deep Water Guneshli (generated by author) 
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However, OIEC of Iran managed to take a 10% stake in the Shah Deniz natural gas 
field in 1996 and the other Lankaran-Talysh's 10% stake in the offshore production 
sharing agreement among the seven oil companies in 1997. However, this positive 
attitude did not normalise Azerbaijan-Iran relations due to the pro-Iranian convictions 
of the Azerbaijan Islamist party leader, which further incensed the Baku regime in 
April 1997. A further factor was the growing Azeri-Israel connection, which increased 
Iran's concern regarding security. In 1999, the discovery of the Shah Deniz natural 
gas field (estimated reserves of 400 million cubic meters of gas) in the Azerbaijani 
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sector of the Caspian Sea appears to have boosted the region's natural gas export 
prospects. For the sake of the future, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-term 
natural gas purchase and supply contract on 12 March 2001. The project of the South 
Caucasus Pipeline, scheduled to carry natural gas from Sangachal via the Georgian 
capital of Tbilisi to Erzurum in eastern Turkey, where the natural gas will join the 
Turkish natural gas distribution system, arose as the result. Ultimately, Shah Deniz 
came online on 15 December 2006 (Fink, 2006). Thus, Azerbaijan is now delivering 
70 Bcf of natural gas to Turkey, rising to 233 Bcf in 2007 and this will continue until 
2018 (www.eia.doe.gov). 
Table 9.1 International oil consortium operating in Azerbaijan 
Company 
AIOC 
(Azerbaijan 
International 
Operating 
Company) 
Shakh-Deniz 
Lenkoran-Talysh 
Deniz 
Apsheron 
Nakhchivan 
Yalama 
Oguz 
Kurdashi 
Jenubi-Garbi 
Gobustan 
Kursangi and 
Garabagy 
Muradkhanli, 
Jafarli, and 
Zardab 
In am 
Araz-Alov-Sharg 
Ateshgah, Yanan 
Tava, and Mugan 
Deniz 
Zafar, Mashal 
Savalan, Dalga, 
Lerik Deniz, 
Janub 
Padar 
Date Signed Shareholder's Percentage of Ownership 
BP Amoco(34.1); Statoil(8.56);1tochu(3.92); 
Exxon(8.0);Ramco(2.08); Unocal(10.04); 
TPA0(6.75);Delta (1.68);Lukoil(1 O.O)Penzoil( 4.81 ); 
20 September 1994 SOCAR(10.0) 
BP Amoco(25.5); Lukoil (lO.O);TPAO (9.0); 
04 June 1996 Statoil(25.5); Elf (10.0);SOCAR (1 O.O);OIEC(10.0) 
Elf(40.0);0IEC(10.0); Petrofma(5.0); Total(10.0); 
13 January 1997Wnitershall(10.0); SOCAR(25.0) 
01 August 1997Chevron(30.0);SOCAR (50.0); Total (10.0) 
01 August 1997Exxcon( 50.0);SOCAR(50.0) 
04 July 1997LUKARCO:Lukoil(32.4);ARCO (27.6); SOCAR (40.0) 
01 August 1997Mobil(50.0)SOCAR (50.0) 
SOCAR(50.0)Agip(25.0); Mitsui 
01 August 1997 (15.0)TP AP(5.0)Repsol(5.0) 
02 June 1998 Commonwealth Oil and Gas (80.0)SOCAR (20.0) 
Frontera Resources (30.0); Delta Oil I 
02 June 1998AmeradaHess(20.0); SOCAR(50.0) 
22 July 1998Ramco(50.0); SOCAR(50.0) 
BP Amoco (25.0)SOCAR (50.0); Monument Oil and 
22 July 1998 Gas(12.5); Central Russian Fuel(12.5) 
BP Amoco( 15.0);Exxon(15.0)Alberta Energy (5.0); 
22 July 1998 Statoil(15.0)TPA0(10.0)SOCAR(40.0) 
JAPEX (22.5); Teiloku(7.5); INPEX{l2.5);ITOCHU 
25 December 1998 (7.5);SOCAR(50.0) 
Exxcon( 20.0);SOCAR (50.0); with 20% to be 
2 7 April 1999 determined 
27 April1999 Mobil(20.0)SOCAR (50.0); with 20.0% to be decided 
27 April 1999 Mocrief Oil international, Inc. (80.0); SOCAR (20.0) 
Sources: www.eia.doe.gov 
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9.2.2 The legal status of Caspian Sea resource management 
After the dissolution of the Soviet regime, the legacy of the Soviet-Iran treaties of 
1921 and 1940 was ratified in the Almaty declaration on 21st December 1991. Tehran 
and Moscow reiterated that joint utilisation of the Caspian Sea could be split as legal 
rights between compulsory registered littoral states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Iran), with the requirement to respect the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea resource management (Brzezinski, 1997). Iran, therefore, proposed the 
Caspian Sea Cooperation Organisation (CASCO) which was established to solve the 
sovereignty question of the Caspian basin in October 1992. A spokesman for the 
Russian foreign ministry emphasised that this organisation was the most important 
outcome of President Rafsanjani's initiative {Tehran Times, 15 October 1994). 
However, this organisation could not solve the disputes over the Caspian Sea. It only 
delayed international investment into the region until the signing of the "Contract of 
the Century''. Iran's exclusion from the Contract undermined Iranian initiatives in 
CASCO as a result of the US dual containment policy against Iran. The littoral 
countries took another stance on the dispute over Caspian Sea classification and the 
resulting resource division. The earliest indicators arose when Turkmenistan asserted 
its rights over the Azeri and Chirag fields to which the Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company (AIOC) held rights, particularly with regard to an oil deposit 
named (by Baku) as Kyapaz and which Ashgabat refers to as Serdar and which 
contains up to 500 million barrels in 1993 (www.eia.doe.gov). Due to this 
disagreement, Russia and Kazakhstan discarded Turkmenistan from the agreement 
which divided the Caspian seabed into national sectors in November 1997. 
Turkmenistan had not taken a harsh position until recently--it was a proponent of the 
condominium principle whereby each littoral country would possess a 10-20 mile 
territorial projection (Nassibli, 2003). The controversies have undermined the 
certainties that international consortiums require to invest. They need the resolutions 
to territorial issues regarding lakes, seas and coastlines in international law. The 
boundaries are shown in the three versions of the map below. 
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Integrated Map 9.1: The division of Caspian Sea basin 
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The Russian approach advocated a solution for the Caspian seabed and subsoil which 
would divide it into national sectors along international boundary lines. This solution 
won the support of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and they signed bilateral treaties with 
Russia at the Ashgabat summit by the end of 2002. Russia was willing to concede to a 
division of the oil production which involved the joint use of the surface areas. This 
permitted Russia to persist in the deployment of its navy in the Caspian and thus 
continue its ability to exert local influence. Iran, on the other hand, insisted on the 
demilitarisation of the area. 
9.2.2.1 Diversification of foreign investments in Caspian Sea resource 
management 
Whereas the Caspian littoral states prefer to continue their own independent foreign 
policy over the hydrocarbon resources, foreign investment now consists of seven 
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offshore production-sharing agreements with an international consortium (Cohen, 
2002). However, the Russian military presence in the Caspian and the CIS was 
undermining the regional states' sovereignty, unless they could divert their energy 
pipelines and foreign connections. Therefore, Kazakhstan started to diversify its 
energy transport by signing an energy swap deal whereby Kazakhstan supplies oil to 
Iran via the Caspian Sea to the port of Neka, and in return, Kazakhstan receives the 
equivalent amount of oil via the port of Kharq from Iran's Persian Gulf. Russia was 
not content over Iran's collaboration with the CIS countries of the issue of deposits 
and attempted to claim possession over the hydrocarbon Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan sections ofthe Caspian Sea to restore its economic and political power 
in the area (Lal, 2006). 
Table 9.2 Caspian Sea Basin leading foreign investment project by country, 2006 
Country 
Azerbaijan 
Kazakhstan 
Project major investor 
ACG Mega Structure 
(BP) 
Shah Deniz (BP ) 
Tengiz (Chevron Texaco) 
Karachaganak(BG, Agip et 
al) 
Kashagan (ENI-Agip, BG) 
Cheleken (Dragon Oil) 
Turkmenistan 
Nebit Dag (Burren Energy) 
Proven reserves Production Projection 
2007;500.000 
5.4 bblb 450.000 bb/d 2010:1 million bb/d 
2.5 mb/d &14-
22.1Tcf 
6.9 mb/d 
2.4 bb/d 
7-9 bb/d 
0.6 bb/d 
0.1 bb/d 
Not producing 2007:296 Bcf 
2007:300,00 bb/d 
270.00 bb/d 
2010:650.000 bb/d 
200.000 bb/d, 2010;500.000 bb/d 
547 Bcf 2015: 1.2 million bb/d 
2010;75.000 bb/d 
Not producing 2015:1.2 bb/d 
25.000 bb/d 2010:40.000 bb/d 
19.000 bb/d 2005:31.000 bb/d 
Source: OGJ Production; EIA; Forecasts; lnterfax; EIA, CERA, SKRIN, APS Review, July 2006 
The lion's share of the ongoing project is under the Anglo-American sphere of 
influence in the Caspian but the secondary shareholder companies are the primary 
actors in the regional conflict. This encourages ethnic violence (Aras and Foster 2001). 
Russia is still controlling Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan's gas transport into Europe 
and Asia. Therefore diversification of the energy routes are essential to reducing the 
European dependency on Russia; because Moscow is getting more confident in using 
energy as a political tool, as seen when it closed the gas tap to the Ukraine (Kamalov, 
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2008). Iran's eagerness to improve cooperation in Eurasia and the Caucasus by 
offering them membership in ECO, and direct linkage with road and rail networks for 
landlocked countries, made Iran a more prominent actor in the region. However, 
several other factors bind Russia and Iran together, such as shared boundaries, 
regional issues, internal security, and a common strategy against the US hegemony, as 
well as economics and arms deals between them (though the arms trade is still 
smaller than it was with the Soviet Union)(Kamalov, 2007). 
9.2.2 Turkey-Iran confrontation during the Caspian Sea incident 
Iran's up-and-down relations with its neighbours were illustrated in the Caspian Sea 
incident following the signing of the agreement between BP and SOCAR, over the 
exploration and development of a field in July and its ratification in December 1998. 
Pertaining to the Araz-Alov- Shargh field, the agreement was accused by Iran of 
increasing tensions in the region (www.eia.doe.gov). An Iranian warship entered the 
disputed waters near Azerbaijan and threatened to fire on the research ship 
Geophysics-3 if it failed to leave the area (Olson, 2004: 118). Iranian combat aircraft 
also violated Azerbaijan's air space to stop a BP research vessel operating in the 
Caspian Sea, which caused a low intensity conflict between Turkey and Iran in July-
August 2001. 
In the meantime, the Turkey's Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu made a trip to Baku 
on August 25, along with 10 F-5 fighter aircraft- the Turkish air force acrobatic team 
Turkish Stars, which upsets the liaisons with Iran (Olson, 2004:120). The display was 
actually booked a year in advance and the General's trip was scheduled 3 months 
prior to take part in the first graduation ceremony of students at the Azerbaijan War 
School, a Turkish-assisted institution (Oran, 2003). An official at the Azerbaijan 
embassy in Turkey declared on 13 August that "There was nothing more natural than 
for our friend and brother, Turkey, to take a strong stance against Iran's aggressive 
position" (Hurriyet, 13 August 2001). The air performance was taken by the press as a 
significant political disruption-Azerbaijani media saw it as an assault on Turkish 
solidarity whilst the Turkish equivalents commented on it as intimidation of Iran 
(Hurriyet, 23 august; Radical, 26 August; Milliyet, 22 August 2001). Iran News 
described Turkey's actions as "unambiguous and a blatant sign of interference and 
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intervention in the affairs of its neighbours" (Sinkaya, 2005:14). Further critics in 
Iranian newspapers stated that Turkey's actions were aimed at fulfilling and satisfying 
the interests and policies of its friends and allies like the US and Israel - the Zionist 
entity. However, former Iranian foreign minister V elayati said that "This is not a 
threat because every country has the right to pursue its own interests, and we do not 
see it as a threat" (Sinkaya, 2005:14). In fact, the Iranian government expressed 
disapproval of Turkey's involvement in concert with, or on behalf of the US in 
containing Iran. However, Turkey declined an Azeri government invitation to build a 
base in Azerbaijan. A Turkish presence in this area could work to the US's advantage, 
but Russia is openly opposed to such bases and activities by NATO in the Russian 
backyard. According to Articles 20 and 24 of the NATO New Strategic Concept, 
which was signed on 24 April 1999, the articles establish a linkage between energy 
resources and terrorism (www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm). 
Integrated map 9.2 Azerbaijan-Iran Araz-Aiov Sbarg oil field dispute 
,.(1:9 Mile$ 
Source: The Economist, 2 August 2001 
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Moscow was not happy to see third party involvement in the Caspian Sea dispute 
(Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe, 21 August 2001). Russia, Azerbaijan, and 
Kazakhstan reached a three-pronged deal on the sub-surface lines of division and joint 
governing of the Caspian's area in 2003, which split up 64% of the sea into 3 uneven 
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parts as per the 'median line' principle, with Kazakhstan granted 27%, Russia 19% 
and Azerbaijan 18% (Jafar, 2004). The main area of dispute was Iran's stance, as it 
claimed a fifth of the relevant area. Turkmenistan and Iran, who failed to sign on to 
the deal, could see their developments in the area held back as a result (Canszi, 2004). 
In August 2006, the countries inked a deal to jointly launch efforts to remedy harm to 
the environment stemming from energy extraction. Since the Islamic revolution, 
President Vladimir Putin's arrival to Iran on 16 October 2007was the first presidential 
level visit by a Russian leader. The visit was aimed at strengthening Iranian-Russian 
ties. Moscow and Tehran agreed to resist third party interventions in the Caspian 
dispute and agreed to develop 19 new nuclear projects in Iran in November 
2007(Young, 2005). This second summit of five Caspian littoral states' leaders in 
Tehran tried to clarify the plans on utilising the reserves under the Sea, but they only 
managed to reach a deal on the use of biological resources whilst also signing a non-
attack agreement with regard to other littoral countries (Times Online, 16 October 
2007). Iran, whose offshore waters are believed not to be rich in oil and gas, 
concluded a US $470 million contract to start extracting oil and natural gas in Iran's 
section of the Caspian Sea, in cooperation with Brazil's national oil company Petr6leo 
Brasileiro (Dow Jones Newswires, 6 March 2007).In summary, Iran stands to lose the 
greatest amount if the Caspian is classified as a sea. So, Tehran prefers an 'inland 
lake' label which would require the littoral countries to jointly and equally own the 
resources, including a 5-way division of the Kashagan field, worth multiple billions of 
US Dollars for Kazakhstan (Janusz, 2005). Due to the dispute, the pipeline project by 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan under the Caspian seabed could not be ratified and this 
prevented Russian and Iranian initiatives on the legal status of Caspian. However, 
despite obtaining a smaller stake in the Caspian Sea, Iran benefited from the 
subsequent transit fees, oil swaps and oil sales. 
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Table: 9.3.Iran's (annual) Financial Stake in the Caspian (in$ millions) 
1 mb/d 
2 mb/d 
Tmnsit Fees Oil Swaps Oil sale 
1 mb/d 
2927 ($292,000,000) -
584 
136.9($136,875,000) -
205.3 
2mb/d 
.75 mb/d 
1.125p/d 
13.6% of oil - 595.7($595,680,000) 1,191.40 
20% of oil 876 1,752 
Sources: Askari, and Taghavi, 2006:1-18 
Gas 
NIA 
NIA 
Iran still insists on the 1925 and 1940 accords and considers the best system for the 
Caspian to be the condominium. If the other states wish to divide the Caspian (Iran 
asks for 20% of the total) Iran does not accept the dual regime (division of seabed and 
common usage of surface). Sectored agreements are favoured by Tehran. On the other 
hand, Iran did not support the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) because it excludes bodies of water that have no outlet to another sea or 
ocean (Article 122), but littoral states can benefit from the equity and proportionality 
considerations in UNCLOS (www.un.org). Iran believes delimitation could be 
practical if five littoral states had full sovereignty and exclusive control of air space 
and subsoil, with a territorial range of 24 miles, an EEZ with the right to explore 
hydrocarbon and living resources. Iran is also a major player which does not support 
the militarization of the Caspian. 
Integrated map 9.3: Caspian Sea dispute 
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9.2.2.3 The questioning of the possible Russia-Iran-Turkey axis: Dundar Kilic 
case 
In opposing the regional cooperation of the Georgia-Ukraine (Uzbekistan)-
Azerbaijan-Moldova (GU(U)AM)'s initiatives in 1998 (www.guuam.org), Moscow 
and Tehran solidified their ties by renewing the former military technology and 
equipment agreement in 1995, which included the rebuilding of the Bushehr nuclear 
station. The military contract was worth $800 million for Russia and required the 
employment of up to 1,500 on-site Russian scientists in 2001(Somersant, 21 February 
2008). Due to dependency on Russia for key military technology, Iran reacted by 
means of a low-profile stance on the first Muslim rebellion in Chechnya (1994-1996) 
and to Russia's pro-Serb and anti-Muslim policy in Bosnia in 1993-1995, which 
developed relationships further (Sami, 2001). Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar 
Velayati, during his visit to Moscow in March 1996, stated that Iranian-Russian 
relations were "at their highest level in contemporary history'' (FBIS-SOV -96, 8 
March 1996: p.7). On the other hand, Bill Clinton and the Yeltsin government agreed 
to remove or dismantle 1004 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 40 nuclear 
bombers in another Muslim country, Kazakhstan. In this context, Nursultan 
Nazarbaev signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty after receiving US financial 
support in 1995 (Anderson, 1997). However, the Clinton government could not 
impede Russian nuclear technology being transported to Iran, resulting in severe talks 
between Russia and American on the nuclearisation of Iran during the Moscow 
summit in May 1997. 
The Russian-Iranian military and economic relationship continued to develop, with 
alleged Russian intentions to conduct a $4 billion transaction of arms and related 
materials between 1997 and 2007 (Golan, 1998). Iran also benefited from the chaos in 
Nagomo-Karabakh in which Russian arms stockpiles and illegal nuclear technology 
could possibiliy have been transferred to Iran (Tchilingiran, 1999). 
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Fi ure 9.3 Iran-Russia trade, 1992-2007 
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Tebran-Moscow relations mainly relied on military equipment purchasing and nuclear 
technology transfers to Iran from Russia. Marshal Igor Sergeyev visited Tebran in 
December 2000, the first visit of a Russian defence minister to Iran since 1980, and 
President Mohammed Khatami made a landmark visit to Moscow in March 2001. In 
an interview with the Russian newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in February 2001, the 
Iranian ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, stated that Iran intended to purchase 
approximately $7 billion of arms from Russia in the next few years. But Russia 
promised to the US that it would avoid further agreements with Iran and stopped all 
weapons' sales after September 1999 (Newsline, 23 February 2001). However, 
despite the rhetoric of a Russian-Iranian strategic partnership, the relations had ups 
and down with regard to regional issues. For instance, the demilitarisation of the 
Caspian Sea may create a dispute between Russia, which has 40 naval craft based at 
Astrakhan and Makhachkala, and Iran which has nearly 50 ships at Bandar e Anzali. 
However, Moscow conducted the largest joint manoeuvres in post-Soviet history of 
its army, air force and the Caspian flotilla-the Sea of Peace 2002, which included a 
joint Russian- Kazakh effort in August 2002 (Ardeshir, 2002), (Alison, 2004). 
However, there is still no overarching agreement between the five Caspian littoral 
states on the division of the Sea's resources. 
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Figure: 9.4Turkey- Russia trade, 1992-2007 
Turby's oxport ond Import to Russian focltrotlonChar1,199l· 
2007 
25,000,000,000 
20,000,000,000 
15,000,000,000 
10,000,000,000 
5,000,000,000 JJ 
0 • I • • •h i l h l . I .1 .1.1. 
• Exports • Imports 
Turkty'urm Import In &tntroltotol of 11971 US$ million 
(1992·2007) 
IChona 
• Israel 
• Norway 
• Spain 
U ran<e 
• Italy 
• RusSia 
• Switle<land 
J G<>rmany (FRG) 
• Netherlands 
• South Korea 
J UK 
Sources: IMF data and SPRI arm transfer data generated 5 September 2008; compiled by author 
The main priorities in the Turkish-Russian relationship are trade, gas pipelines, and 
tourism but not strategic competition. Turkey signed an arms contract with Russia in 
1992, which is similar to Iran's agreement but this should not cause any systemic 
security risks (www.globalsecurity.org). Critics of General Tuncer Kilinc, the general 
secretary of the National Security Council (MGK) see the Turkish-American policy as 
being internally contradictory in northern Iraq. Kilinc said that Turkey would do 
better to try and form agreements with Russia and Iran. In response, Iranian 
ambassador in Turkey, Hossein Lavasani, greeted him enthusiastically while he was 
visiting Recai Kutan. Lavasani said "I was not surprised at all by Kilinc's remarks 
because our embassy (in Istanbul) some time ago entered into relations with the army 
on 28 March 2002" (as cited in Olson, 2004). The ambassador stressed that Iran's 
relations with Turkey were numerous, but they had nothing to do with blocs or an axis. 
Turkey would rather want to have stronger relations without a strategic partnership; 
one might add that included Israel but Kemalist circles ridiculed Kilinc's strategic 
alternatives (Hurriyet, 28 March-2002). As mentioned in Chapter Three, the 
systematic security obligation of Turkey will not allow any kind of systematic change. 
Hence, Turkey can only be an active mediator in the regional politics rather than a 
creator of a new axis in the region. On the other hand, Iran relations with Russia can 
be classified as a mistrustful partnership in pragmatist policy management, which 
prevents any systematic security relations. Hence both Turkey and Iran are happy to 
see the southern Caucasus independent state as a buffer zone between Russia and 
Iran-Turkey. 
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Figure 9.5 Turkey Iran arms import from Russia, 1995-2006 
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The arms transfers between Turkey and Iran clearly demonstrate that the two states' 
defence technology and arms trades are completely different from one another. 
Therefore, there is no way to take part in security relations on a practical level. Turkey 
is mainly a customer of American and EU countries, especially Germany. However, 
Russia has become a major arms retailer for Iran. On the other hand, Turkey's 
relations with Russia are more systematic in trade and cultural connections than with 
Iran, but Moscow still keeps tight control over the security ties of the regional states 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
9.3. The politics of oil and gas pipelines in Eurasia and Caspian Sea: Turkey's 
Iran's and Russia's competition in energy transport 
The politics of energy transport basically represent the metaphor of the "great game" 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This study analyses the initiatives of Russia, Iran, 
China and Turkey in the transportation of natural gas and oil from the Caspian Sea 
and Central Asia. Up to now, Azerbaijan's oil was the centre of energy exploration 
and transportation disputes. However, Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan' s hydrocarbon 
sources are larger than the Azeri's, and mostly rely on the Russian transportation 
system. Due to the dual containment policy against Iran, the Iranian option remains 
limited to oil swaps and natural gas transports from Turkmenistan to Turkey 
(Fishelson, 2007). Turkmenistan, a fairly small and isolated country, has been mostly 
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ignored by the US press but has the purported fourth-largest natural gas deposits in 
the world. Therefore, energy pipeline politics are relevant not only to the regional 
competition between Turkey, Iran and Russia but also to the the international 
competition in the region. The US holds only 2% of the world's oil reserves but 
consumes 25% of the world's oil production (Fishelson, 2007). Thus, as long as oil 
remains a primary fuel, US will never be able to rely on its own reserves. Therefore, 
interdependency in pipeline politics between 'patron' and 'client' have materialised 
with BTC. Turkey follows multi-dimensional politics to keep the balance between 
regional states and the Russia-Iran axis by using soft power strategies and playing the 
mediator role between international organisations and regional institutions. On the one 
hand, the United States mainly aims to extend its military influence in the Black Sea, 
which is not acceptable to Turkey's regional politics. Turkey will not tolerate the 
breaching of the Montreux Convention which was signed on 20 July 1936 (Kanbolat, 
2008). Hence, Turkey became one of the founders of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organisation (BSECO), which included Armenia but excluded Iran, 
much as Turkey is excluded in CASCO. For enhancement of security coordination 
between the Black Sea littoral states, Bulgaria, Romania, the Ukraine, Russia and 
Georgia established the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) 
in April 200l.The organisation is under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of the 
Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee (BSNC), composed of the various chiefs of 
the navies/Black Sea fleet commanders of the parties, aimed at preventing access to 
external powers, especially the United States. Therefore, Ankara continues its 
cooperation with Moscow to avoid external power penetration into the Black Sea. 
9.3.1 Russian initiatives in energy transport against Turkey and Iran 
Russia considers Central Asia to be firmly in its sphere of influence, and would loathe 
losing any of its influence and benefits in the area, especially in terms of energy and 
security. Russia could become an alternative petroleum power to rival the Middle East 
by controlling the sizable Central Asian reserves on its own (Fishelson, 2007). The 
new face of Russian power in the 21st century will rely on its oil and natural gas 
capabilities. The Russian state-owned company, Gazprom, supplies around 1/3 of 
Western Europe's aggregate gas imports. The largest importers of Russian gas are 
Germany, Italy, Turkey and France. Gazprom sold to Europe 161.5 hem of natural gas, 
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and gas sales to the CIS and Baltic States grew by 1/3 to 101 hem in 2006. The key 
customers were Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
(http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru). The major pipelines of relevance are the Central 
Asia-Centre (CAC) pipeline, the Baku - Novorossiysk pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) and the Blue Stream line. The study will compare the dependency 
of Turkey on the Blue Stream and Tabriz-Ankara pipelines within the Chapter on 
economics. The Russian port of Novorossiysk is the main terminal for Baku and 
Kazakh oil, competing with Turkish alternatives, while the CAC pipeline system 
maintains Russian influence on Kazakh, Turkmen and U zbek natural gas 
transportation. The prospective project of a Trans-Caspian line and the Nabucco 
pipeline will be competitive with the Russian system. 
Integrated map 9.4: General pipeline systems in Russia, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia 
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9.3.1.1 Central Asia-Centre (CAC) pipeline 
Ch-
The Soviet-era pipeline system, CAC, is the mam export route for gas from 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Gazprom transports Central Asian gas to 
Russia and export markets as well as acting as an operator of Turkmen gas transit 
across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, the capacity of CAC at various points 
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does not exceed 45 hem per annum (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). The two branches of 
the CAC's gas pipeline system meet in the south-western Kazakh city of Beyneu 
before crossing into Russia at Alexandrov Gay and feeding into the Russian pipeline 
system. Therefore, Kazakhstan is a major transit route for gas from Turkmenistan to 
Russia and on to other markets across the territory of the former Soviet Union. The 
30-year old central pipeline system has significantly outlived its lifespan and needs 
substantial upgrading. Hence, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan signed a joint declaration to build the Pre-Caspian gas line in May 2007. It 
is expected that Gazprom will invest about $1 billion, and Kazakhstan will invest over 
$800 million for the modernisation of this natural gas pipeline network in 2008. 
The western branch of the CAC pipeline delivers Turkmen natural gas from near the 
Caspian Sea region to the north, while the eastern branch pipes natural gas from 
eastern Turkmenistan and southern Uzbekistan to western Kazakhstan where the 
branches meet en route to the Russian gas pipeline system (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). 
Due to pricing disputes, Russia stopped the transfer of Turkmen gas, causing severe 
economic difficulties for Ashgabat's government. But this was resolved in 1998. 
Russia then became the major partner in Turkmenistan's natural gas exports. 
Turkmenistan mainly used the Central Asia-Centre Pipeline to export a total of 8.83 
Tcf to Ukraine (via Russia) from 2002 to 2006, as well as smaller amounts to Russia 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/). Russia received 6 Mfc in 2004 and 10 Mcf in 2006 and 
also expects to buy 80 Mcf of natural gas from Turkmenistan. RosUkrEnergo, the 
intermediary in the Russia-Ukraine stretch, operates the Turkmenistan natural gas at 
$2.83 per million cubic feet (Met). Russia guaranteed initial natural gas exports of 
212 Bcf in 2005, increasing to 1.8 Tcf in 2007, and remaining at 2.8 Tcf from 2009-
2028 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). Gasprom and the Turkmen national company, 
TurkmanNeft, also agreed to build another pipeline from Bektas to the Alaxandriv Gai 
compressor in the Russian natural gas pipeline system (www.gazprom.ru/eng). After 
the pricing dispute halted in 1998, Russia became the natural partner for 
Turkmenistan gas exports. However, neither Turkey with its alliance nor Iran could 
achieve any success in competing with Russia on Turkmen gas exports. The planned 
Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipeline projects aim to diversify the Turkmen gas export 
option towards Europe. 
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Integrated map 9.5 Turkmen pipeline linking the Central Asian pipeline system 
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The Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline (Northern Early Oil Pipeline) is an 830 kilometers 
(520 mile) line, which runs from the Sangachal terminal near Baku to the 
Novorossiysk terminal at the Black Sea coast in Russia (www.bp.com). The 
Azerbaijani section of the pipeline is operated by the State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) with a consortium of 10 partner companies that 
include BP, as the largest single shareholder, while the Russian section is operated by 
Transneft. 143 million barrels of oil (including output from ACG and other fields) 
have been transported via the pipeline system by the end ofNovember 2005. This has 
allowed the shipment of 217 tanker loads from Novorossiysk over the same period. 
However, after a dispute over natural gas supplies from Russia, Azerbaijan announced 
that it would stop the exports of Azeri oil through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline 
starting in January 2007(www.bp.com). AIOC and SOCAR stopped using the 
pipeline for oil exports in April 2007 and February 2008. Azerbaijani oil 
transportation was resumed following completion of technical works in a section 
within Azerbaijan. Due to an explosion on the massive Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline through Turkey and the outbreak of violence between Russia and Georgia, 
the Novorossiysk oil terminal saw an unexpected boost in crude shipments in August 
as producers in Azerbaijan were forced to redirect volumes to the Russian port 
(Tellinghuisen, Energy Intelligence Briefing, 29 August 2008). The Azeri state oil 
firm SOCAR and Russian Transneft which serves the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline 
part in Russia stated that the following August oil pumping would total 166,000 tons 
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versus 83,000 in July (Economic News, 12 August 2008). The dispute increased the 
attractiveness to international oil companies of Iranian options for Azeri oil transport, 
but Washington's opposition to the Iranian initiative is still the main impediment to 
this plan. 
9.3.1.2 Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC): Russia-US cooperation 
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium owns the 1 ,580-kilometer Tengiz- Novorossiysk oil 
pipeline that connects deposits in western Kazakhstan with the Russian coast of the 
Black Sea. The pipeline has been operational since 2001 and the initial capacity of 
the pipeline was 28.2 million tonnes at the end of that year but had increased to 31.12 
million tons of oil in 2007 (Newswire, 11 June 2007: Tellinghuisen, Energy 
Intelligence Briefing, 29 August 2008). There is talk of almost doubling capacity to 
67 million tons/year by adding 10 new pumping stations. Since the pipeline is already 
in place, and runs across relatively flat land, it should be relatively inexpensive and 
easy to increase the capacity if desired. Unlike Azeri oil, Kazakh oil is dependent on 
the Russian route of CPC and also a sizeable amount flows through the old Soviet 
pipeline system pumped via Atyrau-Samara (Fishelson, 2007). On the one hand, 
Russian oil producers use the CPC for approximately 85,000 bblld in 2005(CPC 
News, 20 May 2005; www.eia.doe.gov). However, increasing transport prices 
between varied shareholders of CPC have damaged the American-Russian 
cooperation over control of Central Asian oil and gas. The fact that American 
companies hold a sizable share (22.5% in total) strengthens the CPC's position as an 
extension of America's indisputable power on the world stage (Fishelson,2007).The 
CPC aided this balance and helped the integration of Russia into the western capitalist 
system. CPS's shareholders are as follows: Russia 24%, Kazakhstan 19%, Chevron 
15%, and Oman 7%. A variety of oil and gas companies make up the remainder. In 
addition to Kazakh oil, the CPC also exports for major Russian producers Lukoil, 
Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, and TNK-BP (Fishelson,2007). 
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Figure 9.6 Caspian pipeline consortiums 
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Sources: EIA and CPC official website: http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
http://www .cpc.ru/portaUalias!press/lang! en-US/tabiD! 3357/DesktopDefault.aspx; compiled by author 
The American oil giant, Chevron, was the first major Western oil firm to enter the 
region after the formation of the joint venture Tengizchevroil (TCO) partnership in 
1993. The Tengiz and Korolev fields within the TCO partnership are estimated to 
contain between 6 billion and 9 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Hence, Chevron will 
be able to fully develop Tengiz for the Tengiz Chevrooil (TCO) joint venture to reach 
peak production of700,000 barrels per day, expected by 2015 (Kandiyoti, 2008). 
Chevron has a 45 % interest and will be the principal shipper for the 900-mile (1 ,500-
kilometer) TCP (PR Newswire, 16 May 1997; www.chevron.com). 
Table 9.4 Transport cost comparisons for Kazak Oil from Novorossiysk 
To Europe. Assuming a Cost of Capital of 15% 
Destination-Route Cost/b Cost as a% of Cost Minus Cost 
Baku-Rotterdam: Bypass Route of Bypass Route 
Tanker From Novorossiysk $2.33 89% -0.28 
Novorossiysk-Turkish Bypass $2.61 100% 0.00 
~ovorossiysk-Samsun-Ceyhan $3.14 120% 0.53 
Italy 
Tanker From Novorossiysk $1.74 79% -0.46 
Novorossiysk-Turkish Bypass $2.20 100% 0.00 
Novorossiysk-Samsun-Ceyhan $2.73 124% 0.53 
Barnes, Joe and Ronald Sohgo, 1998) 
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9.3.1.3 Russia-Turkey energy cooperation: Blue stream 
Turkey's structural engagement with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Moscow and Ankara 
achieved the completion of the world's deepest twin Blue Stream natural gas pipeline. 
It began to pump Russian gas from Isobilnoye in southern Russia, to Dzhugba on the 
Black Sea, then on to the Turkish port of Samsun in 2003. Turkey's Calik Energy 
Company, Russia's Gazprom, and Italy's Eni are major stakeholders in this project 
(Fink, 2006). The official opening ceremony of the Blue Stream pipeline and 
cooperation in the Blackseafor and BSEC organisation contributes to good Russia-
Turkey relations (Cornell, Jonssonand and et al. 2006), Tanrisever, 2002). The prime 
ministers of Turkey and Italy (Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Silvio Berlusconi) and the 
Russian president, Vladimir Puti,n attended the ceremony on 17 November 2005 
(Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 17 November 2005). 
Integrated map 9.6: Blue Stream pipeline 
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EU members received 35% of their gas from Russia in 2004: Greece (79%), Austria 
(65%) and Germany (38%) (Pamir, 2007). Providing energy has made Russia a 
significant player in the new world order (Fink, 2006). Although Russia uses energy 
as a political weapon against Ukraine, it has become a more reliable energy partner 
for the Ankara government. 
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9.3.2 Iran's initiatives in energy transport from Caspian Sea 
The blocking of the east-west flow of oil from the Caspian via Georgia, a route that 
bypasses Russia, has made that western route significantly less attractive for Caspian 
oil exporters while Iran is potentially perceived as a much more interesting route. 
Due to the conflict, the use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and of a number of other transportation units 
as well as the cessation of rail deliveries of oil to the Georgian port of Batumi, 
resulted in shortages (Goble, 2008). Iran had already been operating the Caspian oil 
and gas routes with tankers and Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline (Korpezhe-Kurt Kui) and 
using the former Soviet pipeline system from Baku to Tabriz. However, the proposed 
Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline will be competitive with the Russian alternative 
for oil and natural gas transportation from the Caspian Sea. Iran also is also a potential 
mediator between Armenia and Turkey. Moreover, Iran's natural gas pipeline 
potentially reduces the Armenian dependency on Russian energy, which is 
competitive with Russian initiatives in the region. 
9.3.2.1 Korpezhe-Kurt Kui (KKK) gas pipeline 
Turkmenistan has some of the world's largest natural gas fields containing 71 Tcf in 
proven and estimated natural gas reserve, 159 Tcf in the Amu-Dar'ya, Dauletabad-
Donmez, Magrab and 17 newly discovered natural gas deposits in the Lebap, Mary 
and Deashoguz basins. Turkmenistan also has 1. 7 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, 
with possible reserves of up to 38 billon billion barrels. Hence, Turkmenistan's 
energy sources became competitive with Russian natural gas in the post-Cold War 
regional political environment. The pricing dispute between Gasprom and 
TurkmenNeft reduced Turkmen gas production, which sagged throughout the 1990s, 
because Turkmenistan's only natural gas export route ran through Russia. 
Turkmenistan launched the $195 million and 124-mile KKK pipeline to Iran, which is 
considered to be the first natural gas export pipeline in the Caspian Sea region for 
bypassing Russia. However, this is a fairly small pipeline, with a capacity of only 282 
billion cubic feet (bet) per year. The pipeline has allowed Turkmenistan to supply Iran 
with roughly 180 Bcf of natural gas per year (Olcott, 2004). Though some Turkmen 
gas is exported into Russia through the old Soviet pipeline system, the KKK gas is 
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purchased at market rates in cash, while most of the gas to Russia is bartered. The 
pipeline has no capacity to be a competitor with Gazprom, the Russian state natural 
gas company (IRNA, 17 March 1997). An additional 25-year contract between 
Turkmenistan and Iran was signed in December 1997. However, the proposed 
Nabucco pipeline project would add to the Turkey-lran natural gas network and make 
Turkmenistan a competitor of Gasprom. However, Turkmenistan and Iran have been 
restricted by ILSA so that during 2005, Turkmenistan only planned to export 250 Bcf 
with the newly installed $140 million gas processor to facilitate higher natural gas 
flows to Iran. On the one hand, pricing disputes between Ashgabat and Tehran caused 
the closure of KK.K pipeline's taps. Under the new agreement, Turkmen natural gas 
will now cost $130 per tern until 30 June after which the price will rise to $150 
(www.strana.ru). The new regime of the Turkmen presiden,t Gurbanguly 
Berdimukhamedov, unexpectedly cut off exports via the KK.K pipeline on 8 January 
2008 and reduced daily gas exports to Turkey by 75 %, from 20 to 5 million cubic 
meters. The Turkmen cut-off forced Iran to halt all natural gas exports to Turkey, 
forcing Ankara to use as much as a third of its stored fuel. Part of the Turkmen gas 
imported from Turkmenistan is re-exported to Turkey and the other part is paid for by 
Iran and used in domestic ventures (Maleki, 2007). Currently Iran can produce 440 
million cubic meters of gas per day, with about 380 million cubic meters needed for 
domestic consumption, an increase of 12 % over 2007 levels. On the one hand, the 29 
years of US sanctions against Iran have had an even more negative impact on energy 
cooperation with Turkmenistan and the country's natural gas output (Daly, 2008). 
KK.K is a small-width pipeline with non-expandable maximum throughput. So, 
although the Iranian connection boasts rather short lines, they remain pricey and in 
light of US opposition, agreeing to a collaboration to put the line together would not 
make sense. The US has placed a stigma on dealing with Iran as far as oil and gas 
firms are concerned-this would forestall the transportation of Kazakh oil and gas by 
means of Iran, with Chevron having equity in numerous Caspian fields. Another 
option for Turkmen gas is to be pumped to Armenia via Iran. According to the 
contract between Ashgabat and Y erevan in December 200 I, Turkmenistan would 
supply up to 70.6 Bcfper year to Armenia via the Korpezhe-Kurt Kui pipeline, but the 
construction of the $120 million, 84-mile Iran-Armenia pipeline link has been delayed 
for years due to disagreements between the two countries (Turan News, 1 August 
2001). 
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Iran has five pipeline oil networks, and multiple international pipeline projects under 
consideration. Iran has invested in the Neka-Tehran pipeline to increase its import 
capacity at the Caspian port, to handle the growing oil shipments from Russia and 
Azerbaijan, and manage the crude oil swaps from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
(www.eia.doe.gov). 
Integrated map 9.7 Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline system and domestic pipeline system oflran 
9.3.2.2 Iran's swap options for Turkmen- Kazakhs - Azeri oil transport from 
Caspian Sea by tankers/railcars/pipeline to Neka 
The Iranian route for transporting oil and gas is the shortest, relatively safe, with low 
transit fees--incentives for energy suppliers of the Caspian Sea Basin. The export 
routes of the Caucasus or Russia are at a higher cost of US $5-8 per barrel. However, 
Tehran has lowered the transit fees from $4 per barrel to $2.40 per barrel, to make the 
Iranian route more attractive. Despite the Iranian route being cheap and short, 
Washington and EU do not want Iran to be a significant transport route for the energy 
sources of the Caspian Sea. Therefore, they seek to diversify energy supplies in order 
to reduce their dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf. However, the 
dependency of regional countries' energy transport via the Russian Central Asian 
pipeline system, especially Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, provides political power to 
Russian national energy company Gazprom, which supplies 19% of European natural 
gas. Hence, the Iranian option for energy transport still remains a more secure and 
reliable for diversification to Western countries' demand against dependency of 
Russia. Up to now, Caspian oil from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan has 
been shipped through two Iranian ports, Neka and Anzali, and piped to refineries in 
Iran best situated to receive swapped oil by sea. On the other hand, Iran has sufficient 
refining capacity to meet its domestic gasoline and other light fuel needs. Thus, Iran 
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imported over 192,000 bbVd of gasoline and relied upon imports to meet almost half 
of its fuel needs, costing $5 billion in 2006. Iran imports part of its gasoline from 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. For oil swaps with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Iran 
built a new terminal at the Caspian port ofNeka and a new pipeline (370,000 bbls/day, 
208 miles to Tehran), as well as two new refineries capable of processing 500,000 
barrels of Kazakh crude a day as well as Azeri and Russian crude. Iran has been 
swapping oil and buying crude cheaply from the Caspian Sea ports and transporting it 
to Tehran. 
Integrated map 9.8 : Caspian oil terminals and tanker transport 
Compiled by Abbas Maleki and author (2006) 
9.3.2.2.1 Kazakhstan- Iran oil swap 
As the second largest onshore/ offshore oil producing country, Kazakhstan accounts 
for over 55% of the 3mb/d currently being produced in the region (including 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) (www.eia.doe.gov). There are more than 
170 fields in Kazakhstan, all onshore, but with a major part ofTengiz having become 
offshore because of a rise in the Caspian Sea's level. It is operated by Chevron, 
producing about 510,000 b/d of 47 degree API crude oil with 0.5% sulphur (Alam, 
2002; www.entrepreneur.com). On the other hand, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's oil 
and gas transport mainly depends on the Russian distribution system. For instance, the 
Atyrsu-Samara pipeline is linked with the Russian pipeline system at 15 million tons 
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per annum and this will eventually increase to 20-25 million tons (lnterfax, RIA-
Novosti, 30 March 2007). Kazakhstan also exports its crude via two other Russian-
controlled pipelines: The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which connects to 
Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, and the Kenkyak-Orsk pipeline, which 
sends Kazakh oil to Russia's Orsk refinery. In 2006, Kazakhstan was the conduit for 
43 million tons of crude oil and 24 billion cubic meters of gas via Russian pipelines 
(Blank, 2005). Hence, the proposed pipelines aim to diversify Kazakhstan's energy 
transport, such as the Central Asia Oil pipeline (Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan and 
Afghanistan to Gwadar, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan-China pipeline in Aktyubinsk, 
Kazakhstan, to Xinjiang). But the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline 
(Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan to Kharg Island, Iran) on the Persian Gulf will create a 
potential dispute between Russia and Iran. The proposed Trans-Caspian route 
(Kazakhstan Twin pipelines) will be an alternative energy transport system to counter 
Russian dependency. It was planned to start from Aqtau (western Kazakhstan, on the 
Caspian coast) to Baku and could extend to Ceyhan. Although Kazakhstan wants to 
diversify its energy transport and strengthen its economic ties with Western countries, 
Astana have been very keen to avoid direct competition with Russia in terms of oil 
and gas exports. Russia and Kazakhstan collaborate rather than compete, but Iran is 
another possibility for the latter's resource transfers. In accordance with the 
Kazakhstan-Iran oil swap agreement in 1996, up to 120,000 bbl/d ofKazakh oil could 
be transported by tankers through the Caspian Sea to the Iranian Neka port, then sent 
through pipelines to the Tabriz refinery for local consumption. The countries' efforts 
to agree a deal have been going on for years, but an obstacle is Kazakh crude's 
previous incompatibility with Iranian refining facilities and so are costs. Consequently, 
legal and technical hindrances as well as processing difficulties prevented the amounts 
involved from growing. Kazakhstan started conducting experimental deliveries to 
Neka of about 1,600 bbl/d in 2002 and the deliveries were predicted to grow through 
swaps to 17,000 bbl/d. Iran's Lausanne-based subsidiary, the Naftlran Intertrade 
Company (NICO), the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Kazakh 
national oil company KazMunaiGas, operate swap deals between the two countries. 
KazMunaiGas supplies up to 70,000 bbl/d of different types of crude to Neka. Crude 
oil is blended together at the Caspian port of Neka (Iran) and refined in Iran's 
northern regions to be swapped for an equivalent volume of crude at the Iranian 
Persian Gulf coast after payment of a fee that is in the range of $1.50 to $2.00. 
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Kazakh oil to the Persian Gulf provides a strategic advantage for Iran (Iran Daily, 25 
June 2006). In early 2004, Iran finished its campaign of extending the internal 
distribution lines to Neka port to permit capacity growth from roughly 50,000 bbl/d to 
150,000 bbl/d. Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, a deputy oil minister, stated that 
capacity would further grow from 150,000 bbl/d to 250,000 bbl/d by the end of the 
month and, following the deployment of additional pump stations, rise to 500,000 
bbl/d by March 2007 ( eia.doe.gov6). Iran has further intentions to enhance its Tabriz 
and Tehran refineries, to enlarge capacity to 500,000 bbl/d of Caspian crude oil. Since 
2004, swap quanta decreased to 35,000 bblld during the winter of 2004-2005 but has 
since increased somewhat to around 147,000 bbl/d (eia.doe.gov). 
Integrated map 9.9 : Old and new Neka (lran)-Ray (Iran) pipeline 
Compiled by Abbas Maleki and author 
9.3.2.2.2 Turkmenistan Iran energy swap 
Dragon Oil plc. (United Arab Emirate owned) is an operator of the Production 
Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the Cheleken Contract Area of the Turkmenistan sector 
of Caspian offshore. A renewed 10-year contract between Dragon Oil and Iran 
commenced in May 2000 as the US oil titan ExxonMobil's permit submission to swap 
Turkmen oil for Iranian was rejected in April 1999. Turkmenistan is transporting over 
fifty percent (9,000 bbl/d) of its Caspial Sea oil production to the port of Neka. This 
port further serves as a conduit for gasoline and gasoil supplies from Turkmenistan 
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within the smaller terminals at Bandar Nowshar and Bandar Anzali. Tehran's total 
transport capacity is a mere 35,000 bblld Caspian oil, which it buys from 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through a swapping agreement (Maleki, 2007). Dragon 
Oil produced approximately 7,000 bblld in 2001 pursuant to a PSA with 
Turkmenistan, exporting a share of its production through a swap deal with Iran, 
peaking in 2001. The company sold 8.7m barrels of which 83% were routed through 
the swap arrangement with a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company in 2007 
(www.dragonoil.com). The ILSA also seeks to penalise non-US firms from doing 
business with Iran, and it remains to be seen whether Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
will choose to increase swaps with Iran. 
9.3.2.2.3 Azerbaijan-Iran oil swap 
Iran made suggestions that Azerbaijan can send its oil through the Korpezhe-Kurt 
Khui pipeline by sending it east through the Caspian Sea and to the Turkmenbashi 
docks in Turkmenistan, with a possible connection at that point to the suggested 
Kazakhstan-Iran lines in April 2002. Iran also offered to collaborate in constructing a 
line to transfer Baku oil by means of a 190-mile line to northwest Iran, with a 
subsequent unification with Iranian networks and refineries. TotalFinaElf, with its 
significant Iranian involvement, has offered to construct a line with a capacity of 
between 200,000 bbl/d and 400,000 bblld, and in May 2001, Iran's ministry of oil 
gave authorisation to building a refinery near the Caspian, next to the Azerbaijan 
border. This agreement was said to be contingent on the settling of the Caspian 
reserves' dispute, as well as requiring a boost in Western-Iranian diplomacy. 
The oil swap agreement between Azerbaijan and Iran became very considerable when 
a blaze engulfed the pipeline in Felahiye !Erzincan province in the north-eastern part 
of the Turkish section of the pipeline on 5 August 2008. BP, Europe's second-largest 
oil company, and other exporters of Azeri oil have been unable to use the 1,768-
kilometre ( 1,1 00-mile) transport through the BTC line, which carries 1 million barrels 
per day (bpd) from Azerbaijan's capital to the Turkish Mediterranean and on to 
Europe (Apa Azerbaijan News, 28 August 2008). The BP-owned Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's 
Mediterranean coast, resumed tanker loadings following fire damage (Apa Azerbaijan 
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News, 28 August, 2008). This issue was exacerbated by the Russian-Georgian conflict 
as this not only stopped oil transfers through BTC irrespective of the Turkish 
portion's state, but further halted transport of oil through the Baku-Supsa line and by 
train from Azerbaijan to Georgia following the destruction of a bridge in Georgia in 
August 2008 (Global Intelligence, Stratfor, 26 August, 2008). Azerbaijan began 
sending crude through Iran due to the suspension of Azeri oil shipments via the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and by trains; Azerbaijan sent about 1 00,000 bpd north 
through Russia via the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. Realising Iran's unique strategic 
situation, its facilities to access free waters, its remarkable railway system and oil 
terminals in Neka, Amir-Abad and Anzali ports, and its oil storage tanks on the transit 
route of fuel to Turkey and Iraq, Azerbaijan has preferred Iran as a reliable route to 
export its oil to the world markets. Iran can currently handle 200,000 barrels per day 
of Caspian and Central Asian oil (Today Az News, 08 October, 2008). Iran received 
its first cargo of Azeri crude for transit on 24 August 2008 (Global Intelligence, 
Stratfor, 26 August, 2008). Azerbaijan is exporting up to 10,000 barrels a day of crude 
oil through Iran's Caspian port at Neka since the outbreak of the Russia-Georgian war 
in August (http://www.shana.ir). Azerbaijan has stated that transfers will continue 
only as long as the Western path by means of the BTC is oftline. With Russia 
controlling the BTC operation, Iran could become an essential conduit in Azerbaijani 
oil transfers with wide-ranging regional effects (Global Intelligence, Stratfor, 26 
August, 2008). Iran's oil swap deals have doubled to about 100,000 barrels a day from 
50,000 barrels a day and are expected to rise to 200,000 barrels a day in the coming 
years (http://www.silobreaker.com). Iran aims to increase the volume of crude oil to 
500,000 barrels a day under swaps, putting the imported oil through its northern oil 
refineries and exporting an equivalent amount from its southern ports (Today Az 
News, 26 October, 2008). Even if the BTC and Georgian options are back up and 
running, Azerbaijan now knows it has to get the Russians' approval for its energy to 
flow to the West (www.istockanalyst.com). 
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Integrated map 9.10 Azerbaijan Iran oil swap option after BTC was shut down 
Compiled by author 
9.3.2.3 Iran-Azerbaijan natural gas transport 
Iran sends gas through a pipeline to Azerbaijan pursuant to a December 1992 contract 
for 250 Mcm/year supply, which was halted in March 1995. The negotiation resumed 
in 1997 for gas transfers to the Azeri regton of Nakhichevan 
(www.silkroadstudies.org) through an 80-km pipeline to be constructed from the 
Iranian Azeri town of Khoy to the region's border at Dzhulfa (APS Review Gas 
Market Trends, 12 April 1999). Eventually, in December 2005, Azerbaijan inked a 
deal which required payment of an identical set of fees as prescribed in the Iran-
Armenia gas agreement. A gas line was also opened to connect Iran and Nakhichevan 
(Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 February 2006). However, the proposed oil pipeline 
project from Baku to Tabriz (200,000 bblld to 400,000 bblld) by TotalFinaElfremains 
uncertain due to the price and US and Israeli connections with Azerbaijan 
(www.eia.doe.gov). However, Azerbaijan and Iran maintain their cooperation in the 
transport of Caspian and Iranian oil to the Turkish port by using the Tabriz-Ankara 
pipeline. 
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Integrated map 9.11Azerbaijan Iran oil and gas to Turkey 
llllih 
Compiled by Abbas Malek, 2006) 
9.3.2.4 Iran-Armenian natural gas pipeline 
In 2004 Iran and Armenia made public the building of a pipeline connecting the two 
states as well as an electricity network for the exchange of power. Iran provided a $30 
million loan to allow building of the Armenian portion of the pipeline as well as the 
82 km electricity network by means of another $8.4 million loan to be repaid with 
power. The Iranian firm, Sanir, is constructing the pipeline (APS News, 11 April, 
2005). Pursuant to the May 2006 deal, Iran will transfer 36 hem of gas over a 20-year 
duration starting in 2007 at a cost of $21 0-220m to construct the new pipeline and 
update the existing Kajaran -Y erevan line at the Armenian end. 
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Integrated map 9.12 Tabriz (lran)-Yerevan (Armenia) pipeline 
Compiled by author, 2006 
Russia is not happy to see both Turkmenistan's and Iran's contracts with Armenia 
because they would reduce Armenia's dependency on Russia. Iran diversified the 
pipeline routes with a new customer in March 2007. The 87 mile Iran-Armenian line 
was finished at Agarak and began operations at 200 Mcf/d to Armenia in return for 
power supplies (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). 
9.3.2.5 Proposed Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan to Kharg Island (Persian Gulf) 
pipeline 
Various options are possible for direct transport of Caspian oil to the Persian Gulf, 
including a line to send Kazakh oil to Neka by way of Turkmenistan, with a link to 
Iran's network at that port. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, at a meeting 
with Iran President Mohammed Khatami, said that this line would be the cheapest 
means of Kazakh oil exports; the project has undergone a feasibility analysis by the 
Kazakh state oil company and TotalFinalElf. The suggested 900-mile, $1.2-billion 
pipeline would have a capacity of 1 million bbl/d. Turkmenistan deployed a $140 
million gas processor to increase natural gas transfer to Iran in September with the 
Kazakhstan National Oil Company (KazMunaiGaz) (www.eia.doe.gov). Therefore, 
the Iranian option for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan oil and gas transport is 
considered to be a golden gate from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf--now open 
(Associated Press, 25 August 2005). Iran is now the major counter-balance to Russia 
381 
for energy supplies in Asia and the European continent. Iran's major projects are 
demonstrating that Iran can no longer be isolated internationally as is typical when 
super powers try to deter middle-power states. 
Table 9.5 Iran natural gas export projects and SPA status for pipeline projects 
Projects QTY(BCMN) Start Status 
Turkey 3uptol0 2001 signed 
Armenia 1-2.3 2007 signed 
Nakhichevan 0.35 2005 negotiation 
UEA (1,2,3, contracts) 20 up to 25 2005-2007 first one signed 
Kuwait 3.1 2007 negotiation 
Oman in process in process negotiation 
Iran-Europe in process in process negotiation 
Iran-Pakistan-India 27 2009 negotiation 
Sources: National Iranian Gas Export Company, 2005; compiled by author 
9.3.2.6 The Asian option for Iran and Turkmenistan 
The most hotly disputed idea is the $7.4-billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) line which 
would send Iranian natural gas to the Asian subcontinent. With a suggested 1724-mile 
length and a 5.4 bcf/d capacity, the pipeline has been held up due to disagreements 
over shipment costs (Luft, 2005). Iran would likely expand the domestic IGAT -7 line 
into Pakistan instead of building a duplicate; with a capacity of 5.4 bcf/d and extends 
from Assaluyeh to lranshahr. The IGAT-7 ought to be finished by 2011 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iranlpdf.pdf). 
On the other hand, Trans Afghan pipeline {TAP) and Tran-Caspian pipeline {TCP) are 
systems considered an alternative to Iranian and Russian energy distribution by the 
US. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline (TAP) would expand from the 
Caspian through Turkmenistan and over the mountain, into Afghanistan and Pakistan 
as well as including a port/refinery. It could be extended even further into India so as 
to get access to the rapidly growing markets in Pakistan and India and justify demand 
for a line such as this one. 
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Integrated map 9.13 Trans-Afghan pipeline 
Sources: Gazprom, 2007 
TAP construction costs are elevated as Afghanistan is mountainous and tom by a civil 
war, including anti-Americanism, with active Taliban forces. This makes construction 
of the line and security difficult due to its high cost, as is the case with similar 
pipelines running through unstable Afghani areas. If Pakistan and/or India were 
prepared to contribute towards Afghan security, then TAP/TAPI could become 
practicable; at this time, it remains at the planning stage as its precise location, 
capacity or carriage type-whether oil, gas or both-have not yet been finalised 
(Fishelson, 2007). Consequently, another possibility is the building of a 
Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline (TIT), which could carry gas from the eastern 
shore of the Caspian across Iran and into southern Turkey, where it could connect 
with the large Turkish pipeline network for Kazakh natural gas. Iran is encouraging 
the building of a Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran oil pipeline (KTI), with a capacity of 
1 Mlb/d, and constructed alongside a gas line. The latter are particularly convenient in 
the Iranian context due to the geographical proximity of fields in the north-east 
Kazakh sector of the Caspian. 
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9.3. 3 Sino alternatives against Russia 
China is proximate to Central Asia and has a common border of more than 3,000 km 
with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is located in the proximity of two 
more Central Asian states Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and this creates a motivation 
for Chinese involvement in the area (http://www.chinaeurasia.org/Newsletter.html). 
China aims to constrain separatists' movement and wants a stable border to diversify 
energy sources as well to become an economic partner of Central Asian states. China 
has managed to transform its national economic complex and became one of the 
leading trading partners of the Central Asian states. At present, more than 60 % of 
China's imports come from the Middle East via the Malacca Strait (Shenzhen Daily, 
29 September 2004). Thus, in order to diversify oil resources, the state National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a leading Kazakh-Sino consortium operator, agreed 
to contracts with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan state firms, granting them 
50 % stakes in the portions of the pipeline lying in their territories 
(http://globalresearch.ca), because China needs more oil to fuel its soaring economic 
growth and also to diversify its oil imports (http://petromin.safan.com/news). 
9.3.3.1 Atasu- Alashankou oil pipeline 
The building of the 988 km long Atasu (Kazakhstan)-Alashankou (Xingjian) route 
began in September 2004 and ended within ten months. The Atasu-Alashankou 
pipeline must transfer 600,000 tons of oil before shipments commence in mid-2006. 
The initial amounts will not be in excess of 1 0 million tonnes annually, with an 
expansion to the full potential of 20 million tonnes per annum (Panorama, 17 
December 2007). The expansion of the Kenkyak-Atyrau pipeline constructed in 2003 
to the Kumkol oil fields in Kyzylorda region (south Kazakhstan) will substantially 
enhance the tonnage that can be sent to the Chinese Xinjiant Autonomous Republic 
refinery. Atasu-Alashankou also provides Siberian oil with a significant prospect of 
addressing increasing Chinese oil needs. In light of the economic potential of a 
Kazakh-Chinese-Russian triangle, Russia would be better off minimising the 
importance of political factors (Yermukanov, 2007). Transneft, the Russian oil 
pipeline firm on 25th April stated that it intends to send 1.3 million metric tonnes of 
oil (26,000 billion barrels per day) to China via the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 
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2010 ( Blagov, 2006). The Chinese-Kazakh joint venture, PetroKazakhstan, has not 
yet been able to achieve adequate production levels, and by 2007 the Atasu-
Alashankou pipeline is expected to transfer 5-6 million tonnes of oil (The European 
Weekly, 10 February 2007). 
Currently refineries in the Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous district in China, especially 
the one in Dushanzi, do not have the capacity to refine 10 million tonnes of Kazakh 
supplies annually, since they are also responsible for processing Chinese oil 
(Petroleum Report, Feb 7 2007). On the other hand, Russia now plans to connect the 
top of the line with oilfields in western Siberia and also open a direct pipeline to 
China in two years. Russian and Kazakh oil was previously transported to China by 
rail. 
Integrated map 9.14: Atasu (Kazakhstan) Dushanzi (China) pipeline 
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9.3.3.2 Kazakhstan-Sino natural gas pipeline 
In August 2005 Kazmunaigaz and CNPC made a deal to build a gas line from 
Kazakhstan to China, the path for which is currently undecided but the capacity was 
ageed to be at least 1060 bcf per year (30 hem) 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf). The state-owned Chinese 
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National Petroleum Company (CNPC), made its first foray into Central Asia, by 
buying the Canadian-based PetroKazakhstan which owns the Kumkol field. As Lukoil 
was a competitor for the same firm, this success was lauded in China in October 2007 
(Fishelson, 2007). On the other hand, China and Kazakhstan held a meeting in Almaty 
on 9th July 2008 celebrate the initial work on a 1 ,300 km gas line, to be built in phases 
and which should be operational in 2010. It is part of a greater plan to connect China 
with Central Asia's supplies through two parallel lines (http://globalresearch.ca). The 
possibilities open to the parties were the extension of current lines between Bukhara 
and Tashkent in Uzbekistan to the economic capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty, through 
Taldy-Kurgan in Kazakhstan and on to Alashankou on the border with China 
(http://en.rian.rulworld/20060418/46552957.html). Kazakhstan proposed to allow 
transfer of Turkmen gas to China through the country and was open to plans over an 
underwater Caspian line (http://globalresearch.ca). Turkemnistan will connect to the 
3,500 km gas line to be constructed by China National Petroleum Corp and thw 
Kazakhstan government's KazMunaiGas. The length will be at least 7,000 km from 
Turkmenistan, across U zbekistan and Kazakhstan, and on to China's north western 
Xinjiang region. Uzbekistan began building components on its territory as 
Turkmenistan unveiled its part recently ((http://globalresearch.ca). The KPC project 
will have an impact on US influence in the Eurasian region as it contradicts the Silk 
Road Strategy; the KPC forms part of a Russian-Iranian-Chinese inspired scheme for 
a competing transportation system (Bobokulov, 2006). Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is 
evaluating options for another route from eastern countries, possibly through 
Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan to Guangdong province, situated on the southern Pacific 
coast of China. Kazakh energy experts are apparently examining the possibility of 
integrating these paths, while Russia is considering a gas line to China. Yet another 
possibility is building a gas line between Ishim in Russia's western Siberia and 
Alashankou through the Kazakh cities of Astana and Karagand. Another possibility is 
the construction of a line from Chelkar in western Kazakhstan through Kyzyl-Orda to 
Shimkent where it would JOm the Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty pipeline 
(http:/ /en.rian.ru/world/20060418/46552957 .html). 
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Integrated map 9.15 Kazakh-Central Asian oil and natural gas export options to China 
Compiled by EIA, 2006 
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However, the joint venture of the Chinese and Kazakh companies does not have the 
capacity to control the Caspian oil it will ship. The exceptional cold of Kazakh 
steppes during the winter in conjunction with the inferior oil standard with a high 
paraffin component, means that the line may collapse halt altogether if the pumping 
stations cease their operation, even provisionally, as occurred in the winter of 2005-
2006 (Fishelson, 2007). Secondly, neither Kazakhstan nor China has advanced off-
shore technology to explore and drill oil underwater in the Caspian Sea. Thirdly, the 
Kazahagan field, a high-pressure field with significant deposits of poisonous 
hydrogen sulphide, also freezes in the winter. Fourthly, the Kashagan consortium, or 
the Agip KCO, is led by the Italian company ENI, who potentially may wish to avoid 
the oil it transfers from getting to China if an embargo occurs. As noted above, most 
Caspian fields (likely to contribute a minority to total oil outputs) are in the 
possession ofTengizChevroil, a joint venture ofthe Kazakhs and the US, which might 
choose to transfer oil through American-supported routes or via the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC), in which it holds shares (Fishelson,2007). Hence, China is not 
considered as major energy actor for Caspian energy transport, but a potential 
consumer of Russian and Caspian energy reserves. 
9.3.4 Turkish alternatives to Russia and Iran in energy transport 
Turkey is situated close to 71.8% of global proven gas and 72.7% oil deposits, 
especially in Middle East/Caspain basin (http://www.mfa.gov.tr). The strategic 
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location means Turkey is the energy corridor between major producing states and 
consumer markets, making it a principal participant in guaranteeing energy 
availability by means of diversifying supplies. The westward projects connecting the 
Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe are also a key to the region's integration with 
the West (http://www.washington.emb.mfa.gov.tr). On the other hand, as an energy 
consuming country, Turkey's needs were 78 million tons of energy-equivalent as of 
2002, while the indigenous production of 25 million tones could only satisfy 32 % of 
its energy consumption. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources foresees that 
the primary demand will rise to 154 million tons of energy in 2010 and 282 million 
tons by 2020 (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 22 March 2004 ). 
Therefore, Turkey is trying to diversify its energy sources by developing ambitious 
pipeline projects to secure its own needs and then further transit those resources to 
energy-thirsty Europe. Turkey's dependency on 23 billion m3 Russian gas (63 %) and, 
6 billion m3 Iranian gas (16%) is a serious problem for Turkey's energy security. 
Turkey also bought 1.2 billon m3 Azeri gas and also Algerian and Nigerian gas in 
2007. Turkey's State Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) revised its estimates for 
Turkey's gas demand as 38.8 hem for 2010 and 43.4 hem for 2020. Recently, these 
figures were revised again to 42.1 hem and 61.0 hem respectively (www.botas.gov.tr). 
Table 9.6 Status of natural gas pipeline projects in Turkey 
Project Status Length (miles) Max capacity Bcf/year 
Blue Stream in operation 750 565 
Turkey-Iran pipeline in operation 750 495 
South Caucasus pipeline under construction 430 700 
Turkey-Greece interconnectors under Construction 186 407 
Nabucco Proposed 2,050 460-1,100 
Egypt-Turkey pipeline proposed NA NA 
Trans-Caspian Pipeline cancelled I ,050 565 
Sources: EIA, Turkey; http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabsffurkey/NaturaiGas.html; compiled by author 
The Baku-Supsa pipeline, the construction of which was completed in 1999 and 
which is capable of carrying 115,000 barrels of oil daily, was the first pipeline to 
bypass Russia by carrying Azerbaijani oil to the Black Sea coast of Georgia, which 
was then transported via oil tanker to W estem markets. The rail transport, Dubendi 
(Azerbaijan) via Khashuri (Georgia), also became competitive with the Russian 
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pipeline, Baku-Novorossiysk, but Russia also had to establish another Baku-
Novorossiysk pipeline by-passing Chechnya via Makhachkala in Dagestan. Whilst 
Russia keeps the initiative on Kazakh oil and Turkrnenistan' natural gas transport, 
Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi became the major alternatives to Russian and 
Iranian initiatives by by-passing Russia and Armenia. Two further projects, the Baku-
Erzurum natural gas pipeline and the Trans-Caspian pipeline, by bypassing Russia, 
and Iran would increase the rivalry between Russia and Turkey in energy politics. On 
the other hand, the proposed pipeline project, Nabucco also pushes Iran towards the 
international community and would balance the Russian energy power for energy-
thirsty Europe. 
Integrated map 9.16 Turkey as an energy corridor/ hub 
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european _energy _policy/turkeys_ energy_ strategy_ en.pdf 
At the meeting between George Bush and Putin in Moscow, both countries signed 67 
oil and natural gas agreements in 2002. As a concluding mark, the Russian president, 
Vladimir Putin stated that "Whoever controls the production and distribution of oil, 
and natural gas, and the prices of oil, controls the power in this new world system" 
(CBC, 2006). Energy, therefore, is a central political means for Russia to return to the 
centre of global affairs in the new world order. Turkey and Georgia now appear to 
have been a major barrier to Putin's expansionism in the 2000s. However, Iran's role 
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in the pipeline politics remains that of a silent participant which prefers Russian 
initiatives on pipeline politics. 
9.3.4.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
Pipeline politics are different from other commercial agreements. They establish the 
hardwire relationships and represent multi-billion dollar investment links between 
countries. President Bill Clinton and Suleyman Demirel considered BTC to be an 
instrumental east-west channel which would guarantee the independence and 
economic stability of the Caspian Basin independent countries. This would be of 
benefit to the US and Turkey by bypassing Iran, the northern Caucasus (including 
Chechnya), and Armenian-occupied parts of Azerbaijan (Cagaptay and Gencsoy, 
Central Dayligth Time, 28 May 2005). The leading American project agreement was 
announced by the US Energy Minister, Bill Richardson, on 29 October 1998 (Middle 
East Economic Survey, 17 July 2006). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, 
which connects the Sangachal Terminal in Baku to the Marine Terminal in the 
Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, a 1,1 00-mile pipeline, 155 miles of 
which passes through Georgia, was built at a cost of $4 billion. It is being developed 
by a group of eleven national and international oil companies and was formed for this 
purpose in August 2002 as a separately incorporated company (Bahgat, 2006). 
Britain's BP; Azerbaijan's SOCAR; Norway's Statoil; US based Unocal, Amerada 
Hess, and ConocoPhillips; Turkey's TPAO; Italy's Eni; Japan's INPEX and Itochu; 
and France's TotalFinaElf commenced building the line in May 2003. BP owns a 30% 
stake, is the biggest holder, and plays the role of the project design and building leader 
(Cagaptay and Gencsoy, Central Daylight Time, 28 May 2005). 
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Figure 9.7 Baku Tbilisi Pipeline 
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BTC was not only designed for Azeri's oil transport but also for Kazakh's in the 
median and long-term. This means totally challenging the position of Russia in 
Caspian Sea energy transportation. Therefore, Kazakhstan and Royal/Dutch Shell, 
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil were contracted to carry oil from the Aqtau field in 
Kazakhs' sector of the Caspian Sea to Baku in December 1998 (www.eia.doe.gov). 
The project would extend its link with the BTC pipeline if the issue of the Caspian 
Sea bases were solved between literal states. The first shot was fired between Russia 
and the West especially for Turkey and Georgia under the aegis of Washington, after 
the opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the second pipeline to by-
pass Russia, took place on 25 May 2005. It will be the first non-Russian main pipeline 
outlet to the international markets after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The 
pipeline was designed with the capability of carrying 1 million barrels of oil a day, 
initially to transport Azeri oil. The US supported Kazakhstan's participation in the 
BTC by supplying the Azerbaijani region with oil from the extensive Kashagan field. 
The US Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, said that "The USA. wants the 
Kazakh-Azeri talks on the transport of Kazakh energy resources through the BTC oil 
pipeline to be completed in March 2006" ( Fink, 2006; Crawley,2006). 
9.3.4.1.1 Security arrangements at the pipelines 
NATO's Partnership for Peace Program was put together to increase connections with 
former eastern bloc and ex-Soviet states and to aid GUUAM's efforts to guard the 
pipeline against potential attacks (Chikvaidze, 1994:27-8). The removal of Russian 
troops from the Akhalkala military base, which was handed over to Georgia's control 
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in October 2007, strengthened these Western initiatives (Kanbolat, 2006). However, 
Turkey's and NATO's growing engagement with Georgia further tightened Russian-
Georgian relations and the seriousness of the security situation over the BTC pipeline 
(Nickol, 2003). The explosion of the BTC pipeline in the Turkish section (in Refahiye) 
just 48 hours before the outbreak of the Georgian-Russian war on 8th-12th August 
halted the oil flow. It could not be transported via BTC, it could be via carried via 
Russia and its Novorossiysk port. On the other hand, all planned projects would have 
to be delayed further due to uncertainty around Georgia, including the Nabucco 
natural gas pipeline project, which is very important for Turkey (Today's Zaman, 15 
August 2008). The vulnerability of the Georgian portion of the BTC pipeline was also 
manifestly demonstrated when Russia bombed the areas around the pipeline's route, 
just to send a message to the West. The entire pipeline requires constant patrols in 
order to prevent sabotage, especially by the PKK, with the services being provided by 
private security companies. Interestingly, Western companies believe that Iran's 
pipeline option, the Baku-Tehran-Khark (BTK) pipeline, could be maintained at a 
fraction of the cost of the BTC pipeline (Baev, 2006). The Iranian option has the great 
advantage of passing through a politically stable Iran, whereas the BTC pipeline 
passes not only through Georgia, but also through the restive Kurdish areas of Turkey. 
Just a few days before the inaugural ceremony for the opening of BTC pipeline in 
Ceyhan port, the American Minister of State, Condoleezza Rice, signed a security 
agreement with Turkey, amounting to a practical start to the quadrennial defence 
review (QDR) during the G-8 summit. American Senator Richard Lugar, who 
referring to Article 5 of the Alliance Charter in case of military attack, declared in 
NATO's summit in Riga in November 2006 (Dempsey, 2006), that: "Any NATO 
member whose energy sources are cut off by force should be able to rely on assistance 
from the alliance because an attack using energy can devastate a nation's economy''. 
Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning at NATO, supported the establishment of a 
NATO energy security and intelligence analysis cell with the duty to focus on 
intelligence related to terrorism and energy security. Even in this context, potential 
NATO operations, in/out area, of the traditional types of policing, peacekeeping, and 
peace building, are going to overlap (Shea, 2006). 
This included the Georgian and Turkish Black Sea ports (Poti, Batumi, and Ceyhan), 
Georgian and Azerbaijan railways, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the ferry 
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lines that join Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan across the Caspian 
Sea/Lake (Turkmenbashi-Bak:u; Aktau-Bak:u), and the railways and roads being 
constructed in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China, as well 
as the Chinese Pacific terminals, considered to be crucial components of the 'mega 
corridor' (http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9907). 
9.3.4.1.2 Transportation costs of Azeri oil 
At $1.40, the cost per barrel of transport from Supsa to Italian ports by naval routes is 
$0.50 lower than Kirikoy-lbrikbana and a $1.40 lower than Bak:u-Ceyhan (Ronald and 
Barnes, Oct 26 1998). This includes the cost of expanding the Bak:u-Supsa pipeline to 
800,000 barrels per day. A hook up into the Bak:u-Ceyhan line for shipment of Kazak: 
crude will be far more expensive than other Western routes with the long pipeline 
costing considerably more than $2.75 a barrel compared to only $1.74 for shipments 
through the CPC pipeline in Russia to the Black Sea and on to Italy (Bames and 
Soligo, 1998). The main benefit of the oil's international sales will be reaped by 
Azerbaijan, which at present rates, about $29 billion per year, while Georgia and 
Turkey will earn transport fees of $600 million and $1.5 billion per year (Cagaptay, 
Central Daylight Time, 28 May 2005). 
Table 9.7 Transport cost comparisons for Azeri oil 
Delivered to Europe. Assuming a Cost of Capital of 15% 
Destination-Route Costlb Cost as a %of Cost Minus Cost 
Baku-Rotterdam: Bypass Route of Bypass Route 
Tanker From Supsa $1.91 87% -0.28 
Supsa-Turkish Bypass $2.19 100% + 
Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan $2.72 124% 0.53 
Baku-Ceyhan $3.20 146% 1.01 
Italy 
Tanker From Supsa $1.41 80% -0.36 
Supsa-Turkish Bypass $1.77 100% 0.00 
Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan $2.30 130% 0.53 
Baku-C~vhan $2.78 157% 1.01 
Sources: Bames, and Sohgo, 1998 
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9.3.4.2 South Caucasus natural gas pipeline 
The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum is being constructed in 
the same corridor as the BTC to minimise the environmental and social impact, using 
the same integrated project team to the Georgian-Turkish border (www.eia.doe.gov). 
It is 692 kilometers (430 miles) long, of which 442 kilometers (275 miles) extend 
through Azerbaijan and 248 kilometers (154 mile) in Georgia. The initial throughput 
of the pipeline is 8.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year, and after 2012 this 
could be enlarged to 20 bcm per year. The South Caucasus Pipeline is intended for the 
carriage of gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field, with capacity of 0.8 bcf/d by 
2007 (www.bp.com). About 610 mmcf/d ofthe Shah Deniz gas will be sold to Turkey, 
145 mmcf/d to Azerbaijan, and up to 77 mmcf/d to Georgia (www.eia.doe.gov). The 
intended Trans-Caspian pipeline could potentially join the above line to Turkmen and 
Kazakh output. 
Figure 9.8 South Caucasus gas consortiums 
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Although, BP closed the pipeline for safety reasons because of the Russian-Georgian 
war on 12 August, gas supplies were resumed on 14th August 2008. The technical 
operator of the pipeline is BP and the commercial operator is Statoil 
(www.jamestown.org). The South Caucasus natural gas consortium pumped gas from 
the Sangachal terminal in May and began deliveries of natural gas on 15 December 
2006. 
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9.3.4.3 Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipeline (TCP) 
Turkey's engagement with Turkmen natural gas started with the visit of President 
Suleyman Demirel during which both presidents signed the early gas deal on the 29th 
October 1998 (BBC News, 21 May 1999). This agreement was turned into a final 
purchase agreement in May 1999 when Turkish Energy and Natural Resources 
Minister, Ziya Aktas, signed another contract that envisages the construction of a 
2000 km gas pipeline through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Turkey, 
the so-called Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project. 
The plan was suspended although discussions between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan 
regarding the pipeline were reinitiated in October 2001 (Baran, 2007). The intended 
Erzurum-Baku pipeline will create a direct connection to the TCGP Turkmenbashi 
(Turkmenistan) via Baku and Tbilisi to Erzurum, joining up with the Turkish gas 
system (http://www.eia.doe.gov). The TCP oil segment would stretch from Aktau, 
Kazakhstan or Turkmenbashi and Turkmenistan under the Caspian Sea, to Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), ultimately accessing the Mediterranean. 
Integrated map 9.15: The proposed Trans-Caspian natural gas pipelines 
Complied by BOT AS, 2006 
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Although TCP is still in the drafting phase, analyses suggest that a gas line could cost 
$5 billion with a 30 bcf/year capacity. An oil line could cost $4 billion with 400,000 
barrels/day output, amounting to 40% of BTC's overall export capability. The US, 
however, requires European collaboration on the TCP, which would necessitate 
Euroepan belief in its utility. The vast majority of European consumption of gas 
originates in Russia and the TCP could limit these close ties based on need by taking 
gas straight to Europe (Fishelson, 2007). In March 2005 Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
agreed to construct the Aqtau-Baku line, joining the Kashagan offshore oil fields near 
Aqtau in Kazakhstan to the BTC in Baku via a sub-Caspian pipeline in March 2005 
(Cagaptay,and Gencsoy, Central Dayligth Time,28 May 2005). The Trans-Caspian 
westbound pipeline for Turkmen gas also envisaged export volumes of 16 billion 
cubic meters annually at the first phase (mainly to Turkey) and 32 billion cubic meters 
in the second phase (to south-eastern and central Europe). Later, the plan was halted 
due to Russian opposition alongside that of Iran (www.jamestown.org). 
9.3.4.4 Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH: Turkish and Iranian 
alternatives to Russia 
The Nabucco project revolves around a new gas line joining the Caspian states 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), the Middle East (UAE, Iran, and Egypt) 
via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with the 
Central and Western European gas market (Xypaki, 2008). It would span about 3,300 
km, beginning at the Georgian/ Turkish and/ or Iranian/ Turkish borders and 
extending to Baumgarten in Austria. Market research suggests a total investment 
requirement of 7.9 billion Euros and could transfer up to 31 bcm/y (www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/). 
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Figure 9.9 Nabucco gas pipeline 
MA• CCQI 
Compiled by BP Statistical Review 6/2007(in bcm) 
The consortium further encompasses MOL of Hungary, Transgaz of Romania, 
Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, Botas of Turkey, each of which holds an equal share of 
16.67% in the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH's project (Payvand News, 
13 November 2008). RWE's joining of the project as the sixth partner increased its 
potential in December 2007. The construction of the pipeline will start in 2010 and the 
first gas will flow to Europe in 2013 (Xypaki, 2008). Iranian pressure was placed on 
the Austrian company, OMV, one of the six stakeholders in the slow Nabucco project 
which intends to bypass Russia through the use of Central Asian energy. Iranian Oil 
Minister, Gholam Hossein Nozari, said that "The Austrians must hurry up and turn the 
preliminary contracts into actual contracts, because time is running out and we won't 
wait for OMV forever" (!RNA, 12 September 2008). Similarly, Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said in January that "Everybody has recognized that 
the Nabucco project can't work without Iran. A country with 16% of the world's gas 
reserves cannot be ignored" (Tehran Times, 14 September 2008). The head of Botas, 
Turkey' s governmental pipeline firm and a Nabucco stakeholder stated on 5th June 
2008 that Iran's and similar countries' involvement would be needed to ensure 
sufficient supplies are available to make the project worthwhile. In contrast, Matthew 
Bryza, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, 
stated in a Reuter's interview that Washington would object to Nabucco line's use as 
a conduit for Iranian gas. The managing director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
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International GmbH, Reinhard Mitschek, declared that contrary tothe US position, the 
Vienna-headquartered organisation would take gas wherever it can be found because 
the EU's 27 member-states' consumption being at 500 billion cubic meters (hem) in 
2007, of which 300 hem was imported and 200 hem was domestically produced in 
Europe, is set to diminish within 20 years. So, Europe has an expectation of a diverse 
and full range of sources, with the EU receiving 25% of supplies from Gazprom, a 
company which previously utilised gas-pricing as a political weapon against Belarus 
and the Ukraine, resulting in EU wariness of Russian-dependence. The organisation is 
also planning a south stream pipe to run alongside the Nabucco, with potential feed-
ins to supply south-east European markets such as Austria etc (Pannier, 2008). 
Figure 9.10 Nabucco gas pipeline project projection 
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Mitschek stated that "Iran announced recently that they are keen to construct IGAT-9, 
a pipeline from the South Pars field to the north to Tehran and finally to the Turkish 
border, and I could imagine that at a certain point in time as soon as the political 
situation will allow that, gas exports from Iran to Europe will take place. We have 
several statements also from the European Commission, Commissioner (Andris) 
Piebalgs and others that Iranian gas in the long-term is an issue for Europe" (Pannier, 
2008). Iran's South Pars field, some 100 kilometres off Iran's southern coast, is 
believed to be the world's largest gas field. Austria's OMV has signed a so-called 
Heads of Agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company to develop the South 
Pars field (Pannier, 2008). Turkey and Iran also signed the memorandum of 
understanding to develop several blocs in South Pars and the Iraqi government 
Gazprom to transport natural gas from Middle East to Europe. It is hoped by Nabucco 
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that a deal with regard to a trans-Caspian line can be struck, to be laid under the sea 
from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan. Mitschek believes the prospects of constructing a 
line are reasonably good and that some firms who own Nabucco shares are already 
operating in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (Pannier, 2008). 
9.4. Turkey-Iran's (geo) Economic Cooperation Organisation in central Asia and 
Caucasus 
The Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) represents middle-power states' 
intergovernmental international institutionalism and was formed in 1985 by Iran, 
Pakistan, and Turkey to reduce customs tariffs and promote commerce with the aim of 
an eventual customs union. ECO is the successor organisation to the Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD), which existed from 1964 up to 1979. In 1992 
the newly independent republics of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan were admitted into ECO. It is now represented in a wide range of 
geographical areas within the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis (8,620,697 km2). 
Turkey and Iran played a pivotal role in the organisation with a regular meeting of the· 
ECO held every two years. Nine summits have been organised since 1992 to 
deregulate commerce amongst its members (www.ecosecretariat.org). ECO's 
secretariat and cultural departments are based in Tehran, its economic department is in 
Turkey and its scientific section is located in Pakistan. The ECO agenda is to form a 
united market for goods and services, a referential planning council, a trade and 
development bank, joint organisation for reinsurance, shipping, and air transport, a 
cultural institute, science foundations and institutional infrastructure much like those 
of the European Union. The Economic Cooperation Organisation Trade Agreement 
(ECOT A) was signed on 17 July 2003 in Islamabad and the Transit Transport 
Framework Agreement in May 1998 (www.ecosecretariat.org). The member states 
promote intra-regional trade, which increased to US $ 16.7 billion in 2004, compared 
to US $ 10.2 billion in 2002. 
9.4.1 Transportation sector as an interdependency factor 
There are several potentially important corridors across Central Asia: east-west north-
south and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia) linking Asia and 
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Europe along the former Silk Road are part of a network project attracting large 
investments partners like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the 
Islamic Development Bank. These have committed funds for capital projects on ports, 
railways and roads along the TRACECA route (www.trecaca-org.org). 
Integrated map 9.16 Asian highways network and Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor 
(TRACCECA) 
Compiled by Tracceca, 2008; Abbas Maleki, 2006 
Iran's geographical position provides railway and highway links with Turkey in the 
west and Afghanistan to the east and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on both sides of 
the Caspian (Dannreuther, 2003). In March 1995, the Iranian and Central Asian 
presidents cut the ribbon on a 700 km rail link between Bafq in Iran and the Iranianp 
port of Bandar Abbas. The link connecting Mashad with the Persian Gulf and Iran 
with Turkmenistan (the Tejen-Sarakhs-Mashad line), was finished in March 1996 
(http://www.caspianstudies.com). However, Turkey's only rail connection to Central 
Asia goes through Iran but is not functioning effectively as the Armenia rail 
connection between Turkey and CIS countries is closed. Nevertheless, there is a 
passenger train to Iran, the Trans-Asia Train, travelling once a week between 
Istanbul-Tehran. 
In September 1996, the Izmir Treaty set out the basis for the establishment of the 
ECO, which called for accelerating the development of transport and communications 
infrastructures linking the member states with the outside world. ECO members 
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adopted the Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTF A), heavily drawing on the 
TIR convention in May 1998 (Pakistan Press International, 22 October 2004). TTFA 
has the potential of taking the role of a key player in operations to eliminate non-
physical impediments to the unification of regulations as well as accession by its 
members to international transport agreements and standards (ECO Bulletin, 
September 2002). There are limited transportation options between land-locked 
Turkey and Central Asia. The Istanbul-Almaty block container train has been running 
once a week since 22 June 2002. In addition, there are also about 29 roll-on/roll-off 
vessels in the Turkish fleet-- 6 regular private vessels are operating to CIS counties 
through the Black Sea. For the time being, the national air carrier of Turkey has 
flights to all the capitals within the region (Astana, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Bishkek and 
Ashkhabad) and convenient connections for many westerners from Istanbul 
(Heisbourg and Tocci, et al 2003). Iran has recently been engaged in road-
construction projects in north-west Afghanistan, providing new routes to Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan (www.caspianstudies.com). However, poorly organised transit 
gateways to Central Asia via Iran, Azerbaijan, and Georgia create significant 
problems for Turkish truck drivers by increasing taxes on road use, resulting in fiscal 
burdens on Turkish truckers (Orbis, Fall 1996). Therefore, Turkey started to diversify 
its transport links with two projects. Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been 
planning to join their rail networks through the Kars-Ahalkala connection, which will 
provide a rail connection between Turkey and Georgia as well as an alternative rail 
gate to Central and East Asian countries serving the east-west rail corridor between 
Europe and Asia. Turkey's and Iran's mutual rail project, Tatvan-Van on the east-
west corridor to Central-East Asian countries via Iran will provide a faster and 
uninterrupted alternative with more capacity than the existing ferry connection. 
9.4.2 Intra-regional trades and the imperative of private and state sectors of 
Turkey and Iran 
The Turkish state, private sector and non-governmental organisations have filled the 
vacuum in the region through making major investments, which provide Turkey today 
with significant political influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iranian products 
are well known and cheap across Central Asia, but exports are hampered by the 
domestic demand in Iran for goods and products, and the lack of sufficient private 
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business expenence as well as the weak government support for exports. Thus, 
Iranian economic sectors have small stakes in regional economic markets m 
comparison to Turkey's economic integration with regional states, resulting in its 
larger role in the region. Turkish investments in the region impact various fields but 
are mainly focused on energy, textiles, foodstuffs, communication, banking and the 
tourism sector. Moreover, the Turkish Eximbank has supported free market reforms in 
Central Asia. Additionally, one of Turkey's most successful organisations, the 
Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), is a vital instrument for 
providing aid, institutionalising government policies (36 % of all TIKA projects and 
programs focused on the region), and devising economic strategies for Central Asia 
(www.tika.gov.tr.). In general, Turkish companies have completed a large amount of 
construction, including educational, governmental, medical and residential buildings, 
as well as transportation infrastructure. The total intra-regional trade between ECO 
members was 25,102,500.000 in 2006 (ecosecretariat.org). Turkey and Iran hold the 
biggest stakes in regional export and import (www.deik.org). 
Figure 9.11 Intra-regional trades 
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9.4.2.1 Turkey's and Iran's trade relations with Kazakhstan 
According to the Turkish statistical institute report in 2004, Turkish companies made 
$US 1.3 billion worth of investments in Kazakhstan. The main investor companies are 
TPAO, Turkcell, Okan Holding, Rumeli Holding, the Anadolu Group and Koc Group 
in Kazakhstan (www.deik.org).Turkish construction companies also completed 147 
projects, at an estimated cost of US $ 3.2 billion in Kazakhstan. In a 2006 report, the 
402 
Turkey-Kazakhstan trade volume reached $US 1 billion and Kazakhstan also used 
$US240 million of Turkish Eximbank credit and pays back credit regularly. On the 
other hand, Iran's trade volume, mostly dependent on imports, amounted to US$ 1.2 
billion (IMF, 2007). Approximately $ 435 million in Turkish foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows into Kazakhstan each year, with additional capital brought 
from third countries by Turkish companies bringing the annual total to $1.3 billion. In 
fact, US firms have a larger share of FDI in Kazakhstan than do Turkey and Iran. 
Hence, Turkey's economic influence relies on the American presence in Kazakhstan. 
Economic interaction between Tehran and Astana is limited to oil swaps and small 
portions of other sectors. 
Figure 9.12 Turkey, Iran - Kazakhstan trade, 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.2 Turkey-Iran trade relations with Turkmenistan 
Notwithstanding the fact that 400 Turkish companies are registered in Turkmenistan, 
only 20 of them do active business there. Turkish trade makes up about 5 % of 
Turkmenistan's total trade balance (www.deik.org). Turkmenistan also receives the 
second largest amount of Turkish FDI in Central Asia. As a contribution to the 
liberalisation of Turkmenistan's economy, Calik and Koluk Holding operate Nebu, 
Kotum, Linkway textile factories and the Anadolu Groups produce 23 million tonnes 
of Coco-Cola beverages per year. Ziraat Bankasi is a partner of the Turkish-Turkmen 
Bank which ranks fourth place in foreign direct investment company in Turkmenistan. 
Turkish construction companies (GAP Insaat, Ucgen, Ekpar, Mensel, Gama, Polimeks, 
Burc, and Alarko) completed $5.5 billions' worth of projects, over 350 sites in 
Turkmenistan. However, despite this advantage in the private sector, Turkey's trade 
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volume with Turkmenistan was US$ 4.5 million lower than Iran's trade involvement 
of US $1.4 billion in 2006 (www.deik.org, 2007). However, Iran's trade mostly 
depends on energy, especially natural gas transport. Iran-Turkmenistan has also 
benefited from the geographical advantage which made Iran and Turkmenistan a 
major route between the Central Asian states and Europe. 
Figure 9.13: Turkey Iran- Turkmenistan trades, 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.3 Turkey-Iran trade relations with Uzbekistan 
Despite a fluctuating political relationship between Ankara and Tashkent, Turkey's 
Ziraat Bankasi has held a 50% share of Utbank in Uzbekistan since 1992. In the 
automotive sector, the Koc Group produces vehicles at a factory in Sarnarkand. 
Additionally, Barsel Holding is running 12 factories in Uzbekistan within the textile 
sector(www.deik.org, 2007). Tashkent took $375 millions of credit from the Turkish 
Eximbank and pays instalments regularly (www.deik.org,2007). Turkey's trade 
increased after 2003 and reached $600 million. 13 Turkish construction companies 
completed at the cost of US $ 330.6 million a total of 19 projects in 
2004(www.deik.org, 2007). On the other hand, Iran's trade volume increased by 
around US$130 million in 2006 (www.deik.org, 2007). Despite having different 
political views, Uzbek and Iranian businesses are becoming closer because Uzbek 
roads are essential for Iran to access other Central Asian states and northern 
Afghanistan. Within the energy industry, Iran's Oil Exploration Operations Company 
(OEOC) has inked a deal with Petronas of Malaysia to conduct seismic tests m 
Uzbekistan at the high price of$30 million (Mehr News Agency, 18 May 2006). 
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Figure 9.14: Turkey Iran-Uzbek trade, 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.4 Turkey-Iran trade relations with Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan is the only CIS country which is a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (Serin, 2003:7). Turkish exports constitute 90% of the bilateral 
trade volume, making it a key trade partner for Kyrgyzstan (www.deik.org). Turkish 
investments have focused mainly on banking, foodstuffs, plastics, and construction 
materials. Turkish construction companies have completed 19 projects in the 
Kyrgyzstan at a total value of more than $330 million. Turkish investment is 
estimated at $75 million within Kyrgyzstan. Tasarruf Mevduatlari Sigorta Fonu holds 
a 70 % share of the Demir Kyrgyz International Bank (DKIB), which is one of three 
prestigious banks in the country (Ukraine Business Report Weekly, 13 September 
2006). The Anadolu group is the owner of a 90 % share of the local Coca-Cola 
Corporation, which produces 39 million tonnes of drinks per year. The National Bank 
of the Kyrgyz Republic has already utilised $ 48.13 million of Turkish Eximbank 
credit. In comparison to Iran's trade with Kyrgyzstan, amounting to $15 million, 
Turkey's is substantially higher, with $160 million in 2006 (www.deik.org). 
Figure 9.15: Turkey Iran- Kyrgyzstan 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.5 Turkey-Iran trade with Tajikistan 
Due to the civil war, political uncertainty and structural problems, Turkey' s foreign 
direct investment (a mere $30 million) and economic relations with Tajikistan placed 
Tajikistan the last among the Central Asian states until 2001. But between 2001 and 
2005 Turkish - Tajik trade grew from $29 million to $93 million. The primary exports 
of Turkey to Tajikistan are carpets, plastic products, machinery and cleaning materials 
but aluminium and aluminium products are the main import from that country to 
Turkey(www.eik.org). Turkish companies contributed only $30 million investments 
in textile, food, and construction projects such as Oyak Insaat (Sikev-Zigar road) and 
Seyas Insaat {Tajikistan-China road) (www.deik.org). On the other hand, Iran 
economic and cultural links with Tajikistan are primarily connected to infrastructure 
projects such as the road link from Tajikistan to Iran via Herat in Afghanistan, the 
Anzab Hydro-tunnel, the Sang-Toudeh 11 Power Plant over the Vakhsh river 
(www.eurasianet.org), and the construction of the Raqoun power station (Iran Daily, 
11 November 2007). The World Bank has acknowledged the political and economic 
stability efforts made by Iran in Tajikistan. However, according to IMF figures, Iran' s 
trade volume is around $114 million, but Turkey's increased dramatically to $190 
million in 2006 (IMF, 2007). 
Figure 9.16 Turkey- Iran Tajik trade, 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.6 Turkey's and Iran's trade with Azerbaijan 
Energy and communication sector firms and private companies have played a 
significant role in Turkish and Azeri trade, ever since the end of the Cold War. The 
company holds a 6.53 % share of BTCco and a 9 % share of the SCP pipeline project 
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(Desai, 2008 ). Turkish private companies invested $1.5 billion in Azerbaijan. The 
Koc Group, Tukcell, Alcetel and Teletas Anadolu Group, Ziraat Bank, Baybank, 
Royalbank and Cibank continue their services in the country. Azerbaijan utilised $ 
150 million of the Turkish Eximbank credit-the trade volume between the two 
countries is approximately $1 billion. However, trade with Iran was around $ 404 
million in 2006 (www.deik.org) 
Figure 9.17: Turkey Azeri-Iran trades, 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.7 Turkey-Iran trade with Armenia 
Armenia's controversial relationships affect the economic relations with Turkey, 
Azerbaijan and Iran. Due to a lack of diplomatic relations, Turkey and Armenian trade 
volumes were at only $40,000 in 2006. However Iran-Armenian trade volumes 
constituted $140 million. Armenian Airlines is allowed flights between Y erevan -
Istanbul and Y erevan - Trabzon. Turkey also opened the H-50 air corridor for 
international airlines operating on the Armenia line. Regular bus services are also 
available from the eastern Black Sea to Armenia, through Georgia. Additionally 
Armenia is permitted to use the Trabzon port for export and import purposes. After a 
visa regime reform in Turkey on 10 January 2002, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali 
Babacan stated that 700,000 Armenian workers were allowed to stay in Turkey (BBC 
World Service, 16 July 2007). There are 20 companies founded by Turkish -
Armenian businessmen currently in operation in Armenia. According to some 
unofficial data, the bilateral trade volume between the countries has increased from 
about $30 million in 1997 to $200 million in 2007 (Canbolat, 2007). 
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Figure 9.18 Turkey/ Iran-Armenia trade, 1993-2007 
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author 
9.4.2.8 Turkey's and Iran's trade with Georgia 
Turkey's trade relations with Georgia are more important than with the other CIS 
states in the region (www.deik.org). According to Turkish State Statistical Report, 
around 100 private Turkish companies made $150 million worth of investments in 
Georgia. Sixteen of them are construction companies, which completed over 30 
projects in the country. Georgia used $ 41.5 million credit from the Turkish Eximbank 
but trade volume between Turkey and Georgia is at the very low rate of $US 750 
million, with trade with Iran being at $40 million in 2006 (Akturk,2006) 
Figure 9.19 Turkey/ Iran-Georgia trade, 1993-2007 
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9.4.2.9 American economic and military assistance to Eurasia and the Caucasus 
states 
American assistance to Central Asian states plays an essential role for the economic 
and political sovereignty of the Central Asian republics but Russia still remains the 
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main trade and political power in the region. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Soros Foundation used soft power strategies and had direct and indirect effects on 
the regional states' internal affairs, especially with regard to the 'colourful 
revolutions', in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine(www.soros.org). However, the 
Russian military presence in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia and former Soviet 
energy and transport systems balance out the American soft power strategies. 
Table 9.8 US Government assistance to Central Asian republics (1997-2003) 
Country Military (US$ million) 
Kazakhstan 72.5 
Kyrgyzstan 28 
Tajikistan 12.8 
Turkmenistan 13 
Uzbekistan 75.1 
Total 201.4 
Sources: Oliker and Szayna 2003; compiled by author 
9.4. Conclusion 
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The formation of the Azerbaijan International Consortium was the first trigger for the 
'Great Game' pipeline policy and disputes regarding the legal status of Caspian Sea 
resources (Bahgat, 2006). "The great game is finished when everyone is dead, not 
before", said Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim (Kipling, 1991:3). However, most 
scholars claim that the Great Game was over after the completion of the pipeline route 
through the Caspian and Central Asia (Maleki, 2007). The interventionist policies of 
the Russian oligarchy use ethnic instability as a means of penetration, while 
cooperating with Washington's policy of global war on terror in the region. However, 
due to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Russia interfered with the domestic affairs in 
Georgia, directly impeding Western initiatives, such as the BTC pipeline in August 
2008. On the one hand, Turkey's new project to establish the "Caucasus Stability 
Platform" would not only diversify the pipeline options of Western initiatives but 
decrease the level of Russian presence in the Southern Caucasus. Turkish president 
Abdullah Gul's visit to Yerevan created a suitable atmosphere in which to put an end 
to the problems between Turkey and Armenia 6 September 2008 (Aras, and Ozbay, 
2008). Brzezinski argues that "If either Turkey or Iran were to be destabilized, the 
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internal problems of the region would become unmanageable, while efforts to restrain 
regional domination by Russia could even become futile" (Brzezinski, 2004:125). 
However, both Turkey and Iran not only coped with the competition over the Caspian 
Sea incident but by circumventing Russia also increased their interdependency 
through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline and the prospective Nabucco project. Therefore, 
Washington is not entirely against the Turkey-Iran natural gas deals and economic 
relations but seeks to maintain a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geopolitical 
strategy (Brzezinski, 2004). On the other hand, the strategic importance of the Black 
Sea-Bosporus and Blue Stream projects intensify the interdependence relationship 
between Turkey and Russia. Russia will continue to take concrete steps to ensure that 
the majority of Kazakh oil and Turkmen natural gas was carried via Russia to Western 
markets. In this regard, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) plays an essential role 
in the cooperation between Russia and Western companies, especially the American 
company Chevron (Today's Zaman, 15 August 2008). However, the proposed Trans-
Caspian pipeline project could be connected with the South Caucasus natural gas 
pipeline, which is an alternative to the Russian and Iranian initiatives. Therefore, a 
Russian military presence in the southern Caucasus directly represents a deterrent to 
both Turkey's and the US's initiatives. Iran's oil swap option does not have enough 
capacity to compete with the BTC pipeline and CPC but Iran still remains the most 
secure transport option for Caspian Sea energy sources. On the other hand, neither 
Turkey nor Iran has any influence over Central Asian energy politics, but China has 
emerged as a major player, especially due to Kazakhstan's oil and natural gas 
exploration and transportation, and will become a competitive alternative to Russia in 
the future. After the Georgian-Russian war in August, the Black Sea became one of 
the disputed arenas of international politics, one which would lead to a legacy of 
confrontation not unlike that of the Bosphoros and the Dardanenelles. The 
interdependency relations in transport and the ECO's role in cooperation between 
Turkey and Iran will serve as leverage against Russian domination in the region-
through seeking a new strategic relationship. This intergovernmental organisation 
helps Iran's new orientation towards Asia. Despite Iran's geographical advantages, 
Turkey's private sector success and Turkey's Western involvement serves as a 
cornerstone of to the geo-strategic relations with Central Asian and Caucasian states. 
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CHAPTER TEN: 
TURKEY- IRAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
10.1. Introduction 
During the monarchical retgn m Iran, by Turkey's engagement with Iran mostly 
consisted of security matters through the Baghdad Pact and CENTO. The only 
economic institutional tie was through the Regional Cooperation for Development 
(RCD), which organised economic interaction between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan 
(Ogutcu, 2007). While Iran became the main military and trading partner of the US 
Japan and Western countries, Turkey has encountered an economic crisis, internal 
terror and Western arm embargo in the 1970s. The RCD, thus, could not be helpful in 
granting Turkey's request for more lenient payment of the heavy oil import bill. 
Turkey's inefficiency as a liberal economy did not allow it to enter Iran's open 
markets at this time (Iran Trade Ministry, November 1989). Turkey received a curt 
response from Tehran and other oil producers and the absence of such necessities 
pushed Turkey into an era of structural change in its economy and domestic life in the 
1980s. Nevertheless, the Islamic Revolution opened a new page in Turkey-Iran 
economic relations, as Iran became one of the countries admitted to the Joint 
Economic Commission Protocol with Turkey. Since the first Joint Economic 
Commission meeting in 1983, there have been nineteen Joint Economic and Trade 
commission protocols signed (www.deik.org). This Chapter examines the impact of 
economic relation on Turko-Iran relations within three phases: the First Gulf War 
period (1979-1989), the Second GulfWar period (1990-1991), and the post-Cold War 
(1991-2002) period which include the situation after the invasion of Iraq (2003-2008). 
The systemic security settlement of middle-power states underpins foreign policy -
making and restricts their economic relations even if a necessity arises for mutual 
interdependency relations in the economic and transportation sectors. Therefore, this 
chapter analyses why Turkey and Iran failed to institute economic relations. 
10.2.0. Economic relations during the first Gulf War (1980-1989) 
During his term, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal pursued economic liberalisation 
policies reversing the austerity policies announced on 24 January 1980, which entirely 
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changed the trade regime and government control of the economy. Turkey opened up 
its economy with the objective of integrating into the global system by adopting free 
trade regulations in 1987, and unlimited foreign exchange (money transfers) in 1984. 
This consolidated Turkey's attempt to increase export-led growth through a liberal 
economy. Economic liberalisation continued during the coalition governments of 
1991-2002. An important milestone in these policies has been Turkey's customs 
union with agreement the European Union (EU) in 1996 (Hale, 2000). On the other 
hand, the Islamic Revolution changed the direction of Iran's economic ties, especially 
towards the Third World. The economic policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran were 
strongly influenced by the socialist ideology of revolutionaries, called Islamic 
Socialism, which is characterised by state-controlled economies with nationalised 
banks, insurance companies and major industries. Eight years' of war with Iraq 
greatly influenced the centralisation of the Iranian economy. This section attempts to 
discuss how Turkey achieved its active neutrality politics by gaining outstanding 
leverage against Iran and Iraq during the war periods. It also aims to explain the 
structural changes in the Turkish and Iranian economies and the new agreements 
relating to trade transport, and banking regulations between the two countries 
(Kamron, 1991). 
There were two main causes for the improved economic relations with Iran: Ankara 
rejected both the request by Washington to use the Incirlik airbases for military 
operations and economic sanctions against Iran. Turkey also preferred to follow active 
neutral politics during the First Gulf War (Berresiye, 1983: 379). As result, Tehran 
and Baghdad considered Ankara a reliable trading partner of goods and a transit route 
for their imports from Europe. Thus, Turkey welcomed an export and revenues' 
expansion, derived from the transportation of goods for it which provided Turkey with 
a formidable amount of foreign exchange to assist the development of a liberal open -
market economy (Carkoglu, et al. 1998). 
10.2.1.0. Turkey-Iran trade accords and new regulations 
Turkey and Iran signed a series of trade agreements and protocols--the International 
Road Transport Agreement of the l21h May after which the economic commissions of 
both countries agreed to produce a new protocol on banking, economics and trade in 
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Tehran on 7 June 1980 {T.C Resmi Gazete, 7 June 1980). Iran needed a neutral 
transportation channel for its import and exports in with the external world during the 
war period. The barter and trade protocol agreements in the following year, signed on 
22 April, dramatically improved the trading volume between the two countries. The 
barter agreement and trade accord on various issues on 14th January and lOth March 
1982 furthered the Joint Economic and Trade Commission meeting envisaged by the 
Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement on 21st April 1983. In this period, 
Turkish exports to Iran increased from $45 million in 1978 to $1.088 billion in 1983, 
making up almost 19 % of the total exports of Turkey at the time. In 1984, Turkish 
imports from Iran increased from $189 million in 1978 to $1.548 billion Kumar,2008). 
However, the situation changed in Turkish-Iranian trade after Iran's cutbacks on oil 
production and the decline of oil prices coupled with the diversion of resources to the 
war with Iraq which finally led to Iran's economy suffering from foreign exchange 
shortages, that resulted in the curtailment of its purchases from Turkey. Nevertheles, 
the Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission conducted a second meeting and signed 
an additional accord in May which encompassed industrial and technologic 
cooperation on 16th August 1984. The Turkey-Iran Industrial and Technical Joint 
Economic Commission at its third term meeting introduced a new road map for the 
building of natural gas and crude oil pipelines between the two countries on 22th 
January 1985 (Ghasemi, 2002:51-54). The additional protocol to this contract 
diversified non-oil products earmarked for export with a planned $3 billion trade 
volume {T.C Resmi Gazete, 30 January 1985:7). Articles 44-47 in this agreement 
arranged the import and export leverage for Iranian and Turkish goods but Article 48 
regulated the trade in the border provinces of Agri and Urumiye (T.C Resmi Gazete, 
30 January 1985:7). The Turkey-Iran fourth-term economic, industrial, and technical 
Joint Economic Commission meeting concluded with another accord in Tehran on 30 
December 1985. This protocol confirmed the third-terms joint economic meeting 
decision and introduced new regulations into border trade as well (Ghasemi, 2002). 
However, the decline of oil prices (from $26 to $1 0) disrupted the trade balance, and 
caused the cancellation barter agreements in 1981 and 1982. Turkey mostly stopped 
importing oil from Iran in the first six month of 1986, but an additional protocol 
emerged from the fourth economic cooperation meeting in Ankara on 19 June 1986 
with the formation of all diverse committees such as trade, banking, transport and 
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communications, industrial and technical. The meeting aimed also to improve the 
non-oil trade and sale of Iranian products via Europe by Turkey {T.C Resmi Gazete, 
23 September 1986). However, neither the non-oil trade regulations nor the trade 
volume succeeded in increasing the volume of transactions between the two countries 
and it remained lower than $1 billion in 1986. 
10.2.2.0. Oil and War 
It can be said that there are two factors which influenced the level of Turkey-Iran 
trade in the 1980s: Turkey's oil shortage and trade with Iraq, and the Turkish National 
Oil Company {TP AO) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) regulation of 
the oil prices and volumes. In the 1984 and 1986 Joint Economic Commission 
Protocols, Iran agreed to sell 6 million tons of oil each year, but Turkey bought 7.2 
I 
million tons in 1985 and 5.7 million tons of oil in 1986 (Arefnya,2003: 105-9). 
Despite the plan to sell 5 million tons in 1986, Turkey only bought 2 million tons 
from Iran. Nevertheless, after the OPEC meeting in Geneva in November 1986, 
Turkey agreed to buy 6 million tons of Iranian oil at $18 per barrel in 
1987(www.deik.org). On the other hand, during the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey imported 
7.93 million tons of oil from Iraq and exported $4.88 millions' worth of products; 
Iraq's debt to Turkey reached $2 billion in 1990 (www.deik.org). During the war, 
Turkey's pressure on Iran about the Kurdish insurgency impeded a possible attack on 
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, which was the only pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to the 
international market. In addition, the existence of Iranian refugees in Turkey created a 
political crisis, especially as they were considered the prime suspects in political 
murders in Iran {Tibi, 2004), but their business activities played an effective role in 
increasing the trade volumes and cash flow to Turkey( Karasapan, 1989:33-5). 
However, according to the Turkish Chamber of Commerce data, companies 
originating in Iran are mostly called nameplate (tabela) companies, which did not take 
part in any trade but were designed to merely be registered as a presence in Turkey. 
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Figure: 10.1 Turkey's export and imports to Iran and Iraq (1980-1991 
Sources: (IMF, TUIK, DIEK, 2007); compiled by author 
In comparison to Iran, Turkey's imports from Iraq were higher than Iran's in the first 
phases of the war in 1981. However, Turkey's imports from Iran reached their peak 
levels in 1983-1984, but after the cancellation of the barter agreement in 1985, 
Turkish-Iranian trade declined dramatically. While Turkey-lraq trade volume peaked 
at $2.1 billion in 1989, Turkey-Iran trade volume was only $800 million (IMF, 2007). 
These figures signify that despite Turkey's political mentality during the war, its 
political and economic relations with Iraq were more dominant than with Iran (Aydin 
et al, Arab Studies Quarterly, 2005). In fact, Iran managed to keep Turkey as a 
neutral party in the war due to not targeting Turkey with any systematic revolutionary 
or ideological exports (Chubin and Tripp 1988:123-146). After the war, the headscarf 
crisis in Turkey and Iran's position on this issue created a diplomatic crisis that 
resulted in a decline in bilateral trade between the two neighbors in 1989 (Tibi,2004). 
10.3.0. Post-Cold War period (1991-2002) 
After Ayatollah Khomeini's death, Ali Khamenei and the pragmatist leader H. 
Rafsanjani took over power in Iran. Rafsanjani's first government's Five-Year Plan 
{1989/90-1993/94) authorised up to $27 billion in foreign borrowing. It aimed at 
increasing productivity in key industrial and economic sectors and promoting the non-
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oil export sector. His second government's Five -Year (1994/95-1998/99) plan aimed 
at targeted money in transport, particularly the railroad system and the construction of 
a public underground system in Tehran. Other projects were aimed at revitalising the 
petroleum sector and developing the natural gas sector. 
With regard to Turkey, it had been regularly governed by coalition governments, 
whose economic mismanagement created two economic crises in April1994 and 2001. 
The National Security Council, the military-dominated checks-and-balances 
organisation, took control in all domestic and foreign policy, including in relation to 
the PKK terror and against the rise of political Islam. 
Regarding their economic relations during this period, Turkey and Iran consistently 
maintained regular contact through the Joint Economic Council meetings. 
Consequently, an economic and industrial accord was signed between the two 
countries on 22 February 1990. Economic sanctions after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait 
in August 1990 further diminished Turkish exports to the Middle East. As explained 
in the Chapter Nine. Turkey-Iran and Pakistan replaced the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation with RCD and signed a mutual payment agreement on 11 July 1990 
(Aydin and et al, Arab Studies Quarterly, 2005). After the dissolution of the Soviet 
empire, Turkey-Iran-Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed additional treaties in Ashkhabad 
in lOth May 1992 (Haine, 2003). Turkey remained the main road for Iranian trade to 
access the European market during this period, and Iran remained the main short and 
safe transportation road for Turkey's relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
Under the ECO regulations, the two countries signed a transport agreement in Ankara 
on the 15 December, and petrol, natural gas, industrial, electricity, border crossing 
trade and transportation agreements on 22 December 1993 (Arefnya, 2003). The 
Turkish energy company BOTAS and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) 
agreed the controversial long-term natural gas project for natural gas and oil pipelines 
at the 12th Joint-Economic Commission's two meetings in March and May 1994. In 
the meantime, the Iranian oil minister, Gholamreza Agazadeh, and the Turkish energy 
ministry, V eysel Atasoy, concluded 23- year natural gas and oil pipeline contracts on 
2-4 May 1995 (www.eia.doe.gov). 
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10.3.1. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) and the Turkey-Iran 
natural gas agreement (August 1996) 
The controversially militant economic politics of the Clinton government resulted in a 
complete ban on transactions with Iran in April 1995 and a subsequent passage by the 
Congress of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) which potentially could 
penalized third party states for investing in Iran (Dowling, and Popiel, 2002). Under 
the ILSA, all foreign companies providing investments of over $20 million for the 
development of petroleum resources in Iran would be subject to the imposition of two 
out of seven possible sanctions by the US. However, Turkey never applied this 
economic sanction against Iran and always supported Tehran in the UN against anti-
Iranian decisions (Washington Post,2 December 1996). On the other hand, Turkish 
Prime Minister Erbakan' s first foreign visit to Iran in August 1996 resulted in the 
signing by the Turkish and Iranian governments of a $23 billion natural gas deal and 
an agreement for the construction of a pipeline between Tabriz and Ankara over 25 
years, in July 1996 ( Calabrese, 1998). An additional 25-year contract was signed 
between Iran and Turkmenistan in December 1997 that would support the planned 
Nabucco pipeline project (IRNA, 17 March 1997). The contract with Iran reflected 
Turkey's efforts to cope with domestic energy demands and its desire to avoid over-
reliance on Russian gas that at the time constituted 75 % of Turkish consumption. 
Thus, strategically, Turkey made several agreements with other countries to balance 
its energy needs. 
Table: lO.lTurkey's natural gas agreement contracts 
Agreements Bern per year Date Year Status 
Russia (west) 6 14 February 1986 25 in operation 
Algeria 4 14 April 1988 20 in operation 
Nigeria 1.2 09 November 1995 22 in operation 
Iran 10 08 August 1996 25 in operation 
Russia( Blue Stream) 16 15 December 1997 25 in operation 
Russia (west) 8 18 February 1998 23 in operation 
Turkmenistan 16 21 May 1999 30 
Azerbaijan 6.6 12 March 2001 15 
Sources: BOT AS, 2006 
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The US persisted in its pressure on Ankara to overthrow Erbakan's government, 
which was ousted in June 1997 through what is now known as the 'post-modern 
military coup d'etat' (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 12 April 1999). During the 
events of 28 February, the National Security Council banned Erbakan's two 
successive parties and his top lieutenants were barred from politics, and this new form 
of coup aimed at curbing the religious freedoms including parson-preaching schools. 
Despite the anti-Islamic developments in Turkey, the reformist Khatami government 
managed to establish diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey once more and 
therefore moved forward with the natural gas pipeline project with the succeeding 
Ecevit government. Consequently, the Iranian part of the new 40 diameter line was 
slated for completion in 1998, extending 265 km from Tabriz to Bazargan at the 
border, at a cost of $150 million. The Turkish part was also scheduled for completion 
by 1998, extending from Dogubeyazit on the Turkish side near Bazargan to the 
eastern Turkish city of Turkey Erzurum (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 12 April 
1999). The building was finished and began transferring natural gas in 2001 
(www.deik.org, 2006). The source for most of the gas was Kangan in the south, with 
oilfields in the Ahwaz area providing further output. From 2001, NIOC added to the 
transfer the South Pars field's gas as its exploitation began; Iran's commitment was 
for 4 bcm in 2002 expanding to 1 0 bcm/y in 2007 (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 
11 April, 2005). 
Integrated map 10.1: Turkey- Iran pipeline 
http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=617 ; compiled by Abbas Maleki, 2006 
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The Turkey-Iran natural gas contract was eventually accepted by the Washington 
administration, because the deal did not involve direct investments in Iran by Turkey 
or other Western countries. Moreover, the pipeline might be also carry for gas from 
Turkmenistan. In addition, some concessions was extracted from the Americans 
permitting imports of Iranian goods such as caviar, pistachios, dried fruit and carpets, 
in the form of an exemption from the general ban. ILSA's five-year term ended in 
August 2001, and numerous US energy sector companies lobbied for non-renewal 
(www.eia.doe.gov). However, in late July 2001, the US Congress voted 
overwhelmingly to renew ILSA for five more years (Katzman, 2006). 
According to the take-or-pay deal, Iran has exported 20.74 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas to Turkey (Eroasia Daily Monitor, November 24 2008). However, in 
return, Ankara failed to take the necessary steps at the time to guarantee a barter deal 
with Tehran under which the former could have reduced its trade deficit burden, 
stemming in large part from the gas deal with Iran. In July 2007 Iran and Turkey 
signed MoU that would pave the way for $3.5 billion worth of Turkish investment in 
Iran's South Pars gas field on a buyback basis ( Iran Daily, 21 August 2007). This 
study deals with this issue in the economic Chapter. 
Figure 10.2: Turkey's exports and imports to Iran 1992-200 
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Sources: (IMF, 2006, DIEK, TUIK, 2007); compiled by author 
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It should be noted that Turkey and Iran could not achieve a major trade partnership in 
comparison to the trade at this time. Russia began to rival Germany as Turkey's 
biggest export market, buying about $4.1 billion Turkish goods in 1998, compared 
with $5.4 billion for Germany during the 1990s. During this period, Turkey- Iran 
trade hit the lowest amont, as Iran transacted over 80 % percent of its foreign trade 
with Asian countries as Iran's had diversified its economy and natural gas contracts 
with other states. 
10.4.0. The influence of domestic politic in trade: 2003-2008 
After the Justice and Development Party (henceforth, AKP) was elected into office at 
the end of 2002 and elected Tayyib Erdogan as its leader and prime minister of 
Turkey, a resolution was proposed on March which aimed at providing for US 
military passage through Turkey for the invasion of Iraq. However, parliament 
overturned the proposal and consequently Turkey and U.S relations underwent a 
critical period despite being partners in NATO. 
Turkey's new approach to EU and Cyprus policy increased foreign investment and 
trade. According to official figures, trade between Turkey and Iran rose up in recent 
years that was valued at 2.4 billion dollars (2.0 billion Euros) in 2003, a 90% increase 
on the previous year (www.deik.gov.tr, 2006). Erdogan's government copied the 
approach ofKemal Dervis, the economy minister in the previous government who had 
a mandate from the IMF to rescue the Turkish economy, and the IMF economic 
program further increased the liberalisation of economy and politics in Turkey. 
Throughout the constitutional crisis in June 2007, the JDP continued to transform 
Turkish society into a moderate by conservative Islamic direction. This is clear from 
the election of Abdullah Gul, one of the founders and important leader of JDP, as the 
president of the Republic. And worked towards the removal of headscarf ban in 
universities in 2008 and JDP's politics attracted Arab sovereign investment from the 
Gulf. 
During the same period, Iran's nuclear crisis with the US and the rise of conservative 
power in Iran impeded the liberalisation of the Iranian economy. The Revolutionary 
Guard and the conservatives in the Iranian government cancelled the Turkcell and 
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TAV contracts for security reasons in 2004. However, as usual Turkey did not impose 
the UN sanctions against Iran in 2006. Thus, trade volume between two countries 
increased to $8 billion in 2007 and was expected to reach $1 0 billion in 2008, which 
represents a significant boost when compared with the early 1990s. 
10.4.1. The arbitration of the Turkcell consortium and cancellation of TA V 
contracts (2004) 
Turkcell, a Turkish mobile phone service provider, was awarded, by the Iranian 
authorities, alongside GSM (900/1800), a license on the 18th February 2004, 
According to the license the Consortium was expected to pay an upfront fee of about 
EUR 300 ($3 70) billion. The cell phone licence was successfully bid on by a 
Turkcell-led group of companies on the 14 February; this was Iran's largest foreign 
investment since the Islamic Revolution, and is worth more than $3 billion over 15 
years, with the option to renew every five years, giving it a 70% stake (TDNs, 30 July 
2004 
According to the agreement, if the Consortium had not pursued the GSM license, the 
EUR 300 million payments under the consortium agreement would have become 
payable immediately. Turkcell guaranteed an €21 0 million portion of this guarantee 
through HSBC plc. However, after the parliamentary elections in February 2004 in 
Iran, the conservatives took over the Parliament. The government which rose to 
power declared that the Turkish agreements were a threat to national security as it 
would enable Turkey to eavesdrop on Iranian mobile calls. The second agreement to 
which it objected was concluded with a Turkish-led engineering group, Tepe-Akfen-
Vie (TA V), to build and operate a new airport. The consortium stated that it had spent 
over $15 million on preparatory training and goods. The reason for the cancellation 
was the Revolutionary Guards' accusation that the consortium was involved with 
Israel, resulting in the closing of the Imam Khomeini airport on its first day in May 
2004 and the removal of the company's employees (The New York Times, 10 
October 2004). 
It is important to note that in April and July 2004, Turkey and Israel signed several 
economic and trade agreements during the visit of Israel's deputy prime minister 
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Ehud Olmert to Turkey in mid-July 2004 (Kumaraswamy, 2005). Most notably, one 
agreement involved having Israeli companies bid on the privatisation of Turkish 
companies such as Tekel, Petkim, Turkish Airlines and Turkcell. Tehran's aggressive 
stance regarding the apparent financial connections between Turkey and Israel led to a 
changed stance, leading to the contract's extension to a South African group instead, 
giving the first major role to this country's company in the Middle East 
(www.zawya.com, 2007). Thus the Iranian parliament ordered the government to 
cancel the two Turkish contracts as well as the official trip of Khatami to Turkey in 
August. It is also important to note that the Turkish prime minister's visit to Tehran 
with 130 Turkish businessmen could not solve the Turkcell contract crisis on 31 July 
2004 and both the Iranian Parliament and the Guardian Council stated that the 
agreement concerning the mobile phone network would become effective upon the 
approval of the Iranian Parliament on 26 September 2004.But during the following 
year, on April 25, the Iranian Parliament approved a revised proposal, which 
suggested a reduction of Turkcell's stake in Irancell to 49%, included several other 
amendments to the terms of the license agreement originally agreed and submitted the 
proposal to the Guardian Council for their consent. In May 2005, the Guardian 
Council gave their consent. The consent was approved by the Iranian President. In 
addition, the company was involved in various activities, including call centres and 
database management, directory assistance, advertising, operating a central betting 
system, Wireless Application Protocol (W AP) services, value added GSM services 
(V AS), fixed-line long-distance call services and intemet services through various 
consolidated subsidiaries in June 2005 .In addition, during the following month 
Turkcell released EUR 210 million which was guaranteed in the contract on 26 July 
2005. On 2 September 2005, the board of directors of Turkcell decided to continue 
with the Irancell project and approved the ownership structure of lrancell with a stake 
of 49% in Iran cell for Eastasia. However, it has been stated that 21% of the shares in 
Irancell should be transferred to the National Bank of Iran, Bank Melli and the parties 
should agree that these shares should be publicly offered in the third year following 
the initiation of the Irancell operations, and these agreed terms should be reflected in 
all agreements between the parties in lrancell (The America's Intelligence Wire, 8 
September 2005). MTN made an announcement in October 2005 of a $358m transfer 
to an Iranian bank, to serve as its share of the Iranian mobile network licensing fee, 
with a further statement noting that it was attempting to purchase a 49% share in 
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Irancell, a joint company with Iranian businesses, through the Ministry of Telecoms. 
The company lost out to Turkcell in the primary tender but is expected to replace 
Turkcell as the primary investor in Irancell, although this is not final (Ford, 2006). 
The Iranian Telecommunications Ministry set the 21st November 2005 as the deadline 
with respect to the finalisation of the shareholder structure of the Consortium. In the 
meantime, Eastasia has deposited €172. 7 million in Bank Saderat Plc., located in 
London, as its potential contribution to the GSM network license fee and a portion of 
the initial capital, to show its willingness to invest in Irancell. Turkcell provided a 
deposit pledge with (Turkish) Garanti Bankasi in the amount of EUR 91.6 million, 
and provided a bank loan to Eastasia for the same amount. The maturity of this loan is 
set as November 21, 2005 which is also the proposed deadline for the completion of 
the negotiations over the shareholder structure of the consortium. Although Turkcell 
does not currently conduct any operations in Iran, once shareholding structures are 
finalised and Irancell commences operations in Iran, such operations may in the future 
be relevant to Turkcell. As a result, Turkcell has brought a claim in Iranian courts 
seeking to compel the Ministry to implement the laws and regulations passed by the 
Iranian Parliament in connection with the GSM tender process (The Middle East in 
zawya.com, January 2006). On 14 January 2008, Turkcell sent an official letter to the 
Turkish Stock Exchange which explained the question of contract with Iran and 
applied to an international court for arbitration in Paris, but the court case is still 
pending. 
All in all, the conservative cadre in Iran does not want to share the wealth of the state 
and open society further economically or politically at this point, after the failure of 
Foreign Investment Promotion & Protection Act on 25 May 2002 and cancellation of 
Turkcell and TA V contracts (Celalifer, 2007). 
10.4.2. UNSC resolution and US unilateral sanctions against Iran (2006) 
George W. Bush's "axis of evif' address in January 2002 was the continuation of 
economic and diplomatic efforts against Iran since the Iranian Revolution. The 
situation became critical after the revelation of Iran's enrichment program at Natanz 
in February 2003, which resulted in attention from the UN nuclear monitoring 
authority, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran alleges that the 
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nuclear research is non-military, including for energy production, but the US claims 
the intentions are military, referring to a Security Council process as its response 
(www.globalpolicy.org). UNSC demanded that its members ban the supply and sale 
of all equipment, technology and finance which could contribute to Iran's uranium 
enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water related activities or to the research and 
development of nuclear weapons (Green Peace Briefing, February 2007). UNSC 
passed a resolution supporting the P5 and Germany's proposal for incentives in 
diplomatic and economic form, as well as requesting Iran's suspension of uranium 
enrichment by August 2006 (www.globalpolicy.org). A third resolution, number 1747, 
broadened the previous sanctions package against Iran. It includes sanctions such as 
banning exports of conventional weapons from Iran and freezing the overseas assets 
of 28 Iranian individual and entities including the state-owned Bank Sepah and the 
commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Stuart Levey, the undersecretary for US 
Treasury blamed a major governmental bank, Bank Saderat, of sponsoring terrorist 
groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in September 2006. Levey stated 
that since 2001 a Hezbollah-controlled organisation had received 50 million US 
dollars directly from Iran through Bank Saderat. He said that the US government 
would also persuade European banks and financial institutions not to deal with Iran 
(as cited in Washington Times, 9 January 2007). On the one hand, in an interview 
with the Financial Times (5 January 2008), Hamid Borhan, head of Bank Saderat !rani 
said that Of 600 foreign banks that used to do business with Bank Saderat before the 
US imposed sanctions in September 2006, some 200 had halted their business 
transactions. However, China became Iran's main trade partner last year without 
paying much attention to the US position, while much trade is being conducted 
through the re-export hub of the United Arab Emirates (Financial Times, 5 January 
2008). Therefore, Russia and China, two Security Council members blocked the move 
and called the US bank sanctions arbitrary and unhelpful. As a result of Iranian non-
compliance, the security Council placed sanctions on nuclear materials and 
technology transactions. IAEA offerred a 60 day 'grace period' in which it could stop 
its enrichment in exchange for the lifting of UN measures against it in December 2006; 
Iran did not agree (www. Globalpolicy.org). The action taken by the US Department 
ofthe Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC against Bank Saderat in 
September and the designation of Bank Sepah on 9 January 2007 represented the 
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strengthening of economic sanctions against Iran and illustrated the different legal 
authorities that the United States is using to achieve its purpose. Mohammed Bagher 
Zolghadr, one of the 15 top Islamic Republic officials specifically targeted by the UN 
for travel limitation (among other sanctions, including blocking of his bank accounts), 
made a working visit to Moscow without any incident during 4-8 April 2007. 
However, Chinese banks have cut back business with Iranian banks due to US 
pressure over Teheran's disputed nuclear programme in February 2008 (Khaleej 
Times, and Reuters 2 February 2008). The position of Turkey was highlighted by 
Stuart A. Levey, the Treasury's under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, 
who called on Turkey to scrutinise actions by three Turkish branches of Iran's state-
owned Bank Mellat (www.ekathimerini.com). He claimed that Iran uses its banks for 
its missile development and Turkey's proximity to Iran, shared history and ties 
between their people make Turkey a place where "there is need for vigilance. 'This is 
required in order to make sure that Turkey's financial institutions are not abused by 
Iranian financial institutions and Iranian state-owned banks (The Associated Press 28 
January 2008). However Turkey is moving ahead with regard to the pipeline and buy-
back deals on the South Pars Project. 
10.4.2.1. Turkey's South Pars Natural Gas Project (2007) 
By disregarding Washington's warnings concerning any type of engagement with Iran, 
Turkish energy minister, Hilmi Guler, had a meeting in Tehran with Hojjatollah 
Ghanimifard, the international affairs director of the state-owned National Oil 
Company on 19 August 2007 and both of them reaffirmed a MoU signed on 14 July 
2007 (Today's Zaman 13 August 2007). The MoU includes the buy-back contracts 
between Turkey and Iran relating to the South Pars natural gas development fields' 
phases 22-24. Turkish officials have estimated that the project will require a total 
investment of $3.5 billion, including $2 billion to build a pipeline to transport gas 
across Turkey. The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (TP AO) will 
independently provide finance to the amount of $3.5-billion and will begin the 
construction of facilities in the South Pars field in 2008 
(http://oildompublishing.com/). To move forward on the project, Turkish energy 
minister Hilmi Guler made an official visit to Tehran to sign cooperation agreements 
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in electricity production and construction of natural gas power on 19 August 2007 (UP 
Energy 30 November 2007), (Turkish Petroleum Corp. Investments, I October 2007. 
The US and Russia are mutually disturbed by the increasing Turkish-Iranian 
collaboration as it has an impact on Russian influence over Turkmen gas resources 
and a detrimental impact on US efforts to isolate Iran. However, Turkey retains an 
interest in forming the Turkish-Iranian-Turkmenistan joint venture to export natural 
gas to the European Union. Turkey wishes to receive by way of a bargain decreased 
gas prices for Iranian supplies of gas. Iranian Oil Minister Kazim Veziri Hamane 
stated that the increasing European interest in buying Iranian gas via Turkey could 
solve all problems regarding the Nabucco line (Keyhan International, 1 August 2007). 
Integrated map 10.1: South Pars development projects phases 
http:/ /mvdg. wordpress.com/2007 /1 0/08/pipeline-politics-turkeys-south-pars-project/ 
However, in late September, US criticism against Turkey-Iran cooperation escalated 
through comments by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns expressly urging that 
as a United States and NATO ally, Turkey not to break the united front against the 
Iranian uranium enrichment program and therefore they will have to sacrifice the 
South Pars project"(Kreyenbuhl,2007). 
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Instead, it would prefer that Turkey put more weight on Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz 
project, Kazakhstan's Kashagan and Turkmenistan's natural gas projects or proposals 
to purchase gas from Iraq. The short- term success, however, of such a project is 
minimal due to Turkey's tensions with US as well as with the armed conflicts in the 
area. US Ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, stated that the MoU's potential was to 
jeopardise the country's efforts alongside Turkey to exploit Caspian Basin deposits, 
putting them back a decade, including the network designed to take the materials to 
Turkey and for international sale. The effect of continued support of the trans-Caspian 
gas line and similar ventures is to increase the diversity of Turkish and European 
supplies, as well as leading to Turkey's status as a major transit state, whilst 
strengthening connections to its neighbours. Wilson did, however, promise to mull 
over US protests prior to MoU implementation (Euroasian Monitor News, 24 
November, 2008). The Bush administration added Iran's Revolutionary Guard to its 
terrorist organisations' list which can be enforced even by imposing sanction on 
European and other foreign companies that invest more than $20 million in Iran's 
petrochemical industries (turkey.usembassy.gov). Turkish energy minister Hilmi 
Giiler, who joined President Abdullah Giil for his trip to the US on 8th January 2008, 
told CNN Turk that Turkey and the US have made a deal for joint exploration of Iraqi 
oil and gas deposits, with Washington's comprehension of Turkish needs for Iranian 
output to fulfil domestic demand (Today's Zaman, 17 January 2008). Prime Minister 
Erdogan, at a Madrid press event on that, emphasised that Turkey is persisting in its 
gas agreement with Iran as neither US nor Israel can satisfy Turkey's natural gas 
demands (Anatolia news agency, 14 January 2008). The Turkish government 
exploited the chance to declare openly its dissatisfaction with American leniency for 
Kurdish rebels in North Iraq (Kreyenbuhl, 2007). The US offer of Iraqi oil is still 
questioned blocking by the Kurds the ratification of the Law of Oil (Xinhua News 
Agency, 28 January 2008). However, Turkish media reported that the state-owned 
Turkish Pipeline Company (BOT AS) has launched a feasibility study covering 
Turkey's segment of a planned Iraq-Turkey natural gas pipeline (APS Diplomat 
Operations in Oil Diplomacy, 11 Feb 2008). It is to be built parallel to the existing 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline. The project aims to transfer 10 billion cubic metres of 
Iraqi natural gas annually to the Turkish and world markets as envisaged in 2007 
(Xinhua News Agency, 28 January 2008). George W. Bush's government had also 
sent the US Congress a July 2000 deal, concluded by the then US President Bill 
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Clinton the effect of which would have been to allow the sending of nuclear 
technology to Turkey's slated civilian nuclear industry (http://afrocubaweb.com, 31 
January 2008). While the future of the project is still uncertain such a long-term 
project will not be able to solve Turkey's energy needs in the short-run (Energy Daily, 
23 January 2008). 
Due to Turkey's position of dependency, Iran began to cutoff natural gas supplies to 
Turkey in January 2008 which raised further questions about the reliability of Iran as 
a supply source for the proposed Nabucco pipeline from Turkey to Central Europe. In 
fact, due to disagreement between Iran and Turkmenistan on price increases, 
Ashgabat stopped delivering up to 23 MMcm/d to Iran in late December 2007 
(International Oil Daily, 30 January 2008). However, officially both sides announced 
technical difficulties and problems of infrastructure as being responsible for pausing 
the gas flow (Anatolia news agency, 5 February 2008). Turkish energy minister Hilmi 
said that Iran had stopped its gas exports due to a cold snap that forced Iran to keep 
more gas on the domestic market to meet the country's own needs (Global Insight, 11 
February 2008). The giant South Pars offshore field's total recoverable reserves are 
estimated at 14 trillion cubic meters, which is being developed in 28 phases and over 
$15 billion in investments have been committed (Petroluem Report, 25 July 2007) . 
Hence, Turkey's ambition to be an energy hub for European countries diversified its 
energy dependency on Russia and enhanced the process of EU membership accession. 
On the other hand, Turkey and Iran have no intention to challenge Russia's position, 
which provides 65% of Turkey's natural gas. It should also be recognised that Russia 
has a very strong military and economic connection with Iran. Therefore, this energy 
project could always be handled to the mutual interest of three countries; Turkey, Iran 
and Russia. Such joint trilateral interest could increase the stability of the international 
order and the reliability of Russia's and Iran's integration into the international 
community. 
10.5. Turkey- Iran tariff agreement (2007) 
When Kiirsat Tiizmen, then the undersecretary of foreign trade for the Turkish prime 
minister's office, visited Iran in May 2000, Turkey and Iran signed trade agreements 
reducing customs taxes at their border crossings and extending the crossings through 
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two of the most important gates, Giirbulak/Bazergan and Kapikoy, to stay open for 24 
hours (Olson, 2000). Turkey's exports to Iran were around $360 million and its 
imports from Iran were close to $839 million in 2001. 
The growth in bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran is part ofthe JDP's strategy of 
trying to strengthen economic ties with other Muslim countries (Euroasian Daily 
Monitor, 24 November 2008). In this framework, Kursad Tuzmen, who became 
foreign trade minister in 2002, announced in July 2007 that Turkey would soon sign 
preferential trade agreements with 18 Muslim countries, and in which the tariff 
barriers between Turkey and Iran would be reduced in stages as part of an attempt to 
boost trade among the ten members of the ECO. He said that "trade between ECO 
members only accounts for 5-6% of their total trade at the moment. This is a very 
small proportion. We must certainly increase it" (Euroasian Daily Monitor, 24 
November 2008) 
The role of free trade ports in Iran (the cities of Chabahar, Culfa, Kis, and Kesm 
Ireland) and border trade centres in Turkey (Artvin, Ardahan Agri, Kars, Van, 
Hakkari, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Hatay) also provide a great 
contribution to the economic development in the region ( Cetinsaya,2006). In general, 
Turkey-Iran trade can be categorised as being in primary and secondary goods such as 
iron and steel, boilers, machinery and mechanical equipment, textile fibers and yams, 
man-made staple fibers, confectionery, automotive and spare part, plastics, electrical 
machinery, and paper. These constitute the bulk of Turkish exports to Iran. Turkey's 
imports from Iran have kept pace with its exports. Mineral fuels and oil have an 
important place (93 %) in Turkish imports from Iran. In addition to hydrocarbon 
resources, copper and copper products, organic chemicals, rawhides and skins, 
plastics constitute major elements of Turkey's imports from Iran (Cetinsaya, 2006). 
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Table: 10.2. The percentage of mutual import and export between Turkey-Iran 
Turkey Export Import Iran Export Import 
2002 0.58% 2.55% 2002 3 .. 25% 1.36% 
2003 0.77% 3.94% 2003 5 .. 51% 1.85% 
2004 0.22% 3.11% 2004 4.42% 0.58% 
2005 0.77% 4.72% 2005 5.78% 2.20% 
2006 0.76% 6.58% 2006 8 .. 91% 2.35% 
Sources: IMF, TUIK, DEIK, 2007; compiled by author 
Comparing to the coalition government's trade margin, the Turkey-Iran trade balance 
reached $2.94 billion in 2003 (AsiaPulse News, June 18 2003), and $2.771 billion in 
2004. The value of Iran-Turkey trade grew by 52.45 percent to $6.692 billion in 2006 
compared to 2005's value of $4. 382 billion, which reached at $8 billion in 2007. 
According to the Turkish Statistics Institute, Iran had a share of 3.9 percent in 
Turkey's total imports in 2007 and 1.3 percent in its exports--which makes Iran the 
seventh major exporter to Turkey after Russia, Germany, China, Italy, the US and 
France, (www.tuik.gov.tr). The report specifies that Iraq, Japan, India, Singapore, 
Italy, Afghanistan, Germany and the Netherlands are the primary purchasers of 
Iranian goods. 
Figure: 10.3.Turkey's exports and imports to Iran (2003-2007) 
Sources: IMF, TUIK, DEIK 2008; compiled by author 
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10.5. Conclusion 
In general, it can be stated that the volume of Turkey-Iran trade relations does not 
match the long-term historical relations and ethnic and religious ties between them. 
Though ideological factors have played a very significant role in promoting each 
country's economic sectors, there are many reasons behind the neither failure-- for 
instance, the systemic behaviour of Turkey in leaning towards the Western camp in 
trade and politics and security. However, Iran's behaviour in the manner of a lone 
wolf is seen as an alternative alliance mode against a super power. The dual 
containment policy of the US, a trade embargos, and nuclear matters, decreases 
trading between Turkey and Iran, but only stimulates the energy sector which is 
certainly beneficial for Turkey's internal needs. The lack of a private sector for 
Iranian companies and the strict bargaining in deals impedes the development of 
relations with each other. If Turkey and Iran manage to sign the tariff agreement as 
mentioned above and make the ECO more effective, they will move forward to 
increase institutional trading and diversify their exports and imports. In recent years, 
the growth of the non-oil sector in Iran has contributed to the reduction of 
unemployment and improvements in social cohesion. However, the oil and gas sectors 
still accounted for 80% percent of total exports--this affected social instability in Iran 
in 2007 (Ogutcu, 2007), because the state controls all economic activities in the 
country. While a small portion of the economy is run by private companies, the 
percentage is not sufficient to reduce the unemployment. Therefore, the conservative 
movement in Iran still remains a barrier to Turkey's private sector investment in Iran, 
especially after the breach of the contract regarding Turkcel, which diminished the 
already poor level of trust in Iran's business sector. The other issue in Turkish-Iranian 
trade is the growth in truck traffic toward Central Asia, for Turkey and Europe, as 
well as the oil smuggling (90% of all general transactions ), which was estimated at 
$4 billion in 2007. This caused loss of control of the bilateral trade and of tax 
revenues for the Turkish government (Cetinsaya, 2006). 
The importance of Iran's oil and gas resources for a country with an energy shortage, 
like Turkey, and their transport links to international markets make Iran desirable a 
major trade partner for Ankara, because Iran is the owner of the second largest proven 
natural gas reserves (3 tcf) (www.eia.doe.gov). It is also the second largest oil 
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producer in OPEC with 4.2 million barrels per day (bblld), which is equal to 5 % of 
global production (www.ogj.com).The growth in bilateral trade between Turkey and 
Iran provides a new dynamic in the political sector. 
On the other hand, Turkey consumed 617,000 of barrels per day in 2006, with a share 
of 0. 7 % globally (Euroasian Daliy Monitor, 24 November 2008). This has to be 
considered when taking into account Turkey's South Pars project and Iran's nuclear 
ambitions. As a United States' and NATO's ally, Turkey is faced with the practical 
security considerations because it does not want to encourage a nuclear neighbour in 
the Middle East, nor does it want to support a US military option against Iran. Thus, 
Turkey's position remains uncertain (APS Diplomat Recorder, 19 January 2007). 
However, if the South Pars contract is to be signed, Turkey would become an energy 
hub country from the Caspian-Middle East to Europe. Ultimately, the Nabucco project 
would counteract the Russian natural gas company's, Gasprom's, hegemony in energy. 
Iran tried to capture foreign investments by opening the Chabahar port, Khis Island, in 
the Hurmuz free trade zone,and by making announcements of new investment 
opportunities in Iran (www.investiniran.ir). The rail network between Turkey and Iran 
needs to be restored and the necessary security against smuggling provided, as sea 
transport is also very expensive due to the lack of direct routes. Air flights at 
unconventional hours to Tehran reduce Turkish and Iranian businessmen's contacts. 
Iran, in turn, wants to use Caspian and Black Sea trade routes and enjoy Turkish 
investments in naval technology. The Iran Tourism and Touring Organisation (ITTO) 
and the Ministry of Tourism in Turkey operate the tourism industry between the two 
neighbours. It is estimated that 1.5 million Iranian tourists came to Turkey in 2007. 
The cancellation of the double taxation agreement came into effect in March 2005 and 
the Association for Turkish and Iranian Trade also support bilateral trade, which was 
established in November 2001. Since the establishment, the Association has organised 
five Turkish and Iranian trade and economic cooperation seminars and meetings 
(www.isiad.org). According to IMF records as of 21st March, 2007 and 20th January 
2008 Iran received $11 billion foreign investment from the UAE, India, Germany, 
France, ltalia, and Turkey. Iranian trade had certain successes as well, as the Samand 
automobile produced by the Iranian Khodro Company has already entered the Turkish 
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market. All these positive developments play a very significant role m conflict 
management through bilateral relationships. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: 
THE CAPACITIES OF THE MIDDLE- POWER STATE: 
ARTICULATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
11.1. Introduction 
As the discussion in the previous chapters indicates, the relationship between Iran and 
Turkey can be characterised as one of 'mistrust' and this largely depends on the past 
experience and social memory of Turkish and Iranian peoples. Although both 
societies have been faced with the collective amnesia of religious and secularist 
apostasy, the relationship of conflict and cooperative makes up their sub-conscious 
mindset. Turkey and Iran have been able to manage wary but peaceful relations since 
the detente agreement of Qasri-Shirin, which represents the recognition of the dual 
legitimacy of the two countries' religious and political identities. Rather than applying 
the conflict resolution theory in my concluding remarks, I believe that clarifying the 
medium-sized states' capacity not only provides better understanding of middle -
powers' multilateral diplomacy but also explains their multi-directional participation 
in transnational organisations. Middle - powers may concentrate on "niche 
diplomacy", where resources are targeted in "specific areas best able to generate 
returns worth having rather than trying to cover the field" (Cooper, 1997: 5). Turkey-
Iran has different character definitions from traditional middle - power states such as 
Australia and Canada - peripheral Western democracies, which have sought to pursue 
their objectives through multilateral channels. Instead, Turkey and Iran act as both 
coercive and benign regional powers, to produce constructive policy in the region. 
However, a benign regional state, like an emerging middle-power, may employ the 
tools of traditional middle - powers, such as coalition-building, conflict management 
and mediation within a regional setting. For instance, Turkey continues to be a benign 
regional power, seeking to employ these traditional tools, beginning a trilateral 
dialogue between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute 
and the Syrian-Israeli conflict and playing a major role in the UN, NATO and the EU 
in peacekeeping and police operations and observer missions in the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, and the Middle East and as far afield as in Afghanistan (Lesser, 2000). 
However, Iran acts as a regional middle- power, aspiring to be a regional hegemony, 
and to having a nuclear capability for self-reliance in the international society. The 
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Islamic Republic of Iran has the capacity to be a regional hegemony, with its natural 
resources and religious sphere of influence, as an independent middle - power state in 
the Middle East. On the one hand, Iran as a middle-power state avoids a direct 
confrontation with great powers whilst the super powers do not allow expansion of its 
sphere of influence. In practice within the uni-polar system, the bargaining capacity of 
a middle-power has been reduced, but as regional middle - powers, Turkey and Iran 
create alliances with less threatening powers in the region, aiming to check the 
penetration of the super powers by defending regional autonomy. The alliance of 
middle- power states also minimises each others' influence in the region. For instance, 
the Iran-Syrian alliance and the Turkey and Israel alliance perform the regional 
polarity system in the Middle East. However, soft power relations between Russia and 
Turkey, and strategic relations between Iran and Russia also put a check on the middle 
- power and great power hegemonic aspiration in the Central Asia and Caucasus. 
Since post-cold war, Turkey-Russia has sought deterrence against penetration of the 
US in the Black Sea. Both Ankara and Moscow do not want change to the status quo 
of the Montreux Convention of 1936. It places restrictions on the number, type and 
length of stay ofwarships of non- Black Sea states in the Black Sea and is opposed to 
any permanent or extended deployment of US naval vessels in the Black Sea, which 
contravene these provisions (Winrow, 2007). Therefore, the interest of the patron 
super power (the US) and the client (Turkey) do not always coincide with the global 
aspirations of the super power and the regional aspirations of the middle-power states. 
Turkey offered the creation of the 'Balkan Stability Pact' and the 'Caucasus Stability 
Pact' after the Cold War and the Russian - Georgian War in August 2008, as a 
traditional middle- power state, acting within the international community. In practice, 
middle-powers have the resources; and the organisational skills that become 
internationally influential on sectors bases or niche bases. Cooper argues that middle-
power states are capable of autonomous contributions to international affairs, not 
generally or even widely, but in specific niches appropriate to their skills, experience, 
and interests and typically deploying common patterns of statecraft (Cooper, 1997), 
which fits into the roles played by Turkey and Iran in international relations. 
Therefore, as argued so far, by definition and through their sphere of influence, 
Turkey and Iran should be considered as middle - power states. 
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This chapter, thus, aims at bringing the entire discussion together as articulated 
throughout the thesis by providing the results of testing the middle - power state 
capacities of Turkey and Iran. In other words, previous chapters provide the contents 
of the discussions regarding various aspects and features of middle - power states, in 
relation to Turkey and Iran, as defined and modified in Chapter Two, which was 
chosen as the theoretical framework of this study. Thus, this chapter bridges the 
findings in the form of discussion in the earlier chapter and the conceptual framework 
by testing the explanatory power of the modified version of the middle - power states 
as defined in Chapter Two in the case of Turkey and Iran. 
11.2.0. The historical dual legitimacy of middle - power statecraft 
The course of amity and enmity relations represents the change but also progress 
through several stage of socio-political development in Turkish and Iranian history. 
As explained in Chapter Three, Turko - Persian cultural and political synthesis has 
gained great momentum in the Middle Age. The coalition of Turks and Persians 
protect their native culture and also shelter other small nation's cultural reservations 
from Arabic assimilation in the Northern front. The military discipline and verbal 
culture of Turks provided great practical results; Turks easily adopted the Persian 
state bureaucracy and court tradition. With this hybrid cultural synthesis, Turkish 
Sufi-oriented verbal culture managed to assimilate different national groups with 
addition of the intermarriage system in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, such as 
amongst Meskhetian Turks, Azeri Turks, Khemshili Turks, the nations in Asia Minor 
and partially, the peoples' of Balkan, who were forced to do so. The distribution of 
power in political leadership and state bureaucracy also underpinned common 
political and religious discourse in Persia. 
On the other hand, the Mongol invasion terminated the 'Turko - Persian Islamic 
synthesiss.' The cultural dynamics of Persia was re-harmonised by Turko-Mongol 
state tradition and created another political context, known as the 'Persian 
renaissance.' The major elements of Persian renaissance, court tradition, and state 
bureaucracy sustain its legitimacy until the establishment of nation state system in the 
Asian continent. On the one hand, Persian language remained a "lingua franca ", as a 
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court language until the Russian occupation of Turkish and Iranian buffer zones in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. 
However, in the later period, the Ottoman Turk-Greek coalition completely set aside 
Persian bureaucratic and court traditions in the western front, and created a new kin 
soul of nationhood and statehood in the 14th century. The coalition of Turks and 
Kurds brought a new dimension to Turkish political culture by engaging Arabic 
culture via Kurds that was apart from the Turks-Greek coalition in the state 
bureaucracy and strengthened orthodoxy of religious institutionalism in the imperial 
court. For instance, as a result of this, Sheikh ul-Islam, as an institution, was allowed 
to join the Sultan's court in the 16th century. 
The Turkish-Kurdish coalition against Persians and Arabs resulted in great military 
and political successes for Ottoman Turks in the 16th century. Although Ottoman 
Turks won the battles of Chaldiran and Mercidabik, as mentioned about negative 
balance strategy in Chapter Two they only occupied the Arabic lands and preferred to 
ensure the sovereignty of Persia as an independent middle - power state. Ottoman 
Turks became the leaders of the Sunni world and represented the multi-national state 
system against the nation-based states. Hence, the origin of Persian and Turkish 
conflict is political rather than religious. The new religion of Persia unified the 
various ethnic groups--the majority of Iranian and other small groups such as Turks 
and Arabs. Therefore, the emergence of the Iranian nation is based entirely on Twelve 
Shi'ism rather than ethnic distinctions that restored the Persian crown in Persia. The 
duality of religion and statehood and also nationhood became the conflict issues 
between the two empires. However, the legitimacy of state and religion was resolved 
by the peace treaty of Qasri Shirin in 1639. 
The Assembly ofNajaf, explained in Chapter Four, was the first attempt to overcome 
the Sunnite-Shiite antagonism. The ecumenical attempt by Nadir Shah was mainly 
aimed at integrating the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis under the leadership of 
exalted of Turcoman tribe in the 18th century. However, pan-Islamist policies of 
Abdulhamit II and the rhetoric of Jamal al-Din Afghani were perceived as a national 
security threat by Qajar government in the 191h century. The Caliphate movement in 
South East Asia and Islamic utopian clerics and thinkers such as Afghani, Rasid Reza, 
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Abduh, Iqbal and Nursi could not create a new political opposition to the western 
hegemony. The failure of Islamic utopian politics weakened the Islamic identity in the 
periphery of Ataturk's Turkey and ofPahlavi's Iran. The hidden identity ofTurks and 
the national identity component of Iranian people was religion, which sustained self-
strengthening progress of contemporary Turks' and Iranians' identities. Therefore, the 
revolution of Turkish secular oligarchy and the Islamic revolution of Shia religious 
elite are attempts to create an imaginary secular and religious society during the last 
three decades. However, for the status quo of Turkey and Iran as middle - power 
states, both secular and religious revolutions would not equal to fully-fledged new 
political and economic systems to international community. Therefore, both of the 
alternative regimes will not be adopted by the Islamic world. 
During the Cold War, Turkey and Iran chose semi-sovereignty status quo in regard to 
security and economic engagements with Western countries that provided both 
Kemalist and Pahlavi's regimes with a great initiative in the international community. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, both Turkey and Iran have lost their guardianship 
status quo in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the last four hundred years and failed 
to prevent the death and exile of Turkic and Muslim peoples under Soviet rule. In fact, 
they have no agenda of external national identity construction in their sphere of 
history even though they have kinship and cultural ties in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. The kinship and historical dual legacy claims of both secular regimes 
reshaped the mistrust relationship between the nations. As mentioned previously, this 
policy or strategy named 'negating strategy' in the Chapter Two; they perceive each 
other as a competitive rival rather than potential ally, even though they were part of 
the western security system and allies of Israel in the Middle East. Both Turkey and 
Iran ensured that the sovereignty of each country is essential for each other's national 
security as against Soviet hegemonic ambition. Turkey and Iran maintained their 
status quo as buffer states in the Northern Flank in the bipolar system. They truly 
benefited from bargaining power ofbeing a middle- power state during the Cold War 
period. After the Cold War, however, Turkey and Iran negated each other's influence 
in the Caucasus and Northern Iraq. As a middle- power state, Turkey and Iran has no 
economic and institutional capacity to expand their influence in the region, because 
super powers and great powers do not allow the middle - power states hegemonic 
expansion into the regional system. 
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Middle - power states have two options to maintain their sovereignty in the 
international community--being a client state or negative balancer which may be 
valuable for the offshore or forward strategy ofbalance of power. Turkey has chosen 
the semi-sovereignty status, while the Islamic republic of Iran retains her self-reliance 
or full-sovereignty. Similarly, Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of the "guardianship of 
the jurist" ( Valayet-e F aqih) was an attempt for religious revolution within religion 
and provides clerical legitimacy in the religious state (Miller, 2006). However, neither 
Ja' fari proposal ofNadir Shah nor the diplomacy ofTaqrib Movement in 20th century 
have brought Iran back into the Sunni fold. The secular republican leadership and 
Arab monarchies did not grant any type of wholesale recognition of Ja'fari madhhab. 
In the 21st century, Islamic identity is composed of seven 'zones' of political Islam, 
often in competition, namely Arab, Persian (Shia), Turkish, South Asian (Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan), Malay-Indonesian, African and Minority 
(Diaspora) zones (Yavuz, 2004). Each zone's understanding of Islam is not only 
primarily informed by its own national culture and by diverse historical and economic 
factors but is also shaped by the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis. Hence, one 
presumes that Turkey's engagement with NATO and the nuclear ambitions of Iran are 
considered a part of national identity construction of medium-sized states to maintain 
survival in the international society. The security concerns of middle - power regimes 
impede the creation of revolutionary institutionalism in society, because securitising 
the internal politics results in the factionalism that strengthens the patrimonial 
structure in the society. Ironically, both Turkey's and Iran's legitimacy depends on the 
resistance to western imperialism; the motivation of this westernisation is to maintain 
its role as a middle - power state and relations in society. 
11. 2.1. Transformation ofthe public sphere in the middle - power state 
The progress of Islamic oriented states' society is different from western societies; 
Ottoman Turkey and Persian state and social relations are defined as "oriental 
despotism" by Kodourie and Haim (2005: 100). In fact, the failure of renaissance, 
reformation movement and industrial revolution reshape the authoritarian 
modernisation in both Turkey and Iran. Turkey and Iran lack the western style social 
class system such as the bourgeoisie and the labour class, but have a fragmented 
society which demonstrates that there is no common culture identified as national 
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identity. Therefore, the revolutionary movements not only helped to create nation 
states but narrowed the liberalisation of society in Turkey and Iran (Yilmaz, 1998). 
For instance, the Tobacco Revolt in 1891, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 
1906-1911 and the Young Turk revolution in Ottoman Turkey in 1908-1918 made 
structural changes in state-society and attempted to create a new imaginary society as 
well as established nation states. This revolutionary period of Ottoman Turkey and 
Persia marked a rise in the public consciousness and witnessed the emergence of a 
public debate in newspapers, journals and magazines in the higher echelons of the 
Turkish and Iranian societies. This debate was largely confined to a small class of 
intelligentsia and statesmen. On the other hand, the economic dimension of the public 
debate was marked with ethno-religious lines in which the economic class overlapped 
with ethno-religious community. Modernisation efforts of both state elites' were 
mostly military--technical areas of education became the main target of the leadership 
groups in Turkey and Iran. Hence, Kemalist and Pahlavi's revolutions were classified 
as a military coup d'etat and their revolutionary activities were also called as an 
"authoritarian reformation" (Kansu, 1997:5). In fact, Turkish revolution and 
monarchical revolution was one of the many echoes of global upheaval in 
development in the 19th century, technological innovation, mass social unrest, 
economic fluctuations with worldwide repercussions, imperialism and new ideas 
concerning nationhood occupied a prominent place (Mardin, 2004). Hence, the 
external enforcement is the main revolutionary drive for the middle - power state. On 
the other hand, middle - power state's revolution has no capacity to continue its 
revolutionary dynamics when they reach a certain point. For instance, the Jon Turk 
revolution and the constitutional revolution in Iran were interrupted by Kemalist and 
Pahlavi's authoritarian revolution. Similarly, Islamic revolution in Iran was a clear-cut 
break of modernisation programme of the Shah. 
On one hand, secularist and Islamic revolutions focused on the creation of an identity 
as part of a social engineering process. However, both secularist and religious projects 
can be classified as 'a traumatic change' in society. The authoritarian modernisation 
in Turkey basically created its own public sphere by defining it through tenets of 
Kemalism, which excluded Islam and, hence, narrowed down the public sphere to 
move out the 'non -confirming public' which is Islamic and therefore Islam remained 
as an unaccepted identity but it remained as the only 'hidden identity' of Turks. On 
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the other hand, Turkey refused to accept the ethnic based definition of national 
identity of Turkishness, as the Kemalist leadership view Islam as a 'glue' integrating 
the various groups for the maintenance of the country. The well-known Turkish writer, 
Adnan Adivar states that the Kemalist interpretation of secularism, akin to positivism 
in the West, has become the "official dogma' of religion on (Turkish society) just as 
Islamic dogma had been imposed in the past" (as cited in Yavuz, 2003). The state-
monitored public sphere has been characterised more by concern of the western or 
traditional appearance than by "public realm " of Turkish and Iranian society 
(Williams and Lang, 2005:245). The continuity of the constitutional movement 
became a clear - cut development when the Islamic revolution seized power in Iran. 
However, the implementation of the Islamic republic ended the liberal 
progressiveness of the Shah's revolution even though it referenced the constitutional 
revolution which offered a more liberal society in 1908. The theocratic regime of Iran 
does not recognise secular identities and also voices of women in the public sphere 
(Bayat, 1991:316). The discussion between Iranian philosopher, Abdulkerim Soroush 
and former foreign minister Velayeti was mainly focused on the absence of civil 
society and factionalism as well as the politicising of the public sphere in Iran 
(Soroush, 1995). Similarly, the discussion about laicism and Anglo - Saxon 
secularism created two constitutional crises in 2007 and 2008 against Justice and 
Development Party politics in Turkey. The decision of Constitutional Court in 1997 
and 2008 initiated a new move to define secularism in the Turkish context by 
stressing that secularism does not mean separation of religion and the state, but 
implies separation of religion and worldly affairs. According to Habermas, however, 
the public sphere is "made up of private people gathered together as a public and 
articulating the needs of society with the state" (Habermas, 1991: 197). Hence the 
public sphere is the source of public opinion needed for "legitimate authority in any 
functioning democracy" (Rutherford, 2000: 18). The emancipation of the human 
condition not only protects the fundamental individual liberties and rights but also 
recognition of individuals, groups, identities, diversities, and representation of those 
in the public and political domain as legitimate normative contributors. In the case of 
Turkey, the secular definitions of the public sphere in favour of the imagined society 
is challenged by Islamist struggle for recognition of religious identity and visibility 
mostly represented by Sufi groups in the public sphere, whereas Islamic political 
hegemony is challenged in Iran by urban groups such as youth, women and 
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intellectuals who desire secular practices in their daily lives. In both cases, the issues 
of gender occupy the centre in the dispute of private life in the public spheres. As a 
result of politicised and 'state-monitored public sphere', the secular regime of Turkish 
Republic and the regime of Iran Islamic Republic have failed to create non-polarised 
public sphere in contemporary Iran and Turkey. 
11.2.2. Middle - power state containment strategy in agents, and state- society 
relations 
Religious institutionalism has been formed in 'state-controlled form ' in the Sunni 
world and as non-governmental organisations in Persia. Hence, the 'secular modes of 
production' in both Turkey and Iran were met with internal challenges from society. 
Whilst Kemalist oligarchy managed to control political Islam and Islamic radicalism, 
Pahlavi's regime was destroyed by the Khomeini's revolutionary movement but 
similarly Islamic regime of Iran is now faced with secular and globalist challenge. As 
mentioned in Chapter Five, unlike Safavid 'state-controlled religious institutions,' in 
Iran have their own space, economically and politically. Religious identity of Iranian 
people was also one of the components of Iranian national identity in Pahlavi's regime. 
Thus, the religious establishment did not allow the Shah's demand for republican 
system such as Mustafa Kemal's revolution in the state; Shia clerics were not happy 
to see the abolishment of Caliphate and secular court system in Turkey. This shows 
that even if Shia did not follow the Sunni Caliphate politically, they informally 
recognised the legitimacy ofSunnite Caliphate, especially Ottoman Turkey's religious 
and political roles in the Islamic world. 
On the other hand, any of the social movement in Turkey and Iran would influence 
the domestic politics of the respective countries. Islamic revolution in Iran was 
considered as a challenge against the secular identity of Turks in 1979. Thus, a 
military coup d 'hat in 1980 launched the counter revolutionary activities of Kemalist 
establishment, successfully blockaded the influence of the Islamic revolution of Iran 
and the radical Islamic movement in Turkey. Turkish society, is not homogeneous, 
and was composed by external migration and then reshuffled by mass domestic 
immigration which has important consequences for systematic change in state -
society relationship. Due to absence of common political discourse, this fragmented 
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society structure is very vulnerable to foreign or internal penetration. Hence, Kemalist 
leadership successfully advanced the society and used the agents groups in the 
'fragmented society,' especially Islamic groups. The legitimacy of Islamic groups in 
Turkish society depends on the 'hidden identity' definition of state - establishment 
which allows Islamic groups to carry out their own network and education system. As 
stated in Chapter Five, Sufi Naksibendiyye groups, and Gulen and Suleymanci 
movement created 'a counter- public sphere' in society and an incubator for the 
evolution of popular Islamic identity (Y avuz, 2000). The Islamic groups in Turkey 
use the "opportunity space" in the society and, thus, Turkish synthesis of Islam will 
never allow for a revolutionary society even if it is believed that the Kemalist 
revolution was against the public's religious realm in Turkey. Religious institutions in 
Turkey have been operated by the state, and the education law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat 
Kanunu) does not allow for any private religious education. Therefore, religious 
groups still play a more effective role than the state in the social transformation of 
society, as Islamic groups, as agents of the establishment, have renegotiated the 
modem Turkish identity formation and contributed to this identity through changing 
the periphery according to the centre's new political culture and symbolic lifestyle. In 
this regard, the Kemalist revolution is an internal revolution within the Sunnite sect in 
Turkey. 
It is thus concluded that middle - power states are able to blockade others' revolutions, 
hence middle- power state contains the other's influence in its own internal affairs. In 
this regard, Turkey has provided the religious groups with an "opportunity space" to 
balance an alternative identity against Islamic and Marxist movement in 1980s and 
1990s. This explains why Turkish society has not evolved in the same line as 
articulated by Gramsci or Marxian political economy in their attempt at theoretising 
the political and social change. This is because, as mentioned above, systematic 
changes in Turkish society were the result of a balance of power change in the 
regional and international system, and therefore change in modem Turkey has always 
been the result of external legitimacy search rather than the results of internal 
dynamics. 
On one hand, the other characteristics of middle - power state are that it is able to 
manage the activities of agent groups in society. In Turkey, Islamist and Kurds 
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occupy the periphery, the state - establishment provide them a space where they are 
placed time to time without any identity claim in the centre. For instance, in that sense, 
the neo - liberal economic policies of Ozal's leadership strengthened the periphery's 
economic growth. However, the Kemalist establishment forced them back to their 
peripheral zone by launching the 28th February process-- post- modern military coup 
d 'etat in 1997 -- to cleanse the public sphere from the contamination by religious 
groups (Y avuz, 2000). The 28th February process allowed the Kemalist leadership 
groups to exclude the periphery from the public sphere, including from the economic 
benefits of the centre, especially Kurdish and Islamist groups were excluded from the 
privatisation of giant state economic enterprises and factories so that the Kemalist 
elite could maintain their economic and political hegemony, despite the fact that they 
failed integration with globalization as they could not be cost efficient due to renter 
mentality. The Refah - Y ol coalition government was forced to comply with the 
cleansing of peripheral identities from centre and public sphere as a result of 28th 
February 1998 process. Even though, the first Islamist prime minister, Erbakan 
challenged the military intervention by saying that "with or without blood, " the 
system will be changed, the situation became more critical for Islamists after he was 
ousted from his post in 1997. However, it is important to note that Erbakan's WP 
functioned instrumentally in cleansing Islam from the public sphere. 
In addition, the middle - power state can also manage the unitary activities of agents 
groups as well as opposition groups (Yavuz, 2000). For instance, the Welfare- Party 
never gets any political support from Islamic groups, but receive serious criticism 
from the Gulen Movement and Iskender Pasha Group. In fact, Islamist-oriented 
parties in Turkey and reformist parties in Iran are part of the state regime or state -
establishment. Sufi groups in Turkey see themselves as the wise men or the 
technocrats of the states while the Gulen group considers themselves as an alternative 
leadership in the government and state apparatus. However, the Gulen group has no 
social base and also no concern to claim an Islamic identity. Rather, they prefer to be 
pragmatic and assertive for their own factionalism to infiltrate the state -
establishment. In comparing Islamic groups in general, the Naksibandiyya movement 
is socially constructed in Turkey because Nakshi took over the Baktashi lodge after 
the abolition of Janissaries who were considered the main element of the imperial 
army until 1826. Sufi - oriented movements do not avoid to claim their identity when 
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they reach a certain level in the centre, but their presence in state apparatus only 
provide an opportunity space as a thermidor to secure the survival of the regime. 
Similar situation can be evaluated in the case of the Khatami and the Erdogan 
governments in the 2000s respectively. In this sense, the thermidor can only originate 
from leadership groups in middle - power state but not from the agents or appositional 
groups, because middle - power state does not allow the rise of a civil society against 
its own factionalism. Thus, change in the society can only occur within leadership 
groups in the middle- power state. For instance, during the Justice and Development 
Party leadership in recent years, secular liberals supported the democratisation 
programme of the EU. 
As middle - power states, religion is the most influential institution in Turkish and 
Iranian politics, despite the secular nature of Turkey. It plays a significant role in the 
formation of the nation state and the reconstruction of religious or secularist identity 
as well as bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran. For instance, due to religious 
disputes, Turkey and Iran have faced two diplomatic crises. As mentioned in Chapter 
Five, the symbolic figures of the regime, Ataturk and Khomeini, the religious political 
symbol of the headscarf and the symbolic meaning of Jerusalem are the main 
instruments of religious and ideological confrontation between Ankara and Tehran 
since the revolution in 1979. Even though Iran has no serious influence on Alevi 
groups but has measurable impact on small Ja'fari groups in Turkey, the ideological 
differences have a major impact on the Turco -Iran political dispute. On the one hand, 
due to the agent role of Alevi groups in the Kemalist leadership, the potential 
supporters of the Shia sect has been integrated with the secular establishment even if 
state has not officially recognised their religious identity. Because social agents in 
middle - power state are parts of the state establishment who conduct modernisation 
via this agent structure of society. The state - agent structure in society negates the 
other power's influence and also impedes the revolutionary drive of middle- power 
state. Hence, middle - power state's revolution is a 'false' definition of social 
revolution. Consequently, the Turkish secular revolution and the Islamic revolution of 
Iran can only be defined as 'a revolution within religion.' The only differences 
between the two revolutions are in the public sphere. Secular revolution within 
Sunnite sect undermines the influence of God; however, the Islamic revolution within 
Shia brought God back to the public sphere. Therefore, both of them use the public 
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sphere as the arena of their ideological struggle, which impedes the creation of a civil 
society. Hence, the roots of change and progress in the middle - power state are the 
external drive and changes of the regional and international system. 
11.2.3. Middle - power negating strategy in armed agents relations andlegitimacy 
of counter terrorism politics 
The armed agent and state counter terrorism is the product of the nation state system; 
the nation state was an alternative to the multi - national system of the Ottoman 
Empire. The creation of a nation state from an empire has been a 'traumatic change' 
in Turkey, because the imaginary society project of Kemalism breached the entire 
legitimacy of common political discourse, religious and political social contract 
between state ethnic, religious and agent groups in Turkey. The exclusion of Kurdish 
and cleansing of Islam from the public sphere terminated the role of religion in the 
political contract. The hidden religious identity of Turks could not have the capacity 
to create a new imaginary society. However, the Shia religious identity of Iran unified 
the different ethnic groups in Iran. Even if Pahlavis imitated the Kemalist reformation 
program, the religious identity of Iran was one of three component of new imaginary 
society of Pahlavi's project. As mentioned above, state and agent relations in Iran 
were not under state control. Iran maintained its feudal structure and its disciplinary 
religious institutionalism during the Pahlavi government. However, Turkey's external 
immigration from Balkans and the Caucasus and the internal population transfer from 
rural areas to urban districts completely changed society and provided the Kemalist 
regime with an opportunity to use the public sphere for their ideological activities 
(Karpat, 2004). 
The leadership of Turkey has maintained the anarchical order between agent groups 
such as religious and nationalist-Marxist, Alevis-Sunnis and impeded any type of 
middle- power state revolution in Turkey while Iranian disciplinary society's actions 
against the Shah resulted in the Islamic revolution in 1979. Therefore, the control of 
this internal threat is more important than the external one. If an internal threat was 
not under the control of leadership groups, the ethnic or religious movements of agent 
groups could create a revolutionary practice such as the Iranian Islamic revolution or 
become a transnational issue, which middle - power state would not able to control -
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such as PKK and PJAK in Turkey and Iran. On the one hand, they excluded agent 
groups in the periphery can cooperate with external partners to find a legitimate place 
in the region. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Shah used the proxy Kurdish 
political cards against Iraq and also tried to use small Shia groups in Turkey. Similarly, 
Turkey used the Azeri political card against the Shah's activities to undermine his 
regional leadership politics in the 1970s. Similarly, after the Islamic revolution, Iraq 
and Turkey used the Iranian opposition armed group, Mujahedeen Khalq Organisation 
to weaken the revolutionary export policy of Iran. In response, Iran supported the 
guerrillas of Kurdish nationalist groups against Turkey and Iraq in 1980s and 1990s. 
Middle - power leadership groups ensure that the activities of ethnic and religious 
agents are under state control. Hence, middle - power states use counter terrorism 
strategies to control the internal instability and sometimes create internal 'chaos ' or 
'anarchical order' to maintain its regime. Therefore, the leadership group interest is 
more important than the public interest. The national security and state interest is 
considered most crucial for the leadership groups. As mentioned in Chapter Six, 
Turkey did not refrain from using counter - terror groups, Turkish Hezbollah against 
the PKK insurgency campaign in the 1990s. However, the promotion of such an 
armed group can create the conflict between regional states as well as super - power 
interest in the region. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, middle - power - state and 
super - power state's interest were in conflict in Kurdish nationalism in the Middle 
East. For instance, in Turkish - American relations, the conflict was rooted in 
differences of liberal and authoritarian states with regard to transnational conflict 
despite Turkey's contribution to the regulation ofUNSCR 688 decision, "safe haven" 
and "Operation Provide Comfort" in Northern Iraq, as a middle- power state, Turkey 
has no confidence in finding a peaceful resolution or a social contract between Kurds 
and the state. Because the middle power states have no capacity to produce a peaceful 
solution for their own transnational movements. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, for 
instance, Turkey's and Iran's interference into the Kurdish civil war in Kurdistan -
Iraq could not reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East. However, the Dublin 
process and Washington process signify that liberal democratic states provided 
peaceful resolutions against civil war between Kurdish groups in Kurdistan- Iraq. 
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On the other hand, middle - power leadership groups used an armed agent to negate 
the other regional powers influence in its own domestic sphere. As mentioned in 
Chapter Six, the Kemalist leadership undermines the influence of the Iranian Islamic 
revolution by using the unresolved political murder cases in Turkey. The image of 
terror between the two different regimes remains as a 'phantom ' to demonstrate the 
violent face of the Islamic revolution in order to legitimise the secularist regime of its 
state. Iran also benefited from Turkey's counter - terrorism by discrediting the 
secularist regime and claimed a Turkish - Israeli connection to state terror in the 
Middle East. However, the 'phantom of terror' between two equal middle - powers 
was able to cause an armed conflict such as the undeclared war between Turkey and 
Syria in 1997, because middle- power states cannot resort to armed conflict directly. 
They only seek to invalidate each other's influence in the region. Therefore, as a 
middle power state, Iran and Turkey benefited from the dispute on regime differences 
and agent structure in the regional politics. While Turkey's political engagement also 
provide an opportunity to comply counter - terrorism against ASALA and PKK in the 
West, it has not received serious criticism from international society. However, as a 
rogue state, Iranian counter - terror activities such as the Mykonos Verdict and 
supporting Hezbollah and Hamas brought about UN sanctions, and the dual 
containment policy of America. However, both states maintained their bargaining 
power capacity against super - powers or great - power interference in the regional 
politics. 
The other characteristic definition of middle - power states is that they cannot 
establish any regional military alliances against the super - power or great - power in 
the region. The institutional engagement between equal states could not also work 
systematically but only allows for a symbolic peace effort by medium - sized states. 
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, the 'Turkey Iran High Security Commission ' and 
Border committee have not provided any positive results versus violence on border 
crossings and guerrilla activities of PKK and PJAK so far. Due to the absence of a 
social contract between Kurds and Turks, Iranians and Arabs, the legitimacy of 
middle - power leadership does not receive any full-fledged support from society. 
However, traditional middle - power states have a social contract under the quasi of 
common political and economic interests and their geopolitical position has been 
defined in the international system. 
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11.2.4. The absence of middle - power state's social contract 
State formation of Turkey and Iran lacked the experiences of industrial revolution, 
diversification of civil society and similar sources of modernisation drive. Therefore, 
the structure of state-society relations could not elicit any common political discussion. 
The Hobbesian, Locke and Rousseau's contractarianism or Tocquevelli's social 
contract cannot find a place in Turkish- Iranian state and society, because the 
democratisation focuses on secularism and security concerns of the state regimes in 
both Turkey and Iran (Boucher and Kelly, 1994). However, secularism is not 
necessary for democratisation (Berger and Huntington, 2002). The social contract can 
be present in civil society, justice and regulate state-agent relations. There are two 
main reasons behind the absence of middle - power social contract: 
(a) Middle- power state social contract is not able to protect the premises and interest 
of agents. As mentioned in Chapter Three, pan-Islamist policies of Sultan Abdulhamit 
11 and the activities of Hamidiye regiment strengthened Kurdish and Ottoman 
Caliphate ties. The new form of Kurdish and Turkish alliance created a common 
standing against Armenian guerrilla war by Russian support. However, the failure of 
the pan-Islamist policies of the Ottoman state, made it clear that Turks cannot protect 
the interests of Kurdish people in the region. Therefore, Kurdish military campaigns 
started against pro-Turkish and pro-Iranian politics. Since then, Kurdish people have 
rebelled 13 times against the Ottoman state and 28 times have conducted military 
campaigns against Turkey (Birand, 2008). 
(b) Middle - power states prefer to agree with agents of ethnic groups rather than 
making a social contract. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, there is an unofficial 
contract between secular Kurds and Turks against pan-Kurdish and pan-Islamist 
groups under the principles of secularism. The identity of Kurds is considered to be z 
part of the Turkish national state identity in this context. Therefore, the argument 
articulated by Sheikh Said in 1925 in giving the fatwa to justify his rebellion against 
the new Turkish states explains the clear - cut alienation of two nations from each 
other. He stated that "you [Mustafa Kemal] abolished the political contract between 
Turks and Kurds {by removing the Chaliphate], thus there is no political-religious 
ties anymore between you and us" (Mumcu, 1991 :123). 
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Unlike the Western religious experience, Islam cannot be discarded from the public 
sphere in the Middle East, because the religion is the main component of common 
political identity of different ethnic groups. Even though Kurdish territorial integrity 
was divided between Turkey and Iran in the 17th century, religious leadership kept 
Kurdish people under Turkish rule. The abolition of the Caliphate was the 
cancellation of middle - state religious and political - contract. The long - term 
territorial division and assimilation policies of regional national states against the 
Kurdish entity have created a tom identity for Kurds. Many Kurdish reports were 
prepared by the Turkish government and non-governmental organisations since the 
abolishment of the religious and political contract, which aimed to integrate Kurds in 
the new nation state system (Akcura, 2008). Due to structural change in the 
international system, a Kurdish report in the 1990s offered a more democratic solution 
(Akcura, 2008), because the change they need is motivated by global developments 
and their capacity as an external actor in the middle - power state. On the other hand, 
middle - power state has no capacity to claim its imperial legitimacy in the region. As 
mentioned in Chapter Seven, Turkey's historical and kinship claims on the Kirkuk 
question cannot offer any peaceful solution but nor can the super power ignore 
Turkey's or Iran's influence in Iraq, as a niche space. Neither Turkey nor Iran can fill 
this niche space, and this resulted in the balkanisation of the Kurdish question in the 
Middle East and reduced Turkey's and Iran's influence in the region. 
Due to the absence of a social contract, middle - power states have to spend their 
economic and military power to control military insurgencies of opposition groups. 
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, Turkey and Iran are still wasting their efforts against 
the PKK and PJAK. Therefore, middle- power states cannot be effective players in 
the international politics because they spend their power and time to control internal 
instability. Therefore, both Turkey and Iran have no capacity or tradition to produce 
such a contract which would provide a common political discourse between the state 
and the Kurdish people. 
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11.3. The middle - power's negating strategy and its state capacity in regional 
competition 
A Middle - power state has no capacity to undertake armed and political competition 
with its counterparts, great powers and regional middle - power states, but parties use 
soft power or proxy politics to gain stakes in the natural resources of small power 
states. As mentioned, Russia uses domestic instability as a proxy to interfere with the 
internal affairs of Southern Caucasus states and also to challenge the western 
economic initiative of BTC in August 2008. Russia was not happy to see the 
Azerbaijan International Consortium and Turkish and Georgian initiatives in pipeline 
politics. On the one hand, Turkey refrained from the direct support of Washington's 
demand to use, for military purposes, the Black Sea against Russian military action in 
Georgia due to the unclear position of regional politics. Turkey's independent project 
of "Caucasus Stability Platform" aims to diversify the policy option of Ankara and 
also to reduce the dependency of Russia and United States in the regional politics. 
However, as a middle - power state, Turkey has no capacity to produce a conflict 
resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh or to create an effective regional alliance. As 
mentioned in Chapter Nine, Turkey excludes Iran from the Caucasus Stability 
Platform in the first stage of its proposal and BSEC. Similarly, Iran considers Turkey 
as an outsider in CASCO. The Caspian Sea incident was checking the influence of 
each middle - power state and also demonstrates the policy differences between 
Turkey and Iran regarding hydrocarbon sources of Caspian Sea. The incident was not 
aimed at causing direct military conflict between Turkey and Iran, but to diminish the 
economic influence of each other. Therefore, the parties in the Nabucco pipeline 
project are reluctant to establish interdependency relations. On the other hand, the 
cooperation in Blue Stream and Blackseafor intensify the strategic relations between 
Turkey and Russia. Diversification of an energy pipeline route is essential for the 
security of energy, and also sovereignty and the democratisation of small power 
Caspian Sea states. Therefore, Turkey, Iran and the Asian continent are considered an 
alternative against the Russian energy giant's hegemony in the international market. 
Kazakhstan's, Uzbekistan's and Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon sources flow through 
the Central Asian pipeline system of Russia. On the other hand, the cooperation in the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium demonstrated that Russia does not totally stand against 
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the diversification of energy transport to the international market (Today's Zaman, 15 
August 2008). However, Russia was not happy with the total isolation of Caspian 
energy transport such as the Trans-Caspian pipeline project. 
The demographic distribution in Kazakhstan is essential in establishing strategic 
economic and political relations. The Russian population in the northern part of 
Kazakhstan and the landlocked geographic position restrict energy transport options 
for the Astana government. Russia retains its ethnicity right claim for intervention if 
Kazakh government enters the western or Chinese spheres of influence. On the other 
hand, ethnic minorities of Kazakhs in Xinjiang increase the energy cooperation 
between Chinese and Kazakh governments. The oil pipeline and projected gas 
pipeline to Xinjiang will play a major role in energy transport options of regional 
countries. Kazakhstan has received mass external immigrant from China and Central 
Asian state. Kazakhs are no longer a minority in their own land and the sovereignty of 
Kazakhstan guarantees that it is a regional player that can balance Uzbekistan's 
regional ambition. Small powers can also check the other regional players' influence 
in regional politics. 
Turkey's influence in Caspian energy transport is limited to the BTC. However, Iran 
has a more reliable geographical proximity in energy transport. Turkmenistan plays a 
significant role for Iranian transport and energy supply, but due to the dual 
containment policy and UN economic sanctions, Iran cannot receive enough foreign 
investment to establish refineries and pipelines from the Caspian to the Gulf. Iran only 
benefited from oil swap options and tanker transport from Caspian Sea to Neka port. 
The technological deficiencies of Turkmenistan and Iran breached the reliability of 
the Turkey - Iran gas contract. Rather than isolating the regional player from energy 
sources, diversification of energy transport provides stability in regional politics. On 
the other hand, unresolved issues of the Caspian Sea's status in regional politics serve 
to protect Russian initiatives. Therefore, Russia checks Iranian influence and external 
partner investment in the Caspian Sea. In contrast to Russia's deployment of its navy 
throughout the Caspian Sea, Iran propounds that the Caspian Sea should be 
demilitarised and that no forces should be deployed there. Therefore, both Iran and 
Russia could not block Azerbaijan's international oil consortium and BTC consortium. 
The dispute is one of the obstacles of energy extraction from the Caspian Sea. As 
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mentioned in Chapter Nine, due to a dispute between Iran and Azerbaijan, BP 
terminated its project in one of offshore oil fields, Azov, in the Caspian Sea. In fact, 
the status quo of the Caspian Sea is not issue of international law and international 
organisations, because Russia and Iran retained initiatives at the negotiation stage. As 
a middle power, both Iran and Turkey cannot solve the legacy of Caspian Sea and 
cannot design their own pipeline policy in the regional politics. Therefore, most of the 
energy issues have been solved by the international consortium so far. 
11.4. Responding to the institutionalism: middle - power state cooperative 
detente relations 
Middle - power state economic and political regime is not able to create any economic 
and political regional institutions such as European economic and political integration. 
Even though they have natural interdependency on essential issues such as transport 
and energy shortages, their economic and political relations could not offer 
constructive relationships in regional politics. As mentioned above, therefore, they 
become an outsider or third party player in mediation effort of conflict resolution in 
the regional conflict. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, Economic Cooperation 
Organisation (ECO) could not provide regional economic integration. The absence of 
a common political discourse restricted the potential economic power of the regional 
countries. Similarly, Developing Eight Islamic countries (D-8), Islamic Conference 
Organisation (ICO) have no institutional capacity in the nation state systems of 
regional states. The middle - power states' practice of international institutionalism 
allows only small-scale economic and political operations. Secondly, Iran's private 
sector has no capacity or professional experience to supply the demands of a new 
regional market. However, Turkey's private and state companies play an effective role 
in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey also established TIKA, as an 
international development office, to support cultural and economic activities of 
regional states. On the other hand, Iran's trade is limited to oil swaps with Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Turkey made strategic investment m the 
communications system between regional countries and also Turkey's state oil 
company, TPAO is one major partners of international oil consortium in the Caspian 
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Sea. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, despite the geographical advantages of Iran, its 
economic sector is very weak within Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
On the other hand, middle - power states do not wish to establish economic 
integration with one another. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, Turkey-Iran economic 
relations do not reflect the real potentials of neighbouring countries' economic 
capacity, because the ideological and regime differences play a significant role in 
economic relations. Therefore, Turkey-Iran trade accords and regular meetings of 
Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission allow only small -scale trade operations. 
The Turkey-Iran trade graphic reflects the oscillatory relations, which are not based 
on rational politics. Therefore, the realist school approach is not applicable for the unit 
level analyses of such country based studies. For instance, the Turkey-Iran trade 
volume increased during the Iran-Iraq war and after the American led-occupation of 
Iraq. However, Turkey and Iran have no success in tariff agreements on a customs 
union and tax exemption in bilateral trade. The uneasy relations in the transportation 
sector restrict the friendly relationship in economic interaction and also increase the 
unrecorded trade volume between two countries. Due to a lack of private sector 
regulations and experience in Iran, Turkey's trade with Iran demonstrates an 
enormous gap between export and import. For instance in Turkey-Iran's 80% oflran's 
foreign trade depends on natural resources, oil and gas. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, 
state control of the economy forced the cancellation of Turkish companies', Turkcell 
and TA V contracts. During the JDP government, Turkey and Iran agreed to make 
enormous investments; Turkey and Iran signed a €220 million Industrial agreement 
(Fars News Agency, 04 August 2008); Turkey also agreed to build three natural gas 
transformation power plants of 2,000 megawatt in Iran; Turkey will invest $3.5 bin 
Iran's South Pars gas field (Fars News Agency, 19 July 2007). Turkey refused U.S.'s 
request to scrutinise and suspend the activities of the Iran's Bank Mel/at in Turkey 
whilst Iran's major trade partners such as Germany and China suspended the activities 
of the Iranian bank. The metaphor of ups and downs in political relations, thus, is 
valid in Turko-Iran economic relations. Even though Iran is the owner of the second 
largest proven natural gas reserve and second largest oil producer in OPEC, Iran's 
non-oil export is only 20% into the international market. As middle - power states, 
Turkey and Iran are not certain to sign the strategically important South Pars gas field 
agreement. Turkey explained its strategic position for refusing to apply the ILSA, the 
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UNSC resolution and the US unilateral sanctions against Iran. In fact, a middle -
power state does not want economic and political isolation of its counterpart. The 
sovereignty of middle - power states is as important as their own sovereignty in 
regional politics. Turkey is not happy about its dependence on unreliable energy 
contracts with Iran. Therefore, diversification of energy sources is an essential 
security concern of this middle - power state. Because institutionalism of middle 
power states cannot establish the political and economic super - structure in 
international society. 
11.5. Responding the nuclear proliferation: middle - power self- reliance 
andforward strategy 
Iran was the heart of the western alliance and a friendly state to Israel in the Middle 
East during the initial Cold War period, therefore, the monarchical regime of Iran 
benefited from the technology of Eurodif(France), Coredifand the Stanford Research 
Institute to develop the nuclear ambition of the Iranian nation, because Iran is part of 
the Non-proliferation Treaty and had strong engagements with western institutions. 
Iran was acting a regional middle - power player with the support of sophisticated 
American armaments system. 
However, the Islamic revolution by Khomeini suspended the Shah's nuclear program 
and also terminated Iran's regional player role, because Iran had to deal with the 
counter revolution strategies of super power and regional powers' resistance. If 
middle - power state leadership focused on militarisation and security concerns, 
public sphere and political life would be militarised to increase the civil obedience 
and internal stability of states. However, the religious nationalists turned back to the 
strategic nuclear programme and started slow negotiations with Russia in 1989-1995-
2003. The dual containment policy of the United States, and the 9/11 trauma further 
isolated Iran from the international system and forced Tehran to develop domestic 
armament technology for the self-reliance strategy. Hence, the nuclear weaponisation 
programme of Iran was not only stimulated by internal dynamics but also 
demonstrated middle - powers' anger against the double standard politics of the 
international community. International organisation lost credibility for the Iranian 
public and state, especially due to the UN Security Council policy in the Iran-Iraq war. 
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Even though Iran signed the NPT in the 1970s, the revelation of Iran's clandestine 
nuclear programme in 2002 and 2003 created an enormous storm in international 
affairs. Iran upgraded the smuggled P-1 centrifuges initially acquired through the A.Q 
Khan network; IR-2 centrifuges are capable of operating at three times the speed of 
the P-1s (Ehteshami, 2008). The IAEA has found it impossible to certify that Iran's 
nuclear program is fully civilian, leaving the country open to criticism that it has a 
clandestine weapons programme. The UN Security Council demanded a complete halt 
to Iran's enrichment and heavy water related activities. However, Iran accused the 
IAEA and the UN Security Council of having double standards by comparing its 
programme to the Israeli nuclear arsenal (200 or more nuclear warheads). Iranian 
scientific achievements in the field of nuclear technology have become a symbol of 
national pride and the domestic political propaganda militarised political life in Iran 
since the neoconservative government seizure of power in August 2005. Iran will be 
fourth country that is not a party to the treaty that has conducted nuclear tests, namely 
India, Pakistan, and North Korea. However, Iran's weaponisation may have started 
proliferation elsewhere in the region such as Turkey and GCC countries. Turkey has 
been under NATO nuclear weapon hosting country program with the United States to 
deploy and store the 90 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Therefore, 
Turkey can be classified as a traditional middle - power state in hosting nuclear 
technology amongst the likes of Canada and Australia. However, Iranian and 
Pakistani and North Korean nuclear capability are considered a threat to the 
international community. As mentioned in Chapter Four, 439 nuclear power plants are 
under operation in 31 countries around the world. Iran's Busher nuclear station now 
relies entirely on Russian fuel supplies and technological support. 
On the other hand, only three states -- Russia, France and the United States -- deploy 
nuclear cruise missiles. China and Pakistan are also developing cruise missile --
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile -- range systems to increase their future nuclear 
capability. The Rumsfeld commission in 1998 stated that the Iranian threat was an 
exaggeration. He claimed that Iran now has the technical capability to deploy an 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - range ballistic missile, similar to the TD-2 (North 
Korean Taepodong-2 missile) within five years. However, Iran test - fired the Hoot 
Torpedo, and tested the new version of Shahab - 3 ballistic missile with a range of 
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only 1,250 miles (2, 000 km) and armed with a 1-ton conventional warhead on 9th 
July 2008 (Reuters, 1Oth July 2008). 
The events mentioned above demonstrate that middle power state technology depends 
on the core and also the absence of regulation on the regime of strategic weapons puts 
them in a critical position in international society. Having a nuclear deterrence of 
middle power also impedes the super - power containment policy against such state, 
Iran and North Korea. 
The position of Turkey on the nuclear crisis of Iran is different from the Hostage issue 
in 1980 and ILSA, because the nuclear armed Iran not only challenges Turkey's role 
in the region but also increases the nuclearisation of GCC countries in the Middle East. 
As a middle - power neighbour, Turkey tried to play a mediator role in protracted 
negotiations on Iran's nuclear issue, but middle- power states have no power to act as 
a mediator in transnational issues. Turkey does not follow aggressive policy against 
the nuclear programme of Islamic republic, because Ankara supports the peaceful 
nuclear technology of Iran. If Iran has nuclear capability, Turkey will easily develop 
its nuclear technology with western help. 
11.6. Testing the articulation of theoretical framework 
In order to introduce a new theoretical framework and certain amendments in 
hierarchy or definition of states as middle - power state, integrated approaches, as this 
one, need to modify the middle - power definition and also explain the nature of 
Turkey and Iran relations within such a modified version of middle - power states. 
This is due to the fact that both countries' character definition is differentiated from 
the traditional middle power states as discussed in the Chapter Two. This chapter had 
outlined three levels of analysis demonstrated that 'forward strategy' of Turkey and 
'negative balancing strategy' of Iran provides continuity in sovereignty and survival 
by finding 'niche spaces' in international society. This strategic culture in regard to 
security supports the client and self- reliance theory, which gains relative significance 
from the 'containment policy' of 'offshore balancer.' However, both countries' 
strategic interest does not allow supporting the 'preponderance strategy ' of United 
States. Therefore, both Iran's interference into Iraq and proxy engagement with Syria 
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and Lebanon in the War of Hezbollah and Israel in 2008 and Turkish parliament's 
rejection of March Memorandum had checked the balance of power 'preponderance 
strategy' in the Middle East. On the other hand, Russia - Georgian war in August 
checked the 'forward strategy' of Turkey in the Caucasus and Black Sea. Therefore, if 
one looks at the systemic level of analysis, the two middle -power states' behaviour 
will be explained within the realist perspective. Similarly, the negating strategy of 
middle - power state is based on the rational politics to gain leverage in the buffer 
zone. This strategy also formed the competitive detente relationship between two 
neighbouring countries. On the other hand, deconstruction of new identity and 
alternative regime theory may challenge the domestic politics of middle - power state. 
Therefore, the internal threat perception avoids the realist approach; rather employs 
the constructivist approach to agent society and agent - state relations. The 
containment strategy of two alternative regimes does not allow such rational politics 
in bilateral relations. However, they became the main core of the competitive detente 
relationship in Turkish and Iranian cases. On the other hand, the nuclear proliferation 
of Iran will challenge the balance of power containment and offshore balancing 
strategy and can be explained in a realist perspective. The regional super power can 
cause instability in the core and periphery. Such regional super powers might cause a 
war according to realist principles. Therefore, the holistic approach is a necessity of 
peaceful co-existence strategy of Turkey and Iran provides with the researcher to 
establish a rational model tested in the Chapters from Three to Ten, which is 
contextualised below. 
In modelling the relationship between the two countries, as articulated in Chapter Two, 
a number of variables and assumptions were adapted to provide the working 
mechanism of the modified middle-power state theoretical framework in the case of 
Turkey and Iran. These were formulated around three levels: (i) domestic and national 
level variables; (ii) systemic level variables, and (iii) regional level variables. The 
detailed description and contextualisation of these variables and assumptions can be 
found in Chapter Two (section: 2.5.1). Throughout the chapters, these variables and 
assumptions have been contextualised to illustrate the working mechanism of the 
proposed and modified theoretical framework. This discussion below, thus, provides 
further contextualisation for the working mechanism of the proposed model and 
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articulates the findings of the model within the framework of these variables and 
assumptions. 
According to Clausewitz's perceived power and statecraft principles, Turkey and Iran 
are classified as first order Middle-East middle power states while GCC countries and 
Syria are ranked in the second order. As an independent security complex in Levant, 
Israel was classified as upper secondary super regional power in the Middle East. In 
addition to this classification, the theory building chapter (Chapter Two) established 
the assumptions of this study by introducing the main independent and dependent 
variables to test the nature of Iran relations to find if they can be classified as middle-
power states. It should be noted that as analysed throughout this chapter, the 
relationship between these two most influential states in the region was identified as 
cordial and competitive or cooperative detente relationship. The state identity is 
considered as main architect of strategic culture for both the countries. 
The concept of Turco - Persian Islamic synthesis in Chapter Three and deconstruction 
of Turkish and Iranian nation state also presented the main ground of this 
experimental research. The pattern of these relations and the threat perception 
provided the independent variables in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. The discussion in 
these chapters demonstrates that the Islamic revolution in Iran and sub-group 
nationalism (Kurdish nationalism) acted as an independent player in the regional 
politics. The revolutionary export policy of Iran was also negated by the super power 
containment policy. Therefore, this research had taken up religious and ideological 
confrontation, Islamic terrorism and Kurdish nationalism so as to demonstrate how 
these domestic agents and transnational agent groups played a significant role in the 
measurement of the capacity building. On the other hand, the pattern of patron - client 
relationship and negative balancing strategy had presented independent variables in 
Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine. Moreover, interest conflict between super power 
and regional powers provided Turkish - Iranian cases with rational measurement of 
these independent variables. However, developments in energy and transportation 
presented an interdependence relationship, which was discussed as an independent 
variable in Chapter Ten. Therefore, the application of holistic approach in this study 
to every single event not only provided this research with experimental and testable 
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results but also helped to modify the certain definitions in middle - power state in 
international relations. 
The feature of middle power state had been defined and briefly discussed in Chapter 
Two: A middle - power state is a key actor in the region, it organizes regional 
polarity in its own sphere of influence, plays a role as a regional balancer, has the 
capacity to bargain with super powers and is able to resist to super-power 
intervention but it cannot establish coalition blocks and also not allowed to export its 
revolution or hegemonic influence into the region. This definition holds basic 
characteristics on Turkey and Iran relations. Hence, Chapter Two analysed Turkey 
and Iranian position and concluded that both country's policy behaviour present those 
five characteristics as middle - power states mentioned above: 
Feature (a) explained that middle power is a key player in regional politics. Chapter 
Two elaborated the feature of middle power which introduced the new intellectual 
norms in analyzing the Turko - Iranian competitive and cooperative detente 
relationship. Turkey's forward strategic role and Iran's negative balancing policy have 
also played effective role in the containment policy of US over years. Similarly, 
Turkey's zero problems with neighbour states and Iran's nuclear ambition challenges 
the preponderance policy of Washington by claiming its own deterrence in 
international politics. 
Feature (b) clarifies that equal level middle power states can organize the polarity 
system in the region; Turkey and Iran always become an alternative political, religious, 
ideological discourse in defining the middle power regional polarity. As a secularist -
Sunni state, Turkey is considered as an alternative secularist model against Iran's Shia 
Islamic revolution in their sphere of influence of history in the Middle East, Central 
Asia and the Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991. On the other 
hand, the Iran - Syrian alliance and Turkey - Israel alliance relationship reflect 
regional polarity of middle power states. Regional middle power always makes 
alliance with the less threatening one to negate her counterpart influence in the 
regional politics. 
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Feature (c) stresses that middle powers play a balancing role in the regional politics. 
This role is identified as either a negative balancer or forward defender in Turco -
Iran cases. For instance, Iran's regional role is based on self-reliance. However, 
Turkey's balancing act is relied on the patron - client relationship. However, 
geopolitical position provides an opportunity with bargain in the Mediterranean Sea 
and Black Sea. Similarly, Iran's geopolitics in the Persian Gulf and Asian security belt 
is the natural power ofTehran's government. 
Feature (d) emphasizes middle -power is absent from coalition - buildings; although 
middle power states have unique characteristic in regard to geopolitics, they are not 
able to establish a super economic and political structure in their domestic and 
regional politics. Because the agent structure in Turkish and Iranian society is 
different from the Anglo-Saxon middle power state. State is the agent of society in 
those countries. However, Middle Eastern states created own agent in the society. 
Therefore, both Turkey's secularist revolution and Iran's Islamic revolution could not 
have introduced a full-fledged revolution so as to establish such a type of super 
structure. 
The feature (e) explains that middle power states are capable to contain its 
counterpart's revolution in their sphere of influence. As we mentioned in Chapter 
Five, Turkey impeded the revolutionary export policy of Iran by using religious 
groups in the 1980s and 1990s. The super power also prevented such Third World 
revolutionary expansion by supporting the opposite regional power. For instance, the 
Iran - Iraq war explained that middle power's hegemonic ambition could not be 
tolerated by the super power. Similarly, if such military action threatens the super 
power interest in the regional politics, the use of force would lead to indispensable 
options such as the American led - invasion of Iraq. 
In concluding, the analysis, contextualisation and discussion throughout the chapters 
and particularly in this section is a clear indication that Turkey and Iran relationship 
should be considered as a middle-power state, as the discussion provides evidence for 
the working of variables and assumptions. It should, however, be stated that in order 
to enhance the explanatory power of the middle-state theory, the proposed 
modifications are essential. As the analysis and discussion evidences the modification 
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suggested and tested by this study proved to be a successful one, which have 
improved the robustness of the middle-power state theoretical framework. The 
findings of the contextualisation and articulation of the theoretical modelling made in 
this section to evidence the working mechanism of the modified theoretical model, 
namely modified middle-power state, is systematically presented in the following 
section 
11.7. Systematicising the findings for middle- power states in the case of Turkey 
and Iran 
The discussion in this thesis, and the above discussion in this chapter in 
contextualising the findings on the case of the Turkey-Iran relationship help us to 
make generalisations about the relationship between two middle - power. This 
generalisation, in a systematic manner, can be listed as follows: 
1) The common sphere of history and kinship relations creates the dual political and 
religious legitimacy, which are the main motives for competitive detente relationship 
between two equal level states. 
2) The public realm of two conflicting states resists improving the competitive and 
cooperative detente relationship between Turkey and Iran. Therefore, the competitive 
regional power would not able to export its revolution to others. 
3) Middle - power reformation drive is defined as bourgeoisie revolution; it is not 
socially constructed and has no communicative action with the agent groups. 
Therefore, middle - power states' regimes cannot produce a civil society due to 
having an undefined political geography, because it is too idealistic and based upon 
irrational principles. However, traditional middle - powers identify themselves 
culturally and geographically in a sphere of influence of the European political 
identity. 
4) Middle- power states employ the agent groups against revolution and terrorism to 
maintain its regime security. Hence, anarchical order in the internal politics provides a 
wider space for the leadership group to continue their legitimacy of power in society. 
Therefore, counter terrorism and counter revolutionary politics are essential for state-
agent relations in middle - power state politics. 
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5) The legitimacy of agent groups in society depends on their cooperation with 
leadership groups and regime survival. The agent groups only benefited from the 
opportunities provided by leadership groups. If an agent group became an internal 
threat, middle - power states' systems eliminated this agent group in society. 
Therefore, internal threats in domestic arena will be taken under the control by the 
middle - power states. 
6) Middle - power states employ agent groups to eliminate the opposition groups in 
internal politics. However, if the religious or ethnic groups militarise, the leadership 
and regime cannot control the internal threat, because it is now a transnational, 
external threat. Therefore, middle - power states are not able to control the 
transnational issue in the regional politics. 
7) Transnational issues of middle - power states invite foreign penetration into 
regional politics and reduce the influence of middle - power states, because middle -
power states have no capacity to solve transnational issues and no experience of 
humanitarian intervention. Therefore, middle - power states face intrusions of 
responsibility to protect in their own internal affairs by international community. 
8) Middle - power states have failed to make a social contract with different ethnic 
and religious groups in the nation states system. Therefore, middle - power states 
spend their power and efforts to stabilise their domestic affairs. 
9) Middle - power states cannot occupy a niche space in the region, but the influence 
of middle - power states is considered a major deterrent against super power 
penetration into region. 
1 0) Middle - power states are not able to create a regional system, or not able to 
establish a regional alliance with great power and medium sized states, middle -
power states prefer to form an alliance with less powerful states in the regional 
system. Middle - power-great power relations in regional politics mostly rely on the 
mutual suspicion and distrust relationship. 
11) Middle - power states can bargain with super power states, similarly small power 
states have the capacity to bargain with middle - power states. 
12) Middle - power states can resist military intervention of super power and great 
powers, however, small power have no capacity to deter regional expansion of great 
powers or super powers. Middle - power states can reject the super power demands of 
economic sanction. 
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13) Small power states do not engage in direct military conflict with their counterparts 
and have no capacity to solve their own internal transnational issues. 
14) The transnational ethnic nationalism invites foreign military intervention in small 
power states. Neither super power nor middle - power prefers any military conflict 
with the regional great power directly. 
15) Middle - power states can negate each other's influence in the region. If the 
regional middle - power state engages in a military conflict or competition, the result 
would be a zero sum gain in the regional politics. 
16) The sovereignty of middle - power states is essential for the national security of 
other states, because the presence of two middle - power states unite against an 
external threat, and creates a buffer zone. 
17) Middle - power states' institutionalism cannot establish a political or economic 
regime in international politics. Therefore, middle - powers' attempts to form a 
regional alliance are not considered a regional threat against the international system. 
18) Middle - power and super power interests will be in conflict in regional politics, 
but neither middle - power states nor super - powers wish to engage in combat. 
19) Unless nuclear capacity is surveyed by the international community or it serves 
the geopolitical interests of a super power, middle - power states are now allowed to 
have nuclear technology. 
20) Middle - power states have no capacity to act as a mediator in a regional conflict. 
Therefore, the influence of middle - power states is restricted by their own capabilities. 
21) Patronage and clientele structure in society prevent the collective behaviour of 
agents in society. Therefore, the leadership of middle - power states is the principal 
beneficiary in the short-term, but their politics impede the establishment of 
superstructure as a model for the international community in the long-term. 
11.8. The scope for further research 
This study has provided a theoretical, transnational and geopolitical account of 
Turkey and Iran in the regional politics in addition to the role of middle - power states 
in international politics. There is scope for further research on domestic politics in 
particular how patronage and clientele relationships characterize "divide et impera" 
politics to prevent the collective clientalism of agents in domestic politics. Patronage 
has its own morality and pride ( Gellner and Water bury, 1977), therefore, further study 
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will explore the preconditions and consequences of the middle - power state's 
bureaucratic decision making process. Secondly, the case of Iran's nuclear ambition 
will be classified as a transnational issue for future research. Thirdly, the absence of 
super economic and political superstructure requires further research to be examined 
in international politics. 
11.9. Epilogue 
The research in this study has fulfilled its aim by successfully testing the proposed 
and modified theoretical framework, which now efficiently explains the relationship 
of the two middle - power states; Turkey and Iran. 
As the theoretical framework of this study, the contextualisation, and the articulation 
of it presented with event analysis throughout the chapters indicate that Turkey-Iran 
relations have demonstrated how to manage a peaceful co-existence in one of the 
unstable regions of the world. The research argues that a long tradition of Turkish-
Iranian bureaucratic politics have been successfully conducted to detente and cordial 
relationship since 1639. The holistic approaches to micro-level events analyses 
signified that competitive detente and cooperative detente rely upon the experience of 
assertive pragmatism and self-help capability to maintain the peaceful co-existence as 
a sovereign state in the international society. 
In response to ethnic and ideological conflict, Turkey and Iran cannot be either 
classified failed states or hegemonic powers in their sphere of influence despite their 
military campaign into Northern Iraq, because the international structure and 
hegemonic nature of international politics does not allow such state take over of any 
buffer zone. On the one hand, the super power (in this case the USA) needs to co-exist 
with such stable forward forcer client and negative balancer for the sake of its 
offshore balancing strategy. Therefore, as buffer middle power states, Turkey and 
Iran, in their roles of forward forcer and negative balancer, prevent the general war in 
international society. Consequently, this research argued and proved that Iran and 
Turkey have all such types of multi - balancing and multi - directional capacities due 
to being middle - power states, which the balance of power cannot neglect nor can it 
isolate them from the international system. 
465 
In concluding, it should be acknowledged that modified version of the middle power 
state theoretical framework with the identified variables and assumptions is an 
efficient and robust theoretical framework to best explain the relationship between 
Turkey and Iran throughout the history and in contemporary times. 
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